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Henri de Lubac, S.J. (1896-1991) led one of the most important developments within 
twentieth-century Catholic theology, the movement known as the nouvelle théologie. De 
Lubac’s signature move was to return to early church sources to renew contemporary 
theology. This dissertation explores de Lubac's recovery of patristic eschatology for the 
contemporary age. While certainly responding to secularization, de Lubac also sought to 
respond to the “messianic” and apocalyptic shape of modern religious experience and 
political ideology. He argued that the source of secular messianisms was a dictotomy 
within Christianity between mysticism and the apocalyptic. The nouvelle théologie 
movement of the 1940s—from the wartime underground journal Cahiers du Témoignage 
chrétien (The Christian Witness Journals) to the post-war controversy over Christianity 
and communism—witnesses to the clash of differing eschatologies at the heart of 
twentieth-century Catholicism. De Lubac’s response—his recovery of a patristic 
exegetical hermeneutics—must therefore be examined with an eschatological lens. De 
Lubac borrowed from Origen to recover an eschatology that synthesizes a transcendent-
oriented mysticism with a future-oriented hope. De Lubac then showed how two 
historical developments—Pseudo-Dionysian spirituality and Joachimite history—
diverged from the traditional patristic eschatology. Dionysian mysticism ejected the 
historical, while Joachimism’s apocalyptic theology of history evacuated authentic 
transcendence. Both lost a dynamic tension inherent in patristic thought. De Lubac 
argued that the dichotomy between the invisibilia Dei and the futura lay at the origins of 
rationalistic and apocalyptic ideologies in the twentieth century. In the end, this study 
argues, de Lubac creatively appropriated patristic “anagogy” and made eschatology the 
fundamental structure for his sacramental thinking, his understanding of the church, his 
Christology, and his mysticism. The dissertation shows that de Lubac’s “anagogical” 
imagination effected a rapprochement between eschatological impulses within the 
twentieth century and responded to the needs of a divided Catholicism.
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1INTRODUCTION
Henri de Lubac's writings on the history of exegesis (especially Exégèse 
médiévale  and La Posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore) have been enigmatic for 
historians and theologians alike. The four volumes of Exégèse médiévale (1959-1964) 
cataloged a patristic and medieval biblical hermeneutic of spiritual interpretation that had 
long been superseded within Protestant exegesis and arguably within Roman Catholic 
biblical circles as well.1 “Spiritual interpretation” was a method of finding spiritual 
meanings beyond the letter of the text. However, at a time when Catholicism was 
rediscovering the depths of the biblical texts with the help of historical and critical 
interpretive methods, spiritual interpretation appeared to be a step backward. If intended 
as an argument for a particular exegetical hermeneutic, Exégèse médiévale was never 
seriously received by biblicists.2 Historians of Christian exegesis did not know what to do 
with Exégèse médiévale. It appeared to overlook the irreducible pluralism of patristic and 
medieval exegesis, over-distilling this pluralism into the “fourfold sense of scripture.” 
De Lubac's La Posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore (2 vols.) (1979-1981) 
posed a similar difficulty. Analyzing the exegesis of the medieval apocalyptic theologian 
1 I use the French title Exégèse médiévale rather than the English Medieval Exegesis to refer to the entire 
four-volume work because volume four of Exégèse médiévale has not yet been translated into English. 
In what follows I depend upon the English translation of volumes one to three and the French version of 
volume four. For the sake of consistency, I refer to the untranslated volume in the French (Book 2, Part 
2) as Exégèse médiévale 4.
2 David M. Williams states, “His effect on biblical exegetes, especially those outside France, was at best 
negligible.” Williams points to several concerns raised by de Lubac’s work for exegetes, above all, 
“doubts regarding the depth and reality of his commitment to the role of history in biblical 
interpretation.” David M. Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith (Washington, DC: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2004), 170.
2Joachim de Fiore, de Lubac traced “Joachimite” thought from the medieval period to the 
contemporary. He employed several criteria for identifying “Joachimite” thinkers: their 
use of a Trinitarian schema to divide history, the expectation of a new age of the Spirit, 
and an apocalyptic view of the future age to come. The initial reviewers of La Posterité 
spirituelle differed significantly in their assessments, generally depending upon whether 
they were historians, theologians, or philosophers.3 Again, historians primarily objected 
to the wide net in which de Lubac ensnared theologians, philosophers, political and social 
theorists, tyrants, and poets. Among those treated as Joachim’s “spiritual posterity” were 
G. E. Lessing, Friedrich Schleiermacher, G. W. F. Hegel, Hughes Felicité Robert de 
Lamennais, Adolf Hitler, Jürgen Moltmann, and de Lubac’s former student, Michel de 
Certeau. To characterize all of them as Joachimite appeares unjustifiable in purely 
historical terms and somewhat rash.4
Recent scholarship, however, makes sense of de Lubac’s studies on the history of 
exegesis by placing them in the context of his theological commitments, and not only his 
exegetical or historical ones. Kevin L. Hughes, in a recent assessment of Exégèse 
médiévale, explains that de Lubac attempts to recover a theological mentality rather than 
3 James Pambrun, a systematic theologian, interpreted de Lubac's books on Joachim as an extension of de 
Lubac’s fundamental theology. James R. Pambrun, “La Posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore, vol. 1-
2,” Église et théologie 16, no. 2 (May 1985): 256–60. Marjorie Reeves, a medieval historian, gave a 
positive review, but found fault with the criteria for determining who is counted as Joachim’s “spiritual 
posterity.” Marjorie Reeves, “La Posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore, V 1: De Joachim à 
Schelling,” Theological Studies 32, no. 1 (April 1981): 287–94.  See also William Kluback, “La 
Posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore, Vol. 2: De Saint-Simon à nos jours,” International Journal for  
Philosophy of Religion 15, no. 3 (1984): 192–95.
4 Natalie Zemon Davis, for example, objects to de Lubac’s criticism of de Certeau’s Joachimism. Natalie 
Zemon Davis, “The Quest of Michel de Certeau,” New York Review of Books, May 15, 2008.
3a method.5 Exégèse médiévale analyzed the history of spiritual interpretation (also called 
spiritual understanding and spiritual exegesis), the practice of reading beyond the letter of 
scripture to its depth-dimension. It was believed, for much of the Christian tradition, that 
the scriptures have spiritual meanings beyond the literal. The fourfold division of the 
meanings of scripture—historical, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical—exemplified 
the development of this spiritual sense within the exegetical tradition. Beyond the literal 
reference of scriptures, the events spoken of in scripture signify future and spiritual 
realities. Spiritual exegesis embodied a theological understanding of historical events in 
light of their spiritual depth or purpose. According to Hughes, de Lubac intended to 
discern a common mentality underlying patristic and medieval exegetical practices rather 
than to identify a common method of exegesis, which in patristic and medieval thought 
consisted of a dizzying pluralism. While de Lubac admitted that the exegetical methods 
of the patristic and medieval periods could not be revivified, he argued that something of 
the spirit of their interpretation should be recovered for the contemporary age.
Hughes’s insight may also be applied to La Posterité spirituelle. Exégèse 
médiévale treats the historical influence of Joachim of Fiore's exegesis on an exegetical 
tradition of the literal interpretation of the book of Revelation. La Posterité spirituelle 
takes up aspects neglected, though alluded to, within Exégèse médiévale. It proposed to 
reveal a trajectory inspired by Joachim de Fiore, but not limited to his direct influence or 
5 Kevin L. Hughes indicates the problem of reading Exégèse médiévale as a purely historical work, rather 
than as a theological one. He suggests that de Lubac's intention is to outline a theological “mentality” 
within the tradition. Kevin L. Hughes, “The ‘Fourfold Sense:’ De Lubac, Blondel and Contemporary 
Theology,” The Heythrop Journal 42, no. 4 (2001): 451–462.
4to purely theological expressions of his thought. La Posterité spirituelle examines a 
“spiritual line with numerous ramifications, that of the thinkers or men of action (whether 
or not quoting him as their authority but all more or less betraying his dream) tend, like 
him, to conceive of a third age, an age of the Spirit, succeeding that of Christ of which 
the Church was the guardian.”6 “Spiritual posterity” signified a lineage sharing the same 
spirit. In addition, “spiritual posterity” refers to those who expected a new age of the 
Spirit that would occur within this world and history. The spiritual posterity of Joachim 
consists of those who inherited a certain apocalyptic worldview from Joachim. De 
Lubac's research into Joachim de Fiore investigated a mentality with roots in the practice 
of spiritual exegesis but in many ways opposed to it.
Both books share a common argument but develop it in different ways. Both aim 
at discovering a broader worldview or mentality underlying exegetical practices. While 
Exégèse médiévale outlined a mentality that de Lubac wished to recover from the 
patristic and medieval periods, La Posterité spirituelle traced an apocalyptic sense of 
history underlying dangerous political movements and social philosophies that posed a 
present threat. As I will argue, de Lubac privileged the mentality characterizing patristic 
exegetical practices and embodied in the patristic-medieval “fourfold sense of scripture” 
because he discovered within it an authentically Christian understanding of history. 
According to de Lubac, the ressourcement of a patristic-medieval understanding 
6 Henri de Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that 
Occasioned His Writings (San Francisco: Communio Books, 1993), 156. Originally published as Henri 
de Lubac, Mémoire sur l’occasion de mes écrits, Chrétiens aujourd’hui 1 (Namur: Culture et vérité, 
1989).
5of history could respond to a modern historical consciousness while affirming the 
Christian doctrinal tradition. It served to affirm the reality of God's intervention in 
history, the eternal significance of the present, and a Christian understanding of history's 
end. It suggested a future fulfillment of God's promises without succumbing to utopias.
The meaning of history and eschatology is a theme found throughout Henri de 
Lubac's writings and is a central theme within his thought. Through his understanding of 
history and its fulfillment, de Lubac attempted to respond to some of the most significant 
controversies affecting French Catholics and French Catholic theology of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, de Lubac's theology of history and eschatology form the lens through 
which he developed his understanding of sacramentality, his ecclesiology, his 
Christology, and his reflections on mysticism. 
In what follows, I first outline the obstacles to any reductionistic interpretation of 
de Lubac's corpus. Second, I examine proposals for understanding the theological unity 
of de Lubac's work from Hans Urs von Balthasar, Susan K. Wood, Aidan Nichols, Brian 
Daley, and Hans Boersma. Third, I indicate the unifying role of history and eschatology 
within de Lubac's work.
I. Difficulties for the Interpretation of de Lubac's Corpus
Many of de Lubac’s writings were historical studies with systematic theological 
intent. They ranged across early church history, medieval history, ecclesiology, the 
engagement with modern atheistic thought, renaissance studies, and literary criticism. 
6These studies, however, were far from disengaged narration of the past. De Lubac’s 
initial academic appointment was as a professor of apologetics at the Institut catholique 
de Lyon. His article, “Apologétique et théologie” (1930) was a provocative reconception 
of the relationship between philosophy and theology, and faith and reason.7 His 
controversial work on nature, grace, and the supernatural arose through historical 
research on the genesis of the idea of pure nature in Scholastic thought. His first book, 
Catholicism (1938), suggested new directions for Catholic ecclesiology through a 
narration of patristic thought.8 His book Corpus Mysticum (1944) sought a recovery of an 
ancient notion of church and sacrament for the present day.9
While de Lubac's works exhibit an engagement with the problems of his day, 
these works are notoriously difficult to reduce to clear systematic positions. Establishing 
the coherence among his various writings remains a problem. De Lubac even 
characterized his writings as occasional, the choice of topics determined by situations 
imposed upon him rather than by some preconceived plan.10 He likened the development 
of some of his writings to a disorderly evolution or autogenesis. In an interview with 
Angelo Scola, he admitted that Exégèse médiévale grew “in a rather vague order, without 
any preconceived plan, and with enormous lacunae.”11
7 Henri de Lubac, “Apologétique et théologie,” Nouvelle Revue théologique 57 (1930): 361–378.
8 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1988). Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogma, Unam 
Sanctam 3 (Paris: Cerf, 1938).
9 Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, trans. Gemma 
Simmonds, C.J., Faith in Reason (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). Originally 
published as Henri de Lubac, Corpus mysticum: l’eucharistie et l’Église au Moyen âge. Étude 
historique, Théologie 3 (Paris: Aubier, 1944).
10 De Lubac, At the Service of the Church, 369.
11 Henri de Lubac, De Lubac: A Theologian Speaks (Los Angeles: Twin Circle, 1985), 32.
7In addition, de Lubac's work is characterized by an idiosyncratic theological 
method, a characteristic also shared by the nouvelle théologie as a whole. The nouveaux 
théologiens generally resisted the neo-Scholastic monopoly on theological method in 
favor of theological pluralism. In general, they resisted the ahistorical methods of neo-
Scholasticism in favor of methods attentive to historicity. These theologians were forced 
to improvise, drawing resources from the patristic and medieval periods and from the 
wider Christian tradition. The break with neo-Scholasticism left a vacuum difficult to fill. 
The apparent clarity of method and sources within neo-Scholasticism, which gave it the 
appearance of a “science,” is lacking within the nouvelle théologie. Marie-Dominique 
Chenu, Jean Daniélou, Yves Congar, and Henri de Lubac were attentive to historical 
development and methods of interpreting historical sources. Before Vatican II in 
particular, the implications of their shifts in theological methodology were uncertain. The 
problem of coherence within de Lubac's work touches upon the problem of the coherence 
within the nouvelle théologie movement during a time of radical upheaval in theological 
method.12
12 A growing body of literature attempts to interpret the nouvelle théologie as a theological movement. See 
Jürgen Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie – New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor to 
Vatican II (New York: T & T Clark, 2010); Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental 
Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); A. N. Williams, 
“The Future of the Past: The Contemporary Significance of the Nouvelle Théologie,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 7, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 347–61; Brian Daley, “The Nouvelle 
Théologie and the Patristic Revival: Sources, Symbols and the Science of Theology,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 7, no. 4 (October 2005): 362–382; Étienne Fouilloux, “‘Nouvelle 
Théologie’ et Théologie Nouvelle (1930-1960),” in L’histoire religieuse en France et en Espagne: 
Colloque international, Casa de Velázquez, 2-5 avril 2001: Actes, ed. Benoît Pellistrandi, vol. 87, 
Collection de la Casa de Velázquez (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004), 411–425; Agnès Desmazières, 
“La nouvelle théologie, prémisse d’une théologie herméneutique? La controverse sur l’analogie de la 
vérité (1946-1949),” Revue Thomiste 104, no. 1/2 (2004): 241–272; Aidan Nichols, OP, “Thomism and 
the Nouvelle Théologie,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 1–19.
8Even in comparison with other nouveaux théologiens, de Lubac exhibited a 
particular allergy to theological systematization and methodological foundations.13 
Scholars have noted that his writing often avoids speaking in his own voice, but rather 
expresses his own opinions through the explication of the theology of others. Hans Urs 
von Balthasar explained that de Lubac wanted the voice of the ancient church to have a 
clear expression within his writings.14 John Milbank, on the other hand, suggests that de 
Lubac's writings took on an increasingly historical and third-person form after 1950, 
when he was removed from teaching and his writings were under suspicion. Milbank 
develops the theory that de Lubac hid his authentic but heterodox theological opinions 
under the cover of historical studies.15 Whatever the underlying cause may be, his third-
person voice combined with the sheer diversity of his corpus resists the easy discovery of 
a unifying method or systematic consideration guiding his work. 
A final obstacle to describing a theological unity within de Lubac's work is its 
incompleteness. In his autobiographical reflection, At the Service of the Church, he 
admitted that the idea at the center of his thought, a projected book on Christ and 
mysticism, could never be completed:
I truly believe that for a rather long time the idea for my book on Mysticism has been my 
inspiration in everything. I form my judgments on the basis of it, it provides me with the 
13 David Williams declares that “a less systematic systematician is difficult to imagine.” Receiving the 
Bible in Faith, 132.
14 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac: An Overview (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
Communio Books, 1991), 26–7.
15 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 8. I fail to find any evidence for esoterism in de 
Lubac's work.
9means to classify my ideas in proportion to it. But I will not write this book. It is in all ways 
beyond my physical, intellectual, and spiritual strength.16
This admission reflects de Lubac's appropriation of the notion of paradox—that 
conceptual formulation always falls short of theological truth—and is consistent with his 
tendencies away from theological system.17 The heart of his theology remains 
unexpressed; the center remains empty. The incompleteness of de Lubac's work stands as 
a caveat against oversystematic interpretations of his thought. At the same time, it 
proposes something positive about his theological vision: authentic transcendence 
requires that complete synthesis occur only beyond the present horizon. The 
incompleteness of his work testifies to its eschatological character and its apophatic tone.
II. Discovering an “Organic Unity”
Despite obstacles, several authors have helpfully recognized a coherence among 
the diversity of de Lubac's various projects. There are signs of a consistent theological 
vision that permeates de Lubac’s diverse historical and systematic works.18
16 De Lubac, At the Service of the Church, 113.
17  It is more than coincidence that his inability to express the center of his own thought reflects his 
theological anthropology in which the human being, as the Image of God, can only acquire self-
knowledge in light of the transcendent mystery. He writes, “[w]e shall understand more and more as we 
experience it, and as we see better and better that we do not yet understand it, and never shall 
understand it, what this astounding thing, the discovery of God, means—for it will never cease to 
astonish us.” Henri de Lubac, The Discovery of God, trans. Alexander Dru (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans, 1996), 166. Originally published as Sur les chemins de Dieu (Paris: Aubier, 1956).
18 Rudolf Voderholzer writes, “Henri de Lubac left no masterpiece of systematic theology, no 
comprehensive summa of his thought. His work is both many-faceted and versatile. His writings do not 
carry out a long, preconceived plan.” Rudolf Voderholzer, Meet Henri De Lubac, trans. Michael J. 
Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 107. Instead of speaking of his “systematic theology,” 
Voderholzer refers to his “synthetic thinking” and “synoptic presentation.”  Ibid., 108–9. Susan K. 
Wood speaks of an “organic unity.” Susan K. Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in the Theology 
of Henri de Lubac (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), 129. Similarly, Balthasar referred 
to an “organic unity” amidst a “multiplicity of themes.” Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac, 10.
10
A. Hans Urs von Balthasar: Natural Desire for the Supernatural
 Hans Urs von Balthasar's The Theology of Henri de Lubac (1991) places the 
organic center of de Lubac’s thought in his understanding of the creature's natural desire 
for God:
De Lubac is not the only great author who understood and experienced all his completed 
works as an approximation to an ever-unattained center. This form gives the reader a chance 
of seeing how seemingly disparate elements converge upon a center and thus of grasping 
them in their secret intention. In the case of de Lubac…an objective fundamental insight 
corresponds to the subjective admission quoted above, namely,  the role of an undeniably 
positive dynamism in the knowing and willing of the creature that tends through all finite 
intraworldly reality, but also, through all the negations of a 'negative theology' toward a goal 
that cannot be reached 'from below' but is nevertheless necessary. Here we have reached the 
center of de Lubac's principal problem.19
Balthasar's brief book offers an overview of de Lubac's major writings and themes, which 
are systematically connected with the hub of natural desire of the creature for God. 
Balthasar connects the natural desire to three theological areas: fundamental theology, the 
theology of salvation history, and cosmology-eschatology.20 He explains that the “same 
fundamental structure [occurs] in the three areas of inquiry.” Balthasar asks how the 
created order (or the First Testament) can be directed interiorly to its fulfillment in grace 
(or in Christ), “without in the least possessing this latter in anticipation, that is, without 
being able to claim it for [itself].”21 Adding that each theological theme cannot be reduced 
to another, he contends that all shares a common “structural principle of the divine 
19  Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac, 12. The title of the German original is more suggestive of 
unity within diverse themes: Henri de Lubac: Sein organisches Lebenswerk (Henri de Lubac: His 
Organic Life's Work) (1976). The conclusion of The Theology of Henri de Lubac was taken from Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, Le cardinal Henri de Lubac, l’homme et son oeuvre, Chrétiens aujourd’hui 
(Brussels: Culture et Vérité, 1983).
20 Balthasar, The Theology of Henri de Lubac, 62.
21 Ibid., 61.
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plan.”22 He further notes that, in Exégèse médiévale, “the theory of the senses of Scripture 
is not a curiosity of the history of theology but an instrument for seeking out the most 
profound articulations of salvation history.” De Lubac wished to illuminate the structure 
of this divine plan rather than the minutiae of exegetical technique.23
B. Susan K. Wood: Sacrament and History
Susan K. Wood extends Balthasar's argument.24 Like Balthasar, she argues that 
Exégèse médiévale is not primarily about exegesis, but instead concerns a theology of 
history. She shows that the pattern of salvation history is the basic structure that informs 
de Lubac's ecclesiology and Eucharistic theology. Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in 
the Theology of Henri de Lubac traces the theological connection between de Lubac's 
Corpus Mysticum and Exégèse médiévale. Wood demonstrates the parallel between the 
senses of scripture (literal, allegorical, anagogical), the multiple meanings of the “Body 
of Christ” (historical, sacramental, ecclesial), and multiple significations of liturgical 
practice (memorial, presence, anticipation). De Lubac’s theology of scripture, sacraments, 
and church constitutes expressions of an underlying theology of history in which Christ 
fulfills what came before him and anticipates the fullness of the kingdom. For Wood, the 
theology of history forms a structure permeating de Lubac's writings on ecclesiology, 
22 Ibid., 63.
23 Ibid., 76.
24 Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church; Susan K. Wood, “The Nature-Grace Problematic within 
Henri de Lubac’s Christological Paradox,” Communio 19, no. 3 (1992): 389–403; Susan K. Wood, “The 
Church as the Social Embodiment of Grace in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac” (Ph.D. diss., 
Marquette University, 1986).
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scripture, and sacraments. This theology of history functions as a basic method that unites 
various aspects of de Lubac’s thought.
C. Aidan Nichols: Unite in Order to Distinguish
Aidan Nichols recently observed that despite the diverse array of writings 
produced by de Lubac, “unity” remains an underlying theme. 
Unity, however, is an obvious preoccupation throughout—unity of God with man in Le 
Drame  [The Drama of  Atheist  Humanism],  of  human beings with each other in  and 
through God in  Catholicisme,  the unity of nature and grace in  Surnaturel  and its later 
refinements,  the  unity  of  Scripture  in  Exégèse  médiévale,  the  Eucharistic  unity  of  the 
Church in  Corpus mysticum,  her  mystic  and social  unity in  his  other  ecclesiological 
writings,  the unity of  philosophy and theology in  Pic de  la  Mirandole,  the  unity of 
salvation history in his critique of Joachimism. 25 
Moreover, de Lubac appealed to the “unity” of the diverse “witnesses” of the Christian 
tradition living by the light of the same Spirit. According to Nichols, de Lubac's work 
appealed to the unity within a living Christian theological tradition to correct divisions 
that inserted themselves into modern life and theology.
In the place of the Thomistic axiom “distinguish in order to unite,” de Lubac 
“preferred the more gnomic—paradoxical?—formula unir pour distinguir.”26 Nichols 
explains that although de Lubac's emphasis on unity could partially be “temperamental,” 
it is congruent with the incomplete center of his theology, which always eluded him. 
Nichols proposes that the visio Dei was for de Lubac the mystical center toward which 
converged the diverse unities within his writings. 
In the perspective thus outlined, his total oeuvre may be said to represent Hans Urs von 




Balthasar’s “missing” transcendental, for Balthasar’s trilogy should really have been a 
tetralogy, with the same analogical imagination set to work on  unum, the one, as was 
shown with  pulchrum, the beautiful, in the theological aesthetics,  bonum, the good, in 
the theological dramatics, and verum, the true, in the theological logic.27
In Nichols's view, de Lubac's aspiration for unity always escapes formulation, the various 
elements remaining in tension. Yet, to avoid distortion, it is necessary first to understand 
philosophy and theology, faith and reason, God and humanity, and salvation history as 
united.
D. Brian Daley: Spiritual Interpretation in the nouvelle théologie
A number of recent studies have examined the unity of the nouvelle théologie as a 
whole movement from historical and systematic perspectives.28 Daley's “The Nouvelle 
Théologie and the Patristic Revival” argues that the nouvelle théologie’s recovery of 
patristic and medieval exegetical practices—namely, the figural or spiritual interpretation 
of scripture—was central to its shift away from both neo-Scholastic ecclesiology and 
theological methodology. 
The ecclesiology of neo-Scholasticism and the manualist tradition emphasized the 
church as institution and its authority in order to defend the church from Protestant critics 
and attacks from secular governments. According to Daley, beginning in the 1930s and 
1940s, there was a considerable shift in Catholic ecclesiology, in part due to the patristic 
27 Ibid.
28 Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray, eds., Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-
Century Catholic Theology (Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Mettepenningen, 
Nouvelle Theologie - New Theology; Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology; Hans 
Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac,” 
New Blackfriars 88, no. 1015 (2007): 242–273; Daley, “The Nouvelle Théologie and the Patristic 
Revival.”
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revival. The nouvelle théologie rediscovered, from Gregory of Nyssa and Origen, the 
sacramental dimensions of the church as a sign pointing beyond itself to the 
eschatological kingdom.
Moreover, modern neo-Scholasticism conceived theology as a deductive “science” 
along Aristotelian lines, moving from the data of revelation to more universal and general 
conclusions. The neo-Scholastics of the twentieth century looked upon medieval 
Scholasticism as the high-point of a theological evolution whereby theology finally took 
a “scientific” form. Surveying the nouvelle théologie, Daley remarks that its authors 
departed from the deductive methodology of neo-Scholasticism, instead placing an 
emphasis on subjectivity, personal faith, and history. Their ressourcement of the exiled 
voices from the Latin and Greek patristic tradition suggested a shift in theological 
methodology. While many of the nouveaux théologiens did not question the idea of 
theology as “science,” they did recognize that “theological truth was always radically 
bound up in the historical limits of human language and culture, because God has 
revealed himself in the events and words of human history.”29
Daley concludes that the patristic revival in the nouvelle théologie allowed for a 
broadening of theological methodology and a revival of a sacramental mentality:
the  nouvelle théologie  was really about the rediscovery of sacramental modes of thought, 
through  renewed  contact  with  Christian  authors  who  thought  and  read  scripture  in 
sacramental as well as literal terms.…Figural exegesis, in its way of reading all history as 
really speaking of Christ, was the heart of the nouvelle théologie, the greatest lesson it had 
learned from reading the Fathers.30
Daley’s suggestion that the recovery of spiritual exegesis was central to the nouvelle 
29 Daley, “The Nouvelle Théologie and the Patristic Revival,” 381.
30 Ibid., 382.
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théologie is most evident in the work of Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou. The 
scriptural inspiration of the nouvelle théologie also explains its growing appeal to 
Protestant theologians as a resource for theology and ecumenism.31
E. Hans Boersma: Sacramental Ontology
Following Daley, Hans Boersma interprets the nouvelle théologie through the lens 
of its recovery of sacramental modes of thought. He theorizes that the nouvelle théologie 
recovered a metaphysics—possessed by neither Roman Catholic Modernism nor neo-
Scholasticism—which functioned as a common systematic method. He labels it 
“sacramental ontology.” 32 In an earlier article, Boersma identifies “sacramental ontology” 
as the systematic link between the theology of nature and the supernatural and the 
theology of the church in de Lubac's thought.33 He states that sacramental ontology 
concerns the “sacramental character of all created existence,” which character informs de 
Lubac's reflections on both ecclesiology and the nature-supernatural relationship.34 His 
recent book, Nouvelle théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery, 
expands these ideas in an effort to identify the internal coherence within the nouvelle 
31 See Bryan C. Hollon, Everything Is Sacred: Spiritual Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri de 
Lubac (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009); Bryan C. Hollon, “Ontology, Exegesis, and Culture in the 
Thought of Henri de Lubac” (Ph.D. diss., Baylor University, 2006).
32 Boersma borrows the term “sacramental ontology” from Dennis Doyle, who writes that de Lubac's 
doctrine of the supernatural “provides an ontology that allows for speaking of knowledge of God in an 
historical and critical framework,” which assumes that the historical nature of God's revelation does not 
occlude knowledge of God, but is a means to knowledge of God's self. Dennis M. Doyle, “Henri de 
Lubac and the Roots of Communion Ecclesiology,” Theological Studies 60, no. 2 (1999): 209–227.
33 Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology,” 243.
34 Ibid., 224. He adds that this sacramental ontology contributes to de Lubac's understanding of scripture 
and non-Christian religions. Ibid., 244, note 5.
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théologie as a whole.35 The heart of the nouvelle théologie is an account of created, 
sensible realities as signs, anticipations, and mediations of divine realities. 
Boersma suggests that de Lubac’s sacramental ontology is characterized by a 
vertical sacramentalism, which he believes is inspired by neo-Platonism. While other 
theologians of the nouvelle théologie emphasized the divine condescension—Christ 
becoming human and emptying himself—de Lubac's sacramental ontology focused on 
the created ascent: “[drawing] on the Greek Church Fathers and the Neoplatonic tradition 
[he] emphasized the sacramental link in its upward direction: nature pointed upward to 
the supernatural and made it present.”36 For Boersma, the most important implication of 
de Lubac's theology of the supernatural is that God is made present through historical 
realities. Created realities become signs that mediate God's presence.
Boersma's observation that the key to de Lubac's theology is its sacramental 
ontology is a significant contribution. He illumines a critical element in de Lubac's 
thought, namely the “sacramental” relationship between historical, visible realities and 
the mystical depths of those realities. De Lubac’s sacramentalism indicates a correlation 
between his understanding of history and the capacity of created realities to symbolize 
and mediate divine realities. However, Boersma may suggest a too-prominent place for 
neo-Platonist ontology within de Lubac’s work, thereby understating the role of his 
theology of history.
35 While Boersma admits that the theologians associated with the Nouvelle Théologie did not constitute a 
homogeneous theological school, he contends that their approach to diverse theological problems—
including the interpretation of scripture, the theology of history, the development of doctrine, nature and 
grace, and ecclesiology—evinced an underlying sacramental view of reality.
36 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 88. I disagree with Boersma's characterization 
of de Lubac as Neoplatonist, but will take this up in detail in Chapter 2.
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F. Conclusions
Though emphasizing distinct aspects, Balthasar, Wood, Nichols, Daley, and 
Boersma indicate that the historical economy of salvation plays a significant role in the 
theological coherence of de Lubac's work. Nichols's suggests “unity” as the inspiration 
that suffuses de Lubac's writings. I believe that Nichols's insight is substantially correct. 
A reader of de Lubac will discover a sensibility and yearning for unity in his writings, 
especially in Catholicism. It is not entirely clear how “unity” functions in de Lubac's 
theological method or in the content of his writings. In other words, while it is clearly 
elemental to de Lubac's deepest sensibilities, “unity” remains somewhat vague. With the 
other commentators, Nichols explains that the notion of a unified economy of salvation is 
important for de Lubac's engagement with the history of medieval thought. Daley, 
moreover, believes rightly that the engagement with history is central to the methodology 
of the nouvelle théologie as a whole. Balthasar and, to a greater extent, Wood emphasize 
the historical economy of salvation as a structure that de Lubac analogously applied to 
fundamental theology, sacraments, and the church. Boersma too recognizes history as 
central to de Lubac's work, emphasizing history as the sacramental sign that makes 
present divine realities.
The various emphases of these authors are complementary to an extent. They 
suggest a certain theological coherence in de Lubac's exploration of the theological 
meaning of history in his various writings. I take up this direction in chapter two, where I 
indicate that de Lubac, through his recovery of Origen and patristic theology, intended to 
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develop a theological understanding of history. Specifically, de Lubac was concerned to 
articulate the relationship between history and its fulfillment, drawing his inspiration 
from the spiritual interpretation of scripture in the patristic and medieval period. 
III. Toward an Eschatological Unity
While de Lubac's work should not be interpreted in an overly systematic or 
foundational manner, it is possible to see an “organic unity” among numerous “centers” 
of his thought. De Lubac's various theological interventions—his understanding of 
sacramentality, his Christology and ecclesiology, his understanding of mysticism and of 
nature and grace—evince a common pattern or structure organized around the 
relationship between history and its fulfillment:
1. Jesus Christ in his historical reality is the “sacrament of salvation,” that is, the means 
to the totus Christus (the whole Christ), which reaches its perfection at the end of time.
2. The present communion of the church is a sacramental anticipation of the 
eschatological communion of all humanity. 
3. Mysticism—even in non-Christian forms—is an anticipation of the consummation of 
the Mystery, which is both present to us and something to come.
4. The natural desire for the supernatural, while not already supernatural in ontology, is 
an anticipation of a future communion. 
Although de Lubac never elaborated a systematic eschatology that would coordinate the 
various aspects of his thinking, there appears to be an eschatological vision or pattern 
upon which de Lubac depended. In what follows, I argue that de Lubac's eschatology, 
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which arose as a response to diverse streams of Christian eschatology in modernity, 
shapes his various theological interventions.
The first chapter of the dissertation examines the resurgence of an eschatological 
consciousness within Catholicism and within the wider cultural sphere during the late 
nineteenth century and twentieth centuries. I elaborate the historical context of de Lubac's 
theology of history in the eschatological turn within Catholicism in the twentieth century 
and particularly in the “theology of history” debate, arising during the Second World War. 
I argue that the debate between Henri-Marie Féret, Gaston Fessard, Joseph Huby, and 
Jean Daniélou concerning the “theology of history” was an attempt to evaluate the 
eschatological impulses of French and European culture in light of the Christian faith. 
These debates also had significance for the struggle against fascism and as a response to 
the eschatological tendencies of an emerging French communism. One of the questions 
that emerged from these debates deals particularly with the interpretation of the Book of 
Revelation and in what sense it speaks of future realities.
The second chapter treats de Lubac's retrieval of a patristic theology of history 
manifested in the “spiritual sense” of scripture. Origen is the dominant figure for de 
Lubac because Origen's spiritual interpretation of scripture constitutes a theological 
understanding of history—that is, an understanding of the relationship between the Old 
Testament, the New Testament, and eschatological fulfillment. Origen's biblical exegesis, 
in which the letter of scripture hides “spiritual realities,” reflects a Christian belief that 
the surface of history hides what de Lubac calls an “ontological fecundity.” In the 
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allegorical sense, the figures of the Old Testament signify not “transhistorical realities” 
(as in Greek allegorization) but the concretely historical reality of Christ. For Origen, 
history is not just phenomena but interconnected “events” of God's intervention into 
history. The inner orientation of the events of the Old Testament to the New becomes a 
paradigm for the inner yearning of all history for its eschatological destiny. As the source 
for the tradition of Christian allegorization, Origen transmitted an implicit understanding 
of history to his exegetical progeny.
Chapter Three treats de Lubac's understanding of the last spiritual sense of 
scripture, anagogy. According to de Lubac, Origen's anagogy concerns both the 
consummation of creation and the ascent of the mind to the transcendent. Again in 
anagogy, the biblical hermeneutic reflects an implicit understanding of history. For de 
Lubac, it is key that anagogy unites futura and the invisibilia. The practice of spiritual 
interpretation reflected a Christian belief that the events of history were part of a great 
development toward a future fulfillment. He explains that the anagogical sense 
“designates also 'something else,' the very reality of which (not merely the manifestation 
of it) is to come.”37 Anagogy, therefore, is a contemplation of a reality that is not only 
“above” or “always present,” but the anticipation of a future consummation. Yet, we 
contemplate that future through the present. By recovering Origen, de Lubac attempted to 
recover an understanding of history that loses neither transcendence nor the reality of 
history, but binds sacramentally history to its eschatological goal. 
De Lubac believed that modern eschatology, especially in secular and political 
37 De Lubac, Catholicism, 172.
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forms, traces its roots to a dissolution of a patristic-medieval understanding of anagogy.  
During the patristic period anagogy is “heavenly” and “future” (the invisibilia and the 
futura.) In the twelfth century, a dissociation between “heavenly” and “future” emerged; 
this division engendered two principal eschatological impulses that are Pseudo-Dionysian 
and Joachimite in form. The former engendered a mysticism that viewed the historical 
figures and realities of the Bible as figures for the unthematizable transcendent. This 
impulse threatened to disregard the historical character of Christianity and see history as 
a myth. This Joachimite impulse was radically historical insofar as it projected a form of 
fulfillment into a historically future age, an age just around the corner. De Lubac believed 
that Joachim was the source for a host of secular and political eschatologies of the 
modern age. Both the Pseudo-Dionysian and Joachimite forms tended to undermine the 
reality and efficaciousness of Christ's actions in the economy of salvation. 
My fourth and final chapter argues that de Lubac's eschatological synthesis—
which maintains a tension between invisible and future—structures his understanding of 
the sacramentality of historical revelation, of Christ, of the church, and of mysticism. For 
de Lubac, an authentically Christian eschatology unites the “vertical” dimensions of 
Pseudo-Dionysius with the “horizontal” dimensions of Joachim. The sacraments of the 
eschaton both make the eschatological present in our everyday reality and conduct the 
church to that reality. I argue that, while de Lubac does not present a systematic 
eschatology, his account of the sacraments, Christ, the church, and mysticism unite a 
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future eschatolgy with a realized eschatology in an attempt to bridge divergent strands of 
thinking in Catholic modernity.
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CHAPTER ONE: TIME AND ETERNITY IN LA NOUVELLE THÉOLOGIE
I. Eschatology as the “Storm Center”
This chapter narrates the rise of an eschatological consciousness within twentieth-
century Catholic theology. While Catholic theology of an earlier period produced 
systematic eschatologies in the form of treatises on the last things—death, judgment, 
heaven, and hell—twentieth-century Catholic theology more explicitly articulated a 
consciousness of this present time as preceding and anticipating the end. By the early 
twentieth century, an eschatological renewal within Christian theology was already afoot, 
in part due to the influence of the rediscovery of the eschatological message of the 
Gospels by biblical scholars.1 Soon, as Hans Urs von Balthasar claimed, these 
eschatological themes spread everywhere:
Eschatology is the storm center of our times.  It  is the source of several squalls  that 
threaten  all  the  theological  fields,  and  makes  them  fruitful,  beating  down  or 
reinvigorating their various growths. Troeltsch's dictum, “The bureau of eschatology is 
usually closed,” was true enough of the liberalism of the nineteenth century, but since the 
turn of the century the office has been working overtime.2
This eschatological renewal in the twentieth century was the outgrowth of an intensifying 
historical consciousness within Christian theology in the nineteenth. It also, as I will 
argue here, was in concert with a growing eschatological awareness outside of strictly 
theological or strictly Christian circles. In many respects, the themes treated by Christian 
1 Particularly, the work of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer was a catalyst for rethinking the 
eschatological content of the Gospels.
2 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Explorations in Theology: The Word Made Flesh, trans. A. V. Littledale and 
Alexander Dru, vol. 1 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 255.
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theologians intersected with a broader European eschatological imaginary and a broader 
feeling of living at the end of history.
There are reasons to believe that this eschatological storm was not solely a 
response to the traumatizing experience of World Wars I and II, as significant as these 
events were. It was being worked out and anticipated in cultural, ecclesial, literary, and 
political arenas before it reached European Christian theology. A significant apocalyptic 
consciousness is manifest within Catholic magisterial documents of the nineteenth 
century and within the antimodernist movement in advance of the eschatological renewal 
in theology.
If “eschatology was the storm center,” as Balthasar puts it, the nouvelle théologie 
became the eye of the storm in Roman Catholicism from the 1930s to the 1950s. Many of 
the theological conflicts suppressed during the Catholic Modernist Crisis (1902-1907) 
reemerged in the nouvelle théologie: the historically embedded nature of Christian 
dogma, the epistemological status of concepts, the role of apologetics, and the nature of 
divine revelation. The papal promulgation of documents like Pascendi dominici gregis 
(1907) and Lamentabili sane exitu (1907) had the intention of suppressing Catholic 
Modernism and of supporting a homogeneous program of Catholic education grounded in 
the neo-Thomist revival. With the suppression of Catholic Modernism, however, similar 
conflicts reemerged at the center of Thomism itself.
My contention is that Roman Catholic culture and theology in the nineteenth to 
twentieth centuries reflected a broader struggle within European modernity to grapple 
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with the meaning of history and to re-imagine the relationship between time and eternity. 
Specifically, neo-Scholasticism and Catholic antimodernism not only suffered from an 
allergy to history but also contributed to an intense consciousness of history. 
Catholicism's response to modernity depended upon a “metanarrative” of the 
contemporary age as a culmination of decadence and of the present as the last age. 
Ironically, Catholicism combined an eternalism with a thoroughly modern and 
apocalyptic sensibility concerning the present age. This is the soil in which the nouvelle 
théologie grew and also to which it responded. The challenge to relate the changing and 
unchanging, time and eternity, and the historical and the eschaton figured prominently 
within the nouvelle théologie. In particular, these themes emerged following the First 
World War and during and after the Second World War in the debates over the theology 
of history. 
In what follows, I first describe the emergence of eschatological and apocalyptic 
thinking in nonecclesial settings in the fin de siècle. Second, I narrate the “return” of 
eschatology to the center of twentieth-century Catholicism. Third, I examine the World 
War II debate over the theology of history in the nouvelle théologie—specifically the 
work of Henri-Marie Féret, Joseph Huby, Gaston Fessard, and Jean Daniélou—as a 
struggle over the interpretation of time and eternity. 
II.  Temporality and an Eschatological Modernity
The re-emergence of eschatological thinking in twentieth-century Europe took a 
variety of forms. According to Joseph Ratzinger, the rediscovery of the eschatological 
26
character of Jesus's preaching in the work of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer 
impacted biblical studies but had little immediate impact on systematic theology: “As far 
as systematic theology was concerned, they had not the faintest idea of what do do with 
their discovery.”3 However, as Ratzinger explains, Karl Barth's 1919 Commentary on the 
Letter to the Romans initiated a revolution. Barth stated: “A Christianity that is not 
wholly eschatology and nothing but eschatology has absolutely nothing to do with 
Christ.”4 
Barth's radical break with liberal Protestantism and his eschatological turn is often 
associated with a disillusionment with modern ideologies of progress triggered by the 
experience of the World War I. The war indeed acted as a ferment for a theological 
reawakening to eschatology. Yet, this reawakening also occurred in the midst of a period 
of re-evaluation of the meaning of time and eternity beginning in the nineteenth century. 
From around the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, a broad crisis of 
adequately representing temporality and the eternal was unfolding within scientific, 
literary, economic, philosophical, and artistic spheres:
The structure of history, the uninterrupted forward movement of clocks, the procession 
of days, seasons, years, and simple common sense tells us that time is irreversible and 
moves  forward  at  a  steady  rate.  Yet  these  features  of  traditional  time  were  also 
challenged as artists and intellectuals envisioned times that reversed themselves, moved 
at irregular rhythms, and even came to a dead stop. In the fin de siècle, time's arrow did 
not always fly straight and true.5
No single theoretical model accounts for all the different shifts in temporal representation 
3 Ratzinger, Joseph, Eschatology, Death and Eternal Life, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1988), 47.
4 Karl Barth, Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1933), 314.
5 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1983), 28.
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and eschatological consciousness during the period. It suffices, for my purposes, to 
indicate that the confusion over the meaning of time and its end existing within European 
modernity had an affect on Roman Catholicism's representation of time and eternity. 
A. Representing Time in a Changing World
According to David Harvey, prior to the mid-nineteenth century, an 
Enlightenment sense of space and time was dominant among the bourgeoisie. This 
Enlightenment sense emphasized the rational, objective, quantifiable, and universal 
characteristics of time and space.6 For example, the production of maps increasingly 
represented the earth in those aspects necessary for navigation and commerce, evacuating 
space of the “sensuous” qualities developed in medieval cartography: “Maps, stripped of 
all elements of fantasy and religious belief, as well as any sign of the experiences 
involved in their production, had become abstract and strictly functional systems for the 
factual ordering of phenomena in space.” The Enlightenment gave a “totalizing” sense of 
space insofar as the whole world could be conceived as existing in a “single spatial 
frame.”7 
The Enlightenment conception and production of time was similarly totalizing in 
its prioritization of the neutral, objective, quantifiable, and infinite qualities of time. The 
chronometer provided a fixed division for time's flow, allowing its exact measurement 
and, significantly, its conception as a linear progress. Newton's Principia envisioned 
6 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1989), 245.
7 Ibid., 249–50.
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space as a kind of envelope or container for materially extended things, and time was a 
receptacle for change. Absolute time is mathematical in its qualities and extends into the 
past and future infinitely. Although Newtonian space and time had its challengers in 
Leibniz and Kant, they left undisturbed the emphasis on the universal, neutral, and 
quantifiable temporal qualities.  
The conception of temporality of the Enlightenment project was not seriously 
challenged until the mid-nineteenth century, with the genesis of literary, artistic, and 
cultural phenomena known as “modernism.” Technological development is significant to 
the story of modernism because new technologies reordered how Westerners experienced 
their world and how they experienced time. In brief, the increasing speed of 
communication and transportation during the nineteenth to twentieth centuries led to a 
shrinking world. As a result, heterogeneous local practices of measuring time—often 
governed by agricultural, local commercial, liturgical-religious, and seasonal cycles—
were put in conflict. The development of the telegraph and the expansion of railways 
joined different local times together, exposing their differences. Kern notes that travelers 
on a cross-continental journey by railroad in 1870 would pass through over two hundred 
different local times. In 1870, there were over eighty time zones used by the railroads in 
the United States.8 The confusion between different systems had a detrimental effect on 
the efficiency of railroads and, in 1883, a uniform system of measuring time for the 
railroads was created. In the following year, the Prime Meridian Conference organized 
the twenty-four time zones. The increased speed of communication and transportation led 
8 Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 12.
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to various systematic orderings of time across space, joining previously separated peoples 
and economies. This was a vast but chaotic reorganization and creation of “public time,” 
the uniform and measurable progression of moments to which local times would have to 
conform.
According to Harvey, modernism as a “cultural force” formed under the “crisis of 
representation…derived from a radical readjustment in the sense of time and space in 
economic, political, and cultural life.”9 The interconnectedness of the international 
economy, the increased speed of commerce, the unification of monetary systems, and the 
development of new communication technologies were elements of “space-time 
compression.” 
Enlightenment thought operated within the confines of a rather mechanical “Newtonian” 
vision of the universe, in which the presumed absolutes of homogeneous time and space 
formed  limiting  containers  to  thought  and  action.  The  breakdown in  these  absolute  
conceptions under the stress of time-space compression was the central story in the birth 
of nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms of modernism.10 
Thus, “time-space compression” brought the tensions between public time and private 
time, the universal and the particular, the international and the local into the foreground.
The awareness of new configurations of space and time played out in art and 
literature, notably in the writings of James Joyce, Gustave Flaubert, and Charles 
Baudelaire. Joyce and Flaubert expressed the “simultaneity” of modern life, in which 
actions and events in different places paralleled and affected one another. Just as different 
places were being absorbed under a single economy, these authors tried to represent the 
relationship between heterogeneous “times.” Closely related to “simultaneity” is the 
9 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 260.
10 Ibid., 252.
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feeling that modern life is riddled by constant change, insecurity, and ephemerality. 
Baudelaire's attempt to reconcile “the transient, the fleeting, the contingent” with “the 
eternal and the immutable” is characteristic of the “aesthetic thrust of modernism” as a 
whole “to strive for this sense of eternity in the midst of flux.”11 
The attempt to reconcile time and eternity in literary modernism is consonant with 
the work of French philosopher Henri Bergson. For Bergson, the discrete units of 
mathematical or clock time fail to capture the dynamic flow of reality, life as a dynamic 
energy, and of the experience of durée (duration). According to Bergson, consciousness is 
a stream rather than a “conglomeration of separate faculties or ideas.”12  He distinguished 
between a relative knowledge of reality through the symbols or language that ultimately 
distort it, by breaking it up into various pieces, and the absolute knowledge of reality 
through a form of intuition. In his conception of durée, he appealed to a mystical 
experience of time and of reality beyond our power to represent. In a sense, Bergson's 
temporal mysticism was an attempt to reconcile the sense of eternity with an evolutionary 
view of a constantly changing world.13 
The technological advancements that were the cause of economic and cultural 
unification impacted the representation of time and eternity in literature and philosophy. 
11 Ibid., 10, 206.
12 Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 24.
13 Bergson is known to have had a keen antipathy toward clocks. As Kern notes, Bergson's appeal to the 
experience of temporality and his emphasis on intuition is consonant with Charles Péguy, who 
“explained the spiritual death of Christianity by its mindless repetition of fixed ideas: layers of habit 
stifle the dynamic energies of true faith.” Ibid., 26. Bergson's lectures inspired Christian thinkers like 
Pierre Rousselot, Jacques Maritain, and Gabriel Marcel.
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Additionally, modern life also forced the rethinking of the relationships between past, 
present, and future.
B. Representing the Future
Just as the meaning of time was being rethought, fin-de-siècle Europe witnessed 
the contested meaning of the future in the form of challenges to Enlightenment notions of 
uniformity and progress. Increasingly, eschatological and apocalyptic understandings of 
time took center stage in cultural, literary, and political arenas. These new conceptions of 
time and history depicted qualitatively different times and caesuras between eras. They 
announced ruptures between the past and present, and between the present and future, 
and represented this age as the beginning of the end. The apocalyptic sentiment of living 
just before the end was a wide-ranging cultural expression of this contested “future.” A 
version of this sentiment is manifested in the Futurist Movement's admiration of 
technology, speed, and violence that usher in a new world. The Futurist infatuation with a 
new humanity or posthumanity united to technology spilled over into politics; many 
Futurists became fascists.14 
The awareness of the near future was not always the expectation of a glorious 
future era. In some cases, it was an expectation of a decline. The theory of the heat death 
of the universe, embodied in the second law of thermodynamics, exercised an influence 
over popular imagination, particularly in the French Decadent Movement of the late-
nineteenth century. The entropy of all available energy in the universe—no matter how 
14 See Günter Berghaus, Futurism and Politics: Between Anarchist Rebellion and Fascist Reaction, 1909-
1944 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996).
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far in the future it would occur—symbolized a feeling of the late nineteenth century of 
being on the verge of the end. David Weir states, “Whether the late nineteenth century 
was actually a period of decadence is open to debate; but it clearly was perceived as such, 
as a time when all was over, or almost over: not the end, but the ending.”15 H. G. Wells's 
Time Machine foretold a catastrophic future in which humanity would degenerate, 
“overpowered by the forces of nature and society, leading to…an ultimate extinction of 
the species.”16 The protagonist first arrives in a posthuman future and then takes his time 
machine far into the future to witness a barren planet tumbling through space. Oswald 
Spengler's The Decline of the West echoed the theme of the degeneration of society. 
According to Spengler, the modern world is uniquely obsessed with time and the future; 
moderns measure the meaning of the present by its projected end.17 
In fields of art, politics, and history, a dominant trope was emerging. Whether the 
coming era was perceived as the dawn of a new era of history, or the initial winding down 
of a tired universe, at the fin de siècle the present age was seen to be one of transition to a 
new era. Furthermore, to imagine the future was to represent the telos of the present. 
While the fin de siècle representations of the present moment ranged from intoxicated 
enthusiasm to despair, they interpreted the present time in terms of its telos and 
represented the modern age as just before the end. In the next section, I indicate that fin-
15 David Weir, Decadence and the Making of Modernism (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1996), 17.
16 Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 91.
17 Spengler stated, “The theory of Entropy signifies today [the] world's end as completion of an inwardly 
necessary evolution.”  Ibid., 105. 
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de-siècle Catholicism shared in this representation of the modern age as “just before the 
end.”
III. A Return of Eschatology in Nineteenth- to Twentieth-Century 
Catholicism
The challenge to Christian theology of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries was to 
confront and appropriate a new historical consciousness arising within various fields 
adjunct to theology and within European culture generally. Historical consciousness is a 
multifaceted and ambiguous term that often refers to an awareness that we are historically 
located, that our experience of the world is affected by historical circumstance, and that 
the categories of our thinking are affected by our historical experience.18 As I will argue 
below, it is true that neo-Scholasticism, the theological school of thought promoted by the 
Catholic magisterium at the end of the nineteenth century, lacked this historical 
consciousness. In fact, it was purposefully organized against it in the attempt to protect 
18 Lawrence F. Barmann describes historical consciousness by distinguishing between “thinking about 
history” from “thinking with history.” Thinking about history is the attempt to recover the past by 
analyzing evidence available to the historian. Thinking with history is the perception of ourselves within 
the stream of history: “In this mode one perceives the past as a process in which we ourselves are 
located consciously and culturally that is what I would mean by “historical consciousness.” And it is 
this sense that forces one to acknowledge the relativity of all finite reality, i.e., of all that ordinarily 
impinges on our human consciousness, because it is always and necessarily in flux, moving, unstable, 
incomplete, partial.” Lawrence F. Barmann, “Defining Historical Consciousness” (Paper presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Denver, November 2001), 2. Historical 
consciousness, for Barmann, implies that human knowledge is not a “view from nowhere,” but rather is 
somehow tied to its particular and localized conditions. 
In a 1966 lecture, Bernard F. Lonergan made a similar observation when he distinguished 
between a “classicist world-view” and “historical-mindedness” as “differences in horizon, in total 
mentality.” Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-
Mindedness,” in A Second Collection (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 2. The classicist 
worldview takes the unchanging as the starting point for rational inquiry whereas historical mindedness 
takes the changing world of experience as its starting point: “One may work methodically from the 
abstract and universal towards the more concrete and particular” or “begin from people as they are” 
concretely.” Ibid., 3.  
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eternity from the wages of time. However, the neo-Scholastic school and the anti-
Modernist Roman Catholic culture arising during the same period promulgated a keen 
consciousness of history, an awareness of human beings as historical agents, and an 
apocalyptic or cataclysmic view of the modern world.19
A. Eternalism in Catholic Anti-Modernism and Neo-Scholasticism
The common narrative concerning Catholic theology—in its neo-Scholastic and 
anti-Modernist forms—from the middle of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth is 
that it lacked historical consciousness.20 First, it was reluctant to accept the results of 
historical research, or the relative independence of historical investigation from theology. 
This was a resistance to questions of the historical accuracy of the Scriptures and a 
resistance to recognizing the difference between the content of the Bible and that of later 
Christian doctrine. Second, there was the opposition to the idea of historical development 
or evolution, especially when it appeared to challenge the “unchanging” nature of truth.21  
19 Neo-Scholasticism refers to a theological movement that arose in the middle of the nineteenth century 
as a recovery of medieval theology. Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris (1879) endorsed the theology of Thomas 
Aquinas as the primary intellectual vehicle for a Catholic response to the challenges to Christian belief 
in the modern world. Based on Aeterni Patris, theological schools employed neo-Scholastic thought for 
the intellectual formation of priests. 
Neo-Scholasticism is historically related to what Joseph Komonchak calls the “construction” 
of Roman Catholicism, a distinct subculture or sociological form that Catholicism took as a response to 
modernity. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Modernity and the Construction of Roman Catholicism,” 
Christianesimo Nella Storia 18, no. 2 (1997): 353–385. A resistance to the “modern world” was 
characteristic of this subculture. Generally, “anti-Modernist” refers to those authors and their writings 
who suppressed the Modernists, those considered overly sympathetic toward modern philosophy, 
critical methods, political philosophy, and culture during the early twentieth century and particularly 
during the Modernist Crisis (1903-1907). In what follows, I use the term “anti-Modernist” quite broadly 
to refer to the negative assessment of modernity in Roman Catholicism, which often functioned as the 
background narrative to neo-Scholasticism.
20 See Gerald McCool, Nineteenth Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), 9–11; T. M. Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology, 
1800-1970 (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist Newman Press, 1970), 35–36. 
21 The Scholastic systems were more prepared to respond to the attacks on revealed religion by the 
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Scholasticism's model of scientific knowledge prioritized unchanging essences over 
changing events. History and particularity did not fit well within this model.
Anti-Modernist arguments against the Modernists and the later neo-Scholastic 
grievances against the nouvelle théologie almost always returned to the same theme: the 
loss of a notion of truth as unchanging. Pope Pius X's Lamentabili sane exitu (1907) 
condemned a host of errors attributed to Modernist Catholics, which were perceived as 
undermining the authority of the “teaching church” and orthodox doctrine. Among the 
theses proscribed: “53. The organic constitution of the Church is not immutable”; “58. 
Truth is no more immutable than man himself, since it evolved with him, in him, and 
through him”; “64. Scientific progress demands that the concepts of Christian doctrine 
concerning God, creation, revelation, the person of the Incarnate Word, and redemption 
be re-adjusted.” The follow-up encyclical, Pascendi Dominici gregis (1907), targeted a 
Kantianism in which human minds cannot rise beyond “phenomena.” Thus, God cannot 
be known by the light of “natural reason.” Pascendi goes on to say that the Modernist 
presumes that the “representations of the object of faith are merely symbolical” since the 
rationalists than they were to face the challenge of historical research into the continuity of Christian 
dogma with the Bible. The idea of development, change or evolution within doctrine and theological 
systems, found in the theology of John Henry Cardinal Newman just years before, was met with 
anathema by Pascendi and Lamentabili. Indeed, Newman was considered suspect by many anti-
Modernists. It is not that the neo-Scholastics rejected all development of doctrine. Rather, Newman's 
organic model of doctrinal or theological development was rejected in favor of a theory of logical 
development. Theological development—such as the doctrine of the hypostatic union—results from the 
application of metaphysics to biblical propositions, resulting in a syllogism. Historical research into 
scripture threatened not only the truthfulness of certain revealed propositions found in scripture, but 
also the model of conceiving doctrine. Thus, the work of biblicists like Marie-Joseph Lagrange was 
alarming because it assumed a relative independence of historical research from theology. Although 
neo-Scholasticism in the nineteenth century appears to be “classicist” due to its rejection of 
development and resistance to historicity, it also had much in common with the empirical turn within 
the sciences and history in the nineteenth century. T. M. Schoof states that during the mid-19th century, 
there is a philosophical and cultural shift away from German idealists and toward the trust in empirical 
data, from synthetic methods toward analytic. Schoof, A Survey of Catholic Theology, 33.
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mind must construct these representations from the phenomenal and changing world. In 
sum, the anti-Modernist preoccupation was with preserving the constancy of Christian 
doctrine.
Nearly forty years later, the neo-Scholastic attacks on the nouvelle théologie 
returned to the same issue.22 Marie-Michelle Labourdette's 1946 article, “Théologie et ses 
sources,” raised questions over the series Théologie and Sources Chrétiennes for their 
recovery of the thought of the patristic period. While he did not object to the recovery of 
patristic theology, he suspected that the authors and editors of these series lacked a 
respect for theological truth in its “scientific state” embodied in the neo-Scholastic 
system. The implication of the recovery of an earlier theology in these series implied a 
historical relativism—that truth did not remain the same for each time period—and an 
“experiential relativism” in which the object of faith is an expression of an inner 
experience that might differ from person to person or from age to age.23 
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, called the monstre sacré (the sacred monster) of 
22 The condemnations against the Modernists and the end of the Modernist Crisis, generally traced to 
1907, ended discussion on a range of philosophical, exegetical, and eccesiological debates. It did not, 
however, “resolve” those debates by any means, but instead shifted the loci of these conversations to the 
safety of the Papally-endorsed Thomistic thought. Jean Daniélou suggested that the solutions of the 
Modernists were insufficient, but the questions that they asked were valid. Their condemnation only 
prolonged the crisis. Jean Danielou, “Les orientations presentes de la pensee religieuse,” Études, no. 
249 (1946): 5–21. The same debates were continued within Thomistic and scholastic categories and 
through the interpretation of St. Thomas. By stifling “modern” thought and expelling it to the periphery 
or outside of the Catholic Church, and by dismantling pluralism though the enforcement of scholastic or 
Thomistic theology, this same pluralism re-emerged within Thomism itself, and not even a generation 
later. See Gerald McCool, From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1992). Walter Cardinal Kasper's assessment that “the outstanding event in 
the Catholic theology of our century is the surmounting of neo-scholasticism” is valid. However, those 
theologians who most successfully surmounted it considered themselves as part of its tradition. Walter 
Kasper in Fergus Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial 
Mysticism (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), vii.
23 Aidan Nichols, OP, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 3–4.
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Thomism, led the neo-Scholastic denouncement of what was called the “new theology.”24 
In his article “La nouvelle théologie où va-t-elle?” (“The New Theology. Where Is It 
Going?”), Garrigou-Lagrange dropped what Aidan Nichols called the “A-Bomb” of the 
nouvelle théologie controversy. Henri Bouillard had written in Conversion et grâce chez 
S. Thomas d'Aquin (1944) that “a theology that would not be contemporary [actuelle] 
would be a false theology.”25 Garrigou-Lagrange asked the question, “How can 'an 
immutable truth' be held if the two notions that are united by the verb to be [the subject 
and the predicate] are essentially changing?”26 He claimed that, promulgating a form of 
historical relativism, the nouvelle théologie was headed straight toward Modernism. For 
Labourdette as for Garrigou-Lagrange, the first line of defense against Modernism was a 
Thomistic metaphysics and epistemology that enabled a secure possession of unchanging 
truth against the backdrop of an ever-changing world.
These examples from Labourdette and Garrigou-Lagrange are fragmentary do not 
provide a complete picture of the neo-Scholastic movement but it is sufficient to state that 
both neo-Scholasticism and anti-Modernism betrayed a desperate anxiety to preserve a 
metaphysics of unchanging truth and displayed a correlate allergy to historicity. The neo-
Scholastics very clearly foresaw a contemporary challenge to Catholicism under the form 
of historicity and attempted desperately to hold on to truth as eternal, unchanging, and 
24 Richard Peddicord, O.P., The Sacred Monster of Thomism: An Introduction to the Life and Legacy of 
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004).
25 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., “La nouvelle théologie où va-t-elle?,” Angelicum 23 (1946): 127.
26 Ibid., 127; See Agnès Desmazières, “La nouvelle théologie, prémisse d’une théologie herméneutique? 
La controverse sur l’analogie de la vérité (1946-1949),” Revue Thomiste 104, no. 1/2 (2004): 241–272. 
Garrigou-Lagrange's preoccupation with the “unchanging” is illustrated in his unyielding opposition to 
Henri Bergson, the philosopher of process.
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readily available to human reason. Their apologetics, epistemology, metaphysics, and 
dogmatics depended upon a profound dichotomization between historical reality and 
eternal truth. However, they mistakenly attributed to the writings of the Modernists and 
of the nouvelle théologie a form of relativism rather than a search for a responsible way 
out of it. 
In another sense, the “eternalism” and “essentialism” of the neo-Scholastic system 
depended upon a vibrant consciousness of history and of its contingency. In the next 
section, I argue that this consciousness of history developed within neo-Scholasticism 
and anti-Modernist Catholicism under the form of an apocalyptic interpretation of the 
modern age.
B. The Consciousness of History: The Return of the Apocalyptic within 
Roman Catholicism
I have already indicated that a strong resistance to historicity marked Roman 
Catholic culture. The counterpoint to this ahistorical viewpoint was an intense historical 
consciousness on another level. Specifically, neo-Scholasticism and anti-Modernism 
betrayed a cognizance of the contemporary age as one of decadence. Roman Catholicism 
was driven by a profound consciousness of the difference between the modern and 
medieval ages in that this age emerged from a fracturing of the medieval synthesis 
between faith and reason, and church and state. It was a form of consciousness of the 
emerging place of the church in modernity, and a consciousness of the self as an agent 
that can affect this history. This awareness reflected a profound anxiety over the church's 
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place in modernity that manifested itself as what Emile Poulat calls a “cataclysmic 
eschatology.”
Within nineteenth-century Roman Catholicism, “secularization,” both as a 
sociological process and as a seizure of church property, was given an apocalyptic 
interpretation. Even earlier, as Jean Séguy notes, there was an apocalyptic stream in 
French and Italian Catholicism before, during, and after the French Revolution.27 As 
Joseph Komonchak indicates, the French Revolution
was seen as a decisive battle, perhaps the final one, in the great warfare between God 
and Satan.  The three great heroes of the Restoration, de Bonald, Lamennais,  and de 
Maistre,  bequeathed to subsequent generations an interpretation of  the Revolution as 
Satanic in root and branch.28 
According to Cardinal Manning, secularization's “various features represented the great 
apostasy which must shortly precede the appearance of the Antichrist.”29 In the Italian 
annexation of the Papal States in 1870, Catholics witnessed the loss of the “ideal” 
relationship between religious and civil society—that is, a unity of throne and altar. The 
political struggle was interpreted as the struggle for the soul of society. This 
“catastrophic” eschatology became a dominant stream in Catholicism's self-interpretation 
within the nineteenth century and was employed by papal encyclicals. 
A certain narrative about the modern age formed the backdrop to the rise of neo-
Scholasticism. Three Jesuits particularly helped link an interpretation of history with the 
27 Jean Séguy, “Sur L’apocalyptique Catholique,” Archives De Sciences Sociales Des Religions, no. 41 
(1976): 165–172. Émile Poulat states: “This Catholic catastrophism that seems to surprise us today... 
dominates the whole of the nineteenth century and maintained its vigor for a long time.... In its way, the 
Catholic nineteenth century manifested an acute consciousness of the Reign of God….The religious 
climate of the time is of a 'tragic ultramontanism.'” Émile Poulat, L’Église, c’est un monde: 
L’ecclésiosphère, Sciences humaines et religions (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986), 255.
28 Komonchak, “Modernity and the Construction of Roman Catholicism,” 359–60.
29 Ibid., 358.
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neo-Scholastic system: Giovanni Perrone, Matteo Liberatore, and Joseph Kleutgen. 
Giovanni Perrone (1794-1876), one of the founders of neo-Scholasticism, promulgated 
the idea that the recovery of Aquinas can overcome the division between faith and reason 
characteristic of the modern age. Matteo Liberatore (1810-1892), who co-founded and 
edited the popular journal La Civiltà Cattolica, connected the political problem to the 
theological one. For Liberatore, eternal, unchanging principles derived from revelation 
and the church must govern civil and political society, not vice versa.30 The unmooring of 
civil society from those unchanging principles initially occurred in the Protestant 
Reformation, which effects were being worked out in contemporary life. The recovery of 
the medieval theological-philosophical synthesis held the promise of overcoming 
secularization.
Joseph Kleutgen's (1811-1883) Die Theologie der Vorzeit verteidigt [Defense of 
the Theology of the Past] (1860-1873) and Die Philosophie der Vorzeit verteidigt 
[Defense of the Philosophy of the Past] (1878) provided an intellectually robust account 
of the differences between medieval and modern philosophy. Kleutgen interpreted 
modern rationalist and empiricist philosophy as a dissolution of a previous medieval 
epistemological synthesis. According to John Inglis, Joseph Kleutgen and Albert Stöckl 
“were consciously 'recovering' a philosophical tradition in order to provide an alternative 
30 “Against the view that the church should submit to political authority, Liberatore argues that since the 
church is a divine and unchanging institution while the state is earthly and changing, the church should 
not be subject to the state. How can we submit what is eternal to the temporal? Since the eternal cannot 
submit to the temporal, the church should never submit to the state. Any other view, we are told, is 
Protestant and therefore wrong.” John Inglis, Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography 
of Medieval Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 76.
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to what they took to be the inherent skepticism and individualism of modern 
philosophy.”31 They offered an alternative to the histories of philosophy of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries that interpreted the faith of the medieval period as a detriment to 
human reasoning. According to Kleutgen, the realist epistemology of the medieval period 
united the respect for observation of the concrete (in the spirit of modern empiricism) 
with an emphasis on universals (in concert with modern rationalism).32 The premise upon 
which the neo-Scholastic revival was based was the need for a circumnavigation of a 
modern separation between philosophy and theology, and between civil society and the 
church. 
The early neo-Scholastics were generally quite sober and not very amenable to 
apocalypticism. However, the neo-Scholastic narrative concerning modernity—
modernity as a perfidious time in which faith and reason are estranged, and the basis for 
social cohesion is lost—fit well with an apocalypticism and would contribute to an 
apocalyptic reading of modernity in the papal encyclicals and popular journals.33 
The Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius of the First Vatican Council saw in the 
theologies of the Protestant reformers a source of challenges to the faith. Moreover, the 
challenges to the faith were threats to the unity and cohesiveness of human society.
The abandonment and rejection of the Christian religion, and the denial of God and his 
Christ,  has plunged the minds of many into the abyss of pantheism, materialism and 
31 Ibid., 11.
32 Ibid., 296.
33 Liberatore had a popular influence through his journal Civiltà Cattolica, which supported integrism 
between the church and state. Kleutgen directly influenced official ecclesial documents. He consulted 
the first Vatican Council as a theological expert in the writing of Dei Filius (1870) and later composed 
the first draft of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879), which established Scholasticism at 
the heart of the Roman Catholic Church's intellectual response to modernity.
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atheism, and the consequence is that they strive to destroy rational nature itself, to deny 
any criterion of what is right and just, and to overthrow the very foundations of human 
society.34
Five months after the promulgation of Dei Filius, the Italian army invaded the Papal 
States and surrounded the Vatican. As Komonchak stated, the loss of the Papal States was 
felt by many Catholics to be an attack on Christianity's public and social role (not just 
political) and a suppression of the exercise of the faith.35 The suppression of the public 
role of the Catholic Church in France over the next forty years would deepen the crisis, 
confirming the anxiety over the disintegration of Christian and European unity. 
Pope Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris, written nine years after the annexation of the 
Papal States, interprets the outward crisis as a spiritual and intellectual crisis. “False 
conclusions concerning divine and human things, which originated in the schools of 
philosophy, have now crept into all the orders of the State, and have been accepted by the 
common consent of the masses.”36 As the intellect guides the will and the will guides 
public life, the misguided philosophies of the moderns have exercised a deleterious 
influence on the public order. Aeterni Patris presents the restoration of Scholastic 
thought, with its unity-in-distinction of philosophy and theology, as the primary 
intellectual response to this situation. Given the historical context in which Aeterni Patris  
was written, the document is quite measured. While its analysis is incomplete from a 
contemporary perspective, it does not contain the vitriolic language of subsequent papal 
encyclicals in reference to modern thought.37 
34 Dei Filius, 7.
35 Komonchak, “Modernity and the Construction of Roman Catholicism,” 338–39.
36 Aeterni Patris, 2.
37 The document does contain some apocalyptic language: “In these late days, when those dangerous 
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Pope Leo XIII, however, freely elaborated a “catastrophic eschatology” 
elsewhere. The most dramatic of these is the legend that arose surrounding the “Prayer to 
Saint Michael,” which Leo added to the “Leonine Prayers” said at the end of the low 
Mass. In 1884, Leo modified previous prayers to make them into intercessions for the 
freedom of the church throughout the world. The “Prayer to Saint Michael the 
Archangel” was added in 1886. While the prayer may have its inspiration in a mystical 
experience of Leo, a millenarian legend about the origins of the prayer developed later. A 
long version of the prayer contains vibrant apocalyptic imagery. It explains that the devil 
has taken the form of an angel of light and invaded earth, sending wicked people against 
the Church:
These  most  crafty  enemies  have  filled  and  inebriated  the  church...  with  gall  and 
bitterness, and have laid impious hands on her most sacred possessions. In the Holy  
Place itself, where the See of Holy Peter and the Chair of Truth has been set up as the 
light of the world, they have raised the throne of their abominable impiety,  with the 
iniquitous design that when the Pastor has been struck, the sheep may be.38
This prayer's lively apocalyptic images linked recent political events directly to the 
spiritual warfare between the angels and the devil. 
The Catholic antimodernism of the early twentieth century only intensified this 
apocalypticism. In 1907 Pius X promulgated Pascendi, the premier document of the anti-
Modernist movement. Pascendi suggested that a cataclysmic contest between good and 
evil was presently occurring and dividing the Catholic Church itself. The church, Pius 
times described by the Apostle are already upon us, when the blasphemers, the proud, and the seducers 
go from bad to worse, erring themselves and causing others to err, there is surely a very great need of 
confirming the dogmas of Catholic faith and confuting heresies” (Aeterni Patris, 14). Leo's language 
here is a quotation from the sixteenth-century pope, Sixtus V, whose bull Triumphantis confirmed the 
perennial utility of Scholastic theology in combating error. 
38 Rituale Romanum, 6th ed. post typicam (Ratisbon: Pustet 1898), 163.
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wrote, has always needed to be vigilant against those who will mislead it. Yet, “it must be 
confessed that the number of the enemies of the cross of Christ has in these last days 
increased exceedingly…[They are] striving, by new and subtle arts, to destroy the vital 
energy of the Church, and, if they can, to overthrow utterly Christ's kingdom itself.”39 In 
his first encyclical, Pius set his pontificate the task of “restoring all things in Christ” with 
God's grace. With allusions to the French Revolution, Pius states that the extinction of 
God in the public and private realm is perhaps a foretaste of the last days. The “Son of 
Perdition…may already be in the world.” For St. Paul, he writes, the “distinguishing 
mark of the Antichrist, man has with infinite temerity put himself in the place of God.” 
Pius states that human beings have usurped God's place in the Temple.40 For Pius, the 
events of the French Revolution, the annexation of the Papal States, and the challenges of 
the modernists offer an insight into the underlying meaning of modernity and where it is 
heading. Recent attacks against the Roman Church unveil the revolt of the devil against 
God and God's church: this age is the site of a cataclysmic contest between good and evil. 
Furthermore, for Pius, these recent events unveil the ultimate trajectory of the Protestant 
Reformation, which culminates in the siege against the church. 
The apocalyptic mentality of nineteenth- to twentieth-century Roman Catholicism 
complicates any neat division between “classicism” and “historical-mindedness” (in 
Lonergan's terminology). Neo-Scholasticism did not successfully integrate the historical 
consciousness of the age. Yet Roman Catholicism, as a whole, was increasingly 
39 Pope Piux X, “Pascendi Dominici gregis,” in Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 40, 1907, 593–94.
40 Pope Piux X, “E Supremi,” in Acta Sactae Sedis, vol. 36, 1904, 131–2. 
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organizing itself around a cataclysmic eschatology found in political interventions by lay 
Catholics, in the messages contained in the alleged appearances of Mary, and in official 
Catholic pronouncements. The contrast is striking between the serene, rational 
“eternalism” of neo-Scholasticism and the apocalypticism of the encyclicals. This 
apocalypticism functioned as a religious explanation for the church's confrontational 
relationship with modern thought and politics, as well as a justification for the ecclesial 
response. Both a classicist neo-Scholasticism and apocalypticism were joined within 
Roman Catholicism in a form of historical experience and a manner of interpreting the 
contemporary world.
Although Roman Catholic apocalypticism and neo-Scholasticism reinforced each 
other, the apocalyptic was not theologically integrated with neo-Scholasticism. Neo-
Scholasticism had an understated eschatology at best. Within the neo-Scholastic manuals 
of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, eschatology comprised a discrete subject within 
dogmatic theology. It exclusively focused on the last things: death, judgment, heaven, 
and hell. Not only did neo-Scholasticism not generally integrate a contemporary 
apocalyptic sensibility, but Scholasticism as a whole resisted millenarian tendencies. In 
part, this resistance was due to the traditional opposition of the medieval Scholastics to 
the apocalyptic imagination present in the Franciscan Spirituals and other marginal or 
heretical groups. Ironically, many of the same proponents of the neo-Scholastic system 
employed apocalyptic images to make sense of current crises within the church and 
society (Liberatore, Leo XIII). This apocalyptic sensibility envisioned a form of the 
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ultimate drama occurring as a present prelude to the ultimate fight between good and evil. 
There is definitely a tension between the apocalyptic sensibilities and eternalism within 
Roman Catholicism at the Fin de siècle, specifically among the proponents of the neo-
Scholastic system. The debates before, during, and following the second World War over 
the “theology of history” addressed this tension directly.
The feeling of being at the end of an era and of the present time as a foretaste of 
the end had much in common with the growing eschatological consciousness in European 
modernity. Similar to the conflict over the meaning of time within cultural and literary 
modernism, Roman Catholicism reflected a preoccupation with the relationship between 
time and eternity. In nineteenth-century Catholicism, the church is the spatially and 
temporally extended outpost of the eternal within time. The papal encyclicals treat 
various challenges to church authority as “incursions” into the social space occupied by 
the church. With the loss of the Papal States in 1870, that “space” has collapsed: the 
sociopolitical world that was Catholicism's medium was coming to its end. History was 
unhinged from eternity, giving an impetus for an already-existing apocalyptic view of the 
modern age. 
After the First World War, the new situation of Catholicism spurred a reimagining 
of “social Catholicism” in France, especially in the work of Henri de Lubac, Gaston 
Fessard, Jacques Maritain, and Teilhard de Chardin. It also spurred a new theological 
reflection on history that sought to integrate a modern historical consciousness with a 
traditional interpretation of Christianity.
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IV. Theology of History in the nouvelle théologie
One of the most prominent characteristics of the nouvelle théologie was its 
attempt to honestly face the challenges of a modern historical consciousness and to 
integrate it with traditional sources of theological reflection.41 The nouveaux théologiens 
criticized neo-Thomists for their poor understanding of the relationship between theology 
and history.42 The debate over the “theology of history” (1943-1962) arose over 
differences among themselves over modern historical consciousness, the interpretation of 
scripture, and the theological interpretation of human history. 
The debate was initiated by Henri-Marie Féret's book, L'Apocalypse de saint 
Jean: Vision chrétienne de l'histoire (1943). After the liberation of France, a flurry of 
articles in the journals Dieu vivant, Études, and Recherches de science religieuse 
41 Yves Congar's article “Déficit de la théologie” (1934) in Sept magazine implied a reimagining of 
theological methodology in light of the present human condition. Theology, he explained, had become a 
“closed domain,” cut off from other disciplines and human activity. “As long as we talk about Marxism 
and Bolshevism in Latin, as I have seen it done in classes and conferences of theologians, Lenin can 
sleep in peace in his Moscow mausoleum.” Quoted in Jürgen Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie – 
New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor to Vatican II (New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 45. 
Marie-Dominique Chenu's Le Salchoir (1937) proposed that theology was the impact of God's gift upon 
the human intellect. Analogous to the incarnation, because human beings are in time and history, 
theology is going to take a historical form. Chenu suggested reorganizing theological education around 
the study of history. The so-called Catholic Modernist authors—such as George Tyrrell, Alfred Loisy, 
and Friedrich von Hügel—were part of a previous generation engaged precisely with the issue of the 
methodological impact of history on the discipline of theology.
42 It would be a simplification, however, to merely oppose the nouvelle théologie to neo-Scholasticism. 
There was significant continuity between neo-Scholasticism and the nouvelle théologie. First, most of 
the nouveaux théologiens considered themselves to be “Thomists” in some sense of the word. Second, 
like its neo-Scholastic counterpart, the nouvelle théologie was an attempt at a ressourcement of the 
Christian intellectual heritage in order to address contemporary problems. Third, reflecting the 
inheritance of anti-Modernist Roman Catholicism, the nouvelle théologie reflects a keen consciousness 
of the present moment as a confrontation between Christianity and the secular world. The nouveaux 
théologiens expressed an awareness of living within a modern age and that a rift has occurred between 
our age and an earlier time. While theologians like Marie-Dominique Chenu and Jean Daniélou are 
more open to the élan of modern thought, they retain a negative theological assessment of modernity as 
falling away from a previously attained ideal of Christianity.
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responded to this book, taking up themes from earlier debates. The participants included 
Henri-Marie Féret, OP (1904-1992), Jean Daniélou, SJ (1905-1974), Joseph Huby, SJ 
(1878-1948), Gaston Fessard, SJ (1897-1978), and Jean Mouroux (1901-1973), a secular 
priest of the diocese of Dijon.43 De Lubac's contribution to this debate came out in his 
books on Origen, the history of medieval exegesis, and his two books on the posterity of 
Joachim of Flore. Daniélou cited de Lubac's earlier Catholicism (1930) as an inspiration 
to the recovery of a patristic understanding of history. The debate over the theology of 
history did not so much go away as it diffused itself into broader theological themes.44
In what follows, I provide an introduction to the historical context of this debate, 
then examine the theological interventions of Féret, Huby, Fessard, and Daniélou. My 
purpose is to show that eschatology and apocalypticism were persistent themes within 
this debate, and that this debate forms the backdrop for de Lubac's subsequent 
eschatological synthesis. 
A. The Socio-Political Context of a Debate
 At the end of the nineteenth century, French Republicans tried and succeeded to 
remove from France the Catholic religious congregations and their hold on public 
education. Prior to 1879, the religious congregations were permitted to function even if 
the law heavily circumscribed their activity. From 1879 to 1889, France began to expel 
43 The last three are sometimes not included in the usual rosters of the nouvelle théologie authors. Huby, 
who was de Lubac's teacher, was really from a previous generation. Gaston Fessard, though he was 
caught up in the nouvelle théologie controversy of the 1950s, is often not numbered among the “New 
Theologians.” For example, Jürgen Mettepenningen hardly mentions Fessard in Nouvelle Theologie - 
New Theology. 
44 Mettepenningen locates the end of this debate as the beginning of the Second Vatican Council, in which 
history became a prominent theme.
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some religious congregations. At the same time, the French government created a system 
of free, obligatory primary school education without religious instruction. It is at least 
symbolic that, at a time when there was a concerted effort to remove the public footprint 
of Catholicism from France, an iconic expression of technical modernity, the Eiffel 
Tower, was being erected as the most visible structure on the Parisian skyline to celebrate 
the 100th anniversary of the French Revolution.
In 1889, Action française rose as an antirevolutionary movement that advocated 
the return of the monarchy and the return of the Catholic Church as a state religion in 
France. Charles Maurras, the principal spokesman for the movement, was an agnostic 
who wished to capture the power of social cohesion of Catholicism for the French state. 
While Action française attracted many Catholics, others were quite suspicious of the 
movement. The Dreyfus Affair put Catholics on the defensive yet again.45  Under the 
French Concordat of 1801, the church held a place of privilege and was subsidized by the 
government. From 1899 to 1914, Catholics were excluded from government and public 
office. Religious orders, including the Jesuits, were exiled. The Law of 1904 forbade the 
religious to teach. In 1904 France broke diplomatic relations with the Holy See because 
Pope Pius X refused the French government the power to name bishops. In response, 
French Republicans took away the church budget. In 1905, the Law of Separation 
allowed the church to organize itself as it pleased, but provided for lay associations for 
45 Alfred Dreyfus, an army captain of Jewish descent, was condemned to life imprisonment for giving 
military secrets to the Germans. When it became clear that another man had committed treason and that 
antisemitism was behind his condemnation, his case was reopened in 1899. The case split France as 
well as French Catholics. Members of the Augustinian religious order joined a rush to condemn him, 
triggering an anti-Catholic backlash. Yet prominent Catholics were among the Dreyfusards, including 
Charles Péguy. 
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the conservation of church property. Due to the latter provision, Pius X unwisely 
condemned the Law of Separation. The Catholic Church never established associations, 
so church properties were given by the state to other organizations. 
The aftermath of the Great War put Catholics in a very different situation. 
Returning from exile abroad, religious served as chaplains, medics, and soldiers, thus 
they could no longer be seen as the enemy. Foreign affairs and domestic economic 
problems dominated French politics, which no longer had a place for anticlerical politics. 
Religious congregations were allowed to return, though the law banning them remained 
on the books until 1942. In 1921 France and the Holy See resumed relations. In 1924, a 
modification of the French law allowed the church was allowed to own property. An anti-
Catholic government was elected in 1924, but fell quickly in 1925. In 1926, Pope Pius XI 
condemned Action française, precipitating the search for new models of Christian 
involvement in the social and political realm.
The theological renewals in France in the 1920s and 1930s occurred during a time 
of political truce between integrist Catholicism and republicanism. At least in part, the 
generation of theologians of the 1920s to 1930s were not as tied to the political 
establishment as those of the previous generation.46 This generation was less inclined to 
believe that partisan political interests were aligned with the spiritual needs of Catholics. 
Between the wars and following, pastoral initiatives and domestic missionary work 
46 The priests under the concordat were largely rural and pious, and the state treated them like government 
officials. They tended to align themselves politically with those parties and organizations that advocated 
a return of the monarchy. The priests after the separation of 1905 (and especially after World War I) 
were mostly urban, bourgeoisie or working class and not tied to the political establishment.
51
outside the institutional church sought to engage the laity.47 The re-claiming of the 
theological virtues, mysticism, and spirituality became a central pastoral task, especially 
as so many Catholics were disengaged from moral and outward practices of the Church. 
Significantly, the post-war context saw the re-thinking of “Social Catholicism,” a vision 
of the social and political space of the church as the leaven for society. The amelioration 
of tensions between the French government and Catholics allowed for this re-envisioning 
to take place apart from seeking the restoration of a pro-Catholic monarchy.48 
Furthermore, French literary Catholicism was blossoming. The work of Leon Bloy, 
François Mauriac, Georges Bernanos, Charles Péguy, Gabriel Marcel, and Paul Claudel 
had an immense influence on those who would form the nouvelle théologie. Bernanos 
and Marcel especially treated apocalyptic and eschatological themes as modes of 
understanding the relationship between Christianity and secular society. Marcel raised the 
specter of a “post-human” technological society, which wipes away any traces of 
subjectivity and human authenticity.49
47 Henri-Marie Féret was involved in founding three pastoral initiatives just before WWII: Journées 
sacerdotales, retreats for priestly formation, Cours Saint-Jacques, a parallel retreat for lay people, and 
Groupe évangélique, a women's bible study. Henri de Lubac participated in Semaines sociales, an 
annual conference on the social dimensions of Christianity for laity. 
48 Turn of the century initiatives from Catholic philosophers, theologians, and writers contributed to 
seeking new forms of Christian social witness. The philosopher Maurice Blondel was a prominent 
participant in the Catholic “social congresses” from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth 
century. Under the inspiration of Leo XIII's social vision for Catholicism, Marc Sangnier founded Le 
Sillon [The Furrow] in 1894. Le Sillon was a liberal Catholic labor movement and political alternative 
to Marxism. The group was endorsed by the Pope until the 1905 law of separation, which Le Sillon 
supported. In 1912 Le Sillon was condemned by Pius X. These political interventions lead to Catholic 
social philosophies of the 1920s and 1930s. Jean-Yves Calvez names Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel 
Mounier, Gaston Fessard, Teilhard de Chardin, and Henri de Lubac as the most significant theorists of 
social Catholicism. Jean-Yves Calvez, “The French Catholic Contribution to Social and Political 
Thinking in the 1930s,” Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network 7, no. 4 
(December 2000): 312–315.
49 His philosophy highlighted the experience of living in a broken world in which the awe of being is lost 
and transcendence is quashed. Marcel described this as the human being reduced to “function.” Marcel's 
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The advent of the Second World War and the occupation of France divided 
Catholics politically. In general, those involved with the debate over the theology of 
history were active participants in the “spiritual resistance” against the État Français, 
which collaborated with Germany, and the German occupiers. The administrative center 
of the État Français was in Vichy, located a mere 150 kilometers from Lyon. East of Lyon 
was an area of Italian occupation. The southern zone in general, and Lyon in particular, 
became a bastion for resistance movements. 
The underground journal Cahiers du témoignage chrétien became an organ of the 
Catholic “spiritual resistance” that attacked the Vichy and German governments.50 In 
1941, in Lyon, the avant garde editor and art critic Stanislaus Fumet arranged a meeting 
between the Jesuits Pierre Chaillet and Gaston Fessard, and Henri Frenay, the head of the 
Combat network of resistance movements. Fumet and Frenay encouraged Chaillet to start 
a clandestine paper that criticized Nazi ideology from a Christian perspective. The first 
edition of Témoignage chrétien appeared under the title France, prends garde de perdre 
ton âme [France, Take Care to Not Lose Your Soul] in 1941. From 1941 to 1945, Pierre 
Chaillet, Gaston Fessard, Stanislaus Fumet, Henri de Lubac, Georges Bernanos, Yves de 
Montcheuil, and Jean Lacroix were among the authors. Jacques Maritain was among the 
editors. Many of its contributors, including de Lubac, who were located near Lyon, had a 
example in The Philosophy of Existentialism was of a person who does repetitive tasks and regulates 
life around a “time table.” Technological progress functioned to regulate the self and even to see the self 
as a function, which Marcel saw as degrading the experience of being and mystery.
50 Cahiers du témoignage chrétien was one of a series of publications that criticized Nazism. Temps 
présent, which became Temps nouveau, was shut down by the authorities in 1941. Sept, Esprit, L'Aube, 
and Semaine religieuse were all under surveillance by the authorities. Guy Boissard, Quelle neutralité 
face à l’horreur: le courage de Charles Journet (Saint-Maurice, Switzerland: Éditions Saint-Augustin, 
2000), 215.
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greater freedom of movement and communication that allowed for the publication of the 
journal. Yves de Montcheuil, a scholar at Institute Catholique de Paris, distributed 
Témoignage chrétien through his networks in occupied Paris. De Montcheuil's writings 
exuded an apocalyptic interpretation of the present time.51 While ministering to students 
in the armed resistance movement le maquis, he was captured and killed in 1944.52
While the writers for Témoignage chrétien were united in their opposition to 
“collaboration” with Nazism, this unity frayed almost immediately in the post-war 
period. Maritain and Bernanos had anti-revolutionary leanings and ties to Action 
française, and they supported anti-communist regimes.53 On the other hand, for many 
French resistors, communism appeared to be a viable political alternative. In 1947, 
writing in the journal Esprit, Emmanuel Mounier and Jean Lacroix took a stance against 
the “fascism come to France” of General de Gaulle. They appealed to non-fascists, 
including Catholics, to “collaborate” with communists. The contributors to Témoignage 
chrétien had diverse responses to this invitation. Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou were 
more sympathetic to the social and eschatological impulses of communism and sought to 
understand it in light of a Christian understanding of history. In July 1947, De Lubac's , 
Mounier's, and Lacroix's joint participation in Semaine sociales de France (an intellectual 
retreat for Catholic laypeople) contributed to the perception of the emergence of a leftist 
51 Yves de Montcheuil, “Communisme,” Courrier français du temoignage chretien 5 (1943); Yves de 
Montcheuil, “Perspectives,” Courrier français du temoignage chretien 9 (1944): 384–386.   
“Perspectives” is particularly apocalyptic, in which he interprets the present totalitarianism in terms of 
the beasts of Revelation.
52 Aidan Nichols, OP, “Henri de Lubac: Panorama and Proposal,” New Blackfriars 93, no. 1043 (January 
2012): 20.
53 Bernanos had supported Franco during the Spanish Civil War, but became disillusioned with the 
brutality of the war. During and after World War II, he supported Charles de Gaulle.
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Catholicism in Lyons.54 In private letters to Henri de Lubac, Gaston Fessard indicated that 
he saw a community of thought developing in Lyon that was open to communism. De 
Lubac denied that his proximity to this group in Lyon played a significant role in his 
thinking.55
The debate over the theology of history that would unfold extended from the 
reflection over the social space of Catholicism in the modern world in the 1920s and 
1930s and from the spiritual resistance to fascism in the 1940s. Many of the writers 
associated with the Témoignage chrétien also contributed to this debate. While the 
'théologie de l'histoire' concerned primarily the understanding of God's interventions into 
history, the political question remained in the background. 
B. The Debate over the 'théologie de l'histoire'
1. The Exchange Between Henri-Marie Féret and Joseph Huby
Roger Aubert correctly claimed that Henri-Marie Féret's book L'Apocalypse de 
saint Jean: Vision chrétienne de l'histoire (1943) initiated the debate over the theology of 
history within the nouvelle théologie.56 As suggested above, Féret's project to give an 
interpretation of history in light of the Book of Revelation had precedents within 
magisterial documents of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, as well as cultural 
54 Lyons was home to the Fourvière, the Jesuit seminary in Lyons, from which the Cahiers du témoignage 
chrétien was launched. It also was the home to the new series Sources Chrétiennes and Théologie, 
which would come under increasing criticism from neo-Thomists. Mounier and Lacroix, editors of 
Esprit, were also living in Lyons, as was Fumet.
55 Frédéric Louzeau, “Gaston Fessard et Henri de Lubac: leur différend sur la question du communisme et 
du progressisme chrétien (1945-1950),” Revue des sciences religieuses 84, no. 4 (2010): 531.
56 Roger Aubert, “Discussions récentes autour de la théologie de l’histoire,” Collectanea Mechliniensia 33 
(1948): 129–149.
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and political precedents. Jürgen Mettepenningen states, “not only did he give an initial 
impetus to a biblical-theological explanation of the course of history, but also evidently to 
a theology of history, i.e., a theological reflection on history that took seriously history 
and endeavored to integrate it to the full.”57 Written during a time of messianic politics, 
Féret's book attempted an interpretation of history through a biblical lens and spurred the 
reflection on the methodological implications of history on theology. L'Apocalypse de 
Saint Jean advanced an apocalyptic interpretation of the bible, giving voice to a powerful 
religious intuition of the presence of God in history and God's providence over its 
outcome. 
 Féret argued that the Book of Revelation provides the “concrete details” 
concerning the development of God's plan in history, particularly with regard to the 
church. The history of the church is composed of three periods: a time of persecution by 
the Roman Empire; a time of battle against the church's political opponents; and a time 
during which there is a “progressive amelioration of the situation: through numerous 
difficulties, spiritual and religious values would little by little take the place that they 
should.”58 The “conversion of the Jews” and the beginning of the establishment of 
Christian civilization (the thousand-year reign of Christ) would follow long periods of 
struggle. During this era, the fight between good and evil would continue within each 
individual, while religious and civil society would find peace. At the end of this period 
57 Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Theologie - New Theology, 59–60.
58 Aubert, “Discussions récentes autour de la théologie de l’histoire,” 133.
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would come a resurgence of evil in the world, followed by the final intervention of God 
who would destroy evil and bring about a “new heaven and a new earth.”
Féret states that the last stage of history has begun in Christ. Rejecting the 
“messianism” of both Marxism and liberalism, he states that the Christian cannot look to 
a new revelation or a new age. At the same time, “the cause of Christ is assured of 
triumph, not only on the plane of individuals who arrive in heaven, but on the plane of a 
humanity, who in this world will experience…an organization of the world here below 
conformed to the truth of the Gospel.”59 While avoiding the kind of temporal hope that 
characterized fascism and Marxism, L'Apocalypse de saint Jean sought to describe a 
situation in which humanity is conformed to the Gospel, visibly and in its social 
organization and not just individually or spiritually. Furthermore, because conformity to 
the Gospel must occur in this world through human relationships, it must occur through 
human action and cooperation with the Gospel. 
In “Apocalypse et histoire,” Joseph Huby responded to Féret's book in order to 
correct its specious interpretations of the Book of Revelation.60 Huby took the position 
that the apocalyptic discourse in this book, as a “succession of visions that reveal the 
designs of God,” serves to reveal the ultimate meaning of conflicts between the church 
59 Ibid.
60 Joseph Huby, S.J. (1878-1948) was a professor of apologetics at Ore Place, Hastings (1913-1917),  
professor of scripture at Ore Place (1923-1926), and professor of scripture at Lyon-Fourvière). See 
Henri de Lubac, Marie Rougier, and Michel Sales, eds., Gabriel Marcel - Gaston Fessard: 
Correspondence (1934-1971) (Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1985), 322. As de Lubac's teacher at Ore 
Place from 1924 to 1926, Huby encouraged de Lubac to begin the body of research that would become 
Surnaturel. As a biblical scholar, he was also philosophically astute. De Lubac called him “the most 
faithful disciple of Fathers de Grandmaison and Pierre Rousselot.” Henri de Lubac, At the Service of the  
Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned His Writings (San Francisco: 
Communio Books, 1993), 20.
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and the world in the time when it was written and in the present. The Book of Revelation 
lifts the veil, not on the future, but on the present. “Revelation has as its object a present, 
contemporary mystery.…”61
First, according to Huby, the representations of the end of history in the 
apocalyptic genre are only a “contingent manner by which to represent this end.”62 While 
the apocalyptic genre represents God's judgment over history as occurring within time, 
this temporal judgment is “one with the universal judgment at the end of time (or the 
'eschatological' judgment).”63 These temporal representations of catastrophe symbolize 
that we must be torn from our temporal condition to reach our end. 
Second, the Book of Revelation is thoroughly Christocentric, which the future 
eschatology of Féret makes us forget. For Huby, the book does not as much signify the 
reign of God in the historical future as it reveals the reign of God already intervening in 
the world through Christ. “Among the revelations that this book brings us, the most 
important concern not so much particular events as the person of Christ himself and the 
reciprocal relationships between Christ and his faithful.”64 The church will remain in 
conflict with the world until the end of time as a sign of contradiction. However, through 
the church militant, the saints, and the martyrs, the eschatological “church triumphant” is 
already made present. Avoiding any form of millennialism, Huby indicated that the reign 
of God is already realized in Christ but will remain in tension with the present age.
Féret responded to Huby in “Apocalypse, histoire, et eschatologie chrétiennes,” a 





clarification and development of his original thesis. At the outset, Féret distanced himself 
from any crass, literal millenarian reading of John's Revelation. Instead, he developed the 
outlines of a theory of symbol that could support the “prophetic” message of the 
scripture. 
According to Féret, the realities about which the apocalyptic text speaks “are 
presented—and without doubt first of all known to the inspired author—only through 
symbols.”65 The meaning of the text is conveyed through symbols and images—the 
horsemen, the lamb, the lamp stands, the beasts, the woman—that are polyvalent. These 
symbols usually possess a historical referent from the time of the author. In addition, they 
often possess a prophetic character. Apocalyptic symbols, “save exceptions sufficiently 
marked by their meaning or contexts, are normally overt about the future or announcing 
it…We cannot contest that they…predict the future.”66
 Féret claims that the apocalyptic genre in the Old Testament possessed a 
messianic content, since it awaited a further completion. The authors of the New 
Testament recognize that, while the messiah has come, Christians await his return:
In faith the Christian lives inseparably by the fulfillment of the ancient promises made  
by God to his people—a fulfillment inaugurated in the first place by Christ—and in  
expectation  of  their  fuller  blossoming—a  blossoming  that  the  pariousia  or  second 
coming of the same Christ at the end of time will realize. It is on the future that the  
eschatological fragments of the New Testament project their own light, in their way, 
according to variable stages.67 
God's promises have been fulfilled with Christ. However, those same promises are 
oriented to a development into the future, as the extension of that fulfillment in time. 




In opposition to Huby's account, Féret argued that the temporal characteristics 
within prophecy are significant. The millennial prophecy (Rev. 20:1-6) symbolically 
portrayed an era of peace. While we lack explicit knowledge of the concrete mode of that 
“era,” we cannot neglect that it points to the historical future. The prophetic symbols in 
scripture prefigure the “aspect of the mystery of the Church in its future evolution.”68 The 
temporal mode of prophetic expression is itself of importance and should figure into our 
interpretation of the New Testament.
Féret argued that the neglect of the “prophetic perspective” is “of grave 
consequence not only for Christian eschatology…but already for the prophetic documents 
[of the Old Testament].”69 He feared that, by not recognizing the element of prefiguration 
in scripture, we would reduce the symbols of scripture to “some general atemporal 
truths.”70 As a result, the content of Christian hope would be an abstraction and would no 
longer have any bearing on the present church and its current struggles.
Huby's response to Féret's article in “Autour de l'Apocalypse” witnesses to the 
closeness of the two authors in their basic understanding of scripture, but also to 
remaining differences. The point of contention was the manner in which we must 
interpret the “prophetic,” “messianic,” or “future” meaning of the Scriptures, particularly 
John's apocalypse. Féret had stated that prophetic inspiration really sees something “that 
appears to touch on the future.” Huby agreed that 
any Catholic interpreter would not hesitate to admit with Fr. Féret that, in the Apocalypse 





through  the  symbols  which  he  uses,  something  of  the  future.”.…  It  remains  to  be 
determined more accurately what this “something of the future” is and to show how this 
“something,” captured by a mode of knowledge other than that of history, is “really in  
continuity with another reality accessible to historical knowledge.”71 
The question is precisely to what the prophetic glimpse into the future pertains and how 
the reality in the future is related to the reality in the historical context of the author. 
According to Huby, some scriptural symbols, like the beasts of Revelation, refer 
both to the historical context of the author and to future realities. While the human author 
of scripture did not foresee the concrete realities in the future, the symbols that represent 
historical realities in turn bear an analogy to present-day circumstances. In a sense, the 
persecutions of the church throughout time are contemporaneous to the persecution 
occurring in the time of the author.
I believe that this “contemporaneity” of the Apocalypse to each of the great fights of the 
church permits one to call the visions of Saint John properly prophetic visions: through a 
supra-historical view they make him present to the spiritual crises that the church would 
have to cross before its final transformation in the heavenly Jerusalem. It is in this sense 
that I speak of a legitimate application, that is to say, conformed to the intention of the 
inspired author, of the teachings of the Apocalypse that Christians make to analogous 
crises of the Church from the persecution of Diocletian, without moreover causing the 
complete distinction of successive periods, which map in advance the contours of the 
history of the church, to enter into the Johannine vision.”72
Huby affirmed that the Book of Revelation contains a prophetic meaning beyond the 
“historical plane” that tells us something of the future. However, he resisted “the 
tendency to conceive this prophetic or apocalyptic perspective as a second plane itself 
also historical,” that is, a perspective that would single out particular future events as 
precisely foretold by the scriptures.73 Huby affirmed two depths of interpretation of 




scriptural symbols, the historical meaning and the prophetic meaning.  However, he 
opposed the notion that the prophetic meanings signify a new historical era in which 
those prophesies concretely come to pass. The scriptural symbols are analogous to and 
contemporaneous with the events throughout the life of the church.
In summary, Féret and Huby were divided on a point of biblical hermeneutics, a 
point which implicated their respective understandings of history. Importantly, both 
authors articulated the scriptural and theological grounds for a theological understanding 
of the historical future. Féret voiced the notion that the Christian must hope for and work 
toward an era in human history in which society, culture, and human institutions are 
conformed to the Gospel. His theology suggested that Christianity held a response to 
communist aspirations. Féret's critics attempted to formulate a theological understanding 
of history that avoided temporalizing the eschaton. Gaston Fessard developed an original 
reflection on the contemporaneity of the scriptural events.
2. Gaston Fessard's Dialectic of History
In 1947, Gaston Fessard, SJ intervened in the debate over the theology of history 
from the perspective of a philosopher rather than that of a biblical theologian. His 
previous writings in the 1930s and 1940s demonstrate his keen interest in social 
philosophy and its applicability to international relations, political authority, society, and 
the crises then enveloping Europe.74 He warned of “tactical alliances” between Christians 
74 Gaston Fessard, “Pax nostra”: examen de conscience international (Paris: Grasset, 1936); Gaston 
Fessard, Le Dialogue catholique-communiste est-il possible? (Paris: Grasset, 1937); Gaston Fessard, 
Épreuve de force: réflexions sur la crise internationale (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1939); Gaston Fessard, 
Autorité et bien commun (Paris: Aubier, 1944); Gaston Fessard, France prends garde de perdre ta 
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and communists in France, prends garde de perdre ta liberté, a political as well as a 
religious intervention. According to Fessard, communism possessed a similar underlying 
view of history and human agency as the fascism against which he had fought. He 
believed that the theology of history proposed by Féret and others represented a loss of a 
genuine Christian eschatology and a close approximation of Marxism. “Théologie et 
histoire” appeared in Dieu Vivant in 1947, serving as Fessard's response to Féret. This 
article was the initial articulation of a theology of time that would culminate in De 
l'Actualité historique.75 “Théologie et histoire” sought to articulate, beginning from the 
Pauline dialectic between the pagan and the Jew, a theology of history, a synthesis 
between “essentialism” and “existentialism,” and a resolution to the problem of the 
supernatural. Here I wish to trace the basic outlines of Fessard's objection to the 
“apocalyptic” or “prophetic” interpretations of scripture offered by some of his 
contemporaries. 
Fessard recognized that Apocalypse of John had a resonance in the contemporary 
age: “a time of world conflicts and atomic bombs seems to place in question the very 
existence of humanity and to presage its end under the form of a cosmic drama.”76 A 
recent commentary in Dieu Vivant opposed the “Constantinian” Christian who “hopes for 
liberté (Paris: Témoignage chrétien, 1946).
75 Gaston Fessard, “Théologie et histoire,” Dieu Vivant 8 (1947): 37–65; Gaston Fessard, De l’actualité  
historique (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1960); See also Michel Sales, Gaston Fessard, 1897-1978: 
Genese d’une pensée, Presences 14 (Brussels: Culture et Vérité, 1997); Michèle Aumont, Philosophie 
sociopolitique de Gaston Fessard, S.J. (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2005); Mary Alice Muir, “Gaston 
Fessard, S.J.: His Work Towards a Theology of History” (M.A., Marquette University, 1970); Nguyen 
Hong Giao, Le Verbe dans l’histoire: la philosophie de l’historicité du Pere Gaston Fessard, 
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76 Fessard, “Théologie et histoire,” 39.
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salvation by social institutions and identifies the victory of the Lamb with the concept of 
Christian civilization” with the “'apocalyptic' Christian which knows that the work of the 
church here below is, like the terrestrial life of Christ, doomed to failure, so that he must 
live 'under the scope of a rupture of historical time.'”77 
According to Fessard, the work of Féret and Charles Journet suggests that the 
prophetic meaning of the Scripture must come to pass temporally. Specifically, Fessard 
examines Journet's argument that the “conversion” or “salvation” of Israel in Romans 11 
is an expectation of a time in which Jew and Gentile will be united. Yet the opinion 
handed down from the Fathers and Thomas Aquinas envisions the restoration of Israel 
occurring at the end of time. Referring also to writings by E. B. Allo and Jacques 
Maritain, he states, “Here then are three or four theologians, philosophers and exegetes, 
whose affection toward St. Thomas is not in doubt, who do not hesitate to abandon the 
opinion of their Master, on a secondary matter it is true, in appearance at least.”78 
The abandonment of the “traditional opinion” on this precise matter illustrates, for 
Fessard, a more generalized shift toward a hermeneutic that interprets the symbolic 
language of Scripture as prophesies of future historical events rather than evoking its 
deeper meaning. The traditional hermeneutic allowed for the “spiritual interpretation” of 
the literal sense of scripture: “What distinguishes essentially sacred prophecy from the 
profane divination, is that it claims to discover less the superficial and transitory 




brief what gives a religious meaning to the event.”79 Fessard suggested that the Fathers 
and Thomas Aquinas read the “prophetic” content of scriptures in terms of its spiritual 
meaning, because their conception of history supported such a move. He explains that if 
the Fathers
were  not  tempted  to  place  [the  conversion  of  Israel]  in  time,  it  is  also  that  their 
conception  of  history,  the  foundation  of  their  exegesis,  more  spiritual  than  literal, 
allowed them to perceive in the pagans and the Jews less the phenomenal realities than 
“historical categories,” of which the opposition clarifies the whole mystery of Christ and 
of the redemption of the universe. We know that, spiritual or allegorical, the exegesis of 
the fathers considered the history of the world to be divided in two by relationship with  
Christ,  and  that  the  whole  content  of  the  Old  Testament  was  “shadow,”  “figure”  or 
“type,”  finding  its  reality,  its  truth  or  its  fulfillment  in  the  New.  Thus,  Adam  by 
relationship to  Christ,  the Law and the synagogue in  the face of  Charity and of  the 
Church. On the basis of this notion of “type” in particular, the imagination of the Fathers  
could be abused. But its scriptural and theological foundation is not less solid.… 80 
Fessard suggested that prioritization of the “spiritual sense” in the Fathers and Thomas 
justified a manner of relating the temporal realities of Scripture to a broader, more 
universalized set of meanings. Thus, the Pauline prophecy of the conversion of the Jews 
and pagans contains, in seed, a glimpse of the union of all humanity in Christ.
Fessard's principal text is Romans 11, in which Paul explains his apostolate to the 
Gentiles as something that would contribute to the salvation of Israel itself. 
Before Christ, Paul had been the Jew proud of his election in the face of pagans without 
God and without promise in this world; once seized by Christ, he became the apostle to 
the idolatrous Gentiles whom he called to conversion, while the Jews were rejected for 
their incredulity. He unveiled the meaning and the end of the dialectical process in the 
final unity of “All Israel saved” and of “the mass of Gentiles entered into the Church.” 
Naturally, in the course of this reflection, pagans and Jews who are first phenomenal  
historical realities, are stylized, so to speak, into “existential attitudes” characterizing the 
diverse positions of man in the face of God, so that finally “the pagan” and “the Jew” 




the  after of  Christ—defines  the  future-Christian  in  each  man  as  in  the  whole  of 
humanity, by relationship to the second Coming, the end of history.81
In Fessard's account, the Jews and pagans are, first of all, phenomenal realities and 
historical people. In Christ, the enmity between Jew and Gentile, man and woman, slave 
and free, rich and poor is dissolved. The historical realities—reconciled in Christ—are 
reinterpreted in light of the mystery of Christ. According to Fessard, the “pagan” and 
“Jew” become “existential attitudes” within humanity that are to be reconciled within 
each person and each epoch. Furthermore, only at the end of time will all of humanity be 
fully reconciled in Christ. The “pagan” and “Jew” as existential poles within humanity—
while already healed through Christ—are completely united and reconciled only at the 
Second Coming.82
Fessard believed that there were serious theological, as well as exegetical, 
shortcomings in the recent “apocalyptic” interpretations of Scripture which placed the 
conversion of Israel within time. These shortcomings concern the loss of the 
eschatological meaning of the present. He says that we know from experience that the 
divisions that characterize our present history cannot be entirely overcome while we live. 
Those who project the conversion of Israel and the Gentiles within time—and by 
extension expect the realization of a perfected Christian state within time—reduce 
Christianity to a perfection of the natural or social world: 
They have forgotten that one cannot be Christian as one is French or English, blond or 
brunette, intelligent or dull: in other words, that Christian existence [l'être chrétien] must 
never be conceived as a mode of a natural reality. For the reason simply that the genesis 




said: one is never—in the full sense of the word—Christian, but it is always something 
of the future.83
For Fessard, “Christian existence” or the “New Man” is something that must always 
remain in expectation until the end of time, lest we reduce the supernatural life to an 
aspect of the natural.
Furthermore, Fessard claimed that the historical-future eschatology of Journet and 
Féret limited the meaning of scriptural symbols to particular times and eras, thereby 
losing the sense in which they are applicable universally. Although they wish to avoid the 
implication that the meaning of scriptural prophesy is a series of abstract and atemporal 
truths, in reality, Journet and Féret make those prophesies merely “relative” to a 
particular people or age. To say that there will be a point in history at which the “new 
man” is fully established, in other words, when the oppositions that characterize our 
history are resolved, would be to undermine the theological meaning of the present. 
Instead of the “pagan” and “Jew” referring to a particular group of people or to a 
particular era of history, they describe “existential attitudes” in every era. According to 
Fessard, 
the pagan and the Jew are very exactly “historical categories,” or “existential attitudes”  
of which the value, far from being relative to an epoch or a part of humanity, transcend 
time. And in order to discover the extraordinary profoundness of the Pauline analysis, it  
suffices…to find  in  his  dialectic  the  image  even  of  the  most  simple  act  of  faith.  It  
appears  then  that  the  dialectic  according  to  the  before  and after,  of  these  historical  
categories,  reveals precisely  the genesis of Christian existence,  or  of the supernatural  
life in us as in the world.”84




eschatology.” In other words, he desired to articulate a dialectic that describes the 
concrete condition of humanity in the present as already conducing to its future 
eschatological completion. By emphasizing the “contemporaneity” of the Scriptures, he 
attempted to defend the promise of salvation entering into the situation of every person at 
all times, though never as fully realized until the end of time.
3. Jean Daniélou's Fulfillment Theology
Jean Daniélou (1905-1974) was a theologian of history par excellence. This 
younger Jesuit confrere of de Lubac earned a doctorate in theology from the Institut 
catholique de Paris with a dissertation on Gregory of Nyssa. He served on the editorial 
board of Sources Chrétiennes, and he edited the first volume of the series, Gregory of 
Nyssa's La vie de Moïse (1942). In 1943 he was appointed as professor at the Institut 
catholique de Paris and became editor-in-chief of Études, an established Jesuit journal. 
Daniélou's Sacramentum futuri (1950) and Essai sur le mystère de l'histoire (1953) 
exemplify his “fulfillment theology,” in which the historical events of salvation history 
are “types” or sacraments of future events which will fulfill them.85 These essays were 
given over to an elaboration of a Christian understanding of history that can respond to 
present-day understandings of progress and evolution. 
Two brief articles published in 1947—“Christianisme et histoire” and “A travers 
les revues: Christianisme et progrès”—exemplify Daniélou's intervention into the debate 
85 See Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Theologie - New Theology, 89; Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and 
Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
168–90. 
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over the theology of history.86 This controversial 1946 article “Les orientations présentes 
de la pensée religieuse,” published in Études, gave the context for this debate. “Les 
orientations présentes” argued that contemporary theology (that is, neo-Scholastic 
theology) was not sufficient for the authentic needs of living souls and unresponsive to 
the current intellectual world. He stated that Scholasticism had lost contact with the 
movement of philosophy and science, having remained fixed in earlier thought forms.87 
Anti-Christian Marxism and existentialism appear to address the questions that modern 
humanity is asking, while the church appears to be silent. Daniélou aimed to identify the 
salient features of modern thought to which Christianity must respond. 
The study of patristic thought—he names Gregory of Nyssa, Clement of 
Alexandria, and Augustine—was elemental to this response. The church fathers “are the 
nourishment most modern for people today,” he writes, because we find in them an 
understanding of history relevant for today. Whereas history is critical for modernity, “the 
notion of history is foreign to Thomism.”88 For Daniélou, the recovery of a Christian 
notion of history goes hand-in-hand with establishing deeper contact between theology 
and life. Daniélou mentions new pastoral and social initiatives taking place in France—
the movements of Action Catholique and J.O.C. (Christian Working-Class Youth), as well 
86 Danielou, “Les orientations presentes de la pensee religieuse”; Jean Danielou, “A travers les revues: 
Christianisme et progrès,” Études (December 1947): 399–402; Jean Danielou, “Christianisme et 
histoire,” Études 80, no. 254 (1947): 166–184.
87 Daniélou was deliberately provocative. Many neo-Scholastics claimed that Scholasticism integrates the 
truths of other disciplines into a unified “scientia.” By implying that Scholasticism no longer could 
account for modern science and history, Daniélou was announcing its death. 
88 Danielou, “Les orientations presentes de la pensee religieuse,” 10.
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as Emmanuel Mounier, whose work was sometimes sometimes associated with leftist 
movements.89 
Daniélou's essay “Christianisme et histoire” traces the outlines of a theology of 
history to be further elaborated in Sacramentum futuri and Essai sur le mystère de 
l'histoire. He presents the justification for a theology of history as follows:
The search for  a  vision of  history that  permits  an interpretation of  reality and gives 
meaning  to  human  action  is,  after  a  century,  at  the  center  of  the  preoccupations  of 
philosophers.  It  suffices  to  speak  here  of  the  philosophy  of  history  of  Hegel,  the 
historical materialism of Karl Marx, the creative evolution of Bergson, the Spenglerian 
theory  of  the  birth  and  decline  of  civilizations,  the  role  of  temporality  in  the 
anthropology of Heidegger. This is a new dimension that is now overt in thinking. For  
the  old  philosophy,  the  future  is  the  world  of  illusion  and  of  multiplicity,  which  is 
opposed to the world of being. The conception of time as a positive value, of creative  
duration is  an  acquisition  of  modern  thought.  But  modern  thought  received  this 
conception from Christianity.90 
Daniélou is aware that modern historical consciousness in Hegel, Marx, Bergson, etc., in 
part, derives from a Christian worldview. 
Daniélou contrasted the Christian understanding of history with its first and 
second century competitors, Hellenistic philosophy and Gnosticism. His choice is 
influenced by his reading of Irenaeus, whose understanding of history was shaped by his 
opposition to second-century Gnosticism. On the one hand, he characterized history in 
Hellenistic thought as the “eternal return.” The divine world is the unmoving world of 
ideas. 
Immutable laws of the cosmos and of the city are the visible reflection of this eternity of  
the invisible world. Movement itself is an imitation of this immobility. It is conceived, in  
fact,  as  cyclical,  in  the  regular  movement  of  the  stars  as  in  the  eternal  return  that  
89 Ibid., 18.
90 Danielou, “Christianisme et histoire,” 166.
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regulates the movement of history and according to which the same events are eternally 
reproduced.91
In this scheme, the events of history are merely reflections of the eternal ideas. On the 
other hand, Gnosticism depended upon a metaphysical dualism between the inferior or 
evil god of creation and the god of salvation. The god of salvation represented an 
“irruption... of a new world without relationship to the old.”92 Hellenism evacuated 
history entirely, Gnosticism made history entirely discontinuous. Oswald Spengler's The 
Decline of the West, with a “chain of heterogeneous civilizations” is an example of this 
Gnostic tendency. 
According to Daniélou, Christianity concerns historical events more than abstract 
doctrine. Through these irrevocable events, God initiates the slow pedagogy that brings 
humanity from infancy to maturity, in which one dispensation prepares for the next. Each 
historical dispensation must pass away in order to make way for a new stage of 
fulfillment. The passage from Judaism to Christianity, as its succession and fulfillment, is 
analogous to the passage from the temporal to the future age: “Thus this entire world has 
to pass away, undoubtedly not in its very being but in its form, in order to make way for 
the future age, which is built here below by the invisible operation of charity and will be 
manifest on the last day.”93 The Christian must look forward in hope to the fulfillment of 
the present.
While Daniélou admits that this understanding of history has analogies in  





only a progress, but the term of progress.” Christianity is eschatological, he states, in 
three ways. First, history is not just an undending process, but has a definite fulfillment. 
Second, Christianity is that term: “Christ is presented as coming at the end of time and 
introducing the definitive world. Thus, there is nothing beyond Christianity. It is truly 
'eschatos,' 'novissimus,' the last.” Third, the end has already arrived in Christ's death and 
resurrection: “the last of things exists already.”94 Christians are now living in the last days 
awaiting the transition from the temporal to the eternal. While death and evil have been 
vanquished in Christ, we nonetheless await the ultimate triumph in the rest of creation. 
Daniélou describes this period of waiting as analogous to the time between the moment 
of victory in the war and the victorious entrances into Paris.95
 For Daniélou, the Christian lives in the tension between the future and past. The 
eschatological is already present now, albeit in anticipation. “The future age is already, 
but in mystery, under the sacrament.”96 Yet, the present is also a culmination of a 
temporal process. In a rather unclear passage, he explains:
The Christian is divided between two successive worlds that are found to coexist. The 
mystery of the present time is in fact that it brings this similtaneous presence of a past  
world, that survives itself, and a future world that is already existing in an anticipated  
fashion. This is to say that in fact there is not a present world, or that this world is only a 
passage. For the Christian, the world of natural life and of science, the world of the  
temporal city and of economic life has something essentially anachronic. It is radically 
transcended [dépassé] by the world of the Church, which is the future already present.  
The  world  of  the  Church,  in  its  turn,  seems  in  relationship  to  political  society, 
“catachronic”  in the measure that it appears in the future. Juxtaposition of a past and 
future, such is the Christian present.97
94 Ibid., 173.
95  “This moment is the resurrection of Christ. Then will come the Victory Day [Viendra ensuite le Victory 
Day], the day when we pass under the arches of triumph.” He was referring to the parades through the 
Arc d'Triomphe in Paris following Germany's surrender to the Allies.
96 Danielou, “Christianisme et histoire,” 182.
97 Ibid., 183. He defines catachronique as an antonym of anachronique, as “the anticipation of a reality to 
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Daniélou's understanding of Christianity is thoroughly eschatological. While he maintains 
that Christ has brought a definitive fulfillment, the present is characterized by 
anticipation (anachronic or anterior) of that fulfillment. In the “world of the Church,” the 
eschaton exists already. Thus, Christianity appears as the “future” of political society. 
Living between two times, the Christian awaits their convergence. 
Daniélou's theology of history gives rise to his response to the political question. 
In “Christianisme et histoire,” he explains that “human progress is ambiguous.”98 “A 
travers les revues: Christianisme et progrès” fills out his understanding a little more. He 
claims that a belief in human progress—he envisions both technological and political 
advancement—may be an “elementary form of religion,” that is, a basic component of 
religious faith that takes into account humanity's creative role in the temporal. However, 
the presentation of human progess in Marxism takes an idolatrous turn insofar as it awaits 
the salvation of humanity by human power.99 The conception of human progress 
advanced by Marxism is one that lacks transcendence. “The progress of history, 
according to Christianity, is not a process of continual accumulation, as technological 
progress.… It is ascent.”100 While Daniélou sees in a Marxist philosophy of history an 
“idolatrous pretension,” he does not hesitate to find something valid in its underlying 
hope.
come.” Ibid., 183, note 1.
98 Danielou, “Christianisme et histoire,” 183.
99 Danielou, “A travers les revues: Christianisme et progrès,” 400. Daniélou says that Marxist 
understandings of history betray the “great heresy of the modern world,” to believe that by human effort 
we can save ourselves.
100 Ibid., 401, quoting Emmanuel Mounier.
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V. Conclusion
In the post-war context, the debate over the theology of history manifested an 
intense interest in eschatology and a fragmentation of the interpretation of Christian 
eschatology. Although this debate did not treat directly of the political question, its 
backdrop was the restructuring of French civil and political society after the Second 
World War and the variety of Catholic responses to this restructuring. Opposed opinions 
with regard to Communist-Catholic collaboration of Fessard, Daniélou, and de Lubac 
indicate the importance of the political question for their theological deliberations. 
The debate over the theology of history was dominated by the question of how to 
represent the historical present and future from a Christian theological perspective. As I 
have indicated, the subject of this debate shared much in common with the questionings 
within the wider culture. One of the cardinal problems of European Modernism—how to 
recognize the eternal in the midst of flux—became a fundamental concern for the Roman 
Catholic response to modernity, though it was addressed in widely divergent ways. The 
Catholic apocalyptic response—which envisioned the present moment as a decline of the 
current temporal order, (often) the emergence of a new era, and an ultimate battle 
between good and evil to come—mirrored the responses to modernity found in the 
Futurist Movement, the Decadent Movement, forms of Fascism, and Marxism. While, 
traditionally, Scholasticism rejected all forms of millenialism, in the late nineteenth 
century, “catastrophic eschatology” of anti-Modernism began to merge with the serene 
“eternalism” of neo-Scholasticism. A tension between the two still remained. 
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In the “theology of history” debate, the political, cultural, and theological 
questions converged and were made the explicit subject of theological inquiry. The 
primary question was eschatological: Theologically, what is the relationship between our 
historical world—experienced in the church and secular history—and its promised 
consummation? What is the Christian understanding of history and its fulfillment? 
Three correlate questions surfaced in this debate. First, to what extent can the 
contemporary eschatological and historical consciousness (such as that present in 
Marxism) be reconciled to a Christian understanding of history? Fessard opposed Féret, 
in part, because he believed that Féret's future eschatology too closely mirrored an 
understanding of history undergirding both fascism and communism. On the other hand, 
Féret and, more explicitly, Daniélou believed that an authentic Christian eschatology 
served as a corrective to both ahistorical neo-Scholasticism and the dialectical 
materialism of Marx. 
Second, what form of eschatology preserves the eternal significance of the present  
moment and the social space of Christianity? Although Féret and Fessard disagreed on 
this question, both were concerned to preserve the theological significance of the present, 
as well as the importance of a lived Catholicism in which God is encountered through the 
concrete realities of social existence. Daniélou employed the language of sacrament to 
interpret the present as an anticipation of the eschaton. Huby's notion of the 
“contemporaneity” of the Scriptures figured into his desire to preserve the applicability of 
the Scriptures in each moment.101
101  The question of the applicability of Christianity to the social world would be addressed in widely 
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Third, in what sense is Christianity essentially an eschatological reality? The 
selected authors agreed substantially on this point. For Fessard and Daniélou, Christianity 
is something “to come.” Fessard spoke of “Christian existence” or, alternatively, the 
“New Man” as a reality yet to come and not fully present now. For Daniélou, the church 
is where the future is made present under the sacrament. Féret suggested that the 
conformity of the church to the Gospel awaits a future completion. Similarly, de Lubac 
would give a robust account of Christianity as an eschatological reality.102
Henri de Lubac's intervention in this debate came primarily through his 
ressourcement of patristic writings. In Catholicism, he had already suggested that 
Christianity held the corrective to two views of human existence: an ahistorical 
Hellenism in which the goal is to flee the world; and the historical immanentism of 
Marxism, which lacks a transcendent goal. The understanding of history present in the 
Fathers, he believed, united history and transcendence. 
Similar to the other participants in the debate over the theology of history, de 
Lubac sought the foundations for an understanding of history within scripture. Féret, 
Huby, Fessard, and Daniélou each depended upon the notion that the scriptures signify 
something beyond the historical or literal meaning. De Lubac's work toward the 
ressourcement of the “spiritual sense” of scripture had a precedent in the disagreement 
among Féret, Huby, and Fessard concerning the future or prophetic meaning of the text. 
With Huby and Fessard, de Lubac rejected the idea of a new historical era of fulfillment 
varying directions before Vatican II in the work of Gaston Fessard, Jacques Maritain, Marie-Dominique 
Chenu, and Maurice Montuclard, among others.
102  In chapter 4, I will treat de Lubac's account of the eschatological dimensions of the sacraments, the 
church, Christ, and mysticism.
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after Christ, and he was critical of a Joachimite tradition of biblical interpretation. While 
he does not single out Féret, de Lubac appears to reject the milleniarian aspects of Féret's 
exegesis. At the same time, de Lubac was sympathetic with Féret's attempt to interpret 
the “prophetic” meaning of the biblical texts as the “aspect of the mystery of the Church 
in its future evolution.”103 As I will indicate, de Lubac's theology of history approaches 
that of Daniélou, for whom historical events are the sacraments of future fulfillments. The 
disagreement that arose between Daniélou and de Lubac over the terminology of spiritual 
interpretation—Daniélou preferred the term “typology” while de Lubac preferred 
“allegory”—testifies to how close their understandings of history were.
De Lubac's contribution to a theology of history came primarily through his 
ressourcement of Origen, the second- and third-century African theologian. De Lubac's 
groundbreaking book on Origen, published a few years after the exchanges between 
Féret, Huby, Fessard, and Daniélou, sought to address the issues that arose from their 
debate. It argued that Origen's characteristic “spiritual interpretation” of the Scripture 
preserved a Christian understanding of history necessary for today. De Lubac would 
emphasize that Origen's treatment of anagogy, the final “spiritual sense” of scripture, 
united both the anticipation of the future and the contemplation of the transcendent. 
Origen appeared to offer a synthesis and harmony between the divergent eschatological 
positions of Henri-Marie Féret, Gaston Fessard, Joseph Huby, and Jean Daniélou. In the 
following chapter, I examine de Lubac's recovery of Origen as a theologian of history and 
as the basis for de Lubac's eschatological synthesis.
103 Féret, “Apocalypse, histoire, et eschatologie chrétiennes,” 130.
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CHAPTER TWO: EXEGESIS AND THE STRUCTURE OF HISTORY 
Henri de Lubac devoted more of his writing to the history of scriptural exegesis 
than to any other theological topic, including nature and grace, and ecclesiology. 
Composed over several decades, these writings focused on the spiritual interpretation of 
scripture, especially the fourfold sense. In 1948, he published a short article “On an Old 
Distich: The Doctrine of the 'Fourfold Sense' in Scripture.”1 This article argued that the 
“spiritual meanings” embodied in the fourfold sense of scripture not only influenced a 
long tradition of Christian interpretation of Scripture, but also that their logic structured 
the relationship between theological disciplines. De Lubac's groundbreaking History and 
Spirit was published two years later.2 It claimed that Origen was largely responsible for 
systematizing the Christian teaching on the spiritual meaning of Scripture and refuted the 
then-dominant opinion that Origen's spiritual sense of scripture was primarily Hellenistic 
in character. In “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory” (1959), de Lubac argued 
that Christian allegory (particularly in Origen) constituted the antithesis of Hellenistic 
allegory. His monumental multi-volume work Exégèse Médiévale (1959-1964) is often 
cited for its recovery or ressourcement of the fourfold sense of scripture. Exégèse 
Médiévale took a diachronic approach to the spiritual sense, tracing a development from 
the patristic period to the early modern period.  
1 Henri de Lubac, “On an Old Distich: The Doctrine of the ‘Fourfold Sense’ in Scripture,” in Theological 
Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 109–28. Originally published as “Sur un vieux 
distique: La doctrine du 'quadruple sense,'” 347-366 in Mélanges offerts au R. P. Fernand Cavallera 
(Toulouse: Institut Catholique, 1948).
2 Henri de Lubac, History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture according to Origen, trans. Anne 
Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007). Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Histoire 
et esprit : l’intelligence de l’Écriture d’après Origène, Théologie 16 (Paris: Aubier, 1950).
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De Lubac's ressourcement of patristic and medieval exegesis is sometimes 
interpreted as a reaction against critical methods in biblical studies. However, his writings 
on the history of exegesis were not intended to reestablish the fourfold sense as a 
contemporary biblical hermeneutic. He did not merely intend for his studies on the 
history of exegesis to break perceived constraints of historical-critical exegesis. His goal 
was not primarily exegetical. He explained that his research on spiritual interpretation in 
Origen was a window to the recovery of a partially lost vision of reality:
The subject I had first envisioned assumed a broader scope in my eyes...It was no longer 
even a matter solely of exegesis. It was a whole manner of thinking, a whole world view  
that  loomed  before  me.  A  whole  interpretation  of  Christianity  of  which  Origen, 
furthermore, despite many of his personal and at times questionable traits, was less the 
author than the witness. Even more, through this 'spiritual understanding' of Scripture, it 
was Christianity itself that appeared to me as if acquiring a reflective self-awareness. 
This is the phenomenon, one of the most characteristic of the early Christian period, that,  
in the final analysis, I sought to grasp.3 
De Lubac wanted to understand the mentality, the doctrinal vision and the sense of 
history, which supported Origenian practices of spiritual interpretation. Spiritual 
interpretation was both an epiphenomenon of the creed and ethos of the early church and 
also that by which the church attained a doctrinal “self-awareness.” So Origen's exegesis 
belonged not only to biblical interpretation, but to an entire way of looking at reality that 
was the shared inheritance of the early church.
Moreover, de Lubac sought to recover the roots of an early Christian reflection on 
history and revelation for the contemporary age.4 Against what he believed was a 
3 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 11.
4  Recent interpreters have focused on the significance of de Lubac's recovery of ancient Christian 
exegesis for his understanding of the supernatural, culture, and ecclesiology. See Susan K. Wood, 
Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in the Theology of Henri de Lubac (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1998); Bryan C. Hollon, Everything Is Sacred: Spiritual Exegesis in the Political Theology 
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resurgent Hellenistic view of history within modern thought, he argued for a recovery of 
an authentically Christian understanding by turning to patristic and medieval sources. In 
response to an empiricist separation between history and metaphysics, he proposed the 
vast ontological interconnection of historical realities. And, in response to an increasingly 
secular and humanist historical consciousness, he proposed a Christocentric view of 
history.
In Chapter 1 I surveyed twentieth-century debates over the theology of history and 
the development of a renewed eschatological focus within Catholic theology. In this 
chapter, I draw from de Lubac's writings on the Christian exegetical tradition in order to 
discover the key components and structure of his theology of history. Although he does 
not compose a discrete theology of history apart from eschatology, an analysis of his 
specifically historical reflections helps to contextualize his eschatology.
I first examine de Lubac's argument that the early Christian exegetical tradition 
was a reversal of the Hellenistic view of history. Second, I argue that, according to de 
of Henri de Lubac (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009); Bryan C. Hollon, “Ontology, Exegesis, and 
Culture in the Thought of Henri de Lubac” (Ph.D. diss., Baylor University, 2006); Hans Boersma, 
“Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac,” New 
Blackfriars 88, no. 1015 (2007): 242–273; Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental 
Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Other scholars 
have interpreted de Lubac's historical studies for their value in recovering an ancient biblical 
hermeneutic for today's biblical exegesis. See See Marcellino G. D’Ambrosio, “Henri de Lubac and the 
Recovery of the Traditional Hermeneutic” (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1991); 
David M. Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2004).  Williams expresses consternation that de Lubac composed no clear methodology for 
uniting contemporary scientific exegesis with ancient allegorical methods. However, de Lubac's guiding 
interest became theological rather than exegetical. De Lubac himself indicated that his studies on 
ancient exegesis were not for the purpose of establishing it anew: “Does this mean that we would 
propose returning to it  as a guide for today's exegesis and theology? No one would seriously dream of 
that.” De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 124. While de Lubac's studies on ancient exegesis may have a 
bearing on contemporary exegesis, I will emphasize that de Lubac's primary interest was in the theology 
of history underlying the procedures of interpretation.
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Lubac, the multiple senses of scripture represent an epiphenomenon of a Christian 
understanding of history in which there is an “ontological bond” between realities. Third, 
I explain this ontology in terms of an “historical exemplarism” that de Lubac appropriates 
from Origen. This exemplarism envisions the historical life of Christ as the fulfillment of 
Old Testament figures and the signified of previous signs. Fourth, I examine de Lubac's 
understanding of revelation and salvation for the rationale for this Christocentric view of 
history.
I. Spiritual Meanings and the Hellenistic View of History
 De Lubac argued that the spiritual interpretation of scripture, a dominant mode of 
exegesis in the ancient and medieval church, was a correction to Hellenistic thought. 
First, I provide a brief summary of what de Lubac meant by spiritual meaning and the 
fourfold sense. Second, I examine de Lubac's contrast between Hellenistic allegory and 
Christian allegory. Third, I argue that de Lubac saw in the fourfold sense an 
epiphenomenon of a particularly Christian view of history that reversed or corrected a 
Hellenistic view of history.
A. Spiritual Meanings and the Fourfold Sense of Scripture
The exegetical consensus of the early Christian tradition, especially the pre-
modern tradition of exegesis, is that scripture contains meanings beyond and beneath the 
literal, that is the plain meaning of the text. The reading of scripture should also involve a 
penetration of the text, and the text's penetration of the believer, so that she or he might 
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attain to its hidden depths. Various theological formulations of this teaching were 
proliferated during the Middle Ages. De Lubac argued that these formulations generally 
had a common structure. 
A medieval formula summarized and systematized this traditional teaching in a 
short rhyme:
Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria,
Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia 
[The letter teaches what took place, allegory what to believe
The moral what to do, anagogy what goal to strive for.]
The foundational meaning, upon which the others were based, was the literal sense. De 
Lubac describes the literal sense as essentially an historical meaning, insofar as the text 
truthfully conveys what occurred, namely God's interventions into time. The literal sense 
is an historical sense. Beneath the letter, there is a spiritual sense, which was sometimes 
divided into multiple spiritual senses. “Allegory” (often called the “mystical sense”) 
described the Christological meaning of the scriptures. It suggested that the events 
narrated in the Scriptures are fulfilled in the “event of Christ” and that this fulfillment 
extends through the church. The “moral sense” (often called the tropological meaning) 
denotes the implication of the historical meaning for the individual soul and for the 
church. The anagogical sense denotes the last meaning, the ultimate fulfillment at the end 
of the world.
De Lubac saw the fourfold sense exemplified by the Christian interpretation of the 
city of Jerusalem.5 The historical city of Jerusalem is symbolic of the city of God 
5 Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. Mark Sebanc, vol. 1 (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), 108. Originally published as Exégèse médiévale, 1: Les 
quatre sense de l'Écriture (Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1959). Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The 
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“renewed in Christ”; but it also symbolizes the reign of God in the soul; and, finally, the 
historical city of Jerusalem ultimately refers to the heavenly city. The Old Testament 
reference to Jerusalem is assumed into a broader interconnection of scriptural realities 
and images.
While de Lubac recognized a terminological anarchy during the patristic period 
with regard to the meanings of scripture, he argued that the various terminology often 
contained a common structure. In his usage, the “spiritual sense” is inclusive of the 
allegorical, moral, and anagogical senses in contradistinction to the “historical sense.” 
The primary division between letter and spirit expresses the relationship between the Old 
Testament and the New Testament: the New Testament is the spiritual meaning of the Old 
Testament history. Indeed, the title of his monograph on Origen, History and Spirit, 
reflects this division. The basic meaning of the division between letter and spirit is 
articulated within various formulations of multiple spiritual senses. The fourfold sense 
(history, allegory, tropology, anagogy) in medieval thought is basically the same as 
Origen's trichotomy (history, allegory, anagogy). As the first of the spiritual senses, de 
Lubac often identifies “allegory” with the spiritual sense as a whole, inclusive of the 
moral and allegorical senses. However, at times, he specifically distinguishes allegory 
from the other spiritual senses.
Four Senses of Scripture, trans. E. M. Macierowski, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 
2000), 199. Originally published as Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sense de l'Écriture (Paris: Éditions 
Montaigne, 1959). De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 115.
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B.  Hellenistic Allegory and Greek History
Patristic and medieval theologians employed allegorical interpretation (also 
“spiritual interpretation” and “mystical interpretation”) to read the Old Testament in light 
of the New Testament. Admittedly, this procedure resulted in extravagant interpretations 
of the Bible and, in many cases, appeared to have few hermeneutic controls. In the Latin 
Middle Ages, the predominant use of the Latin text and the distance of medieval culture 
from the Greek language resulted in a loss of the textual criticism developed by some 
church fathers, including Origen. The rebirth of Greek studies during the Renaissance and 
the doctrinal battles of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation led to a renewed focus 
on the literal meaning of the text. New tools of exegesis developed during the 
Enlightenment lead to critical exegesis and to broad challenges to traditions of spiritual 
interpretation and allegorization.
Nineteenth-century biblical scholarship, especially the work of Adolf von Harnack 
(1851-1930), constitutes the broad context for de Lubac's studies on spiritual meaning, 
the fourfold sense, and Origen. Employing the tools of critical exegesis, Harnack 
developed what is described as the “Hellenization Thesis.” In History of Dogma 
[Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte] and in a more popular work What Is Christianity? 
[Das Wesen des Christentums], Harnack argued that the early Christian development of 
dogma was “Hellenistic.” Christianity developed away from the Gospel through its 
increasing focus on philosophical truth.6 In other words, Hellenistic thought-forms 
6 According to Harnack, Hippolytus and Tertullian contributed to identifying elements of the Christian 
faith with Greek philosophy, for example, by identifying the Logos with the Son of God. Origen 
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infiltrated the Hebraic-Christian thought-forms, overshadowing them from the second 
century to the time of the Reformation. Thus, the doctrinal development of the earliest 
councils—including the Trinitarian doctrine, Logos Christology, the doctrine embedded 
in the Creeds—are suspected of being Greek at their core. Harnack's Hellenization thesis 
suggested that the major theological developments of patristic thought served to mutate 
the Gospel into a species of Greek philosophy.7 The allegorization of Scripture reflected a 
development whereby the Greek philosophical milieu permeated Christian interpretation 
of the Scriptures.  
Harnack impacted the French Catholic theological milieu through the work of 
Alfred Loisy, a Catholic priest and scholar, whose L'Evangile et l'Eglise (1902) 
challenged Harnack's assertions in What is Christianity? Although Loisy's resolutions 
were unacceptable to the French Catholic bishops and the Holy See (Loisy was 
excommunicated in 1907), he brought attention to a series of issues that would dominate 
early twentieth-century Catholic theological debate.8 De Lubac believed that many 
French historians—including  Aimé Puech, Pierre Batiffol, and Louis Duchesne—
repeated Harnack's claim that much of third century Christian thought had “transformed 
(Harnack calls him the “Christian Philo”) was responsible for “recasting” Christian faith as a dogma, in 
order to compete with the neo-Platonic systems of his day. He sought to transcend the Gospel for the 
sake of speculation. Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, vol. 2 (London: Williams and Norgate, 
1896), 11.
7 For an overview of Harnack's dichotomization of historical interpretation and metaphysical speculation, 
see James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century, 
2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 287.
8 To what extent was Christianity's doctrinal development the result of a permeation by Greek or Platonic 
philosophy? And was this development a negation of the Gospel? Is the metaphysical form of 
Scholastic thought fundamentally at odds with the historical form of the Scriptures? The response often 
adopted by Catholic apologists generally responded to Harnack's Hellenization thesis by denying 
differences between the New Testament teaching and latter dogmatic formulations, arguing that the later 
formulations were a development, but a logical development necessitated by the Scriptures themselves.
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Christianity into a philosophy.”9 Indeed, contemporary scholarly opinion regarded Origen 
as promulgating a “tool for obtaining a 'timeless superunderstanding' of the Bible,”10 a 
hermeneutic that saw the events narrated in scripture as mythical expressions of a 
philosophical reality.11 
While scholars of early Christianity criticized the spiritual interpretation of 
Scripture, especially in Origen, for its mythological reading of scripture, Rudolf 
Bultmann's influential program proposed a “demythologization” of Scripture itself. 
Bultmann suggested that God's sovereign actions in history are themselves transcendent 
and ineffable. The Bible contains the report of God's actions clothed in the worldview of 
its writers. Demythologization was, in effect, the process of translating the mythical 
vestment of biblical narrative into the historical and existential categories of 
contemporary humanity. The culture-bound mythical formulations of Scripture must now 
find a transposition into modern language, the language of existentialism. Bultmann's 
biblical criticism, according to de Lubac, established a radical break between God's 
9 The quotation is taken from Aimé Puech, Recherches sur le discours aux Grecs de Tatien (1903) in de 
Lubac, History and Spirit, 93 note 258. See also 259-261. These scholars, de Lubac argued, 
misunderstood Origen's allusions to the need to pass to a deeper meaning or a “higher teaching.”  For 
them, it expressed a gnostic doctrine: that the historical events of redemption, including Christ's 
sacrifice, were only for beginners; that to advance spiritually, one must pass beyond the external and 
corporeal events of salvation; that there exists a more profound knowledge—a philosophical, gnostic 
meaning—for those who are “spiritual.” De Lubac also mentioned Alain Guy, who stated that allegory 
derived a “philosophical meaning” from the Bible and used the Bible as a “kind of philosophical code 
and a springboard for ontological mediation.” Henri de Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian 
Allegory,” in Theological Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 175. Originally published 
as “Allégorie hellenistique et allégorie chrétienne” Recherches de science religieuse 47 (1959): 5-43.
10 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 174.
11 History and Spirit outlined the two principle criticisms of Origen. First, Origen “infused Hellenism 
broadly into the biblical tradition' and…substituted a 'metaphysical truth' received from another source 
for the 'absurdity of the text taken in its literal sense.” De Lubac,  History and Spirit, 15. Second, Origen 
refused the historicity of the meaning of scripture, distancing himself from the literal meaning of the 
text. Ibid., 17. Others imagined that Origen was a Platonist or that he anticipated idealist philosophy.
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actions and the form by which they are communicated.12 In his own work, Bultmann 
reproduced what was criticized in Origen, the transposition of biblical narrative into the 
philosophy of the day. 
C. De Lubac's Assessment of Hellenism within Christian Theology
De Lubac essentially agreed with the now-classic contrast between Greek 
metaphysics and Christian historical thought. However, he differed from Harnack on 
whether early Christianity in general and Origen in particular followed the pattern of 
Greek metaphysics. History and Spirit and “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory” 
challenged the position that “all Christian allegory is bound to be related, in its origins 
and characteristics, to the doctrines of intellectual paganism that allegorized its myths and 
to Philo's exegesis.”13 De Lubac noted, “the main question that comes up with respect to 
Origen is less of knowing whether he was an intellectualist or a mystic, or in what 
measure he was one or the other, than of knowing whether he was fundamentally 
'Hellenist' or Christian.”14 De Lubac did not dispute the profound influence of the 
Hellenistic milieu on Christian theology or the use of Greek categories by the Church 
Fathers. Yet, de Lubac argued that early Christianity developed allegory, not as a 
12 Henri de Lubac, “La Révélation divine: Commentaire du préambule et du chaptre I de La Constitution 
‘Dei Verbum’ du Concile Vatican II,” in Révélation divine – Affrontements mystiques – Athéisme et sens  
de l’homme, vol. 4, Œuvres complètes (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2006), 70. Originally published as Henri 
de Lubac, La Révélation divine: Église Catholique Romaine, Councile Vatican II [1962-1965] (Lyon: 
La Bonté, 1966).
13 “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 165.  De Lubac writes that Philo “develops a timeless 
allegory that maintains no internal relation with biblical history. This is not at all the case with Origen.” 
De Lubac,  History and Spirit, 22.
14 Ibid., 48. De Lubac states that he intends to show that Origen distanced himself from “a 'Platonic 
gnosis.'” Ibid., 93.
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repetition of Hellenistic categories, but as a reflection upon the realities expressed in the 
Gospel.
The essential difference between Hellenistic thought and early Christian thought 
was a differing understanding of history. De Lubac explains,
There  are  two  features  in  the  allegorism of  the  philosophers  that  appear  constantly 
whatever the text on which their work is based or the system that they deduce from it;  
whatever purpose guides them or the precise nature of the method they use. For on the  
one hand they reject as myth what appears as a historical account, and deny to its literal  
sense what they claim to reveal in its meaning as a mystery: their ύπόνοια [esoteric  
meaning] is, in the strictest sense, an άλληγορία [allegory]. .… On the other hand, if they 
“spiritualize” in this way whatever purports to be historical, it is not for the purpose of a  
deeper understanding of history. They do not see mythical events as symbols of spiritual 
happenings;  but perceive beneath the historical  veil  scientific,  moral  or  metaphysical 
ideas.15 
Hellenistic allegorical interpretation reinterpreted unseemly and irreverent exploits of the 
gods in Homer and the poets by recasting those stories as allegories or myths for 
philosophical or scientific truths.16 In sum, pagan philosophical allegory, for de Lubac, 
refused the historical account in favor of discovering the “power of nature,” the 
“harmony of the universe,” or “the original matter,” in these myths. This form of 
allegorization also influenced Philo of Alexandria, a first-century Jewish philosopher. 
While Philo did not deny that the events of Scripture occurred, he believed that “they are 
of no interest save through what they symbolize.”17
15 Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 166. 
Originally published as Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogma, Coll Unam Sanctam 3 (Paris: Cerf, 
1938). 
16 “For the philosophers, in all the stories that serve as material for their theories, it is not a question of 
personal beings or spiritual facts; the tangible individuality of heroes or gods is transformed under their 
eyes into the nature of things or of the human soul or of divinity diffused everywhere; their 'allegory' 
(their  ύπόνοια [esoteric meaning] dissipates all history, all real drama; it makes everything 'vanish into 
the elements of the world.'” De Lubac,  History and Spirit, 21.  
17 De Lubac,  Catholicism, 167. In “Hellenistic Allegory,” de Lubac cites Jean Pépin, whose studies argue 
the early Christian tradition adapted a method from Stoic philosophy. De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory 
and Christian Allegory,” 117-118. Interpreting a kinship among the allegorical interpretation of St. Paul, 
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According to de Lubac, Hellenistic allegorical method exemplifies certain 
presuppositions concerning the meaning of history, which, in Catholicism, he attributed 
to Platonism, Buddhism, certain Indian religions, and Christian heresies such as 
Manichaeism, Docetism, and Gnosticism.18 These religions and philosophies envisioned 
human destiny as an individualist escape from history.19 This pattern of conceiving 
history is circular, dualistic, and phenomenal. Despite their diversity, de Lubac asserts,  
“running all through these many differences there is always agreement about the basis of 
the problem and its presuppositions: the world from which escape must be sought is 
meaningless, and the humanity that must be outstripped is without a history.”20 Within 
this pattern, history is cyclical and what occurs in time will return again ad infinitum.21 
Origen, Porphyry, and Sallust, Pépin argues “that the essential attitude of Christians toward the Bible 
was the same as that of the Greeks toward their myths.” Ibid., 178, note 82.
18 Susan K. Wood noted this correlation between exegetical methods and philosophies of history. She 
indicates that de Lubac interprets the fourfold sense as a theology of history. In other words, de Lubac 
does not treat the fourfold sense for its own sake, but only insofar as it proposes a particular 
understanding of temporality. The correlation is present early in de Lubac's career in Catholicism (a 
chapter entitled “Christianity and History” directly precedes and corresponds with the one entitled “The 
Interpretation of Scriptures.”) Catholicism is significant for two reasons. First, de Lubac's first book 
anticipates many of the themes that are developed later in his career. Second, it provides a broader 
perspective on how de Lubac understands the alternatives to a Christian conception of history. His other 
writings on the history of exegesis often make only glancing allusions to problems that he is attempting 
to resolve. In contrast, Catholicism provides a wider lens for de Lubac's fundamental concerns. It is 
therefore important to read his writings on exegesis in light of his earlier Catholicism.
19 De Lubac,  Catholicism, 140–41. Catholicism identified an opposite stream of thought within 
contemporary thought, exemplified by Marxism, that envisions a purely historical destiny of a corporate 
humanity. Catholicism made little effort to explicate this second stream of thought or philosophies of 
historical progress that underly it. However, the main argument of the book is that Christianity 
possesses a different view of the social unity of humanity than do philosophies of historical 
immanentism. The context for Catholicism is the balkanization of the Catholic Church amidst the rise of 
totalitarianism and nationalism throughout Europe and the loss of the Church's social cohesion. 
Catholicism was published in 1938, prior to the German invasion. The pressing need was to assert the 
social and historical dimensions of Catholicism in the face of a growing spiritual individualism. During 
and after the German occupation, de Lubac more directly emphasized the narratives of history within 
atheistic humanism. He suggested that those philosophies proposing an escape from history and those 
proposing a historical immanent human destiny shared certain fundamental tenants.
20 Ibid., 139.
21 “The 'eternal return,' from which nothing may be expected, each of its phases—the Great Year, 
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Insofar as the events of history will perpetually recur, history itself is phenomenal and 
unessential. In this historical cycle—de Lubac calls it an “infernal cycle”22—there is no 
true forward movement. Salvation or fulfillment consists in an escape from materiality 
and history, a spiritual ascent to the One, or the escape from the desires of this world. The 
world itself is something from which we require salvation or escape.
Platonic metaphysics in particular supported a phenomenal view of history. It 
posed a dichotomy between the world of ideas—made up of stable and unchanging 
essences— and the world we experience, the world of appearances. Platonic dualism—
the sensible and intelligible, temporal and eternal, appearance and reality, illusion and 
truth—affected its appraisal of history.23 History, of course, falls on the side of the 
sensible, temporal, appearance, and illusion. It is not that the events of history are  
unimportant, but they symbolize in movement what exists eternally. Historical reality is 
'this moving image of unmoving eternity,' 'this eternal image without end' which is 
'unfolded in a circle following the law of numbers'”24 De Lubac recognized within 
Hellenistic thought in general, and Platonism specifically, a tendency towards a 
phenomenal view of historical events whereby history is always something to be 
eclipsed.  
The Greek philosophical view of mythical narrative reflected this dualism. To 
attain the intelligible truth, the particularity of history or myth must be stripped away. 
Mahâkalpa, Jubilee or whatever it is called—the end of one being the beginning of another, with never a 
forward movement, how overpoweringly monotonous it all is!” Ibid.
22 Ibid., 142.
23 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 186.
24 De Lubac,  Catholicism, 141–42. 
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According to Plotinus, “myths distribute throughout time and separate from each other 
beings who are not separated in reality…they cause to be born what was never begun, 
they divide it, thus teaching what they can and leaving to one who understands the task of 
recomposition.”25 According to Sallust, “it is not that these things [myths] never 
happened, because they always exist; but the discourse can express only successively 
what the understanding sees and grasps at the same time”26 In other words, Hellenistic 
religious myth served as a metaphoric vehicle or an allegorization of the truth which has 
always been. 27 
In sum, the central theme running throughout these works is that Hellenistic 
thought vacates history of meaning, leading to a mythical interpretation of religious 
narratives. Possessing no truth in themselves, these histories symbolize atemporal truths, 
whether philosophical, moral, or cosmological. Allegorical interpretation, in its pagan 
forms, was the tool used to discover a deeper philosophical truth beyond religious myth. 
However, de Lubac would argue that Christian allegorical interpretation, far from 
negating the importance of history, was the primary tool Christians used to preserve its 
meaning.
25 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 182.
26 Ibid., 182.
27 De Lubac suggested that the Christian docetistic heresy especially bore the mark of a Hellenistic 
conception of religious myth and history. By conceiving a divide between the mere human appearance 
of Jesus and his divinity, Docetism repeated the Hellenistic pattern whereby that which occurs in time is 
unsubstantial and phenomenal and in which the events of salvation become a mere appearance or a sign 
that points to a reality that they do not themselves embody. De Lubac stated that Christianity overturns 
the “docetist mitigation” of history. De Lubac,  Catholicism, 141. Additionally, “Gnosticism tends 
toward a universal docetism,” thereby repeating a pattern inherited from Hellenistic thought. Ibid., 145 
note 29.
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D. Christian Allegory as a Subversion of Hellenism
Despite superficial similarities with Hellenistic thought, De Lubac argued, early 
Christian exegetical practices diverged significantly from Hellenism.28 He suggested that 
the allegorical interpretation of Scripture (which, as de Lubac claims, influenced the 
entire development of Christian theology) was neither a syncretistic melding of Greek 
philosophy with the Scriptures, nor was it a transformation of the Gospel into 
philosophical categories. In practice, de Lubac claimed, Christian allegory and its 
conception of history functioned as an 'antithesis' or subversion of Greek allegory.29 By 
drawing the opposition between Greek and Christian allegorical interpretation, de Lubac 
could counter the supposition that the Christian doctrinal tradition was merely a repetition 
of Greek ontological categories. 
Yet some current literature suggests that the nouvelle théologie in general and de 
Lubac in particular espoused a recovery of Neoplatonism or depended upon Neoplatonic 
ontology. Wayne J. Hankey, John Milbank, David Grumett, Guy Mansini, and Hans 
Boersma have each, to some extent, attributed Neoplatonism to de Lubac.30 In general 
28 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 183. The value of history is a critical and 
consistent claim running through Catholicism, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” History 
and Spirit, and Exégèse Médiévale.
29 Susan K. Wood notes his anti-Platonism within both his understanding of exegesis and in his 
ecclesiology. See Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 46 and 100.
30 Wayne Hankey suggests that the ressourcement of the Greek Fathers within the Nouvelle Théologie—
especially de Lubac and Daniélou—and within the series Sources chrétiennes was indeed a turn to a 
Platonic ontology. He writes, “Those who were seeking an alternative to Thomism, whose scientific 
divisions of this kind they associated with its Aristotelianism, generally saw Platonism as involving the 
desired integration for the sake of theology understood as mystical itinerarium.” Wayne J. Hankey, 
“Neoplatonism and Contemporary French Philosophy,” Dionysius 23 (December 2005): 143. Following 
Hankey, John Milbank concludes that de Lubac's entire work is informed by a Neoplatonic ontology. 
Milbank attributes a thoroughly neo-Platonic ontology to de Lubac (and to Thomas Aquinas!). John 
Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (Grand 
92
they appeal to Neoplatonic ontology in order to explain aspects of de Lubac's theology of 
grace, his theology of the supernatural, or his challenge to the Scholastic theory of “pure 
nature.”
Boersma, particularly, has claimed a link between de Lubac's theology and 
Neoplatonic ontology. He interprets de Lubac's opposition to the theory of “pure nature” 
as a critical adoption of a roughly Christian Neoplatonist ontology derived from the 
Greek Fathers. This ontology, according to Boersma, envisions created realities as 
sacraments of the divine and eternal. The invisible is made present in the visible; the 
transcendent is made present in the immanent; the supernatural is made present in the 
natural; the divine is made present within history.31 
Boersma further argues that the nouvelle théologie adopted a “unified view of 
reality,” expressed by the term néoplatonisme belgo-français.32 Although he stops short of 
stating that the nouvelle théologie expressly depended upon Neoplatonic ontology, he 
affirms fundamental commonalities. In a subsequent book, he doesn't hesitate to align 
Neoplatonism and Christian sacramental thinking.33
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 26. David Grumett believes that de Lubac's denial of the 
theory of pure nature requires an ontology found within Teilhard de Chardin, which he suggests 
resembles Neoplatonism. David Grumett, “Eucharist, Matter, and the Supernatural: Why De Lubac 
Needs Teilhard,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 10, no. 2 (2008): 165–78.
31 By framing the relationship between the historical (visible) and the mystical (invisible) in terms of 
natural and supernatural, Boersma misses how, for de Lubac, the historical is not merely “natural” 
because it is the place of God's self-revelation. Indeed, the “natural-supernatural” distinction is 
ultimately unsuitable for explicating the relationship between history and revelation.
32 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 114. 
33 Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (William B. Eerdmans, 
2011), 117. It is somewhat unclear what Boersma refers to the “Platonizing tendencies” within de 
Lubac's thought. Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology,” 273. He concretely points to de Lubac’s insistence 
that human beings have a natural desire for God with a Platonic sensibility: “De Lubac was unyielding 
on the issue of desiderium naturale [natural desire] because it provided an essential theological link 
with a patristic, more or less Neoplatonic mindset, which had been sacramental in character.” Boersma, 
Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 98. 
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Boersma recognizes several instances where de Lubac affirms the gratuity of 
grace by strongly distancing his theology of grace from Neoplatonic ontologies that fail 
to distinguish between the created order and God's redeeming grace.34 Boersma writes, de 
Lubac's anti-Platonic “comments may seem to make it difficult to look to de Lubac as a 
resource for the recovery of a more sacramental ontology that relies in part on the 
Platonic tradition.”35 By implication, a sacramental view of reality requires something 
like a Neoplatonic ontology. Boersma explains that de Lubac's anti-Platonism was an 
obligatory defense against his critics, who accused him of losing the gratuity of grace. 
The question left unanswered is whether, in Boersma's view, de Lubac's theology of grace 
and understanding of sacraments requires support from a Neoplatonist metaphysics.
The attribution of Neoplatonism or elements of it to de Lubac is misleading on 
several counts. First, parallels between Neoplatonism and de Lubac's theology are not, 
strictly speaking, unique to Neoplatonism. De Lubac himself recognized similarities 
within a general mystical tradition found in Hellenism, Philo, Origen, and patristic 
theology, including Origen and Augustine, through the Medieval period.36 Second, these 
Boersma’s reasons for closely relating Neoplatonism and sacramental ontology are not entirely 
clear. He suggests that Platonism has certain broad characteristics that make it amenable to sacramental 
ontology: the visible is a sign of the invisible; the universe is destined to ascend to the One; the 
immanent is open to be lifted up to the transcendent. If the natural universe can be a sign of the 
supernatural, one might suppose that natural could mediate the supernatural. Yet two aspects of Platonic 
thought cannot be easily fitted to Christianity: first, its lack of clear delineation between the created and 
uncreated orders; second, its lack of respect for history. The neo-Scholastics accused de Lubac and the 
nouvelle théologie of the first; the writers of the nouvelle théologie accused the neo-Scholastics of the 
second. Both accused each other of having too close allegiances to Greek metaphysics.
34 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 89. 
35 Ibid., 90. 
36 “[I]n the Bible so many things 'are given in parables and enigmas.' It is all 'full of mysteries.'” De 
Lubac, History and Spirit, 184.“This way of thinking, which Origen shares with Philo as well as others, 
would more or less be that of the whole patristic age. It would persist as well into medieval theology.” 
Ibid., 185. However, he states that is was not sufficient for understanding the threefold sense, which 
“had the merit of bringing out Christianity and its interpretation of the Bible in all their originality, 
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scholars interpret a congruence with Neoplatonism primarily in de Lubac's writings on 
nature, grace, and supernatural finality.37 Yet they neglect the clear anti-Platonic themes 
within his writings on exegesis.38 As a result, the anti-Platonism within de Lubac's 
theology of history is overlooked.
De Lubac's monograph on Origen, History and Spirit, highlights the anti-Platonic 
intention of his work. It argues that although Origen was indebted to the broader 
Hellenistic milieu and the Scriptural interpretation of the Hellenized Jews of Alexandria, 
the fundamental spirit of his exegesis is different.39 More generally, the Christian 
allegorical and symbolic interpretation of the first centuries overcame a Hellenistic view 
of history: “As paradoxical as this might appear to a modern mind, was not one of the 
especially in contrast to Philo.” Ibid.
37 De Lubac drew from the Greek and Latin fathers in order to recover a theological anthropology in 
which human beings possess a single, supernatural finality. De Lubac's critics find his theological 
anthropology to inadequately preserve the autonomy of nature and the gratuity of grace, reflecting a 
more or less Platonic ontology. While it is beyond the scope of this project to address de Lubac's 
theological anthropology, I should mention that his conception of human finality reflects his 
understanding of finality within the historical order. An adequate assessment of de Lubac's theological 
anthropology would need to examine his theology of history, in which his anti-Platonism is key. 
38 For example, against Daniélou, de Lubac argued that early Christian allegorical interpretation of 
Scripture was fundamentally distinct from its Hellenistic and Platonic counterparts. See Henri de Lubac, 
“Typology and Allegorization,” in Theological Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 129–
164. Originally published as “'Typologie et allégorisme” Recherches de science religieuse (1947): 180-
226.
39 De Lubac was quick to point out the “Hellenic factor in the Origenian synthesis.” He admitted that 
Hellenistic and Philonic interpretation had a great influence upon Origen, and in many respects Origen 
is similar to Philo. De Lubac explained the reason that many scholars group Origen and the wider 
Christian allegorical tradition with Philo: “Seen from a distance, certain doctrinal groupings or certain 
patterns might seem closely related because a slight common atmosphere envelops them. There has 
been much confusion, between the spiritual exegesis of the Fathers of the Church and the allegorism of 
the Greek philosophers, of which it is the exact opposite.” De Lubac, History and Spirit, 182. De Lubac 
asks us to “perceive, beneath the surface of resemblances, the antagonism of fundamental assertions, 
and beneath the apparent borrowings, the radical transformations.” Ibid., 22. More broadly, de Lubac 
argued that while early Christianity distinguished “letter from spirit, or biblical history and the mystery 
borne by it, or figure and fulfillment, or shadow and truth, they do not in the least draw their inspiration, 
even indirectly, from the Platonic distinction between opinion and true knowledge.” Henri de Lubac, 
Scripture in the Tradition (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001), 165. Originally 
published as L'ecriture dans la tradition (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1967).
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motives for this symbolism in the Christian thinking of the first centuries, precisely to 
assure history a meaning that pagan antiquity had denied it?”40 Rather than transposing 
Greek categories upon the Gospel, this exegesis subverted those very categories to 
communicate a particular understanding of time. 
Hellenistic allegory, is structured around two poles: the sensible and intelligible, 
temporal and eternal, appearance and reality, illusion and truth. Like Hellenistic allegory, 
Christian allegory was based on a duality. Yet in early Christian allegory, the duality was 
no longer between a changing history, on the one hand, and the unchanging atemporal 
truth, on the other. Instead, it was built upon the duality between two events within 
history: the events of Old Testament and the Christ event that fulfills them:
Two meanings that make one, or of which the first, very real in itself, must step aside for 
another from the moment that the creative transfiguring Event takes place, are not at all  
the same as two meanings that exclude each other in the way that appearance and reality, 
or “illusion” and truth do.41
According to de Lubac, the Christian duality between the “letter” of Scripture and its 
“Spirit” was fundamentally a relationship between the Old Testament and New 
Testament.42 Christian allegory assumes that God has truly intervened in the events 
narrated in the Old Testament. The “allegorization” of that Old Testament history is its 
interpretation in light of another, more ultimate intervention.
In “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” de Lubac characterizes Christian 
allegorization as the “antithesis” or reversal of Greek allegory:
40 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 9.
41 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 186.
42 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 194. De Lubac adds that the “general relation between the letter and the 
spirit” is seen by Origen as “a first principle of Christianity.” Ibid., 195.
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Just as the τυπικά [types] or the συμβολικά [symbols] of the Old Testament or the literal 
reading of the Gospel is not a misleading appearance, the ἀληθινά [truths] or the νοητά 
[intelligible things] of the New Testament or the final ends are not some kind of essences 
or immaterial ideas. Jesus is the “truth,” he is “full of truth,” because he has made “all  
shadow and cloud” vanish by putting an end to the literal observance of the law. But the 
law was no less genuinely historically promulgated and observed .… For Christians, the 
πράγματα  [things]  of  Christian  allegory,  its  “invisible  realities,”  are  also  “future 
benefits,” eschatological, the participation promised as Christ's legacy. Hence far from 
being  analogous,  even  vaguely so,  to  the  Greek  opposites  to  which  they have been  
compared,  the  Christian  opposites—letter  and  spirit,  darkness  and  truth,  history  and 
mystery—are their antitheses. The union of the two terms in the distinction, which is 
also the distinction of the two “Testaments” from each other, reveals a world of thought 
that philosophers reflection on and refining their myths never suspected might exists..… 
Thus, the very structure of the symbolism used by the two groups is different.43
In opposition to Hellenistic allegorization, Christian allegorization of the Old Testament 
affirms that the Old Testament events are authentic interventions by God in time. 
Significantly, this allegorization does not interpret the Old Testament as a myth for an 
atemporal truth. Instead, allegories are the Old Testament promises fulfilled in the future, 
the objects of hope and expectation.
According to de Lubac, Christian allegory preserves the notion the events of 
history are critical for salvation: 
Far from showing that the Christians shared the same idea (at least formal) of “religious  
philosophy” as the Greeks, far from constituting—following an old polemical expression
—a sign of the contamination of the Christian idea by the Greek idea, Christian allegory 
expresses the inverse idea: the idea of the spiritual significance and consequently the  
primary importance of the very reality that man experiences in the course of time and of 
the event itself; the idea that in this reality there are “radical changes, absolute initiatives, 
veritable interventions,” producing a history worthy of its name, a history of mankind's  
salvation...; the idea, above all, of a more radical change than any other, as extraordinary 
in the spiritual order as the miracle of the water changed to wine in Cana was in the 
perceptible one.…It was a “conversion,” a “transposition,” a “transfiguration.”44
The Christian allegorization of the Old Testament, instead of discovering moral, 
43 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 187.
44 Ibid., 196.
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scientific, or metaphysical principles, reflects a theology of history that has been shaped 
at its root by God's intervention into history.
While de Lubac was aware of a great diversity within Christian biblical 
interpretation, he asserted that a stream of allegory from St. Paul to the medieval period 
diverged significantly from Hellenism. In Exégèse médiévale he argued that Origen 
systematized and transmitted this Christian form of allegorical interpretation of Scripture 
that became the inheritance of patristic and medieval thought. And it was this exegetical 
tradition which preserved a uniquely Christian comprehension of history, of the 
intervention of the divine Word into history, and of the relationship of events to the Word. 
De Lubac's anti-Hellenistic argument functioned to allow a space for the absolute 
intervention in, and transformation of, history by God.
II.   Spiritual Interpretation and the Structure of History
In the previous section, I indicated how de Lubac contrasted Christian and 
Hellenistic allegory. He argued that the two fundamentally differed in their understanding 
of history. This section develops a reading of de Lubac's theology of history based on his 
affirmations concerning the spiritual interpretation of scripture. I argue that de Lubac's 
ressourcement of spiritual interpretation is essentially a reflection on the historical  
economy of salvation and that, in his view, spiritual interpretation constitutes an 
epiphonemenon of a Christian understanding of that historical economy. First, I show 
that, for de Lubac, “spiritual meaning” indicates that history possesses a depth beyond its 
phenomenal surface. Second, I explain how the unity among the multiple meanings of 
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scripture have their basis in the unity of the history of salvation. As a result, for de Lubac 
there is an interconnection between the events of history that de Lubac describes as an 
“ontological bond” between historical realities of different eras.
A. Spiritual Meaning as the Depth of the Historical Event
De Lubac noted that some patristic and medieval theologians promulgated a 
subjective or mystical explanation for spiritual interpretation. They suggested that the Old 
Testament authors had a privileged insight into Christ, and therefore when they spoke 
they were also vaguely speaking of Christ. While de Lubac did not entirely dismiss this 
idea, he wished to attenuate what he called a subjective interpretation, today untenable, 
that the prophets were privy to a mystical vision of Christ in advance.45 Instead of looking 
on the level of mystical psychology, he affirms what Dom Charlier says about looking for 
it “in the objective realm of realities in a living development. That presence [of Christ in 
the Old Testament] transcends consciousness and man; it is in the profound logic of 
events and ideas.”46 In de Lubac's interpretation of the traditions of spiritual exegesis, the 
underlying rationale for “spiritual meaning” was an ontological relationship among the 
realities of history themselves. It assumed that somehow Christ is already-interior to the 
realities narrated in the Old Testament.
Within Catholicism, de Lubac initiated a theme running throughout his writings: 
45  De Lubac, History and Spirit, 464, note 110. De Lubac noted that it may be possible to affirm a kind of 
“implicit knowledge,” grounded in the “dynamism” of the spirit, by which the rites of the Old Covenant 
carried out in faith were joined to those of the New Covenant. Yet, he avoided a justification for this 
“implicit knowledge” in a mystical psychology of the authors of the Old Testament. Ibid., 464, note 
108.
46 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 465.
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the historical form of salvation.47 Because salvation is realized and progresses 
historically, de Lubac could no longer think of history as composed of mere facts or 
occurrences. The facts of history are “no longer phenomena, but events, acts.”48 History, 
he wrote, “possesses... a certain ontological density and fecundity.” As de Lubac 
explained, this “ontological density and fecundity” is due to the fact God acts within the 
historical world, gives history a depth that it would otherwise not contain.
God acts in history and reveals himself through history. Or rather, God inserts himself in 
history and so bestows on it a “religious consecration” which compels us to treat it with 
due respect. As a consequence historical realities possess a profound sense and are to be 
understood in a spiritual manner, ίστορικἀ πνευματικως; conversely, spiritual realities 
appear  in  a  constant  state  of  flux  and  are  understood  historically:  πνευματικἀ 
ίστορικως.49
Because God acts within history, there is an infinite depth to those actions and history 
possesses symbolic or sacramental dimensions. The “ontological density” or spiritual 
depth of history undergirds the Christian practice of finding”'spiritual meanings” within 
the events narrated by Scripture. 
De Lubac explained that although the exegetical tradition extrapolated multiple 
spiritual senses of scripture (allegory, tropology, anagogy), these senses initially form a 
unity. “Each of these meanings,” de Lubac claimed, “is at first expressed in the 
singular.”50 The multiple senses are first the “spiritual sense.” De Lubac explained that 
the spiritual sense represents primarily the inner meaning of the events of salvation, and 
only secondarily does it function as a hermeneutic for interpreting the details of scripture. 
47 “So in close connection with the social character of dogma there is another character, equally essential, 
and that is the historic[al].”  De Lubac, Catholicism, 141. If salvation is the salvation of the whole 
human race, and the human race develops in time, then salvation takes a historical form. 
48 Ibid., 142.
49 Ibid., 165.
50 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 122.
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The practice of spiritual interpretation of scripture is primarily a Christian reflection on 
the interior depths of history. De Lubac admitted that many particular spiritual 
interpretations of the patristic and medieval periods were fanciful. At the same time, by 
emphasizing that multiple senses are first singular, he indicated that the basis for spiritual 
interpretation as a whole is an authentically Christian reflection on history. De Lubac at 
once indicated the roots of the practice and deemphasized the most questionable features 
of spiritual interpretation. 
According to de Lubac, spiritual interpretation reflected a belief that historical 
events contained hidden spiritual depths. He explains, 
The Bible brings him [the Christian believer] a history that is the history of salvation:  
“magnum sacramentum spei ac salutis nostrae a saeculis antiquis depositum” [a great 
mystery of our salvation and hope is stored up from the ages of old]. This mysterious 
history  is  completely  imbued  with  a  profound significance,  which  is  its  spiritual  or 
mystical meaning, in turn, allegorical, moral and anagogical.51 
De Lubac argued that, for the great tradition of Christian exegesis, the “spiritual 
meaning” found in the texts was not primarily in the text. Instead spiritual meaning was 
primarily within history and reality.52 “The spiritual meaning, then, is to be found on all 
sides, not only or more especially in a book but first and foremost in reality itself.”53 
51 Ibid., 122.
52 De Lubac claimed that Origen's spiritual interpretation is primarily concerned with discovering the 
inner meaning of history. This idea is echoed by Augustine, who says “In the very fact itself…we ought 
to seek the mystery.” De Lubac, Catholicism, 169 note 14. 
53 Ibid., 169. In “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory” de Lubac similarly explained that “Christian 
exegesis was claiming to discover a spiritual meaning in history.” De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and 
Christian Allegory,” 195. See Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 36. Mary Healy sums up de 
Lubac's understanding of the spiritual sense: “As de Lubac has demonstrated, the spiritual sense, 
correctly understood, is not a property of texts but of history. The spiritual sense does not refer to a 
literary relationship but an ontological relationship.…Thus the spiritual sense is not an additional 
meaning retrospectively superimposed upon the texts in light of new events, but something that was 
already hidden in those things written about in the texts.” Mary Healy, “Inspiration and Incarnation: 
The Christological Analogy and the Hermeneutics of Faith,” Letter and Spirit 2 (2006): 34.
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Thus, the events occurring within human historical experience contain a deeper, salvific 
meaning; spiritual meaning is, above all, a function of the spiritual depths of historical 
reality.
The language of exterior phenomena and interior mystery is another way to 
describe this spiritual depth. Spiritual interpretation suggested, for de Lubac, the 
movement from the exterior, material, perceptible, and phenomenal event to its secret or 
mysterious interior.54 He wrote, “facts…would be perceptible in one respect and divine in 
another.”55 The exterior materiality of historical facts cannot convey their complete 
significance. Similarly, de Lubac characterized spiritual meaning in terms of a “mystery” 
found already within the facts of history: “The mystery is not only announced, prefigured 
or assured by the facts: the facts themselves have an interior that in diverse ways is 
already pregnant with the mystery.”56 The “mystery” is something already interior to the 
bare event, but not exhausted by their pure materiality. 
In summary, de Lubac distanced Christian spiritual interpretation from Greek 
allegory in order to show that spiritual meaning was found within, rather than beyond, 
historical experience. In his account, the perception of a spiritual meaning of scripture is 
the perception of the reality expressed through the events of the history of salvation, and 
it is the perception of the significance of human historical experience.57 His emphasis on 
spiritual interpretation reflected a broader emphasis within his writings concerning the 
recovery of a 'sense of the sacred' and the mystical depths of everyday experience. 
54 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 112.
55 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 195.      
56 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 117. 
57 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 196.
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B.   The Fourfold Sense and the Ontology of History 
De Lubac explained the duality of the letter and spirit of Scripture in terms of the 
mystery hidden within the depths of history. However, the traditions of spiritual 
interpretation that de Lubac traced expanded this duality into multiple spiritual senses, 
often into a trichotomy (history, allegory, anagogy) or a quaternary (history, allegory, 
tropology, anagogy). As mentioned above, de Lubac's preferred example was the city of 
Jerusalem. In patristic biblical interpretation the historical city of Jerusalem becomes a 
figure of the church, but also of the soul, and of the heavenly Jerusalem. Events and 
persons narrated in scripture are symbolic anticipations of future realities. Within the 
trichotomy and quaternary, the fundamental metaphor shifts from a depth within the letter 
to a network of symbolic meaning.
I argue here that de Lubac explains the multiplicity of spiritual meanings—
allegory, morality, and anagogy—in order to relate the interconnected events in the 
historical economy of salvation. He explains their unity primarily in terms of the unity of 
the historical economy of salvation. As a result, the fourfold sense of scripture and 
threefold figuration suggests that the events of history are interconnected with each other 
in God's historical plan. First, I examine de Lubac's understanding of a progressive and 
unified historical revelation. Second, I explain how biblical figuration rests on the 
ontological bond between events in history.
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1. A Progressive and Unified Historical Revelation
The movement from one level of meaning to another—from history to allegory to 
morality to anagogy—was far from arbitrary. In “On an Old Distich,” de Lubac explained 
that the four levels of meaning comprise an interconnected unity: “These four levels of 
meaning do not fan out in different directions: they follow each other in a continuous 
series and form a simple whole.”58 Several images drawn from the Fathers illustrated this 
unity. De Lubac noted Jerome's image of the construction of a building, in which history 
was the foundation, dogma constituted the walls, morality constituted the furnishings, and 
anagogy was the roof. He also noted the image of excavation by which deeper and deeper 
levels are extracted from the Sacra Pagina.59 Each level of meaning is interlinked, but 
each subsequent level presupposes the previous as its basis. 
De Lubac explained that the images of excavation and construction were 
insufficient. De Lubac noted in Exégèse médiévale that texts from the medieval period, 
though employing the fourfold sense, often do not reveal the “secret soul of the theory.”60 
First, each of the meanings posseses a unitary identity:
We speak, as indeed we must, of diverse senses..… One superimposes them, juxtaposes 
them, or opposes them; one enumerates them and parades them in succession as if they 
were  so  many  independent  entities.  This  is  an  unavoidable  flattening  arising  from 
language, which did not deceive the ancients—any more than a good Thomist would 
take the principles of being of which he asserts the real distinction as so many “things.”  
Just as one ancient author says of the four degrees of contemplation, so ought we say of  
these four senses that they are interlinked like the rings of a priceless chain: concatenati  
sunt ad invicem.61
58 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 116–17.
59 Ibid., 117.
60 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:201.
61 Ibid.
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The senses of scripture reflect a single reality. But second, each level of meaning leads to 
the next as through different stages towards fulfillment: 
Each of them possesses a propulsive force such that the one leads to the other “through 
increments of understanding, as it  were by certain steps of the mind.” “The word of  
history” is  brought to  completion by “the sense of  allegory,”  and, in their  turn, “the 
senses of allegory” of themselves incline “to the exercise of morality.” We pass by means 
of a natural and necessary movement “from history to allegory, and from allegory to 
morality.” Allegory is in truth  the truth  of history; the latter, just by itself,  would be 
incapable of bringing itself intelligibly to fulfillment, allegory fulfills history by giving it 
its sense. The mystery that allegory uncovers merely makes it open up a new cycle; in its  
first  season,  it  is  merely  an  “exordium”;  to  be  fully  itself,  it  must  be  brought  to  
fulfillment in two ways. First it is interiorized and produces its fruit in the spiritual life,  
which is treated by tropology; then this spiritual life has to blossom forth in the sun of  
the kingdom; in this [blossoming forth consists] the end of time which constitutes the 
object of anagogy.62
Thus, each stage finds its fulfillment and completion in the next. The senses of scripture 
are suggestive of a succession from one phase to another.
“On an Old Distich” affirms that the multiple senses form a unity and that there is 
a succession from one to the other: 
But even that [previous] explanation is incomplete, because there is not only an essential 
interdependence among the four meanings, there is also a dynamic continuity. They truly 
engender each other in a way that makes their internal connection very strong. As we 
have just explained, they are not just parts of the same whole: the same reality exists in  
each of them; it is just that its different parts are viewed successively. The mystery is not 
only announced, prefigured or assured by the facts: the facts themselves have an interior  
that in diverse ways is already pregnant with the mystery.63
The meanings of scripture form more than parts of a single whole. Instead, de Lubac 
explains, “the same reality”—which de Lubac calls the “mystery”—“exists in each of 
them.” The unity of diverse senses of scripture reflects the singleness of the mystery in 
each stage of its development.64 Second, the meanings of scripture possess a “dynamic 
62 Ibid.
63 De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 117.
64 Moreover “same reality” existing in each of the meanings of scripture is the “mystery of salvation” 
which gradually unfolds within history. De Lubac described a “mystic identity” among each meaning of 
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continuity.”65 This is because each meaning brings about the next: “Each sense leads to 
the other as its end.”66
These two characteristics of the senses of Scripture—an organic development 
whereby one sense of scripture finds its truth in another and the unitary identity among 
them—share a single point of convergence, namely the unity and coherence of God's 
actions within history. The continuity between the senses of scripture primarily concerns 
historical realities about which Scripture speaks. The development from one meaning to 
another “is first of all temporal. In time history precedes the mystery; it is 
'prefiguration.'”67 The phenomenon of prefiguration in Scripture presupposes this 
relationship in the realities of which scripture speaks, the prefiguring temporal reality and 
the prefigured temporal reality.
scripture. Within his writings, the term mystère has resonances with the Greek patristic mysterion and 
the Latin patristic sacramentum. Mysterion essentially meant God's plan of salvation as it develops 
within history, culminating in Christ. In Pauline usage, mysterion referred to “the sacred plan of God 
from the unfolding of the history of the world.” The mystery encompasses both Christ's historical 
existence and his prefigurations in the Old Testament. The Greek patristic period generally followed 
Paul. Sacramentum becomes the standard translation of mysterion within the Latin Fathers. John D. 
Laurance, Priest as Type of Christ: The Leader of the Eucharist in Salvation History according to 
Cyprian of Carthage, vol. 5, American University Studies VII: Theology and Religion (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1984), 52–65. De Lubac's frequent use of mystère almost always denotes “God's design for man, 
whether as marking the limit of or the means of realizing this destiny.”  Henri de Lubac, The Church: 
Paradox and Mystery, trans. James R. Dunne (Staten Island, NY: Alba House, 1969), 13. Originally 
published as Henri de Lubac, Paradoxe et mystère de l’Église (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1967). 
“Mystery” is de Lubac's convention for the “economy of salvation,” either  salvation itself in its final 
consummation or the progressive historical stages of this salvation. Therefore, de Lubac's claim that the 
same “mystery” exists in each meaning of scripture expresses an unfolding of God's unitary plan of 
salvation. Further, de Lubac's use of mystère may suggest an interpretation of his writings on nature and 
grace (including The Mystery of the Supernatural) that incorporates his understanding of the historical 
economy of salvation.
65 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:201; de Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, 217.     
66 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:203. Footnote 49 quotes from Gregory In Ez VI, h. 3, n. 18: “per 
litteram ad allegoriam tendimus” [we extend to allegory through the letter].
67 Ibid., 2:202.
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A compact passage from Exégèse médiévale summarizes de Lubac's view of the 
evolution of the mystery through time: 
In the mystery, nothing suffers separation. Through each of its phases the coming of 
Christ “is something indivisible.” If the traditional understanding of Scripture perfectly 
assures, within the history of our salvation, this “junction of the event and the sense,” 
which, for every reflective mind, is one of the major preocuppations, it is by Christ and 
in Christ that the understanding assures that junction at each of its stages. It is always 
pointing to the mystery of Christ in its indivisibility. This is the selfsame unparalleled 
mystery which is again the mystery of ourselves and the mystery of our eternity.68
Here, de Lubac indicates that each phase of history is “indivisible” from the next. This is 
because each phase of salvation represents a gradual evolution of the mystery of Christ. 
History is the gradual unfolding of God's mysterious plan for humanity. And since each 
stage of this plan is an essential stage of growth, there exists an underlying unity among 
them.
In sum, de Lubac's explanation of the unity of the fourfold sense in Exégèse 
médiévale is essentially a recapitulation of his evolutionary view of history found within 
Catholicism. History itself contains an organic development towards a goal. Therefore, 
earlier stages of salvation possess the seeds, so to say, of what will occur later. The unity 
of God's plan forges unity among events in history, reflected in the fourfold sense. 
2. The Ontological Bond between Events
According to de Lubac, the concept of a graduated and progressive salvation 
engendered the idea that events in history share a “mystical identity” or interior 
relationship to further temporal and eschatological fulfillments. They share likeness to 
68 Ibid., 2:203.
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what follows because they will become what follows. Fundamentally, the two covenants 
are fundamentally interconnected: 
There is only one God, author of both Testaments, faithful to himself throughout both,  
and it is the same gesture of that God that is manifested by both, each in its own way; it  
is  the  same  salvation  that  each  announces.  For  every  Christian,  the  first  Testament  
already contains  Christ  in  a  mysterious  way,  but  it  is  consequently only understood 
through him.69
But also, according to de Lubac, the traditional symbolic correlations between biblical 
events—expressed in the concepts of figure, type, image, shadow, and anticipation—were 
far from arbitrary. These terms reflected a view of the integral relationship between 
events of history. In History and Spirit, he explains:
If, for example, the manna is really the figure of the Eucharist, or if the sacrifice of the 
paschal Lamb really prefigures the redemptive death, the reason for this is not extrinsic 
resemblance alone, no matter how striking this might be. There is actually an “inherent  
continuity” and “ontological bond” between the two facts, and this is due to the same 
divine will which is active in both situations and which, from stage to stage, is pursuing 
a single Design—the Design which is the real object of the Bible.70
The term “ontological bond” is an emphatic affirmation that there is an interior 
relationship among the events themselves.71 
According to de Lubac, Thomas Aquinas grasped this “ontological bond” between 
historical realities better than many who followed him. Thomas summarized and 
systematized this interconnection between the meanings of Scripture in the first question 
of the Summa Theologiae.72 He posed the question “Whether in Holy Scripture a word 
69 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 190.
70 Ibid., 462; de Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, 37.
71 De Lubac's language of interiority is joined by an ontological and sacramental language. De Lubac 
speaks of the relationship between history and allegory in terms of the relationship between res and 
veritas. For an extensive treatment of de Lubac's understanding of the “mutual interiority” of the senses 
of scripture, see Matthew T. Gerlach, “Lex Orandi, Lex Legendi: A Correlation of the Roman Canon 
and the Fourfold Sense of Scripture” (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 2011), chap. 8–9.
72 See de Lubac, “Typology and Allegorization,” 140. De Lubac states that Thomas brought clarity to an 
ambiguity within the tradition of allegorical interpretation by distinguishing between a “typical” 
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may have several senses?” The response grounds the multiple senses of Scripture in a 
relationship between realities.
I answer that,  The author of  Holy Writ  is  God, in whose power it  is to signify His 
meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, 
whereas  in  every  other  science  things  are  signified  by  words,  this  science  has  the 
property,  that  the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. 
Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense,  
the  historical  or  literal.  That  signification  whereby  things  signified  by  words  have 
themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal,  
and presupposes it.73 
For Thomas, the words of scripture signify realities, realities which in turn already exist 
within a web of signification. Since God created the realities referred to within the Bible, 
those realities themselves signify other realities, including the realities of salvation. 
Yet, de Lubac provided a slightly different emphasis than Thomas. De Lubac 
attributes to the patristic tradition a more explicit consciousness of the role of the 
historical economy in the multiple senses of scripture, and draws from this consciousness 
for his own understanding. The biblical symbolism that arises within patristic exegesis 
presumes an interior and ontological relationship between events in history.
III.  Origen and “Infinite Ontological Difference”
This section continues to develop an interpretation of de Lubac's theology of 
history based on his affirmations concerning spiritual interpretation. Above I argued that 
de Lubac emphasizes that the continuity between the senses of Scripture is based 
ultimately on an ontological interconnection between events in history. I described this 
meaning and a “metaphorical” meaning of allegory. Ibid., 156.  
73 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 1, 5 
vols., Second and Revised. (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947) I, 1, art. 10.
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correlation as “ontological” because the events of history are not merely related in 
concept but the underlying reality itself is somehow conjoined. Here, I show that de 
Lubac draws from Origen's exegesis for the rationale for this “ontological bond between 
events.” First, I briefly examine de Lubac's defense of allegorization due to its 
preservation of the difference between letter and spirit. De Lubac argued that Origen's 
exegetical principles suggested not only an organic development within historical 
economy salvation but also an ontological difference between stages in that economy. 
Second, I argue that de Lubac drew from Origen's leitmotif “the newness of the Gospel” 
to explain the difference between Christ and his anticipatory figures. Third, developing 
the idea in section I. of the uniqueness of the Christian view of history, I argue that de 
Lubac understands the unity of salvation history to result from a unique Event, an 
“historical exemplar.”74 Specifically, de Lubac envisioned a particular historical event—
the Christ event—as that which all of history images and anticipates. 
A. Allegory and Typology According to de Lubac
Contemporary scholarship on the early church, according to de Lubac, interpreted 
two competing modes of biblical interpretation at work in patristic exegesis:
We would thus have, on one side, the partisans of the divine “condescension” adapting 
itself to people who are still unrefined in order to elevate them gradually, through a wise 
“economy,” to a more pure religion; and on the other side, theorists of an allegorism 
thanks to which what appears to be an entirely material prescription unworthy of the 
Divinity can receive a sublime sense.75  
The difference consisted in how the church fathers interpreted the symbols and figures of 
74 While de Lubac did not deploy the term “exemplarism” with any systematic consistency, I find it useful 
to express the uniqueness of the Christ event in relationship to all of history.
75 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 284–5.  
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the Old Testament. On the one hand, there was an allegorical mode of interpretation, 
epitomized by Alexandrian exegetical traditions that emphasized that Old Testament 
figures were symbols of the truth found in the New Testament. On the other hand, church 
fathers such as Irenaeus emphasized that the Old Testament was a pedagogical 
preparation for the New. This historical and supposedly Hebraic mode of thought 
emphasized a progressive economy where biblical types pointed forward to their 
antitypes. As de Lubac noted, patristic scholarship in the 1940s contrasted symbolism to 
pedagogical preparation, or, as they called it, “allegory” to “typology,” respectively.76 
A Jesuit and former student of de Lubac's, Jean Daniélou, developed the contrast 
between “allegory” and “typology.” Daniélou's research grew out of his collaboration 
with Sources chrétiennes, a series of publications and translations into French of early 
Christian writings. The first volume was a translation of Gregory of Nyssa's The Life of 
Moses (1942), to which Daniélou wrote the editorial introduction. Daniélou wrote that 
Gregory of Nyssa, like Origen, integrated elements from Philo's symbolism with more 
historical mode of interpretation derived from the New Testament. He discerned a 
contamination of Greek allegory in the symbolism of the Alexandrian theologians. In a 
series of studies, Daniélou suggested that Origen followed Philo's exegesis too closely. 
He proceeded to further oppose Origen's allegory from a Christian mode of interpretation, 
which he called typology and that depended more closely on historical events.77 In studies 
76 See de Lubac, “Typology and Allegorization,” 129, note 1. Contemporary scholarship remains divided 
on whether the distinction between “allegory” and “typology” adequately describes differences between 
patristic authors. See Peter W. Martens, “Revisiting the Allegory/Typology Distinction: The Case of 
Origen,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 16, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 283–317.
77 Jean Danielou, “Traversee de la Mer Rouge et baptême aux premiers siècles,” Recherches de science 
religieuse 33 (1946): 492–30; Jean Danielou, “La typologie d’Isaac dans le christianisme primitif,” 
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that followed, he sought to distinguish an authentically Christian view of history.78 
Daniélou's recovery of a patristic understanding of biblical interpretation—which he 
called “typology”—was linked to his constructive development of a theology of history. 
He sought to discern a Christian theology of history within patristic exegesis in order use 
it to address the historical awareness within the contemporary age, especially as exhibited 
by Marxist thought.79 
The term “typology” derives from St. Paul's reference to types (τύποι): Adam is 
the “type of the one to come” (Rom. 5:14 NAB); the punishments of the Israelites in the 
Old Testament “happened as examples (τύποι) for us” (1 Cor. 10:6 NAB). Typology, as 
Daniélou conceived it, was the discernment of a series of analogical correspondences 
between events and persons within salvation history. According to Boersma, a type bears 
a likeness to a future reality that it signifies, which prepares for this future reality, without 
itself being that reality.80 Typology discovers a really existing pattern joining the events of 
history and the sacramental life of the church. 
In a 1947 article, de Lubac challenged Daniélou's opposition to “allegory” in 
favor of  “typology” and Daniélou's interpretation of Origen.81 De Lubac departed from 
Biblica 28 (1947): 363–93; Jean Danielou, “Les divers sens de l’Écriture dans la tradition chretienne 
primitive,” Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses 24 (1948): 119–26; Jean Danielou, Origène (Paris: La 
Table Ronde, 1948).
78 Jean Danielou, “Christianisme et histoire,” Études 80, no. 254 (1947): 166–184; Jean Danielou, 
Sacramentum futuri: Études sur les origines de la typologie biblique, Études de théologie historique 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1950); Jean Danielou, Essai sur le mystère de l’histoire, nouvelle édition. (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 1982).
79 Jean Danielou, “Les orientations presentes de la pensee religieuse,” Études, no. 249 (1946): 5–21; 
Danielou, “Christianisme et histoire.”
80 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 174.
81 One should not overemphasizethe division between Daniélou and de Lubac. As co-founders of Sources 
chrétiennes, they had a shared theological project. De Lubac's intentions and historical methods were 
similar to Daniélou's.
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Daniélou on several matters of historical interpretation: first, he argued that “typology” is 
a modern idea and was not distinct from “allegory” in the first centuries; second, the term 
“allegory,” despite the problems it often caused, was a dominant and traditional mode of 
exegesis; third, Christian allegory developed by Origen was fundamentally different from 
that of Philo and Hellenism. Whereas Daniélou sought to separate out the “typological” 
from the “allegorical” in order to distinguish a Christian understanding of history from 
what was a foreign import, de Lubac argued that Origen's allegorization itself preserved a 
Christian understanding of history. Here lies their methodological difference. 
De Lubac believed that Daniélou, to some extent, bought into a false dichotomy 
between an historical and an allegorical exegesis persistent within contemporary early 
Christian studies. The choice between Irenaeus, whose theology was that of an historical 
pedagogy, and Origen, whose theology saw the Old Testament as a symbol for heavenly 
realities, was specious:
This schema also lacks nuances. It is based on a false a priori that does not seem to be 
essential  rather  than  on  the  study of  the  texts..… Why would  the  preparation  for  a  
coming reality not be symbolic  of that  reality?  And why would the symbol have no 
pedagogical  value?  One  whole  modern  school,  as  we  know,  has  wished  to  see  in 
supernatural beliefs both a stage toward adult humanism and its anticipated symbol. In 
Proudhon's eyes, Catholicism as a whole symbolized socialism, which was to complete it 
by eliminating it. Christian antiquity, in any case, never seems to have perceived any 
opposition between an explanation of the ancient religion of Israel by symbolism and an 
explanation by divine “condescension” and the development of revelation.82 
Not only was this dichotomy false, but Origen himself combined historical preparation 
and symbolism within his allegory. The mutual opposition between allegory and 
pedagogy, or symbolism and history, was a thoroughly modern one, driven by a modern 
82 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 285.
113
dichotomization of history and metaphysics.83 De Lubac's preference for Origen's 
theology and its lack of a dichotomy between historical development and allegory reflects 
his refusal to mutually oppose history and metaphysics.
Although he agreed that the language of “allegory” lead to misunderstandings, de 
Lubac insisted against Daniélou that allegory contained an idea essential for a Christian 
interpretation of history: the transcendence of Christ in relationship to his anterior 
anticipations. While Daniélou maintained the superiority of Christ to his Old Testament 
figures, the language of typology suggested only a difference of degree. Typology 
suggested a series of analogous realities within Scripture (e.g., God's presence in the  
tabernacle, the temple, the physical body of Christ, the church), but failed to adequately 
express the transcendence of the Christ event. De Lubac claimed that allegory preserved 
the “worth of facts…endowed them with a sublime significance, in view of magnifying 
still another Fact.”84 This Fact is the historical life of Christ, which categorically 
transcends his anticipations. Unlike typology, Christian allegorization preserved a radical 
difference between the “letter” and the “spiritual meaning,” between figure and 
83 In “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory” de Lubac briefly indicates that the modern opposition 
between history and metaphysics is thoroughly Hellenistic in form. He compares the ancient interpreters 
of myth (Heraclides, Sallust, Proclus) with modern ones (Julius Wellhausen, D. F. Strauss, G. L. Bauer). 
Like the Greeks, who make religious stories into a myth opposed to metaphysical truth, the modern 
historians interpret biblical narratives as myths indicative of some moral or “cosmological knowledge.” 
De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 194–5.
84 Ibid., 194.
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fulfillment.85 While maintaining the inner ontological bond between an historical figure 
and its fulfillment, “allegory” served to also maintain their ontological difference.  
B. Christian Newness and the Transcendence of Allegory
De Lubac defended Origen's allegorical interpretation especially because it 
preserved two elements in harmony. First, it maintained the ontological bond between 
historical realities (e.g. Israel and the church) that reflected a development of salvation 
through time. Second, it maintained an ontological difference between those realities (e.g. 
the heavenly Jerusalem is not just a later stage in development of the city of Jerusalem, 
but is ontologically or categorically different). While de Lubac did not develop this 
second idea in a systematic manner, his History and Spirit, Exégèse Médiévale, and 
Scripture in the Tradition developed the idea that allegory implies this ontological 
difference between figure and fulfillment.
Newness and Transcendence: De Lubac borrows a theological vocabulary directly 
from Origen:  “newness of the spirit,” “newness of life,” “newness of Christ,” and 
“newness of Christianity.”86 “Newness” encapsulates the idea that the coming of Christ is 
something unprecedented in a long history of preparations. To speak of the Newness of 
Christ, or the New Testament is an ontological claim as much as a temporal claim. The 
85 The principles of Origen's exegesis, therefore, expressed a theme within de Lubac's Catholicism, that 
Christianity alone unites “both the transcendent destiny of man and the common destiny of mankind.” 
De Lubac, Catholicism, 140–41. In other words, Christianity unites vertical (transcendent) and 
horizontal (historical and social) dimensions of salvation. In de Lubac's reading, modern Catholicism 
exclusively emphasized the vertical dimension of salvation to the neglect of the horizontal dimension. 
De Lubac recognized that the desire for a salvation of the social and temporal has re-emerged without 
the vertical dimension, allowing it to take dangerous forms in Nazism, Fascism, Communism. 
86 De Lubac entitled the final chapter of Scripture in the Tradition,“The Christian Newness.” The idea, 
however, is found much earlier. See Ibid., 177, 269–70, 391. 
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New Testament is new—that is, categorically different from the Old—because it speaks 
of a fundamentally new situation between humanity and God, and not only because it 
comes later in time. The textual reality reflects an historical reality: Christ brings all 
newness in relationship to the law and the prophets. Allegory, therefore, encapsulates the 
idea of the absoluteness of the “act of Christ” in relation to previous figures.
While “newness” describes the categorical difference of allegory to history, de 
Lubac employs another term—transcendence—to describe the same phenomenon in his 
writings on Christology, nature and grace, and apologetics. In “The Light of Christ,” de 
Lubac described a chimerical notion of transcendence which emphasizes the supernatural 
origin of Christianity by ignoring the human and historical conditions of its development. 
He said that this transcendence can also be called “exteriority.”87 On the other hand, 
there is another transcendence, a true transcendence, of which the first was only, at best, 
the naïve transcription. An intrinsic transcendence, in virtue of which a given reality, 
considered as a synthesis, in what comprises its own being, surpasses essentially the  
realities of the same kind that surround it....  Any true synthesis is always more than 
synthesis.... It is, in a phenomenal continuity, the passage to a new, higher, incomparable 
order.88
While de Lubac is describing the transcendence of Christianity to preceding religious 
forms, his notion of transcendence closely aligns with his understanding of “allegory.” 
Allegory recognizes a continuity between the historical city of Jerusalem and the New 
Jerusalem within scripture, all the while allowing for a radical difference and disjunction. 
Ontological difference: De Lubac describes this radical difference as an 
ontological difference. The transcendence of the New Testament in relationship to the 




Old Testament epitomizes this relationship. But Christ is what effects this transcendence. 
As de Lubac explains, allegorical meaning is possible only due to a new principle 
brought about by Christ:
[The  Christian]  relationship  of  “allegory”  to  “history”  is  primarily,  as  we  know,  a 
relationship of “after” to “before.” But... it is not this alone. It not only makes us pass, as  
St. Augustine says, “ex illis quae facta sunt usque ad ista quae fiunt” [from past facts to 
present facts], but also, and by the same movement, makes us pass from things “quae 
sub umbra legis historialiter accidisse leguntur” (which one reads as having occurred 
historically  under  the  shadow of  the  Law)  to  those  which  “spiritualiter  eveniunt  in  
populo Dei tempore gratiae” [occur spiritually in the people of God in the age of grace]. 
Thus, it is also in the qualitative order.89
The Christic interpretive principle of the facts belongs to a different order of reality than 
the facts themselves, protecting the difference between history and allegory.90 The truth of 
the literal meaning, he stated, “does not, even from an entirely formal point of view, 
correspond to the truth” of its spiritual, that it allegorical, meaning.91 De Lubac makes it 
even more explicit, describing “an infinite ontological difference” and “an infinite 
qualitative difference” distinguishing anticipation and fulfillment.92 
Infinite Difference as a Principle of Continuity: Commonly, we think of a radical 
difference as a break or disruption. A likeness between one thing and another depend 
upon a shared quality or characteristic, which places the two things within the same 
category. Growth of an organism requires a continuity of identity with a change in 
characteristics (height, weight, age). For it to change into something completely different 
89 De Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, 159.
90 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:117.
91 Ibid., 2:103. Susan K. Wood observes something similar in de Lubac's Christology: “De Lubac's sense 
of the transcendent quality of grace and the radical rupture and newness achieved in Christ enable him 
to maintain the distinction between the two orders [of grace and nature].” Susan K. Wood, “The Nature-
Grace Problematic within Henri de Lubac’s Christological Paradox,” Communio 19, no. 3 (1992): 401.
92 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:98; de Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, 159.
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would be its cessation of existence or loss of identity. The principle at work within de 
Lubac's understanding of allegory is different. 
There is an “infinite qualitative difference” between history and its allegorical 
fulfillment in a later event. But, according to de Lubac, this infinite difference establishes 
continuity: “To misunderstand it [this infinite qualitative difference] would be to make 
out of the allegorical sense, which is a spiritual sense, a new literal sense; and this would 
practically negate the interiority of the Christian mystery.”93 It would be a 
misunderstanding to conceive Christ as the last prophet in the series, or even the best. 
Likewise, it would be a misunderstanding to conceive the Old Testament prophesies as 
being fulfilled merely on the literal-historical level. His presence and sacrifice “fulfill by 
surpassing.”
The concrete example and perennial problem of supercessionism within Christian 
thought helps to illustrate. A Christian emphasis on absolute uniqueness and 
transcendence of Christ in relation to the Old Testament may risk negating the validity of 
the Old Covenant or endorsing a form of supercessionism. For example, the first-century 
theologian Marcion endorsed an extreme disjunction between the Old and New 
Testaments and ended by rejecting the validity of the Old Testament. Likewise, such a 
radical difference between anticipation and its Christological fulfillment in scripture 
conceivably could support an idea that the New replaces and invalidates God's covenant 
with the Jews. 
However, de Lubac suggested the opposite is true. He explains that Origen 
93 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:99. See de Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, 160.
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“appealed to spiritual interpretation in order to defend that Old Testament against 
adversaries that rejected it.”94 By interpreting the New Testament as the “spiritual 
meaning” of the Old, Origen was able to defend the validity of the New Testament 
against the Jews and the validity of the Old Testament against the Gnostics and 
Marcionites. The categorical or ontological difference between the two, allowed them 
both to exist in harmony. On the other hand, a mere linear progress from Old to New 
would “make out of the allegorical sense... a new literal sense.” It would imply that God 
has given a New law that replaces the Old. A correct understanding of the infinite 
ontological difference actually preserves Christianity from a crude supercessionism.  
Within orthodox Christianity, exemplified by Origen, the emphasis on the 
“trancendence” and “newness” of the Gospel preserved a twofold awareness of the 
unprecedented nature of Christ's work and the continuity of his work with that of the Old 
Testament. De Lubac's affirmation of an “ontological bond” between realities and an 
“infinite ontological difference” between them allowed him to develop his understanding 
of the symbolic relationship between historical events.
C. Symbolism and History in Origen's Exemplarism
De Lubac discovered in Origen's allegory a principle by which to understand the 
relationship of anticipation to fulfillment. According to de Lubac, by integrating 
symbolism into an historical schema, Origen reversed a Platonic “exemplarism,” thereby 
preserving a Christian meaning. 
94 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 57, see 54-58.
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De Lubac's anti-Platonic argument was an important challenge to dominant 
interpretations of Origen. According to these interpretations, Alexandrian allegorical and 
symbolic theology purportedly intimated a Platonic “exemplarism” in which empirical, 
earthly realities are imperfect imitations of divine realities. Platonic cosmology 
contrasted the kosmos noetos (world of existence) with the kosmos aisthetos (sensible 
world). The eidos (ideas/forms) were the exemplars which were the sufficient cause of 
empirical things in the sensible world; empirical things were the imitation. 
Origen himself drew a dichotomy between the “sensible” and the “intelligible” to 
describe the relationship between history and its spiritual meaning.95 However, in the case 
of Origen, de Lubac prefered to speak of a “Christian transposition” of Platonism, rather 
than a “Platonic transposition” of Christianity.96 Within Origen, the dichotomy between 
sensible reality and intelligible reality takes on a new meaning precisely due to its 
integration into a historical schema. Origen, rather than copying Platonic exemplarity, 
reverses and baptizes it.97
In Origen's hands the Platonic dichotomy between the sensible and intelligible 
became a trichotomy—shadow, image, truth—which reflected the historical division of 
95 De Lubac admitted, “The opposition that he places between the αίσθητά (objects of sense) and the 
νοητά (intelligible realities) is at times disturbing. His anagogical vocabulary has been judged suspect.” 
Ibid., 325. De Lubac argued, Origen's division between sensible and intelligible is biblical rather than 
Platonic. Origen drew from St. Paul's division between the “invisible perfections” of God and the 
visibility of God's works (Rom. 1:20) and drew from Hebrews, which construed Jewish worship as “a 
copy and shadow of the heavenly sanctuary” (Heb. 8:5 NAB). Similarly, St. John drew a distinction 
between the world below and the world above. 
96 Ibid., 326. 
97 More precisely, Origen expands upon a transformation of exemplarism already present within Paul and 
the Letter to the Hebrews. Speaking of the symbolism in Paul and Hebrews, de Lubac writes, 
“Exemplarist thinking and allegorical processes would be borrowed from the ambient culture and 
profoundly transformed.” Ibid., 469.
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the Old Testament, the New Testament, and heaven. His schema reflects his threefold 
division of the meaning of scripture: history, allegory, and anagogy. For Origen, the Old 
Testament (history) is a figure for the New Testament (allegory), which in turn is a figure 
for the heavenly reality (anagogy). Although Origen continued to employ a language of 
“sensible” and “intelligible,” the meaning had shifted significantly. This is because, 
unlike the Platonic exemplarism, a fulfillment of the Old Testament occurs within history, 
in the New Testament. 
As a result, the intelligible realities are not “pure essences” or ideas or 
“abstractions.”98 Instead, they are a future fulfillment. The literal meaning of the Old 
Testament “designates also 'something else' the very reality of which (not merely the 
manifestation of it) is to come.”99 Old Testament figures are both prophetic (“προϕητικα 
σύμβολα [prophetic symbols]: a declaration, a foreshadowing, προτύπωσεις”) and a 
preparation.100 They are not inadequate images of a prior transhistorical reality.101 Instead, 
they invoke a fulfillment of a future reality. 
These “heavenly things” toward which he has us raise our eyes are for him, as for the 
Letter to the Hebrews, to be taken in their fullness, future realities in relation to the signs 
of them contained in the Bible….They are “the mysteries of the age to come”…. They 
are  always  related to  a  future  situation,  and they always  presuppose the  Mystery of  
Christ.102 
98 Ibid., 327.
99 De Lubac, Catholicism, 172.
100 Ibid., 172.
101 “The events of Jewish history clearly continue to herald the future Jerusalem. There is no 'reversal' that 
would make of them 'the image of an earlier and higher history, the reflection and the result of a past 
celestial history instead of being the prefiguration of a celestial history to come.'” De Lubac, History 
and Spirit, 331.
102 Ibid., 327–8. De Lubac notes that there is some ambiguity in whether these Old Testament figures are 
related to the first coming or the second coming of Christ.
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Old Testament figures point to and prepare for a future reality. But this future reality is, at 
the same time, a transcendent event. Allegory, he explained,
goes from history to history. It relates the unique facts with another unique fact, divine 
interventions that have already taken place with another divine intervention, equally real 
and incomparably more profound. It does so in a such a way that everything culminates 
in a great fact, which in its completely unique singularity is the carrier of all spiritual 
fecundity.  Thus,  its  result  is  simultaneously  completely  “historical,”  “mystical,”  and 
“celestial.” It is, we repeat, the fact of Christ, both unique and universal.103
The events and symbols of which Scripture speaks point to and culminate in a future 
Event that utterly transcends what occurred before.
The principles of allegory drawn from Origen are consequential for de Lubac's 
view of history. For de Lubac, Christ becomes the historical exemplar of Old Testament 
history:
The whole Christian fact is summed up in Christ—as the Messiah who was to come…
who had to be prepared for in history, just as a masterpiece is preceded by a series of 
rough  sketches;  but  as  the  “image  of  the  Invisible  God”  and  the  “first  born  of  all  
creation” he is the universal Exemplar.... Christ, in so far as transcendent and existing 
before all things, is anterior to his figures, yet as a historical being, coming in the flesh, 
he appears after them....this living synthesis of the eternal and temporal is one in its  
duality: Christ existing before all things cannot be separated from Christ born of the 
woman, who died and rose again.104
Allegorical interpretation becomes the vehicle to express a paradox that could not 
fit into the Hellenistic pagan world view. The concrete life and death of a human 
being is the transcendent eternal mystery prefigured in time.
This represents, for de Lubac, a reversal of Platonic exemplarism.105 It is the 
particular Christ event which becomes the exemplar of historical realities. The 
103 De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 195.
104 De Lubac, Catholicism, 174.
105 “The body follows its shadow, the exemplar its 'type'.… The rough sketch is the preparation for the 
archetype, the imitation (μίμημα) comes before the model.” Ibid., 172.
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“spiritual fecundity” of history, exemplified by the practice of spiritual 
interpretation, is less a universal law of which Christ is an example than a 
consequence of Christ himself. Rather than the universal constituting the sufficient 
reason for historical particular, the historical particular (the Christ event) becomes 
the sufficient reason for the universal pattern in which all things find a fulfillment 
in Christ. De Lubac employs this principle as a brand of Christianity itself, wherein 
all things find their fulfillment in Christ: philosophical knowledge is an anticipation 
of Christian revelation; non-Christian religions anticipate their completion in Christ 
event; creation anticipates redemption.106 De Lubac's understanding of salvation, 
religious epistemology, and the finality of the created order each exhibit an 
underlying pattern traceable to or exemplified by Origen. 
IV. History and Christological Fulfillment
In section II, I showed that for de Lubac, the senses of scripture share an identity, 
described as an ontological bond, that represents the unity of events in the history of 
salvation. Just as the letter is oriented toward and finds fulfillment in allegory, so history 
106  Susan K. Wood notes this very principle within de Lubac's ecclesiology and in his defense of Teilhard 
de Chardin's mariology. She writes: “In spite of the strong exemplarism in Teilhard, the most Christian 
element in his thought here may be the principle that the universal exists because of the particular. 
Specifically, the ideal universalized as feminine exists in its unitive and spiritually receptive function 
because a particular, concrete, historical woman embodied such perfection in her own being. This 
transforms Platonic exemplarism into its mirror image, in which all is reversed. The real is not 
dehistoricized so that the particular is only an imperfect image of an ideal and perfect reality, but the 
universal exists because it has been achieved in historical particularity. The concrete is not a symbol of 
the universal, but the universal is a symbol of the concrete.” Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 
100. I would only add that within de Lubac's understanding of biblical exegesis and the fourfold sense, 
rather than the “universal” being a symbol of the concrete, it is prior events of salvation that become 
symbols of the concrete Event. Historical particulars symbolize the “exemplar,” which is the historical 
life of Christ. 
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is oriented from incompleteness to completion. In section III, I indicated the Christic 
fulfillment of the events narrated in the Old Testament is infinitely ontologically superior 
to those realities themselves. De Lubac's theology of history construes Christ as the 
historical exemplar, in whom all history finds fulfillment and to whom they are oriented. 
This section articulates the role of Christ as the “examplar” in relation to his 
prefigurations. Christ, both historical and transcendent, is the creative force who unites 
the historical economy of salvation in himself and, in doing so, becomes the focal point 
of salvation. Christ assumes all salvation history to himself and recapitulates it in himself. 
In doing so, he exercises a retroactive causality on the previous figures and anticipations. 
Yet the economy of salvation, for de Lubac, is the same as the economy of revelation. 
The same exemplarism occurs in the economy of revelation. Christ assumes all revelatory 
signs to himself, making all revelation converge upon himself, becoming the Sign to 
which all signs point.107 De Lubac saw the exegetical-historical relationship between 
historical anticipation and fulfillment in the same way as he saw the relationship between 
sign and signified. 
First, I examine de Lubac's La Révélation divine for its construal of the unity of 
the economy of revelation and salvation. Second, I look at Christ as the focal point of this 
economy, as the fullness and the ultimate means of salvation/revelation. Third, I examine 
the parallel that de Lubac creates between anticipation and fulfillment (in the economy of 
salvation) and sign and signified (in the economy of revelation.)
107 As “Sign,” Christ is the sign of the totus Christus, that is, the anagogical completion of the economy of 
salvation. I examine de Lubac's treatment of Christ as a sacrament or “sign” below (ch. 4, part III).
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A. The Unity of Revelation and Salvation in Christ
Like many of his twentieth-century Catholic counterparts, de Lubac's work prior 
to the Second Vatican Council employed personal and historical categories to describe 
God's revelation. In his work as a theological advisor at Vatican II, de Lubac influenced 
the outcome of Dei Verbum, Vatican II's dogmatic constitution on divine revelation. Dei 
Verbum confirmed the emphasis on the personal and historical character of revelation.108 
De Lubac's subsequent commentary on the document, La Révélation divine, is a window 
onto de Lubac's thinking directly after the Council.109
1. A Unified Economy of Revelation and Economy of Salvation
La Révélation divine develops around a core insight found in Dei Verbum: the 
concrete unity of the economy of revelation and the economy of salvation in Christ. In de 
Lubac's view, Dei Verbum maintains the indissociability of the “manifestation” of God 
and the “self-gift” of God. Quoting Bernard of Clairvaux, de Lubac explains:
Dando revelat, et revelando dat [by giving he reveals, and by revealing he gives].  It is 
impossible  to  dissociate,  even  in  thought,  if  one  wishes  that  it  is  maintained  at  the 
interior of revelation and in its proper perspective, the manifestation that God makes of 
himself and the gift that he makes of himself; in other words, revelation and its end: this  
108 Dei Verbum shifted away from two inadequate characterizations of revelation. First, neo-Scholastic 
manual tradition and, arguably, Vatican I's Dei Filius, emphasized an over-intellectualist and abstract 
conception of revelation as the communication of truths about God otherwise unavailable to natural 
intellectual powers. Second, some Protestant theologies emphasized revelation as God's communication 
through the biblical text. 
109 Because de Lubac was reticent to detail the workings of the commissions on which he served, his 
specific role in the formation of the document is unclear. As a result, there are hermeneutical difficulties 
in interpreting his theological commentary on a document which he had a role in drafting. He certainly 
considered this document an authoritative expression of the Catholic Church's faith. However, his 
commentary does function to affect the ecclesial reception of the document. Here, I interpret La 
Révélation divine as a reflection of themes encountered in his previous and subsequent work.
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is what this whole first chapter of the Constitution Dei Verbum repeats. The one and the 
other are expressed by the same word: “eternal Life.”110
The “manifestation” of God is an analogue to “revelation”; the “gift of God” is an 
analogue to “salvation,” the end or purpose of revelation. The means by which God 
communicates with humanity (the self-manifestation) and the means by which God saves 
humanity (the self-gift) are united in the incarnate Word. God's revelation is and brings 
about salvation. 
The object of revelation, de Lubac claims, cannot be merely ideas about God 
communicated through the Scriptures; rather, the act of announcing salvation is a 
realization of salvation. De Lubac writes: 
the announcement of salvation contains the salvation announced. The object revealed 
does not consist in notions, by themselves without vital efficacy, which would hardly 
make for the purpose of making explicit a Christianity existing already in an “implicit” 
state, or of naming finally a reality up until then “anonymous.”111 
Dei Verbum expressed the unity of God's enactment of salvation in history with the words 
of revelation: “the plan of revelation (revelationis oeconomia) is realized by deeds and 
words (gestis verbisque) having an inner unity” (Dei Verbum, 2). De Lubac noted that 
some bishops at the Second Vatican Council opposed this formulation. They desired 
language that restricted revelation to “words.” According to de Lubac, an overemphasis 
110  De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 57. Dei Verbum, according to de Lubac, affirms the unity of 
revelation and salvation in the concept of “eternal life” in the writings of Paul and the Gospel of John. 
John describes eternal life as knowledge of God and of Christ (Jn 17:3). Ibid. De Lubac explains: “Such 
a 'knowledge' [connaissance] can only come with 'communion.' Thus, in his circular thought, going 
from 'life eternal' to 'life eternal,' Saint John ends where he has begun.” Ibid., 57-8. “Knowledge” and 
“communion” are the subjective-noetic poles of God's revelation and God's salvation. Just as revelation 
and salvation are indissociable, knowledge and communion are indissociable. 
111  De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 58–59. The reference to 'implicit' or 'anonymous' Christianity 
appears to be the language of Karl Rahner. Whether de Lubac is here criticizing Rahner is uncertain. De 
Lubac's point should be taken as an affirmation of the efficacy of historical events for salvation. On this, 
de Lubac and Rahner are in agreement.
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on “words” to the detriment of “deeds” supposed a misunderstanding of the “Word of 
God.”112 In contrast, the final conciliar text highlights the character of revelation as an 
historical event that effects what it proclaims. De Lubac claimed that the unity of 
revelation and salvation makes salvation decidedly historical, giving those salvific 
moments within history a revelatory import. 
The summit of this economy is the sacrifice of Christ. Christ manifests God's 
being through his life, death, and resurrection. In Catholicism, de Lubac spoke of a unity 
of “the act of [Christ's] sacrifice” and the “objective revelation of his Person.”113 But, in 
“La Révélation divine,” he goes further to explain that the kenotic [self-emptying] 
personal actions of Christ both save us and manifest God to us. Here, de Lubac echoes a 
typically Balthasarian theme: divine revelation as such is kenotic. The Word must empty 
himself in order to speak to us, not just to save us. He writes: 
“Already the divine Kenosis was announced in the Word of the ancient Law. In Jesus  
Christ,  the  temporality  of  the  human  experience  and  the  eternal  truth  are  rejoined” 
[quoting Balthasar]. It is in ''emptying himself” and in taking “the form of a slave” (Ph 2, 
7) that he is made present to us in history to reveal to us “what the eye has not seen, nor 
the ear heard, what is come to the heart of man, all that God has prepared for those who 
love him.”114
112  Ibid., 68. De Lubac criticized the intellectualist view of revelation, promulgated in theological 
manuals after the First Vatican Council, for an impoverished view of the event-character of revelation.. 
Neo-Scholastic manuals tended to distinguish between revelatio supernaturalis, communicated in 
words, from revelatio naturalis, communicated through facts or realities. This distinction served to 
protect the supernatural character of Christian faith against deism while preserving the access that all 
people have to knowledge of God, even without the gift of faith. However, the distinction deployed an 
opposition between revelation that takes place though prophecy (verba) and revelation operative 
through natural realities (facta). Ibid., 68–9. Vatican II, by speaking of gesta verbisque (deeds and 
words), avoided this problem. According to de Lubac, revelation is essentially “bound” to events 
experienced within a particular history. The same Word who is operative in realizing God's designs in 
history also communicates to us using human words. Thus, “supernatural” revelation should not be 
opposed to the concrete facts and realities through which salvation is enacted. 
113  De Lubac, Catholicism, 226.
114  De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 117.
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Appealing to the Philippians Christ Hymn, de Lubac explains that the historical presence 
of the Son results from the divine condescension and self-emptying. In sum, de Lubac 
unites two aspects of Christ's action—salvation and revelation. The self-revelation of God 
saves; the saving act of God reveals. 
2. The “Christological” Concentration of Revelation and Salvation
The events of salvation through which God is revealed have a culmination and 
total realization in Christ. De Lubac borrowed Karl Barth's term “Christological 
concentration” to describe Christ as the focal point of God's revelation.115 This term, 
elaborated in the theology of “La Révélation divine,” aptly captures de Lubac's 
understanding of the christocentrism of revelation and salvation. Revelation reaches its 
apogee in the person of Christ himself. De Lubac describes the “fulfillment” of revelation 
in Christ as equally an assimilation, a transfiguration, and a surpassing of previous 
revelation.
As de Lubac noted,  Pope Pius XI's Mit brennender Sorge stated that “in Jesus 
appeared the fullness of revelation.” Dei Verbum's language was stronger: “Jesus is this 
plenitude.”116 By identifying the fullness of revelation as Christ, the Council avoided the 
pitfalls of a too-abstract concept of revelation or a purely textual revelation:  “'revelation 
described by the Constitution is truly Christian revelation, and not some or other 
115  Ibid., 116.
116  Ibid., 72. He noted that during the commission's deliberations one father of the council asked that the 
line “qui est la plénitude” (who is this plenitude) be replaced by “en qui est …” (in whom is...). By 
refusing this request, the commission upheld an intensely Christocentric and personalistic view of 
revelation. Ibid. note 1.
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revelation of a philosophical or gnostic kind'—nor even…a simple biblical revelation. 'It 
is Christ who is the Author, the Object, the Center, the Summit, the Fullness and the 
Sign.'”117 Christ is the “Event,” the “Fact,” the “Gesture,” and the “Act.” De Lubac's use 
of the majuscule both identified it with the divine, and indicated its characteristics as a 
proper noun. It is concrete and unrepeatable. The unprecedented entrance of the divine 
Word into history is the summit of the twofold economy of revelation and of salvation.118
While, in La Révélation divine, de Lubac described Christ as the fullness of the 
revelatory economy, de Lubac's writings on spiritual interpretation indicated why he is 
this fullness. Christ unites the entire economy of salvation in his person. De Lubac 
appealed to the patristic and medieval theme of the verbum abbreviatum (the abridged 
Word) in Irenaeus, Origen, Augustine, Rupert of Deutz, and Thomas Aquinas. The Word 
of God had previously spoken through the prophets. Christ, the verbum abbreviatum 
assimilates all of the previous prophetic “words” into himself. The verbum abbreviatum 
is the convergence of all the words scattered in history into one. Thus, Christ  
“concentrates” the entirety of the revelatory economy within himself.
The Incarnate Word's assumption of Old Testament realities to himself effects the 
fulfillment and unification of revelation. In Scripture in the Tradition, de Lubac 
explained, “The categories in which Jesus expresses himself are biblical categories; he 
117  De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 74. Quoting René Latourelle,
118  The concentration of revelation in the concrete life of Christ is, what de Lubac, argues was the basis 
for patristic allegorization. Christian allegory, he says, relates what takes place in history to a unique 
historical event. De Lubac, “Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory,” 195. “Christian exegesis... is 
an act of faith in the great historical Act which has never and never will have an equal, for the 
Incarnation is unique.” De Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, 147.   
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sublimates them and unifies them by making them converge on himself.”119 A passage 
from History and Spirit reads similarly:
Even in the very consciousness of Jesus—if we may cast a human glance even into this  
sanctuary—the Old Testament was like the matrix of the New or the instrument of its 
creation.  That  means  much more  than  external  preparation.  The  categories  in  which 
Jesus expresses himself about himself are the old biblical categories. He explodes them, 
or, if you prefer, he sublimates and unifies them, by making them converge on himself. 
But they are in some way necessary to him, and, on the other hand, in this renewed use, 
they do not become various abstract categories.120 
His personal action is the spiritual interpretation of the Old Testament, through which he 
internalizes the Old Testament, assuming it to himself, and uniting it all in his person.121 
In this sense, he is the “spiritual interpretation” of Scripture. 
The fulfillment of revelation also goes beyond and surpasses what came before:
The plan of God for humanity is composed of a series of privileged times (kairoi), which 
come to culminate in a unique Time (Kairos). Jesus himself says that he has come 'to fulfill.' 
But this accomplishment is a going beyond [dépassement]. This unification is at the same 
time a mutation: the new principle transcends what it unifies; 'the new covenant' takes the 
place of the ancient, henceforth 'Old.'
And as a result of fulfilling previous revelation, he goes beyond. He “surpasses them all 
[previous prophetic revelations] by fulfilling them.”122 By fulfilling prophesies, Christ 
brings about a unification of those prophesies in himself.123 
In sum, de Lubac construes Christ as the pinnacle of salvation and revelation. 
Although he does not prioritize any single concept of the action of Christ, he describes its 
119  De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 111, note 3.
120  De Lubac, History and Spirit, 437.  
121  The Messianic consciousness of Christ ties together the Old and New: “He is conscious of fulfilling 
and transfiguring at the same time, of fulfilling by transfiguring. He is carrying out the oracles of the 
prophets, but he knows that he is doing still more: he takes, in his supreme act, a wholly prophetic 
religion and reveals in its absolute essence, or rather completes its reality, the great divine Gesture, 
which up until then had been wholly symbolic...” Ibid., 465–66.
122  De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 113.
123  “In fulfilling the prophesies, Jesus Christ fulfills and unifies divine revelation in himself. In him are 
'the fullness' and the summit.” Ibid., 110.
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singularity as an assumption of previous revelation, a unification of revelation in his 
person, a transformation of it, and as something that surpasses it. We should note that 
though he does not articulate a theology of self-gift as does Balthasar, de Lubac sees the 
divine kenosis in Christ as the locus and concentration of both salvation and revelation. 
Christ's life, death, and resurrection, therefore, is the Event that unifies and transcends all 
previous revelatory events.
B. The Convergence of Signs in the Word
The entirety of this chapter aims at explicating the implications of the spiritual 
interpretation of Scripture for a theology of history. Specifically, it aims to show that the 
spiritual sense, for de Lubac, reflected a meaning given to history by a new and 
transcendent principle inserted into it. According to de Lubac, Jesus' life, death, and 
resurrection is that principle. It “creates” the spiritual meaning of scripture, introducing a 
new reality at the heart of history. Better yet, Christ is the spiritual meaning. The Christ 
event is not “confirmative” of an already-existing spiritual meaning but is rather creative 
of that meaning.
1. Christ Objectively Re-Orients His Figures
Above, I noted de Lubac's desire to avoid subjective or mystical explanations of 
Christ's prefiguration in the Old Testament. In Origen's exegesis, de Lubac discovered the 
seeds for an historical and objective justification for “spiritual meaning.” The spiritual 
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meaning, insisted de Lubac, was at the depth of the Old Testament by virtue of a new 
princple:
This exegesis is aware of being developed by virtue of a creative, or more precisely a 
transfiguring, principle, but it does not posit this principle. It merely draws from this  
principle the infinite consequences, by using the tools which each age offers it. Christian 
exegesis believes in Jesus Christ, who bestows this meaning on the Scriptures. It believes 
in Jesus Christ, who has transformed all things and renewed all things. In him the ancient  
Scripture is “converted.”124
Christ transfigures the scriptures, “bestows meaning” on the Scriptures, brings about a 
“transcendence,” brings all newness, and effects the bond between the Old and New 
Testament.
Christ does not merely effect a profound understanding of the spiritual depths of 
the Old Testament, as if the Old Testament contained those depths on its own. Instead, the 
entrance of Christ into history effects the meaning of the Old Testament events 
themselves:
Through this Christian event the Old Law has become spiritual. Which does not mean 
only that we can now, thanks to the light of Christ, finally see the spirit that was in this  
law; rather, it  means that this very spirit  is a creation, a radiation from the Christian 
event. This event alone makes, not so much our understanding, as, first of all, the things 
themselves pass from the 'obsolescence of the letter,'  where we could have stagnated 
indefinitely, to those 'heights of spiritual newness' that transform the whole horizon. To 
tell the truth, Jesus Christ, therefore, does not come to show the profound meaning of the 
Scriptures like a teacher who has no part in the things he explains. He comes, actually, to 
create it, through an act of his omnipotence.125
The Old Testament anticipates Christ because the transcendence of Christ affects that 
which precedes it. This creative act of omnipotence is “none other than [Christ's] death 
on the Cross, followed by his Resurrection.”126 Christ, so to say, objectively (re)orients 
124  De Lubac, Scripture in the Tradition, 147. 
125  De Lubac, History and Spirit, 310.
126  Ibid., 310.
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previous realities, making them anticipations of himself. Since Christ himself is the 
absolute fullness of what God wishes to communicate, previous prophetic figures and 
types receive their “total fulfillment” in him.
Instead of entirely dismissing the Old Testament anticipation of the New 
Testament or justifying it by appeal to a prescient mystical knowledge, de Lubac sees it 
as the result of an interior relation between events brought about by Christ: 
Is this to say that, outside of a kind of wholly implicit  knowledge that we have just 
defined, no ray ever filtered, under the Old Law, of that light which was to shine in  
Jesus? Assuredly  not.  But these rays,  like those of  the dawn, were already from the 
coming Sun. We could just as well call them a shadow, as Origen did. They thus did not 
constitute a stage that was in itself independent from the stages that were to follow. The 
important  fact  in  this  order,  the  one  that  permits  us  to  say  that  the  Old  Testament 
anticipates the New, was not a present spiritualization of the earlier history or institutions 
of Israel. It was not even absolutely the eschatological orientation of Israel's reflection on 
its great  memories.  It  was the proclamation  of a future spiritualization thanks to  the 
insertion of a Principle that would be given from above, the proclamation of a total and 
definitive renewal.127
De Lubac initially employs the metaphor of the Sun casting its light to describe the 
relationship between the figure and its reality. Sunlight at dawn is an image of a positive 
anticipation of something else. But then de Lubac adds the Pauline image of “shadow” to 
supplement the image of sunlight.128 Unlike the ray of sunlight, the shadow is caused by 
the Sun but does not belong to the same category as the Sun. 
Christ is the new principle which creates the anticipation in the Old Testament. 
We might say that the objective basis for the Old Testament's “anticipation” of the New 
127  “Christ, in so far as transcendent and existing before all things, is anterior to his figures, yet as a 
historical being, coming in the flesh, he appears after them. Late in historic time, but prior in priority to 
all time, Christ appears to us preceded by the shadows and the figures which he himself had cast on 
Jewish history.” Ibid., 466–67.
128  De Lubac, Catholicism, 174. De Lubac sees a similar relationship of letter to spirit, type to antitype, 
shadow to body in Saint Paul. De Lubac, History and Spirit, 468.
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Testament is the retroactive effect of Christ.129 By assimilating Old Testament into 
himself, he became its spiritual meaning. As a result, the glory of the Christ event radiates 
backwards, casts its shadow backwards, causing the Old Testament to symbolize and 
anticipate him. 
2. The Convergence of Signs in Christ
In La Révélation divine, the same fundamental precepts of salvation history—the 
unification of revelation in Christ and the retroactive causality of Christ on his figures—
are at work in de Lubac's account of revelation. Revelation is mediated historically 
through outward realities. Christ perfects revelation through his self-manifestation in 
exterior signs, according to Dei Verbum, his “words and deeds” and his “signs and 
wonders.”130 All of Christ's exterior actions are symbolic communications that one must 
penetrate to discover, at its depth, his self-manifestation.131 
According to de Lubac, Christ constitutes the “concentration” of all signs. He 
constitutes the unification of all signs of God's transcendence and he radiates his glory 
through all those signs that he unifies:
Every  revelation  furnished  by  the  Word  made  flesh  is  condensed  in  his  personal 
129  De Lubac's notion that Christ effects an ontological anticipation in the Old Testament is the basis for 
his affirmation of Origen's exemplarism. The historical exemplar will be important for de Lubac's 
understanding of the symbolic structure of reality insofar as it indicates that the universal depends on 
particular and that symbols are now directed to a particular historical realization.
130  Christ “perfected revelation by fulfilling it through his whole work of making Himself present and 
manifesting Himself: through His words and deeds, His signs and wonders, but especially through His 
death and glorious resurrection from the dead and final sending of the Spirit of truth” (Dei Verbum, 4).
131  “In relationship with a general doctrine of symbolism, it explains also that the visible works of Christ 
are not comparable to a drawing, that one would only have to contemplate without searching further, but 
rather as the letters of a text, that it does not suffice to admire, even if it is good calligraphy, but which 
one must be forced to penetrate the meaning: after having seen, and praised, one must read, and 
understand.” De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 122.
134
presence,  so  it  is  for  the  signs  of  his  mission:  [Christ],  “in  his  historical  reality, 
comprised by his conduct, his words, his miracles, the accomplishment of prophesies,  
etc.,  constitutes  a  global  “figure,”  the  great  Sign that  we have to  perceive.  In  other 
words, to believe in the mission of Christ and of his message will be to perceive the 
convergence  in  him  of  all  signs,  a  convergence  that  confers  on  him  their  total 
signification. But in reality, “the signs of revelation are not exterior to Christ.” They are 
Christ  himself,  in the radiation of his  power,  of his holiness,  of  his wisdom. In this 
radiation, we perceive his glory of the Son of the Father: we pass directly to reflect on 
the source. One must moreover add that the lone “figure” of Christ must be—perhaps—
the sufficient sign, and more meaningful than any other, in order to believe in him.132
De Lubac is working with a subtle reflection on the Incarnation. By assuming, 
assimilating, or integrating all signs into himself, the Word unites sign and meaning, 
making himself the point of convergence of all signs.133 As a result, those signs gain their 
properly revelatory value insofar as the glory of God radiates through them.
De Lubac's comments on Dei Verbum are suggestive of his understanding of 
apologetics. Faith does not result as a conclusion from certain signs or marks of 
revelation exterior to revelation itself. Rather, it results from penetrating those signs to 
their source, who is Christ. It results in seeing the glory of the Son radiating through all 
signs, indeed making them signs. The fundamental structure of figuration and fulfillment 
within de Lubac's theology of history parallels de Lubac's understanding of revelatory 
signs and symbols. Just as Christ brings about his anticipation within the Old Testament, 
he also radiates God's power, holiness, and wisdom through external signs. 
In summary, de Lubac follows a Christian exegetical tradition of spiritual 
interpretation. The Old Testament is an anticipation of Christ, and Christ is the spiritual 
132  Ibid., 124.
133 “In the thought of the Council, the facts and signs of the Gospel, miraculous or not, do not have only 
an apologetical value. They have...a properly revelatory value. By them, the Word made flesh ‘fulfills 
revelation’ at the same time that he ‘confirms’ it. Himself, by all himself, is the great Sign, not only 
'confirmative' but first and entirely ‘figurative.’ He is ‘the great efficacious sign, the universal 
Sacrament by which God enters into communion with us.'” Ibid., 125–6.
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meaning of the Old Testament. The Old Testament does not foreshadow Christ on the 
level of the letter, but only through allegory. It is anticipatory because of the creative and 
transformative power of Christ. By assimilating Old Testament history into himself, 
causing those realities to “converge” on himself, Christ forms what de Lubac calls an 
ontological bond within history. As a result, his concrete human life becomes the unique 
Sign, the “exemplar,” through which all other signs must be understood. The historical 
actions of Christ transfigure all previous anticipations and radiate God's self-
manifestation both historically and cosmically.
V. Conclusion
De Lubac's theology of history is arguably the organic center of his thought. His 
research on the history of exegesis traced the broad contours of his insights into history. 
First, I argued that de Lubac conceived patristic allegory and symbolism as allowing a 
depth-dimension to history rejected by Hellenism. Hellenistic and Platonic 
understandings of history did not permit the coincidence of events and ultimate meaning 
as did the patristic understanding of revelation. De Lubac's ressourcement of the patristic 
allegorical and symbolic traditions of exegesis was an anti-Platonic and anti-Hellenistic 
move. 
Second, I indicated that de Lubac construed the “spiritual sense” as the depth of 
history and the fourfold sense of scripture as the exegetical epiphenomenon of a Christian 
understanding of history. This understanding construed an intimate interconnection 
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between historical events by viewing some of those events as symbols and preparations 
of other events fulfilling them.
Third, I argued that de Lubac's defense of Origen's allegorical interpretation  
centered on Origen's emphasis on the “newness” and “transcendence” that Christ brings. 
For de Lubac, allegory represents a principle transcendent to everything that came before. 
It is a principle of transformation, which explains the ontological relationship between 
figure and truth, or anticipation and fulfillment. While de Lubac did not use the term, I 
described the Christian event as the “historical exemplar.” Unlike Platonic exemplarism, 
for Origen, history finds its ultimate meaning within a concrete historical event—the life, 
death, and resurrection of Christ.
Fourth, I examined de Lubac's Christocentric understanding of revelation and 
salvation to find the rationale for this bond between realities in history. De Lubac 
especially notes the creative character of the Christ event, which bestows the “spiritual 
meaning” on the Old Testament, which creates the ontological bond between events, and 
which creates the relationships of anticipation and fulfillment. By assimilating and 
interiorizing the reality of the Old Testament, Christ unites in himself the Old Testament 
realities. Christ becomes “spiritual meaning” in person. The action of Christ has a 
retroactive effect on the Old Testament symbols and figures. As a consequence, Old 
Testament symbols are interiorly and ontologically related to Christ. In a similar manner, 
de Lubac saw the incarnate Word as the compendium of all signs of revelation, uniting all 
137
signs in himself. As a result, they become signs in virtue of the radiation of Christ's glory 
through them.
As noted above, de Lubac did not write a discrete theology of history apart from 
eschatology, or a discrete theology of anticipation apart from fulfillment. The inner 
identity of the anticipation or figure is, ultimately Christ, and cannot be fully understood 
apart from the coming of Christ, its exemplar. Prefigurations do not anticipate Christ by 
way of an exterior relation. It is the entrance of Christ into history that brings about the 
relationship of figuration. It is the exemplar that orients everything else. De Lubac's 
construal of the relationship of anticipation and fulfillment in Christ becomes a pattern 
driving de Lubac's broader understanding of the eschatological finality of the created 
world. In sum, de Lubac's theology of history lays the ground for understanding his 
panoramic eschatology: the supernatural finality of nature, the finality of the church in 
the totus Christus, the finality of mysticism for its mystery, the theological finality of 
philosophy. The subsequent chapter will focus on the eschatological implications of de 
Lubac's theology of history.
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CHAPTER THREE: ANAGOGY AND ESCHATOLOGY
As mentioned above, Henri de Lubac never developed a discrete eschatology. The 
array of themes traditional to eschatology—death, the resurrection of the body, judgment, 
heaven, hell, purgatory, the fulfillment of God's promises, the end of history, the final 
coming of Christ, the unity of the cosmos with God, the beatific vision—are not gathered 
in a single place in de Lubac's work or treated systematically. This is due, in part, to his 
tendency to view eschatology through corporate and communal lenses instead of 
prioritizing the fate of the individual soul. De Lubac's eschatology takes primarily the 
form of an ecclesiology that envisions the relationship of the present church to the future 
and celestial church. De Lubac's eschatology is distributed especially throughout his 
writings on the history of exegesis insofar as he treats anagogy, the last of the spiritual 
senses of Scripture.
In this chapter, I argue two interrelated theses regarding de Lubac's eschatology. 
First, the fundamental tensions in de Lubac's eschatology are best understood through the 
lens of “anagogy.” Second, de Lubac's narrative concerning early Christian understanding 
of anagogy and its subsequent fate colors his eschatology. His eschatological thought 
develops out of a retrieval of Origen's eschatology read against the medieval and modern 
fate of “anagogy.” My objective here is to articulate significant strands of de Lubac's 
narrative concerning the historical origin, evolution, and fate of the final sense of 
Scripture in Christian thought. 
Two works, in particular—History and Spirit and Exégèse médiévale—contain 
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this narrative. De Lubac discovered in Origen of Alexandria the roots of a scriptural 
hermeneutic that effected a synthesis between Christian eschatology and spirituality. The 
basic shape of this synthesis, according to de Lubac, held until the twelfth century.1 De 
Lubac proposed that in the twelfth century eschatology became detached from 
spirituality, to the detriment of both. Coincident with this development, a tradition of 
mysticism inspired by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite effectively lost its foundation in 
the history of salvation while, at the same time, a counter-tradition, launched by Joachim 
of Fiore, emphasized history to the detriment of transcendence. In the first, “anagogy” 
became a “vertical” mystical ascent to “higher realities”; in the second, it became the 
“horizontal” expectation of a utopian future. 
I caution that my summary of de Lubac's narrative, by necessity, surveys and  
simplifies both the argument of History and Spirit and of Exégèse médiévale, and the 
historical developments they examine.2 Exégèse médiévale has a particularly broad scope. 
It treats anagogy in numerous contexts but nowhere provides a unified account. By 
focusing on the historical development of anagogy, I do not intend to negate other factors 
that contributed to a separation of eschatology and spirituality. Yet, for de Lubac, the 
spiritual interpretation of scripture (including anagogy) was both an epiphenomenon of a 
1 Some authors have read Exégèse médiévale as if it merely catalogued a static hermeneutic, constituted 
by the fourfold sense of scripture, from the patristic period through the medieval. While de Lubac 
certainly emphasized a continuity within a long exegetical tradition, he also indicates the points of 
rupture. He notes particularly important developments that will eventually engender new forms of 
theology. 
2 A limitation of my survey, which is also a limitation of de Lubac's work, is that it takes the perspective 
of the history of ideas without a corresponding examination of the social and historical context. A more 
robust narrative of the history of the splintering of mysticism and eschatology would require an appeal 
to shifts in religious practices, textual practices, the social place of the mystic subject, and practices of 
theological and spiritual formation.
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broad Christian mentality and an exegetical practice that contributed to that mentality. As 
such, spiritual interpretation remains important for understanding the nexus of ideas and 
practices that constituted the developing Christian eschatological world view.
I. Anagogy and Anagogies
In Exégèse médiévale, de Lubac explained that the term anagogy was borrowed 
from Greek paganism but was given a new meaning within a Christian context. The Latin 
term anagogia is a transiteration of the Greek anagōgē, meaning “ascent.” Its ending ia 
followed the pattern of historia, allegoria, and tropologia. As de Lubac noted, some 
authors explained the etymology of anagogia as the confluence of ana (upward) and 
agōgē (leading), Greek words equivalent to the Latin sursumductio.3 Anagogy became 
the sense “which leads the thought of the exegete 'upwards.'”4
De Lubac does not identify the precise origin of anagogy's association with the 
meanings of scripture. He noted that in the first few centuries of Christianity, Origen, 
Gregory of Nyssa, Didymus the Blind, and Jerome employed anagogy as “one of the 
names of the spiritual sense in general.”5 For these authors anagogy had not yet acquired 
the specialized meaning that we find in Pseduo-Dionysius, that of intellectual 
contemplation. However, de Lubac suggests that in Cassian, anagogy became more 
specialized and that Cassian's anagogy was a step toward that of Pseudo-Dionysius. De 
3 Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. E. M. Macierowski, vol. 2 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 179–80.  Originally published as Exégèse médiévale, 




Lubac's central point in this part of Exégèse médiévale is that the early tradition had not 
yet made anagogy a specialized term. It united several elements which would later be 
distinguished and separated. Using a series of quotations from Aelred of Rievaulx, 
Venerable Bede, Robert of Melun, John Cassian, and Augustine, de Lubac compiled 
definitions of anagogy:
Anagogy is first off … “a sense of the things above.” It leads the mind's consideration 
“from things visible to those invisible,” or from things below “to things above,” i.e. to  
“the divine things.” It is this sort of allegory “which lifts the understanding of the mind  
through visible things to the invisible,” or “through which speech is borne over to the 
invisible things to come.” More concretely, this will be the sense that lets one see in the 
realities of the earthly Jerusalem those of the heavenly Jerusalem: “for a certain part of 
the earthly city has been made an image of the heavenly city.” Although these things no 
longer belong to time, nevertheless, for us who trudge and toil through time, they are  
things yet to come, objects of desire and of hope.6
Anagogy is a spiritual movement, the movement of the mind or spirit from the visible to 
the invisible; it is a manner of seeing through visible and present realities to those of 
heaven.  But it is also associated with the virtue of hope because these heavenly realities 
are future for us. 
In a section of Exégèse médiévale entitled “A Twofold Anagogy,” de Lubac 
described two general perspectives by which anagogy would be understood by exegetes. 
There are two anagogies: “the one which fulfills the doctrinal formulation of the fourfold 
sense; the other, which fulfills the spiritual formulation of the threefold sense.”7 Both 
anagogies represent the end-point of the exegetical enterprise. De Lubac's description of 
“two anagogies” is somewhat ambiguous. First of all, the fourfold sense (history, 
allegory, tropology, anagogy), he claimed, constituted the doctrinal formulation because 
6 Ibid., 2:180–1.
7 Ibid., 2:181.  
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the placement of allegory after history gives a Christological and ecclesial tone.8 
However, it is unclear whether the “spiritual formulation of the threefold sense” refers to 
the same formulation in three parts (that is, history, allegory, anagogy) or to the Philonic 
variant (history, tropology, allegory/anagogy). The latter, de Lubac argued, took on non-
Christian meanings and was associated with “a kind of moral anatomy and physiology.”9  
Second, de Lubac did not specify whether these two anagogies constitute divergent 
exegetical traditions within early Christianity. In its early stage of development, the last 
spiritual sense of scripture possessed elements of both anagogies. It appears that de 
Lubac's elaboration of two anagogies looks forward to later developments in which these 
differing “anagogies” would become distinguished and separated. This separation, 
according to de Lubac, would signal and contribute to a division of disciplines within 
theology.
For de Lubac, these two anagogies are complementary. “The standpoint of the 
first anagogy is objective and doctrinal; that of the second pertains to subjective 
realization; in other words, the one is defined by its object, and the other by the manner 
of apprehending it.”10 He explains that “the first 'declares the sacraments of the future 
age,' or 'disputes about the life to come,' whereas the second leads 'to beholding the 
mysteries of the age to come,' 'to contemplating the heavenly mysteries.'”11 
8 See Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. Mark Sebanc, vol. 1 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), 146–7. Originally published as Exégèse médiévale, 1:  
Les quatre sense de l'Écriture (Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1959)
9 Ibid., 1:146–7.
10 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:181.
11 Ibid., 2:181. Matthew Gerlach perceptively describes anagogy as containing a double perspective: (a) 
the things above and transcendent and (b) that which is not yet. Matthew T. Gerlach, “Lex Orandi, Lex 
Legendi: A Correlation of the Roman Canon and the Fourfold Sense of Scripture” (Ph.D. diss., 
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We over-emphasize the opposition; but, as we shall see, it is justified. Let us say that the  
first  of  the  two  anagogies  teaches  that  part  of  Christian  dogmatics  called 
“eschatology”—which  itself  is  further  subdivided  into  two  parts,  according  as  the 
ultimate end of each person or that of the universe as a whole is concerned. As to the 
second anagogy, it introduces us here and now into the mystic life; at the terminus of its 
movement, it  fulfills that “theology” which is made etymologically the equivalent of 
“theoria”  and  which  is  the  contemplation  of  God.  In  modern  terms,  the  one  is 
speculative; the other, contemplative.12 
The principal distinction is between the objective and the subjective, between the 
transcendent and heavenly reality and the contemplation of that reality.
According to de Lubac, the first, the doctrinal and objective anagogy, was a 
Christian “modification” of a thoroughly eschatological Jewish prophetic tradition. 
Leading up to the time of Jesus, Jewish prophecy conceived the fulfillment of God's 
promises, brought about by the messiah, as a heavenly dwelling and a heavenly temple. 
The coming of the messiah would closely coincide with the end of time.13 When Christ 
came, however, time did not come to an end. The Christian expectation of an imminent 
end of the world was slowly transformed in the consciousness that Christians now live in 
the interim: “A gap opened up between the first and the last coming. In that gap the 
Church would unfold its existence for an indeterminate period.”14 Christ introduced a 
division in time that would require a reconception of the present with regard to the future: 
“It would seem necessary, then, to conceive the New Testament as truth in respect to the 
Marquette University, 2011), 339–40. This double perspective, I will argue, is at the center of de 
Lubac's eschatological thinking. To be precise, however, de Lubac's quotation from Cassiodorus, Bede, 
Origen, and Aimon, indicates that both anagogies include a future-oriented element: “future age,” “life 
to come,” “age to come.” Here, the primary distinction is between the objective (disputes, declares) and 
the subjective (beholds, contemplates). 




Old, but as a mere 'image' with respect to the ultimate reality still to come.”15 The present 
time is a “pledge” and “exemplar” of what is to come; the church is a “forerunner” of the 
“age to come.” 
From the very beginnings, a tension marked the shape of Christian eschatological 
hope. Christ constituted the salvation offered by God, and the Christian now possesses it. 
However, time has not yet come to an end, and this salvation is not yet possessed in its 
fullest intensity and luminosity: 
Notwithstanding the gap opened by the first coming and the still unchanged conditions 
of our knowledge, notwithstanding the sorely felt distance between the nunc [“now”] of 
the earth and the tunc [“then”] of eternity, it is in fact the very reality of salvation which 
henceforth  is  inserted  into  history  and  immediately  offered  to  us.  By  faith,  the 
believer...can  paradoxically  say “night  is  illuminated  as  day.”  He already holds  “the 
substance of the things that he hopes for”; he has already, albeit still secretly, penetrated 
into the kingdom. The primitive Christian community … from the first instant … had 
“an intense awareness of being at once the Israel of God and the heavenly kingdom 
anticipated on earth.”16
The doctrinal formulation of anagogy is founded on an inner identity between the present 
state and the future state, the church militant and the church triumphant. We could call 
this a sacramental relationship, in which the present church is an effective sign of the 
church to come. 
The second anagogy is subjective, completing “the movement of mystical 
tropology.”17 De Lubac describes no longer the object of contemplation, but the act. It is 
contemplative rather than speculative. By Gregory the Great, anagogy is associated with 
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 2:183.
17 Ibid., 2:188. There is some ambiguity in de Lubac's account. De Lubac earlier spoke of this second 
anagogy as that which fulfills the “spiritual formulation of the threefold sense” (i.e. history, allegory, 
anagogy) Ibid., 2:181. However, he later calls it the completion of the movement of mystical tropology 
enumerated within the fourfold sense (i.e. history, allegory, tropology, anagogy.) Ibid., 2:188. 
145
the “volatus: flight, impulse, no longer intellectual representation but spiritual movement, 
anagogy.”18 For Richard and Hugo of Saint Victor, anagogy is a “real ascent of the 
soul.”19 Subjective anagogy is not an intellectual method, but a spiritual flight of the 
mystic or poet, who not only speculates about the heavenly mysteries but is united with 
them. De Lubac explains that “the fully concrete anagogy, total anagogy, is reserved for 
the 'fatherland.' Mystical contemplation is not yet vision. So however high anagogy leads, 
it always leaves something to look for and always with greater fervor, because it still 
doesn't uncover the Face of God.”20 For Origen as for  Gregory of Nyssa, the anagogical 
movement of the soul is not arrested even in heaven, since God always remains a mystery 
and the human being must always seek a deeper realization of the mystery.
De Lubac speaks of a unity within anagogy of the objective and subjective, and 
the doctrinal and mystical dimensions:
Anagogy realizes the perfection of both allegory and of tropology, achieving their synthesis. 
It is neither “objective” like the first nor “subjective” like the second. Above and beyond this 
division, it realizes their unity. It integrates the whole and final meaning. It sees, in eternity,  
the fusion of the mystery and the mystic. In other words, the eschatological reality attained 
by anagogy is the eternal reality within which every other has its consummation.21
Ideally, these different dimensions are united within anagogy. De Lubac's description of 
the two anagogies in Exégèse médiévale anticipates the late medieval period, during 
which anagogy would no longer be strictly associated with biblical exegesis. The 
objective anagogy will develop into a theological discipline concerning the last things 
and the end of time, while the subjective anagogy will develop into a distinct discipline of 





mysticism or spirituality. The anagogical meaning of scripture in Origen of Alexandria is 
pivotal to de Lubac's story, for Origen's biblical exegesis united both mysticism (the 
subjective anagogy) and eschatology (the objective anagogy) into a single whole. The 
period antecedent to this division is therefore critical to de Lubac's narrative.
II. Anagogia in Origen
In eschatology as in the theology of history, Origen is a significant figure in de 
Lubac's historical interpretation and theological construction. De Lubac identified Origen 
as the source of both the threefold and the fourfold senses of scripture, which governed 
the shape of Christian theology for a millennium.22 With some caveats, Origen became 
the norm against which de Lubac adjudicated the subsequent exegetical tradition. A 
thorough account of de Lubac's interpretation of Origen is beyond the scope of this 
chapter.23 Instead, I wish only to highlight key elements that de Lubac drew from Origen 
for his understanding of anagogy.
Two characteristics of Origen's anagogy reappear in Exégèse médiévale as the 
cardinal attributes of what de Lubac advances as the normative eschatological tradition. 
First, congruent with the exposition above, Origen's anagogy is both objective and 
subjective. Second, Origen's anagogy envisions the heavenly realities as also future, the 
object of hope.
22 Exégèse médiévale, vol. 1 argues that Origen is the primary patristic source for what would be 
established as the fourfold sense of scripture. 
23 For an overview of de Lubac’s reading of Origen see Michel Fédou, “Henri de Lubac, lecteur d’Origìne: 
l’hospitalité de la théologie et sa source mystique,” Revue des sciences religieuses 77, no. 2 (April 
2003): 133–46.
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A. Objective and Subjective Aspects of “Spiritual Understanding”
Exégèse médiévale describes two aspects of anagogy, indicative of the objective 
realities that constitute the ultimate things and as a subjective, mystical participation in 
those things. In History and Spirit, the objective and subjective aspects belong to the 
“spiritual sense” as a whole. In other words, the objective and subjective aspects that de 
Lubac ascribes to anagogy are promulgated in Origen as characteristics of “spiritual 
understanding” generally, but inclusive of anagogy.24 
De Lubac explains, “the spiritual sense, understood as the figurative or mystical 
sense, is the sense that, objectively, ends in the realities of the spiritual life and that at the 
same time, subjectively, can be given only as the fruit of a spiritual life…the Christian 
mystery, in fact, is not to be contemplated with curiosity as a pure object of science; 
rather it must be interiorized and lived. It finds its fullness in coming to completion in 
souls.”25 The object of the spiritual understanding is Christian mystery. Subjectively, 
Christians know this mystery by entering into the mystery and living the mystery: “The 
whole process of spiritual understanding is identical, in principle, to the process of 
conversion. It is its luminous aspect. 'Intellectus spiritualis credentem salvum facit' (The 
spiritual understanding saves the believer).”26 In Origen, de Lubac argues, the objective 
24 De Lubac indicated that Origen, as well as much of patristic thought, lacked rigid systematization of 
terminology. He associates anagogy with the spiritual sense as a whole: “For some then, the spiritual 
sense is entirely anagogy: 'mystic anagogy,' Origen used to say, or again: 'the allegories according to 
anagogy,' or simply: 'according to anagogy.'” De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:35. 
25 Henri de Lubac, History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture according to Origen, trans. Anne 
Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 466. Originally published as  Henri de Lubac, 
Histoire et esprit : l’intelligence de l’Écriture d’après Origène, Théologie 16 (Paris: Aubier, 1950).
26 History and Spirit, 466, quoting Augustine. “There is a reciprocal causality between that conversion to 
Christ and the understanding of the Scriptures” Ibid., 467.
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content attained through spiritual understanding, at its base, is the same as the process of 
conversion to it.
In de Lubac's interpretation, Origen's spiritual understanding consists of an 
unending process of assimilating oneself to God's mystery:
The sacred text is truly understood, insofar as it is given us to understand it, only in a 
perpetual  effort  of  transcendence,  in  a  “flight,”  in  a  never-completed  movement  of 
anagogy.  This  anagogical  movement  is  also  an  interiorizing  movement.  And in  this 
respect, too, it is without end. For the understanding of Scripture is at the same time the 
vital assimilation of its mystery. It does not consist in ideas, but it communicates the very 
reality of the One whose riches are unfathomable. It can grow indefinitely, because it 
expands to the nature of the mind's capacity to receive it.27
The understanding of scripture participates in both prayer and conversion. The ultimate 
meaning of scripture is both objective and subjective because the Christian's 
appropriation and interiorization of the mystery is a component of that ultimate mystery 
itself. Another way to explain it is that the anagogical meaning consists of the 
transcendent realities signified in the Scriptures, but these transcendent realities include 
the believer herself in union with the transcendent: “The Word of God, a living and 
efficacious word, reaches its real fulfillment and its full meaning only by the 
transformation that it works in one who receives it.”28
The anagogical meaning of scripture is not an entirely objectified and discrete 
intellectual content. As the personal reception and conversion to a personal God, the 
anagogical movement of the soul more closely approximates what Thomas Aquinas calls 
the intellectus (the simple and intuitive intellectual gaze) rather than the ratio (the 
27 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 382.
28 Ibid., 447.
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discursive reason). “It is a matter of attaining, with 'the eyes of the soul' an 'intellectus 
simplicior.'”29 
According to de Lubac, Origen identifies spiritual understanding with his most 
controversial teaching, the notion of the final restoration of all things (apocatastasis). De 
Lubac underplayed the controversial aspects of Origen's teaching on the apocatastasis, 
namely the conversion of all created intellectual beings to God, including the damned and 
the devil, and the links between apocatastasis and Neoplatonic and Stoic cosmology. 
Spiritual understanding, de Lubac states, “is itself this 'apocatastasis' in which God does 
not appear as a distant third part with whom we could discourse or as the object of an 
impersonal contemplation; rather he presents himself to the soul in view of a dialogue of 
love.”30 Apocatastasis is, for Origen, a synonym for the conversion to God and the 
conversion of the church to Christ. The final stage of the movement of spiritual 
understanding is then, ultimately, both a transformative conversion and a definitive 
ecclesial-cosmic fulfillment.
As a result, the coextensive growth of spiritual understanding and conversion is 
not an individualistic process. The spiritual interpretation of scriptures is the end and 
means of an ongoing spiritual dialectic of which the church as a whole is the subject.
It is a unique movement, which, beginning with initial incredulity, is raised by faith to 
the summits of a spiritual life whose end is not here on earth. Its unfurling is coextensive 
with the gift of the Spirit, with the progress of charity. The whole Christian experience,  
with  its  various  phases,  is  thus  contained  in  it  in  principle.  The  newness  of  the 




understanding is thus to pass on to the “new man,” who never ceases to be renewed de 
claritate in claritatem (from glory to glory).31
The dialectic of spiritual understanding is the same as the process of conversion and the 
growth of charity. De Lubac suggests that spiritual understanding is coextensive with the 
historical dialectic, the growth of the church as a spiritual organism and its passage on to 
the “new man.” Therefore, anagogy, as another name for spiritual understanding, 
designates the process, and the final phase of the process, of conversion whereby the 
church as a whole is transformed by charity and unified with Christ. 
B. Heavenly and Future Aspects of Origen's Anagogy
Closely related to the unity of objective and subjective anagogy,the unity between 
transcendent and future aspects of anagogy in Origen is also emphasized by de Lubac. 
The object of anagogy is both a heavenly reality and a future realization. The anagogical 
ascent of the soul is likewise the progress through history towards an ultimate fulfillment 
at the end of time or beyond time.
The structure of Origen's theology of history illumines the meaning of anagogy as 
heavenly and future. Origen's theology of history consists of a threefold structure: the Old 
Testament, the New Testament, and heaven; or Israel, the Church, the Assembly of the 
Kingdom. The historical division reflects a tripartite and progressive symbolic structure: 
“shadow,” “image,” “truth.”32 The Old Testament contains symbolic prefigurations of the 




fulfillment. Thus, the Old Testament is a mere shadow of the coming truth; the New 
Testament is its image. The Old Testament is oriented toward its fulfillment in the New. 
But the New Testament is oriented to a future fulfillment as well: “It is the whole New 
Testament, understood as the complete progress of the Christian economy up to the last 
day, that also appears to him to be oriented toward a more profound, absolutely and 
solely definite reality; a reality that has the duty to make known by preparing for it, 
serving thus as intermediary between the Old Law and the 'eternal gospel.'”33 Thus, for 
Origen, the New Testament itself contains symbolic prefigurations of a promised 
fulfillment.
The prominent Origenian theme—the “eternal gospel”—illumines the structure of 
his tripartite theology of history. For Origen, “the eternal gospel” (Revelation 14:6) 
reveals the mysteries of which Christ's actions and words were the figure. Christ 
announces the realities of the kingdom, not yet fully manifest. “Thus, just as each object 
from the Old Testament was a sign announcing the New, so each object of the New is in 
turn a sign whose reality is found 'in the ages to come.'”34 As the Book of Revelation 
presents itself as a vision into a heavenly drama, it announces the eternal gospel of which 
the words of Revelation are a sign. So just as the adherents to God's law awaited its 
fulfillment, the Christian awaits a further, subsequent fulfillment of the Gospel in the 
future age.




Christ and transmitted by the apostles must be superseded by another, just as the Gospel 
supersedes the Law. De Lubac addressed this difficulty, contrasting Origen's 
interpretation of the eternal gospel with that of Joachim of Fiore: "There is not really 
anything more in common between Origen and Joachim of Fiore than this name, eternal 
gospel—but this is a biblical title drawn from the Apocalypse—and the idea that this 
eternal gospel consists in the thorough spiritual interpretation of the Gospel—but they 
completely disagree on the nature and time of this interpretation.” First of all, the “time” 
of the eternal gospel is different: Joachim awaits the eternal Gospel and a future spiritual 
society “in time” while Origen's eternal Gospel is no longer in time.35 Origen's “eternal 
gospel is the antithesis and anticipated antidote of that of the Calabrian monk. It is no less 
opposed to that arbitrary and unhealthy problem which, ever since the time of Montanus 
has so often reappeared in the history of the Church. In brief, it is completely 
eschatological.”36 In other words, the object of the eternal gospel transcended time for 
Origen, but was temporal for Joachim. 
Second, the nature of the eternal gospel is different as well. Origen's “eternal 
Gospel” shares an identity with the Gospel. A tripartite theology of history—Old 
Testament / Gospel / Eternal Gospel—frames Origen's use of the phrase “eternal Gospel.” 
However, de Lubac added, “this trichotomy tends to be resolved into a dichotomy.”37  
Origen's “eternal gospel remains in close relation to the Gospel that was proclaimed to us. 
35 Ibid., 252.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 253.  Thus, the trichotomy Old Testament / Gospel / Eternal Gospel is reduced to the dichotomy 
Old Testament / Gospel  Eternal Gospel (or shadow / image  truth).➝ ➝
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It constitutes another state of it, not something added to it.”38 The eternal Gospel is the 
future state of the present Gospel, at which point the mysteries revealed in figures will be 
unveiled in truth.
Thus, de Lubac explains that the historical realities that constitute the Gospel have 
a mediatory role. In a sense, they existed only to pass into their fulfillment. In other 
words, the realities recounted in the Gospel have solely the function of drawing us into 
the Gospel in its final state: 
Linked to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Logos, history, if it is in fact mediatory,  
must not hold us indiscriminately. Its whole role, on the contrary, is to pass on. History, 
in any case, is essentially what passes on. Thus the events recounted in the Bible … all  
exhausted, so to speak, their historical role at the same time as their factual reality, so as  
no longer to survive today except as signs and mysteries. Thus, in its entirety, up to its 
final event, history is a preparation for something else. To deny that is to deny it. The  
truth to which it introduces us is no longer [of] the order of history.39
The Gospel, both historical and spiritual, is a preparation for and figure of its future state, 
which is completely spiritual. 
The relationship between the Gospel and the eternal Gospel (or image and truth, 
or New Testament and eternity) in Origen's theology of history reflects the paradox of 
Christian eschatology. On the one hand, the Gospel and eternal Gospel share a profound 
identity, between the present economy of salvation and its final fulfillment. The veil must 
only be removed from our eyes for us to experience the splendor of God's salvation given 
to us now. On the other hand, the figures of the present order will pass away, existing 
only to transfer us to eternity. We exist in a time of waiting.'40
38 Ibid., 252.
39 Ibid., 322–23.
40 De Lubac suggested that this tension is present in Origen, who in different places emphasizes the Old 
Testament as a symbol for eternity, the New Testament identified with its celestial fulfillment, or the 
eternal as something yet awaited “whether the mediating term is omitted, the spirit being elevated from 
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The structure of history in Origen situates anagogy within the exegetical-spiritual 
process. Allegory draws out the figural meaning of the Old Testament “history,” which 
meaning is the New Testament. However, it is not sufficient to see in the Old Testament 
the figures of the New. 
In its turn then, in order to be understood as it must be, in its newness, which is to say, in  
its  spirit,  in  order  to  merit  its  name  as  New Testament,  the  content  of  this  second 
Scripture  must  give  way  to  a  perpetual  movement  of  transcendence.  The  spirit  is  
discovered  only  through  anagogy:  τήν  έπί  τά  πνευματικὰ  ἄπταιστον  άναγωγή  (the 
uninterrupted  anagogical  ascent  to  spiritual  realities).  We  must  consequently  always 
ἀνάγειν τήν ίστοϱίαν (ascend above the history).41   
Anagogy completes the exegetical procedure in a movement from the historical figures of 
the New Testament to the transcendent realities that they figure.42
It is critical that the object of Origen's anagogy is understood as being both 
heavenly and future. Anagogy treats the mysteria futura saeculi, “mysteries of the age to 
come.”43 The “things above” are also the “last things.” De Lubac explains: “'anagogy' is 
no more independent of 'eschatology' for him than for Saint Paul or Saint John. These 
'heavenly things' toward which he has us raise our eyes are for him, future realities in 
an earthly bond of Israel to 'supra-celestial places,' from the sacrifices of Israel to the Sacrifice that is 
consummated in the Temple on high—or whether the last two terms are fused together into one by the  
awareness of their profound identity, since it is a matter of the same Priest, the same Sacrifice, the same 
Victim, of the same Master of Truth whose 'words do not pass away'—or whether, finally, the third term 
is less expressed than intended, through a movement of 'transcendence' or 'anagogy' that is not 
completed, for 'insofar as the Son has not returned in his glory,' the depth of his mysteries cannot be 
explored.” Ibid., 253.
41 Ibid., 323.
42 For de Lubac, “anagogy” is a synonym for transcendence. Transcendence is a particularly modern term, 
imported into the Catholic vocabulary with the help of the Roman Catholic Modernists. De Lubac's use 
of the term reflects his dependence upon Blondel and his familiarity with the Modernists. 
43 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 478. See also ibid., 326–28, 422–3; Henri de Lubac, Scripture in the 
Tradition (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001), 52. Scripture in the Tradition was 
originally published as L'Écriture dans la tradition (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1966).
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relation to the signs of them contained in the Bible. They form this 'intelligible world' that 
can be seen only by pure hearts. They are the 'mysteries of the age to come.'”44
Even if, for Origen, anagogy is a movement beyond history, de Lubac claims that the 
realities of which it speaks are to be fulfilled in the future. In essence, the anagogical is 
the future orientation of the present, and thus remains an object of hope rather than 
something already complete. 
Significantly, by emphasizing that anagogy concerns the “mysteries of the age to 
come,” de Lubac also insisted that the age to come is always mediated. Origen conceives 
the anagogical meaning of scripture to be mediated by the concrete events of the New 
Testament:
The anagogical sense, just as much as the tropological or moral sense, is dependent on 
the allegorical or mystical sense. It is also an eschatological sense. The exemplarism has  
thus  been  reversed.  If  it  is  thus  true  that  in  the  final  analysis  “Origen  seeks  in  the 
historical events of the Old Testament the image of transcendent realities,” this is not 
without the mediation of the things, both historical and spiritual, that constitute the New 
Testament.45
The ascent to the eschatological is a passage through the historical events narrated by the 
New Testament. In similar terms, the New Testament history is a sacrament of eternity. 
The future-orientation of anagogy ensures the essential role of the sacramental-historical 
economy as a mediation of eternity.
In summary, Origen's anagogy was at the same time heavenly and future, 
objective and subjective. The temporal gospel shares an identity with the eternal Gospel, 
uniting the present economy of salvation with its final fulfillment. At the same time, for 
44 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 327.
45 Ibid., 328.
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Origen, the history narrated by the temporal Gospel exists as a figure of the eternal, and 
will pass away. Because of the continuity between the two, the temporal Gospel mediates 
the eternal, existing as the sacrament of that final fulfillment. For Origen, anagogical 
ascent to the transcendent and celestial requires the mediation of the present and is a 
progress to a future not yet achieved. Anagogy is, for Origen, both subjective and 
objective because the objective historical dialectic of the church, its earthly pilgrimage 
toward its eternal destination, is also a dialectic of interior conversion and of mystical 
ascent. 
III. The Specialization of the Spiritual Senses
Medieval Exegesis narrated a development of what de Lubac considered a core 
hermeneutical tradition from the patristic period to the early modern period. De Lubac 
suggested that this core tradition remained intact through the medieval period, but that  
developments within patristic and medieval thought obscured the logic of the 
hermeneutic of the fourfold and threefold senses. Yet the “specialization” of the senses of 
scripture is equally significant, especially for understanding the development of anagogy.
In what follows, I will examine how, according to de Lubac, patristic and early 
medieval shifts in the meaning of the spiritual senses contributed to a specialization of 
anagogy. First, I examine the process whereby the mystical meaning of the scriptures, 
originally understood as the spiritual meaning of history, becomes associated with more 
narrow mystical experiences. I treat this process under two headings: (a) the fate of 
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allegory; (b) the fate of tropology. Second, I then indicate how these evolutions affected 
the Victorine School and Scholasticism, both of which were important to anagogy.
A. The Specialization of Mysticism 
De Lubac observed a process whereby there was a gradual shift in association of 
the “mystical” meaning of Scripture from the allegorical, to the tropological, and finally 
to the anagogical. This shift in association points to a gradual shift in meaning of 
“mystery.” It evolves from a Pauline sense of the “plan of God” that is unfolded in 
history and beyond to a more static meaning referring to those things above. In other 
words, a Pauline meaning of mysticism, in which mysticism was intimately connected 
with the “mystery” of the economy of salvation, underwent a process of narrowing, de-
historicizing the “mystical meaning” of scripture.
1. The Separation of Doctrine from Mysticism (The Fate of 
Allegory)
Within early Christianity, spiritual interpretation functioned as both a spirituality 
and an apologetic, evolving as a response to both paganism and Judaism. Paul used it to 
defend Christianity against the Jewish rejection of the New Testament. The Gnostics, 
however, claimed to possess a deeper, spiritual meaning that would supersede all biblical 
revelation. Origen, “saved the unity of biblical revelation” by claiming the New 
Testament was the deeper spiritual meaning of the Old Testament. 46 He defended a 
46 Ibid., 59.
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spiritual interpretation “through an explanation taken from Scriptures, for the needs of the 
spiritual life they [the heretics] claimed to satisfy.”47 Within Origenian thought, 
“apologetics continued in spirituality, and the doctrine of the 'spiritual sense' saw its field 
of application grow indefinitely.”48 
As a result, de Lubac claimed, patristic thought associated the mystical meaning 
of scripture with allegory in particular: “the mystical understanding of Scripture counted 
among the essential components of theology; to be more precise, particularly of that part 
of theology which, at the time of the Fathers, was called the 'economy.' From that time 
forward, the so-called mystical or allegorical sense was always considered to be the 
doctrinal sense par excellence, the one that sets forth the mysteries relating to Christ and 
the Church.”49 Thus, the “allegorical” sense and the “mystical” sense designated the same 
reality. The allegorical sense was also the doctrinal (theological) sense because allegory 
interpreted the “mystery” present within the historical meaning of Scripture, which 
mystery is Christ and his fulfillment of the Old Testament. 
However, de Lubac claimed, a specialization of allegory evolved in two ways. 
First, during the early Middle Ages, de Lubac claims, a change in context for spiritual 
interpretation occurred. The apologetic context for the spiritual sense was lost, in part, 
due to the loss of a constant contact with a living tradition of paganism, which until the 
medieval period was alive in the Christian consciousness. The idea that there was a 





Christian allegory had won out. As a result, there was not much interest in the apologetic 
criticism of pagan allegory as non-historical or the corollary defense of Christian allegory 
as faithful to history. More importantly, the key to patristic allegory—that the New 
Testament is the spiritual depth of the Old Testament—was no longer as critical to the 
medieval practitioners of allegory. Thus, during the Middle Ages, the connection between 
the exegetical procedure of allegorization and the progressive economy of salvation was 
obscured.
Second, “mystical” meaning was gradually detached from the doctrinal meaning 
of scripture. Allegory in Origen was simultaneously doctrinal and spiritual because the 
interpreter of scripture examines the words for their depth, their spiritual meaning. This 
spiritual meaning is doctrine. 
As doctrine appeared more settled even in its least details, moreover, the sense relating to 
the spiritual life thus acquired a kind of independence. They crossed through the obscure 
layer of “allegories” more rapidly in order to penetrate the “secret delights” of which  
they were the promise. Mystical exegesis was no longer of great help for reflection on 
the mystery: from this point of view, its active role was past; but it remained a marvelous 
springboard for the inner impulse. The spiritual sense of Scripture became particularly 
the sense of the contemplative.50
After the great doctrinal debates of the patristic period and the ecumenical councils, the 
fundamental doctrine of the faith appeared more secure. The practice of searching the 
depths of Scripture was not as essentially tied to doctrinal understanding. As a result, 
spiritual interpretation continued but became associated with more contemplative 
practices and took on a more subjective and interior flavor.
50 Ibid.
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2. The Separation of Spirituality from Exegesis (The Fate of 
Tropology)
Tropology, the moral sense of Scripture, denotes the personal implications of the 
biblical story for the believer. It “is not entirely a 'doctrine of interior illumination.' It is 
the doctrine of the interiorization of the biblical datum: its history and its mystery. 
Neither this history nor this mystery is denied or forsaken, as it would at least be possible 
to believe among those who speak of a birth of the Word only within the contemplative 
soul.”51 Although tropology is an “interiorization” of the mystery, it is not individualistic: 
it implicates a reciprocal relationship between individual spirituality and the entire life of 
the church.52 Tropology is the dramatic interiorization of the mystery of Christ and its 
extension to the individual and the church as a whole. Connected to the fate of allegory, 
tropology also underwent an evolution that would separate spirituality from the doctrinal 
(that is, allegorical) meaning of scripture.
Monastic exegesis especially contributed to a specialization of tropology. 
Although monasticism made salubrious contributions to a profound Christian awareness 
of the meaning of the scriptures for the individual, it also generated excesses. Christian 
monasticism centered itself on lectio divina, the reading of and meditation on the biblical 
word. It extended patristic mystical tropology, applying it to a particular mode of 
religious life. A hallmark of monastic culture—the distinction between the laity and the 
monks, between actives and contemplatives, in sum, between degrees of being Christian
51 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:139.
52 Ibid., 2:136.
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—affected its biblical interpretation.53 Texts traditionally interpreted as referring to the 
church as a whole were transposed to the monastery.54 The city of Jerusalem, commonly 
interpreted as representing the church, becomes a symbol for the Abbey of Citeaux. On 
the one hand, these transpositions from church to monastery manifested a creative 
application of traditional themes; on the other, they contributed to a spiritual elitism.55 
The association of tropology with the intense “delight” of contemplation 
exemplified a specialization. The Word of God contains a spiritual sweetness underneath 
its letter. The delight of mystical contemplation would be interpreted as the particular 
prerogative of the monks and directed toward individual experience.56 While de Lubac 
claimed the vast majority of monks did not succumb to elitism, he believed that 
monasticism betrayed the tendency to focus on the experience of the monk as a more 
intense form of “spiritual nourishment.”57 
Monastic practices were in continuity with a wide-ranging tendency in medieval 
theology which led tropology to be placed in the service of an increasingly specialized 
“spirituality.”  
53 As an example of the spirit that animated monasticism, de Lubac described its idea of “conversion.” 
Conversion describes a new orientation to Christ. To convert is to renounce the world for Christ. In the 
monastic culture, “A 'convert' is no longer a man that has come from error to the truth, from paganism 
or Judaism to the Gospel: it is the one who renounces the 'world' for the 'cloister.' The day of his entry 
into religion is the day of his 'conversion.'” Ibid., 2:145.
54 Ibid., 2:146.
55 Ibid., 2:150.
56 See the section of Medieval Exegesis 2 entitled Doctor mellifluus on the “sweetness” of Scripture. The 
sweetness of honey is extracted from the comb as the spiritual understanding is extracted from the letter. 
Originally applied to the spiritual understanding as a whole, in the twelfth century it was applied by the 
Cistercians to the interiorization of the mystery in the soul. It indicated the need not only to know the 
mystery in an intellectual sense, but to understand by “experiencing” or “tasting” the mystery. Ibid., 




A trend is taking shape toward the beginning of the twelfth century, which tends more 
and more to put usefulness—and charm—on the side of tropology. With the organization 
of the ecclesiastical studies and the differentiation of the disciplines, allegory became 
more theoretical, more impersonal, in a certain way drier, and tropology, on the contrary, 
more practical, looking more to regulate external activity than to nourish the interior life.  
In our present categories, we would say that the first becomes the object of theological  
speculation, whilst the second tends to monopolize preaching.58
Developments within monastic exegesis contributed to the specialization of both the 
allegorical and tropological senses. Allegory would become associated with a more 
objective and technical theoretical discipline of theology, while tropology was employed 
for interior edification. De Lubac called the shift in focus of tropology a “refinement and 
gratuitousness.”59 The Scriptures become a mere springboard or “occasion” for spiritual 
self-edification and for spiritual experiences.60 “Connections with the doctrinal meaning 
that formerly, even implicitly, still governed spiritual developments are, in practice, 
severed. Or else the Bible primarily provides a framework.”61 De Lubac indicates that as 
a whole, spirituality was in the process of making itself independent from biblical 
exegesis. “We have seen above how, following dogmatic theology, spirituality was little 
by little detached, methodologically, from exegesis, in order to follow its own ways.”62 
The development of tropology as “practical” and interior, despite some positive 
development within medieval mysticism, tended to forget the connection of tropology 
with God's actions within the economy of salvation.
58 Ibid., 2:176.
59 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 479.
60 Ibid., 479.
61 Ibid., 497.
62 Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sens de l’écriture, vol. 4, Théologie 59 (Aubier: 
Éditions Montaigne, 1964), 487.
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B. The Victorine School and Scholasticism
It is common to speak of a “renaissance” in the twelfth century during which 
radical changes affected medieval culture and thought. Like his Thomist contemporaries 
Etienne Gilson and Marie-Dominique Chenu, de Lubac traced significant changes in 
methods and institutions of Christian theology to the twelfth century.63 Centers for 
theology shifted from monastic schools to the city schools and universities. Scholastic 
methods arose as powerful intellectual tools for all the sciences. The twelfth century 
witnessed the rise of the “summa”—a compendium of topically organized theological 
knowledge—which would eventually replace the biblical commentary as the dominant 
theological genre. Institutional and methodological changes point to an underlying shift 
in the model of human knowledge and the place that theology enjoyed therein. A linear 
history of salvation and an eschatological perspective no longer fit into this new model of 
knowledge.64 In de Lubac's account, two schools of thought, on the surface were opposed, 
63 See Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1991); Marie-Dominique Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on 
New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
64 Several factors, that de Lubac himself points out, are worth mentioning for their contribution to a new 
model of knowledge. First, dialecticians were “unmindful of the concrete history and revers[ed] the 
traditional methods to build their idea-palaces on new plans.” Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The 
Four Senses of Scripture, trans. E. M. Macierowski, vol. 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 
2009), 254. Originally published as Exégèse médiévale, 3: Les quatre sens de l’écriture (Paris: Éditions 
Montaigne, 1961). Second,  de Lubac described “resurgences of the platonic ideal, not particularly well-
disposed to 'becoming.'” Ibid., 3:254.  Third, de Lubac identified the “enthusiastic discovery of Nature” 
at the onset of the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, which threatened to overtake previous models of 
theological knowledge. Ibid. Adelard of Bath, Bernard Silvestris, and William of Conches particularly 
adopted the categories of Aristotle and Platonism for the advancement of physical science as a universal 
model of knowledge. Fourth, he identifies “the insidious influence of a 'nominalist' logic, which was in 
danger of ending up 'somehow de-existentializing the chief facts of the dispensatio under the pretext of 
assuring the unity of faith and salvation through time.'” Ibid., 3:255. 
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colluded in their contribution to a new model of theology: the Victorine School and 
twelfth-century Scholasticism 
I will only make the briefest mention of the most prominent of the Victorines, 
Hugh of Saint Victor and Richard of Saint Victor. These two contributed to two 
developments outlined in Exégèse médiévale. The first, attributed to Hugh, was the 
methodological separation between history and allegory. In a basically conservative 
attempt to secure allegorization, Hugh essentially divided theology into “two detached 
pieces”—history and allegory—which were “destined to become, in fact, quite 
independent of each other.”65 De Lubac explained that the trajectory on which the 
Victorines set theology gave rise to a division. History would become “historical and 
literal exegesis,” then “positive scholarship,” and eventually “criticism.”66 Allegory 
would loosen its ties to exegesis and become an “autonomous system:” “It will progress 
in rationality and in abstraction, to become the majestic edifice of the Summas of the 
great epoch.”67 Although Hugh of Saint Victor resisted the dehistorization of Christian 
theology in his time—he was part of the “resisting Augustinian environment”—he 
contributed to a methodological division that would become standard in the wider 
milieu.68
65 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:313.
66 Ibid., 3:313.
67 De Lubac, Exégèse médiévale, 4:314. “We have quite often pointed out this sort of split that intervenes 
between a theology, once it has become purely 'speculative,' and a spirituality where feeling and 
imagination are dominant—and which may secretly draw its principles from some non-Christian 
source. What may perhaps be less noticed, is that this split comes about as a consequence of the 
practical rupture of each of these two with exegesis, i.e., 'the historical foundation,' unless the unity of 
faith which serves as the foundation for them both should be attained in some other fashion.” De Lubac, 
Medieval Exegesis, 3:315.
68 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:254. De Lubac states that Hugh of St. Victor cannot be blamed for the 
widening division which was occurring. While his own theological synthesis showed signs of this 
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The second development, attributed to Richard, is the methodological separation 
of mystical theology, constituted by tropology and anagogy, from history and allegory. 
According to de Lubac, Richard of Saint Victor created a new genre of mystical literature 
which was detached from the literal and allegorical senses. 
Thus a genre of spiritual literature begins to be established … which will  finally no 
longer have any visible organic attachment, as has been said before, either with exegesis  
or with theology properly so called. He continues in principle to tie the explication of 
scripture to contemplative process, and his mysticism is always chock full of doctrine. 
On the other hand, if we take his work as a whole, we recognize that the influence of  
Pseudo-Dionysius in him, as in Hugh, is allied with that of Saint Gregory, which remains  
very strong. But after him, the evolution rushes headlong, To an extent never previously 
attained, Saint Gregory gives way to “divine Dionysius,” whose anagogy was, as we 
have seen, not very scriptural. Origen and Saint Augustine alike back away before him.69
 Tropology and anagogy would be “detached from the first two parts, so as to be 
constituted as a body of spiritual doctrine rather remote from its biblical foundations and 
from the newly constructed theology.”70
The increasing division between doctrine and spirituality within early Medieval 
thought was exacerbated and hardened with the shift of theological methodology that 
occurred within Scholasticism.71 Scholastic theology, by definition, was a theology of the 
“schools.” With the establishment of cathedral schools during Carolingian Renaissance, 
the centers of theological erudition began a shift from the monasteries. Theology would 
shift from the “school of contemplation” to a “school of disputation.” 
De Lubac indicates that the mode of theology graduated from reading (lectio) to 
division, he attempted to bind history and allegory together. Ibid., 3:317.
69 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:321.
70 Ibid., 3:315.
71 In perhaps an ironic jab at contemporary neo-Scholasticism, de Lubac described Scholasticism as "a 
new theology with new methods" that arrived on the scene. While de Lubac and other French 
theologians were accused of inventing a “new theology” (i.e., untraditional and modern), de Lubac 
indicated that Scholasticism in fact was new.
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disputation (disputatio). The monastic lectio focused on reading and meditation, which 
was essentially in the form of an exegesis of Scripture. While the monastic lectio “took 
on a contemplative aspect,” the scholastic lectio concerned argumentation.72 Scholastic 
lectio eventually will become the “dialectical disputation,” the argument over a particular 
question. The quaestio called upon students to debate the theological question posed, in a 
response of yes or no. Although the traditional links between theology and mediative 
practices were preserved, the early medieval disputatio would change the characteristics 
of the theological discipline. According to de Lubac, dialectical thought “called upon the 
mystery 'to be reduced into categories that had already been constituted in their 
entirety.'”73 The genre of the quaestio shifted the content from an explication of the 
depths of the text to answering a series of disputed questions. Significantly, the dialectical 
method worked under the assumption that the disputation could be resolved on the level 
of the “letter” without appeal to the mystical depths of the text.74 The contemplative-
mystical lectio became something extra, but not an essential component of this new mode 
of speculative theology. The twelfth-century change of theological genre therefore 
constituted a significant change in mentality.75
72 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 1:61.
73 Ibid., 1:63. See ibid., 1:55–66 on “New Questions”; Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist 
and the Church in the Middle Ages, trans. Gemma Simmonds, C.J., Faith in Reason (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 229. Corpus Mysticum Âwas originally published as Henri de 
Lubac, Corpus mysticum: l’eucharistie et l’Église au Moyen âge. Étude historique, Théologie 3 (Paris: 
Aubier, 1944).
74 While, in the twelfth century, de Lubac claims, the quaestio was not the “well-defined, technical genre” 
that it would later become, it already influenced the shape of theological reflection. De Lubac, Medieval  
Exegesis, 1:67. By the thirteenth century, “the leap is thus made. The break has taken place. 'Dialectic' 
and its 'questions' have won the day, and the change in methodology is found to have been accelerated 
by the inroads of an entirely new set of contents, that of the philosophy of Aristotle. Teaching no longer 
has as its framework the triple or quadruple explication of the biblical text.” Ibid., 1:73.
75 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 1:60.
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Later Scholasticism emphasized theology as a “scientific” discipline subject to 
proofs. The new emphasis on proof effectively dismantled the interconnection between 
theology and mysticism. Proofs were primarily drawn from Scripture and increasingly 
focused on the literal sense of scripture.  A proof could not depend upon a tenuous and 
uncertain “mystical interpretation.” As John of Paris claimed, "mystica theolgia non est 
argumentativa" [mystical theology does not furnish proofs].76 De Lubac noted that 
Thomas Aquinas himself declared that proofs can only come from the literal sense of 
scripture. The field of dogmatics had to depend upon a certain interpretation of the literal 
sense of scripture. Demonstration using the literal sense became the new ideal for 
theological knowledge. Scholasticism's new ideal appropriated the older categories of 
spiritual exegesis, but at the same time changed them. The great thirteenth century 
scholastics, including Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, embedded 
“spiritual understanding” and the three spiritual senses within a new model for 
theological inquiry. After the thirteenth century, the “exposition of the fourfold sense 
remains an obligatory theme for the scholastic.” However, it was becoming “merely an 
empty repetition of an old theory. The application is entirely mechanical.”77 
76 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 482.
77 De Lubac, Exégèse médiévale, 4:310. The change of methodology, however, does not mean that 
medieval Scholasticism entirely lost an understanding of sacred history. Bonaventure melded scholastic 
method with a profound and original reflection on history in response to Joachimite thought among the 
Franciscan “spirituals.” In Thomas Aquinas, though less explicitly historical, theology and scripture 
remain united within Scientia scripturae. De Lubac claimed, following Congar, Spicq, and Chenu, that 
Thomas was doing nothing but putting to systematic use the traditional categories of exegesis. It was 
not a matter of innovation. See ibid., 4:286; de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:315; Henri de Lubac, 
“Joachim de Flore jugé par saint Bonaventure et saint Thomas,” in Pluralisme et oecuménisme en 
recherches théologiques: Mélanges offerts au R.P. Dockx, O.P., Bibliotheca Ephemeridum 
Theologicarum Lovaniensium 43 (Peeters Publishers, 1976), 37; Henri de Lubac, “On an Old Distich: 
The Doctrine of the ‘Fourfold Sense’ in Scripture,” in Theological Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1989), 109–28.  
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De Lubac insisted that “mystical knowledge” held an ambiguous place in the new 
ideal for theology which took root beginning in the twelfth century. While the exposition 
of the fourfold sense remained an obligatory structure for biblical interpretation, the 
tropological and anagogical senses of Scripture were placed outside of the realm of 
theology properly so called. As a result, the essential interconnection between mysticism 
and theology could no longer be assumed.
IV. A Narrowing of Mystical Ascent: The Pseudo-Dionysian Legacy
For Origen, anagogy is a mysticism that moves from the sensible to the 
intelligible and that moves to the end point of the economy of salvation. Origen 
incorporates the 'verticality' of mystical ascent with the 'horizontal' journey of the church 
towards the end of time, the eschaton. In de Lubac's interpretation, at the close of the 
twelfth century, the connection between the exegetical process and the historical 
economy of salvation was becoming attenuated. As a result, the last sense of scripture 
was no longer viewed as the endpoint of the progression of the historical economy 
towards its goal, but instead placed in the service of a mysticism disengaged from that 
economy. De Lubac described a corollary loss of the eschatological association of the 
anagogical sense of scripture. This change resulted in
an obscuring of  the social  and eschatological  perspective.  In  the classical  distinction 
between the four senses, the fourth was concerned with realities that were both heavenly 
and future, mysteria futuri saeculi [mysteries of the age to come]. In Origen himself, as 
we have seen,  anagogy united these two characteristics; it  contained the hope of the 
Church in progress. Now an exegesis essentially attentive to things of the interior life did  
not have to treat what we call today the “end of history.” Centered on the individual soul, 
it did not have to speak explicitly of the Church triumphant any more than it did of the 
Church militant. That was a legitimate specialization, from the moment that mysticism 
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thus disengaged remained based on mystery. But this habitual preterition was perhaps 
not without leading in the end to a certain narrowing of hope.78
In sum, the anagogical sense was stripped of its social and eschatological reference, 
becoming more narrowly focused on the individual mystical ascent to invisible realities. 
One of the most significant factors in the shift of the meaning of anagogy within 
medieval Christian theology was the influence of the fifth- to sixth-century 
pseudepigraphal writings of Dionysius the Areopagite. Dionysius's compositions melded 
a spiritual tradition stemming from Origen with Neoplatonic mystical traditions, resulting 
in an influential body of teaching concerning the mystical ascent to God and deification.79 
John Scotus Eriugena (ca. 815-ca. 877) translated Pseudo-Dionysius into Latin, making 
these writings available to early medieval monastic circles. According to de Lubac, 
although  Pseudo-Dionysius was read from the ninth century on, his influence 
proliferated in the twelfth century: “Just as the march of the mind had passed through 
Aristotle, so will it pass through Dionysius.”80 De Lubac noted that the popularity of 
these writings was due, in part, to their false attribution to the disciple of Paul in Acts 
17.81 
Dionysian mysticism is characterized by an anagogical ascent to God that, 
beginning from material and symbolic representations, rises beyond them. Dionysius's 
mystical ascent is composed of three stages: the symbolic, affirmation, and negation. 
Symbols are the divine manifestations, which participate in the “emanation” of God. 
78 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 478.
79 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100 - 600), vol. 1, The Christian Tradition: 
A History of the Development of Doctrine (University of Chicago Press, 1971), 344–349.
80 Medieval Exegesis, 3:321.
81 Ibid., 3:322.
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They are the material representations of the divinity, including those found in Scripture. 
The second and third stages comprise a dialectic of affirmation (kataphasis) and negation 
(apophasis). Symbols are interpreted though this dialectic, by which what we affirm of 
God within the symbols must be subsequently negated to maintain the transcendence of 
God. For Dionysius, it is more fitting to say “not what [God] is, but what he is not.”82 
According to Dionysius, positive representations of the Godhead—Word, Mind, Cause—
are less fitting than the negative modes of representation—invisible, infinite. But in 
reality, Dionysius defends biblical imagistic representations of God as more appropriate, 
for it is implicit that the biblical representations, unlike the philosophical counterparts, 
point to rather than comprehend the divinity.83 Yet the anagogical flight to God must rise 
above images and representations. The Dionysian dichotomy between God's invisible 
reality and the ultimately inadequate Scriptural forms of representation make the latter, 
even the narratives concerning God's historical interaction with humanity, akin to myths. 
De Lubac had an overwhelmingly negative evaluation of Dionysius, finding a 
destructive strain of thought in his mysticism.84 First, de Lubac ascribed to Dionysius a 
82 Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, 1:347.
83 "If, then, the negations respecting things Divine are true, but the affirmations are inharmonious, the 
revelation as regards things invisible, through dissimilar representations, is more appropriate to the 
hiddenness of things unutterable.” The Celestial Hierarchy in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, 
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, ed. Colm Luibhéid, trans. Paul Rorem, The Classics of 
Western Spirituality (Mawah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987), 165.
84 De Lubac's evaluation of Dionysius is even more significant given the apparent parallels between 
Dionysius' understanding of erōs and de Lubac's theology of “natural desire.” Dionysius envisions erōs 
as the outpouring of God's love whereby creation comes to be and as the cosmic force whereby all 
things desire to return to the Good. God creates by giving himself over to that which is not God, while 
remaining God. Made possible by this creative gift, the mystic returns to God by an ecstatic outpouring 
of herself or himself in a return gift. De Lubac insists that human beings possess a desire for the vision 
of God that is essential to what it means to be human. This desire is made possible only by God's 
intention for humanity. Both Dionysian erōs and Lubacian “natural desire” have an “anagogic” 
dynamic. 
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tendency toward an individualist mysticism. Second, Dionysius's apophatic theology 
construed the material, historical, and symbolic realities narrated by Scripture as suited to 
an inferior stage of contemplation. Third, Dionysius loses the eschatological. The first 
reservation concerning Dionysius have been convincingly disputed by recent theologians 
seeking to recover Dionysius for contemporary theology. They have produced more 
positive, and perhaps fairer, interpretations.85 Essentially responding to the charge of 
individualism, Mark A. McIntosh argues that corporate and ecclesial aspects of 
Dionysius's mystical theology resist divisions between individualistic “spirituality” and 
ecclesial faith.86 The other charges—that Dionysius loses the historical dimension of 
salvation—is more difficult to shake. According to Balthasar, “what was once historical, 
temporally conditioned reality becomes for Denys a means for expressing an utterly 
universal theological content. The dimension of history and of Church history interests 
him not at all; only the eternal, only the divine interests him."87 However, Balthasar 
argues, Dionysius does not evacuate history altogether. He indicated that Dionysius does 
85 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Clerical Styles, vol. 2 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 144–210; Mark A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of 
Spirituality and Theology, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1998), 44–56; Tamsin Jones, “Dionysius in Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Jean-Luc Marion,” in Re-
thinking Dionysius the Areopagite, ed. Sarah Coakley and Charles M. Stang (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 213–24.  
86 McIntosh explains that Dionysius has been blamed for the transition from spiritual theology to a 
modern mysticism, from earlier communally-oriented mystical practices to a mysticism of individual 
interior states. McIntosh, Mystical Theology, 44. McIntosh argues that instead, “the mystical depth 
encountered by the spiritual seeker is not found by a purely interior ascent of the soul, but rather that 
such a Neoplatonic itinerary has been re-contextualized in the sacramental life of the community.” Ibid., 
45.
87 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, 2:152. See also Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, 
1:346.   
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not negate the value of concrete symbols and intellectual constructions of the divine; 
rather this mysticism retains the value of symbols while recognizing their insufficiency.88 
De Lubac's reservations concerning Dionysius especially considered the reception 
of his writings. De Lubac explained that “anagogical” mysticism in monasticism and the 
early medieval milieu possessed an eschatological framework.
But  when,  laden  with  an  insufficiently  transformed  Neoplatonism,  the  thought  of 
Dionysius was introduced into the west, the risk of a disturbance in equilibrium arose, at  
the expense of supernatural historicity and of the eschatological component. This risk 
came to a head in the work of John Scotus. It was reinforced by the second Dionysian 
wave in the course of the twelfth century. This Dionysian anagogy, whereby one passes 
from the order of visions to that of pure contemplation or from symbolic theology to 
mystical theology, is neither first nor foremost in the end time of an exegesis: it is, as it  
were,  the  last  spurt  of  a  sort  of  cosmic  energy  raising  each  nature  according  to  its  
hierarchic order in the graduated series of illuminations. It makes the mind, as Hugh of  
Saint  Victor  says  commenting  on  the  Celestial  Hierarchy,  penetrate  “into  the 
contemplation  of  higher  things,”  but  these  “higher  things”  would  at  the  same  time 
scarcely appear any longer as the “last things.” By anagogy, said Cassian, “speech is 
carried over to the invisible things to come.” This was, as we have seen, the language of 
the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of Origen; it was also to be that of many others. In  
the tradition influenced by Dionysius, however, a dissociation tended to develop between 
the invisibilia and the futura, as between the mystic life and the mediation on Scripture. 
No longer aware of a certain order of personal intimacy between the two liberties, the  
divine and the human, the mysticism formed by Dionysius spontaneously tended toward 
the  “edification  of  the  holy  Church.”  When  these  traits  came  to  dominate,  they 
profoundly differentiated the mysticism of Dionysius from that of Origen, Augustine, or 
Gregory. The history of the struggles for influence and of attempts at synthesis between 
these two mystical traditions would be extremely interesting to untangle. Here let us 
simply  recall  the  explanation  that  Garnier  of  Rochefort  soon  gave  us  about  the 
purification of the understanding which empties itself of every image so as to climb back 
to  its  “superessential”  original.  They  no  longer  have  any  more  than  a  very  loose  
connection  with  Scripture.  Now,  try as  they might  to  appeal  to  the  authority  of  the  
Soliloquiae, they in fact came straight from Dionysius.89 
88 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, 2:178–9. Despite the profound alliances between de Lubac's and 
Balthasar's theological projects, they diverge on the interpretation of Dionysius. The difference between 
Balthasar and de Lubac on this point is due in part to a different “optic,” a different set of problems to 
which they responded. Balthasar recovers Dionysius for his own theological aesthetics. Unlike 
Balthasar, nowhere does de Lubac assess the merits of Dionysius the theologian. Instead, his concern 
was for the historical impact of Dionysius in the Middle Ages and the enthusiastic reception of 
Dionysian thought into a new theological climate of the twelfth century. The Lubacian optic concerns 
what happens to biblical narrative under the strain of Dionysian thought, and especially the resultant 
impact of Dionysian thought on the anagogical.
89 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:194–5.
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In this long quotation, de Lubac indicates that Dionysian thought contributed to a process 
whereby the earlier mystical tradition represented by Origen, Augustine, and Gregory 
was supplanted with what would be a modern form of mysticism. There was a “transition 
from mystical understanding to speculative mysticism—to wit, from Scripture to 
Dionysius.”90 Dionysius is not singularly responsible for this transition; rather, his 
twelfth-century reception exacerbated theological trajectories already in place.91 
Most significantly, for de Lubac, the fracturing of the invisibilia (invisible things) 
from the futura (future things) within Christian eschatology is the key to that transition. 
Dionysian anagogy passes beyond the symbols of God's manifestation in a dialectic of 
negation. In effect, it mitigated the mediation of the historical events of salvation. 
Moreover, Dionysian anagogy was insufficiently oriented to a future realization. The 
“higher” reality of Dionysian thought helped to establish the object of anagogy as the 
atemporal, ahistorical divine reality, whether contemplated directly after the use of signs 
and images is left behind or contemplated through the visible. 
Twelfth-century definitions of anagogy, de Lubac tells us, give evidence of the 
underlying dissociations between the future and the invisible. For Peter Comestor (died 
around 1178), anagogy “'deals with God and the things above the heavens,' as if it were a 
question of intemporal objects.”92 Rupert of Deutz (1075-1129) writes that with Scripture 
90 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:322.
91 Among these trajectories were eternalism and a prioritization of interior experience. Eternalism is a 
tendency to regard only the universal and unchanging as dignified of divinity, thereby neglecting the 
particularity of the actions and events of the history of salvation. The second, the interiorization of 
Christian mysticism, consists of a direct (unmediated by external realities or histories) experience of the 
divine. Mysticism tends toward a “pure contemplation.”
92 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:195.
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“we can weigh carefully at any time, not what or how God is, but what he is not, and that 
God is to be likened to no creature.”93 Garnier of Rochefort (died around 1199), described 
anagogy as the vision “whereby it [the mind] strives to contemplate the most holy 
heavenly one as he is by the mind's climbing up and going out in nakedness and purity 
and without covering.”94 For William of Ockham (ca. 1288-ca. 1348), it is “an 
explanation whereby the invisible things of God are seen to be understood through those 
that have been made.”95
By the end of the twelfth century, the connection between the anagogical ascent of 
the mind and the last sense of Scripture was becoming tenuous. In the case of Meister 
Eckhart the history of salvation was “transposed dangerously in dialectical stages” of the 
ascent of the soul.96 In the case of Jean Gerson, “the anagogical meaning of the Cantique,  
without precise reference to the mystery of the Church nor to an eschatological hope, is 
then the description of the 'anagogici excessus' of the perfect soul as Denys understands 
it.”97 In sum, anagogical meaning was becoming almost entirely focused on the ascent of 
the mind to the detriment of eschatology and Christian hope.
V. Joachim of Fiore
According to de Lubac, Joachim was a voice of protest against the Dionysian 
93 Ibid., 2:196.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., 2:195. “In the same way, the 'sapientia anagogica' which authors like Hugh of Balma define 
especially according to Dionysius, will no longer be presented as the last moment of an exegesis; it will 
rather be the high point of a contemplation arising from the 'plane of history,' the 'planities historiae': he 
will allow it to be opposed to 'any speculative wisdom,' as that which comes from God and not men.” de 
Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:316. 
96 De Lubac, Exégèse médiévale, 4:489.
97 Ibid., 4:494.
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traditions dominating the medieval landscape.98 Yet Joachim's eschatology depended 
upon the same dichotomy between the future and the invisible that governed Dionysian 
thought:
Two deviations threaten spiritual understanding at its peak. Spiritual understanding can 
forget  that  Christianity is  eschatological  and,  effectively,  suppress hope—at least  the 
specifically  Christian  hope.  On  the  other  hand,  by  an  inverse  dissociation  of  the 
invisibilia  and the  futura,  it can also conceive an eschatology upon earth and thereby 
transform hope—at least a primary phase of hope—into utopia. Some signs of the first 
tendency, due in part to the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius, had appeared for us with 
respect to anagogy and we have just picked up its trail once again. It remains to explore  
the second in its most illustrious instance: that of Joachim of Flora (ca. 1132-1202).99 
The first deviation is a theologia divorced from œconomia; the second is œconomia 
without theologia. The object of Dionysian anagogy was exclusively the “invisibilia 
Dei;” the object of Joachim's eschatology was a future historical state. Dionysian 
mysticism and Joachimite prophecy were products of similar dissociations between the 
future and the invisible. Though opposed, they thus shared a similar feature. 
In part, Joachim reacted against proto-rationalistic tendencies within medieval 
thought in general and nascent Scholasticism in particular. He creatively synthesized the 
categories of an ancient exegesis into a new, powerful apocalyptic vision that projected 
Christian hope into the terrestrial future. His new synthesis was a corrective, but also 
contained dangers.
98 De Lubac testified to the expansive influence of Dionysius on the high Middle Ages and beyond: “After 
the 13th century, Denys invades everything: cosmology, metaphysics, ecclesiology, even politics, 
spirituality. But it is a multiform Denys. The Denys of Albert the Great and of the Thomists is not 
entirely the one of Thomas of Verceil, of Hugh of Balma, of Robert Gosseteste, and of the Franciscan 
community; their Denys is not the one of which the secular Guillaume de Saint-Amour had invoked the 
authority. In the time of Boniface VIII, the pontifical theologians, with a Giles of Rome, had 
constructed their teaching on a kind of amalgamation of Aristotle and Denys, and this same 
amalgamation is found a century later in the work of their successor John of Torquemada. However, all 
the spiritual currents are more or less Dionysian.” Ibid., 4:494.  
99 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:327.
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A. Sources and de Lubac's Methods
De Lubac's earliest significant treatment of Joachim of Fiore appeared in 1950 in 
History and Spirit, in an extended contrast between Origen's and Joachim's use of the 
term “the eternal Gospel.” De Lubac's Catholicism only referred to Joachim once, and not 
in the context of Joachim's exegesis or eschatology; Joachim went unmentioned in Le 
Drame de l'humanisme athée (1944) and Sur les chemins de Dieu (1956). De Lubac 
examined Joachim's exegesis and the Joachimite tradition of biblical interpretation in 
Medieval Exegesis 3 (1961) and Exégèse médiévale 4 (1964).100 Three years later, de 
Lubac published an article entitled “Joachim de Flore jugé par saint Bonaventure et saint 
Thomas” that examined the Scholastic response to Joachim's historical thinking.101 The 
two volume La Postérité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore (1979, 1981) soon followed. De 
Lubac wrote more on Joachim than on any other historical figure, except maybe Origen.
Exégèse médiévale narrates the “exegetical posterity” of Joachim, namely those 
who followed his exegetical methods. This posterity consists of those who interpret 
prophecies of Scripture literally and historically. La Postérité spirituelle is an account of 
the “spiritual posterity,” those who would hope for a third age of the Spirit or of the 
spirit.102 De Lubac argued that while Joachim's “exegetical posterity” lost its vitality long 
ago, his “spiritual posterity” remained a significant cultural force:
The first, which was not sustained by any élan of thought, is but a withered branch in the  
100 Medieval Exegesis 3:327-419 and Exégèse médiévale 4:325-344 contain the most extended 
interpretations. 
101 De Lubac, “Joachim de Flore jugé par saint Bonaventure et saint Thomas.”
102 This second posterity nonetheless has clear ties to Joachim's exegesis. Henri de Lubac, La Posterité 
spirituelle de Joachim de Flore: de Joachim à Schelling, vol. 1 (Paris: Éditions Lethielleux, 1979), 14.
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present hour. The second is a dense forest. After the thirteenth century, it has constantly 
metamorphosed, and not only at the interior or on the margins of the churches, but as far 
as in the secular thought of modernity. More exactly, the Joachimite idea has not ceased 
to act like a ferment. In the variety of forms that it has assumed, learned or popular, it  
has constituted one of the principle channels conducing to secularization, that is to say of  
the denaturing of Christian faith, thought and action.  It has served also to supplement or  
substitute  mysticism  [mystique]  for  processes  of  rationalization  that  couldn't  by 
themselves  arouse  the  necessary  enthusiasm  for  their  achievement.   Today  it  has  a 
surprising renewal of life.103
De Lubac's method of interpretation of Joachim follows the pattern of his other 
historical works. His overriding interest was not the individual author, but the Nachleben 
of an idea. As Emmanuel Falque notes, for de Lubac, “every text, in particular on the 
matter of theology, is understood not only in its context, but also through the tradition 
that it engenders.”104 In the case of Joachim, de Lubac was interested less in Joachim 
himself than in the traditions engendered by him. In particular, de Lubac wished to 
understand the shifts and ruptures within an intellectual tradition: “His method is entirely 
his own and original. Even before any historical reference to Joachim, I have said, he is 
attempting to generate 'the innovation of Joachim.' To track ruptures and transitions: such 
is the method constantly taken by de Lubac since Exégèse médiévale.”105 De Lubac also 
traced that which contributed to those ruptures. Joachim was the beneficiary of an earlier 
tradition, which he creatively re-formed.
While de Lubac ascribed to Joachim a significant role in a rupture within 
Christian eschatological thinking and even saw in him the precursor of dangerous 
philosophical and political movements, he did not read Joachim in merely a critical 
103 Ibid., 1:14–15.
104 Emmanuel Falque, “La postérité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore ou le principe d’immunité chez Henri 
de Lubac,” Revue des sciences religieuses 77, no. 2 (April 2003): 189.
105 Ibid., 190. I would add only that this interest in rupture and transition was at the heart of de Lubac's 
historical focus since Corpus Mysticum.
178
mode. On the one hand, he paints Joachim as an innovator, whose exegetical 
methodology broke with a centuries-long tradition.106 On the other hand, he saw 
Joachim's thought within a historical evolution of “spiritual interpretation” and also as a 
response to forms of nascent rationalism within the church. De Lubac treats Joachim 
sympathetically, as a mystic who envisions a “regeneration in spirit” of the church.107 
“His 'internal dynamism' was consequently not an entirely aberrant force.”108 Joachim 
was probably not aware of the “disruptive” effects that his theology would have.109 
Consequently, Joachim's reception within the theological tradition was, perhaps, 
of greater importance than Joachim himself. The great scholastics, including Bonaventure 
and Thomas Aquinas, confronted Joachim's exegetical and eschatological thought. 
Bonaventure purified it and integrated it into his theology of history. Thomas Aquinas 
refuted it without such integration.110 The condemnations at the Fourth Lateran Council 
(1215) and the Synod of Arles (1263) of Joachim and of heresies spread under his name  
106 De Lubac's opinion conflicted with that of Leone Tondelli, Francesco Russo, Antonio Crocco, and 
Marjorie Reeves, who championed the fundamental orthodoxy of Joachim. They argue that Joachim 
envisioned a purified church of the future whose institutions would remain intact. In contrast, de Lubac 
argued that Joachim proposed a radical discontinuity between the present and the past. Indeed, Joachim 
was quite aware of the novelty of his proposals. De Lubac, Posterité spirituelle, 1:22. Bernard McGinn, 
reviewing this debate, states that the differences between the positions could be partially bridged by 
avoiding the loaded contrast between heterodoxy and orthodoxy. Bernard McGinn, Apocalypticism in 
the Western Tradition (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 1994), 9: 34.
107 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:417. Joachim “struggled against the deadly dessication that seemed to 
menace the Church, both in her pastors and in her doctors” and “reacted against an inclination toward 
psychologism and subtlety.” Ibid., 3:418.
108 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:418.
109 De Lubac, Posterité spirituelle, 1:17.
110 Bernard McGinn mentions that Thomas' refutation of Joachim split modern historians. Some, including 
Ernesto Buonaiuti, “have seen in Thomas' opposition to the abbot a sign of the loss of the historical and 
eschatological dimensions of Christianity in Scholasticism. Thomist scholars, on the other hand, like Y. 
Congar, M. D. Chenu, and M. Secklar, have risen up in defense of the doctor claiming that he saved the 
true dimensions of Heilsgeschichte in Christianity by attacking the false variety spawned by Joachim.” 
McGinn, Apocalypticism in the Western Tradition, 40. De Lubac argues that Thomas himself preserved 
the historical dimensions of Christianity, but that the subsequent Scholastic tradition did not.
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marginalized a growing Joachimite eschatological tradition. However, elements of his 
historical-eschatological and spiritual vision were transmitted, but increasingly stripped 
of their links to Christian theology. Thus, de Lubac writes, “defeated in the most beautiful 
of his dreams, Joachim of Fiore, in the manner of Nostradamus, triumphs in his 
hermeneutics. People borrow his prophetic historicism without wanting to retain anything 
of his hope.”111 It was neither Joachim's particular prophesies of the end of time nor his 
exegetical method that was passed on into modernity; rather, it was his prophetic 
expectation of a new age within history.
B. Joachim's Radical Eschatology
Bernard McGinn describes the uniqueness of Joachim in terms of his explanation 
of the third age. “All medieval thinkers were eschatological in the sense that they 
accepted the Christian understanding of history that looked forward to the definitive 
event of the return of Christ and the end of time.”112 Even Joachim's expectation of an 
imminent end of time was quite common. Joachim is unique, McGinn states, in that he 
envisioned the third age as “the age of the fullness of revelation and the triumph of the 
viri spirituales, the 'spiritual men.'”113 This would be the age of the Holy Spirit, “the 
perfection of the divine within history.” In sum, Joachim's eschatology was “radical” 
because the third age would be a future historical age of fulfillment. De Lubac agreed 
with McGinn's assessment that Joachim is not unique in seeing his own age as the last, or 
111  De Lubac, Exégèse médiévale, 4:344.
112  McGinn, Apocalypticism in the Western Tradition, 9: 34.
113  Ibid., 9:34.
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in reading the scriptures the tribulations and triumphs to come. This was part of a long 
Christian apocalyptic tradition.
According to de Lubac, two lines of Christian thought converge in Joachim's 
theology. The first, is the notion of a “slow divine pedagogy in the advance of 
revelation.”114 Throughout history, God's numerous interventions have been a gradual 
pedagogy and a growth of the human race in its knowledge of God. The writings of 
Irenaeus are a premier example, but this historical schema is ubiquitous in the early 
church. The second is, in part, inherited from monasticism, which presented the monks as 
realizing a “new age.” De Lubac notes that the Dionysian notion of successive 
hierarchies, in which one stage of contemplation points to a higher one, is similar.115 
Joachim essentially takes the notion of contemplative ascent through numerous 
ontological and epistemological stages and lays it on its side, interpreting it historically as 
a succession of historical periods.
Understood against the backdrop of the traditional division of the ages of 
salvation history, Joachim's division of history is the key to understanding the innovation 
of his system. 
People distinguished generally, according to Saint Paul, in the history of salvation, three 
successive “ages,” or three “states,” or three “reigns,” attributed respectively to three 
persons of the divine Trinity. These were the reign of the Father, which extended through 
the eight “days” of creation; then the reign of the Son, which was inaugurated by the 
promise of the redeemer made to Adam the day after his sin; lastly,  the reign of the  
Spirit, covering all the time of the Church and was supposed to last until the end of this  
world: “a new and eternal testament.”116
114  De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:412.
115  Ibid., 3:313–14.
116  De Lubac, Posterité spirituelle, 1:19.
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De Lubac noted that there were many variations on this division of history, which would 
characterize the Old Testament as the age of the prophetic Spirit (Irenaeus), or would 
contain a fourfold, sixfold, or sevenfold division. But these variations did not disrupt “the 
fundamental division, which carried the essential doctrine.”117 
In Joachim, the traditional historical division was radically altered:
As many before him, on the other hand, Joachim divided the universal history into three 
parts, according to the sacred number of the Trinity,  recommended by the scriptures. 
Only, he no longer placed the two caesuras, or the two thresholds in the same place. For 
him, the age of the father is extended until the hour of the redemptive incarnation; at that 
time was begun the age of the Son, which was the one of the present Church; but soon,  
already “initiated” or announced in figure, a third age (he said more willingly a third 
state or a third time) was supposed to succeed it,  even on this earth, the last, which  
would  be  characterized  by  the  reign  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  This  was  a  radical 
transformation.118 
According the the traditional schema, the third age, “the age of the Spirit,” is the time of 
the present church. Perhaps motivated by the Scriptural account of Pentecost, the 
tradition has the Christian living in the final age of history under the reign of the Spirit. 
Because of a continuity between the present church and the future heavenly kingdom, 
eschatological expectation concerns the fulfillment and completion of the present order. 
In the case of Joachim, we are now anticipating the age of the Spirit and the bringing 
about of a new order of salvation history.
The rupture between the second and third age, in effect, governed other aspects of 
Joachim's thought. First, borrowing a title from the book of Revelation, he contrasted the 
“carnal Gospel” with the “eternal Gospel.” Both Origen and Joachim prominently used 
this latter term. For both, the “eternal Gospel” was a spiritual interpretation of the Gospel 
117  Ibid., 1:20.
118  Ibid., 1:21–22.
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given to us in the New Testament. “But they completely disagree on the naure and time of 
this interpretation.”119 De Lubac states that for Origen, the “eternal Gospel” is the future 
state of the present Gospel, not an addendum. Origen's “eternal gospel is the antithesis 
and anticipated antidote of that of the Calabrian monk. In brief, it is completely 
eschatological.”120 For Joachim, the eternal Gospel will supersede the carnal Gospel and 
will establish a new spiritual society within time.121 
Second, but closely related to the first point, Joachim's biblical hermeneutics 
indicated a radical change in the spiritual interpretation of Scripture. Joachim's exegesis 
was governed by the “concord” between the three ages of history. Each age has an 
interior process of development, so that its initial “germination” is followed by a 
“fructification” and its “passing away.”122 The ages overlap; when one is just beginning, 
the previous has reached its midway-point of development. The first age corresponds to 
the Old Testament; the second corresponds to the New Testament; the third remains in the 
future. De Lubac argued that the relationship between the Old Testament to the New is no 
longer for Joachim a relationship of letter to spirit, but instead of one of “one letter to 
another letter.”123 Joachim's exegesis mirrors the correspondence between “two external 
histories.”124  The persons, figures, and events of the Old Testament have concordances 
119  De Lubac, History and Spirit, 252. 
120  Ibid., 252.
121  Ibid.
122 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:334.
123 Ibid., 3:336.
124 Ibid. De Lubac notes that traditional principles of spiritual interpretation held apocalypticism, always 
present in the church, in check. “It is precisely that doctrine, that principle of interpretation, sometimes 
inexactly described as 'idealist,' which turns out to be missing in Joachim.” Ibid., 3:407–08.
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within the New Testament, and also prophetically prefigure the persons, figures, and 
events in the third age, which is presently arriving.125 
Third, the hiatus between the second and third age affected how Joachim viewed 
the relationship between present ecclesial institutions and those of the future age. There is 
some debate about the extent to which Joachim believed that ecclesial institutions, the 
papacy, and the sacraments must pass away in history. However, he envisioned a 
disjunction between the institutions of the present age and those that come, between the 
Christians of this age, and the “spiritual men” of the subsequent age. Where Origen saw 
continuity between the present and the eternal, Joachim saw a rupture. According to de 
Lubac, the rupture between present and future introduced by Joachim goes so far as to 
endanger the centrality of Christ and the church in the coming era of salvation. 
C. Effects of Joachim's Theology of History and Eschatology
The rupture that Joachim advances is between the second and third age. By 
locating the third age within history, he dissociated the events of salvation history and its 
future fulfillment. According to de Lubac, it is because the “time of the Spirit” intervenes 
between the Gospel and eternity that a rupture occurs between the present church and the 
eternal church, between the work of Christ and that of the Spirit.126 The age of the Spirit 
125 The principle of “concord” assurred a correspondence between past and future events. De Lubac 
insisted that concord was fundamentally different from the principle of spiritual interpretation in Origen 
and much of the tradition. De Lubac describes concord as a correspondence of certain external 
characteristics between events, such that one historical figure is likened to another, one war is likened to 
another, one liturgical practice is like another. The guiding principle of spiritual interpretation, on the 
other hand, is “interiorization.” Christ recapitulates events of the Old Testament by subsuming them to 
himself. The “interiorization” of the New Testament is the spiritual recapitulation of the New in the life 
of the church. 
126 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 3:418.
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will supplant the present economy of salvation. By placing the age of the Spirit within 
history, Joachim calls into question the “definitively fulfilling character of the work 
accomplished by Jesus Christ.”127 As de Lubac indicates, “Joachim has compromised—
without intending to, it seems—the full sufficiency of Jesus Christ.”128
Additionally, for de Lubac, Joachim both contributes to and is the witness of a 
shift in a Christian understanding of eschatological expectation. The awareness that the 
“kingdom of God is near” is common in Christianity. In the early church, this awarness is 
an expectation of the imminent end of the world. Within Joachim, an expectation exists 
for a new temporal order, a spiritualization of the Gospel that is just beginning to take 
ecclesial and political shape. The spiritual tradition inspired by Joachim transmitted a 
future-oriented expectation of a new era, already germinating, in which humanity would 
come of age. This expectation carried well beyond the boundaries of biblical 
interpretation or theology, and well into modernity. In La Posterité spirituelle, de Lubac 
argued that this spiritual tradition would become entirely horizontal, historical, and 
secular.
VI. Conclusion
As indicated previously, the vertical and the horizontal, the mystical and 
eschatological elements of the Christian faith were important to de Lubac from his 




Christian images used to describe the movement from this world to the next.129 The 
former envision an ascent of the individual soul through various levels of reality, each 
level being necessary for the attainment of the next. Christian images of “ascent” through 
history transformed the Hellenistic images: “the old image of the ascent of the individual 
from sphere to sphere soon gives way to that of a collective progress from one age to 
another.”130 Patristic Christianity, he claimed, was fascinated with the notion of a 
collective journey through time, and the subdivision of ages. Christianity, unlike 
Hellenistic thought, brought together both collective progress through history and the 
transcendence beyond it.
De Lubac's historical narrative extended his claim in Catholicism concerning the 
patristic understanding of history and eschatology. By holding together eschatological 
hope and mystical ascent, Origen's eschatology exemplified the essential characteristics 
of this Christian synthesis. The subsequent dissociation between the futura and invisibilia  
within Christian eschatology, particularly during the twelfth century, engendered two 
principal eschatological impules. The first was Pseudo-Dionysian in form; the second 
was Joachimite. The first engendered a mysticism that viewed the historical figures and 
realities of the Bible as figures for the un-thematizable transcendent. This impulse 
threatened to disregard the historical character of Christianity and see history as a myth. 
129 He also associated Hellenistic images with Pythagoreanism, Neoplatonism, the Upanishads, and the 
Bhūmi of Mahayana Buddhism.
130 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1988), 145. Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogma, Unam 
Sanctam 3 (Paris: Cerf, 1938).
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This second was radically historical insofar as it projected a form of eschatological 
fulfillment into the historical future.
It is supremely important to understand de Lubac's claim that Christianity unites 
futura and invisibilia, collective progress and transcendence. His criticism of Dionysian 
and Joachimite thought is for the purpose of uniting the two, or of recovering an 
eschatology that circumnavigates the division between them. These two aspects are held 
in tension, and the neglect of either results in a deformation of Christian faith. 
For that is the expression of the Christian condition: tension,  essential  to these “last 
times”  that  we  are  living  in  the  Church,  between  two  characteristics—mystical  and 
eschatological—of our faith. “Spe enim salvi facti sumus” (For in hope we are saved). 
The eschatological boundary is not purely in the future—nor will it ever become purely 
in the past. The words of the Lord … have “begun to put an end to figures,” and of 
course they have done so still in images, accommodating themselves to the present state  
of our understanding, but this was already “so that the truth begins.” And on the other 
hand, as they will never pass away, they will always be in the process of being realized.  
The words of Moses and those of the prophets needed to be fulfilled, and once fulfilled  
by Christ,  they had only to disappear.  But the words of Jesus Christ are and always  
remain full—without that fullness ever becoming something past .… Origen adds: “et in  
actu impletionis sunt semper, et quotidie implentur, et numquam perimplentur” (and they 
are always in the act of being fulfilled, and they are being fulfilled every day, and they 
are never totally fulfilled). The Lord himself, who pronounced them, “is still there, but as 
someone who never ceases to arrive”: Is this not the meaning of παϱουσία (parousia), at 
once presence and future?131 
The tension maintained by Origen between the mystical and eschatological is the optic 
through which de Lubac narrates his subsequent tracing of Dionysian and Joachimite 
thought. This narrative enables us to understand de Lubac's criticism of contemporary 
theologies of hope or of interventions in contemporary debates over communism and the 
theology of history.
Furthermore, the tension between the mystical and eschatological is key to de 
131  De Lubac, History and Spirit, 261–62.
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Lubac's understanding of the sacramental economy of salvation. Although de Lubac did 
not spell it out in these terms, the dissociation of the future and invisible within 
Dionysian and Joachimite eschatologies ruptures the sacramental-historical economy of 
salvation. The former threatens to ascend beyond the salvation enacted by Christ, leaving 
it behind for its deeper meaning. It threatens to see the historical or sacramental signs as 
things to be transcended. The latter threatens to progress beyond the present economy of 
salvation. By temporalizing the break between the second and third ages, and by placing 
the third age in the future, Joachim anticipates an age in history that has transcended 
signs or figures. In the next chapter, I will argue that de Lubac's theology of the church, 
the sacraments, and knowledge of God is governed by this eschatological tension. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SACRAMENTS OF THE ESCHATON
The previous chapter presented the historical division described by de Lubac  
between a transcendent-oriented mysticism and a future-oriented apocalyptic. De Lubac's 
return to the patristic sources, especially to Origen, included a recovery of the unity 
between the transcendent and apocalyptic, between realized eschatology and future 
eschatology, between the “already” and the “not yet.” He wished to retain the tension 
between the ascent to God through creation that we find in Pseudo-Dionysius and later 
medieval traditions and the future-oriented eschatological tendencies in medieval 
thought. 
In this chapter, I argue that de Lubac's eschatological synthesis structures his 
understanding of the sacramentality of historical revelation, of the church, and of 
mysticism or religious knowledge. I first explain how the divisions within medieval 
eschatology functioned to disrupt the sacramental economy of salvation. In sum, an 
overemphasis on either “realized” eschatology or “future” eschatology diminishes the 
sacramental dimensions of the historical economy of salvation. Second, I examine the 
eschatological structure of de Lubac's understanding of sacramentality. In general, de 
Lubac sees a sacrament as a visible “means” to salvation through which the “end” 
manifests itself. Third, I show that de Lubac narrates the centrality and efficacy of Christ 
in terms of this fundamental eschatological structure. Fourth, I examine de Lubac's 
ecclesiology as an eschatology. Finally, I show that de Lubac's mysticism or religious 
epistemology is governed by an anagogical perspective inspired by Origen. Present 
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contemplation of God depends upon the sacramental traces of God within the world, yet 
moves beyond those traces. The synthesis between kataphaticism and apophaticism 
remains for us future. 
I. Eschatology and the Sacramental Economy
Simply put, history matters. In Catholicism, de Lubac claims that Christianity, 
unlike other religions and political ideologies, unites the mystical movement towards the 
transcendent with a consciousness of historical development. For de Lubac, Christianity 
weaves a path between making history its own goal by reducing salvation to a world 
process (as in Hegel and Marx), and divorcing revelation from historical events (as in 
Bultmann). For de Lubac, an overemphasis on either the invisibilia Dei or the inner-
historical futura in Christian eschatology serves to disrupt the sacramental nature of the 
economy of salvation.
A. Dissociation between invisibilia Dei and futura
Problems arise in the Christian understanding of the sacramental economy from 
both a Joachimite and a Pseudo-Dionysian direction. Both dissociate the invisibilia Dei 
and the futura. Each eschatological emphasis ruptures the sacramental-historical 
economy of salvation by dividing œconomia (God's actions in history) from theologia 
(knowledge of God). According to de Lubac, Dionysian mysticism is a theologia 
divorced from œconomia while Joachimite eschatology is œconomia without theologia.1 
1 De Lubac describes a unity of œconomia and theologia within pre-medieval theology. Œconomia 
referred to God's actions in history from the very beginnings to the redemptive incarnation. Theologia 
describes the ultimate purpose or intention guiding the economy and, at the same time, God's fulfillment 
190
The flowering of Joachimite and Dionysian systems of thought in the twelfth century 
came in the wake of developments in the history of biblical interpretation that 
methodologically separated history from allegory. The methodological separation of 
history from allegory implied a separation of economy from theology. 
This separation was embodied in the fundamental shift of theological metaphor 
from the patristic era to the rise of Scholasticism. The divine plan became a work of 
divine wisdom. Plan suggests that God's intentions are unfolding and built up historically 
toward an eschatological fulfillment in the future. Work of wisdom, on the other hand, 
suggests God's eternal wisdom, of which the created world and the Bible are 
manifestations. This difference, however slight, is indicative of an increasing separation 
between economy and theology that manifested itself in late medieval theology, which 
attended more to philosophical problems than to the history of God's manifestation. In a 
sense, the notion that the Bible and creation are a work of eternal wisdom contributed to 
the division between the “invisible,” transcendent wisdom of God and the “future.”
The exclusive focus on the invisibilia, which de Lubac traced in Pseudo-
Dionysian forms of thought, is an overrealized eschatology. Realized eschatology 
generally reflects the present-ness of the Kingdom of God in the Gospels: “Asked by the 
Pharisees when the kingdom of God would come, he said in reply, 'The coming of the 
kingdom of God cannot be observed, and no one will announce, 'Look, here it is,' or, 
of this plan. Anagogia was, at least, allied with theologia. At the same time, theologia affirmed God's 
transcendence even with regard to God's actions in history.  Henri de Lubac, “La Révélation divine: 
Commentaire du préambule et du chaptre I de La Constitution ‘Dei Verbum’ du Concile Vatican II,” in 
Révélation divine – Affrontements mystiques – Athéisme et sens de l’homme, vol. 4, Œuvres complètes 
(Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2006), 83. Originally published as Henri de Lubac, La Révélation divine: 
Église Catholique Romaine, Councile Vatican II [1962-1965] (Lyon: La Bonté, 1966).
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'There it is.' For behold, the kingdom of God is among you'” (LUKE 17:20-21 NABRE). In 
Luke, the kingdom is essentially bound to Christology. The kingdom is among us because 
Jesus is present among us. An overrealized eschatology intensifies the Lucan account: 
“the kingdom of God is within you.”2 
The Pseudo-Dionysian ascent of the mind is an ascent to a higher reality beyond 
history, beyond the events of salvation narrated in the gospels. Following the same 
pattern, some realized eschatologies accentuate the present moment in which God is 
made manifest to the conscience, the “now,” and the divine presence in the “now.” As de 
Lubac noted, Rudolf Bultmann's realized eschatology located revelation in the existential 
time of encounter and decision. For Bultmann, God acts historically. Yet, because of 
God's transcendence, the historical account of the Gospels can never adequately represent 
God's historical presence. The Gospels are mythologized accounts, created by the cultural 
prejudices of first-century Palestine, that articulate the inarticulable. The concrete events 
of salvation become a mere vehicle for expressing or representing the salvation already 
present that transcends human expression. Because the divine, for Bultmann, cannot be 
represented, “salvation history” is reduced to non-historical existential moments of 
encounter with the divine. On deeper inspection, by dissociating God's actions in history 
(œconomia) from God's being (theologia), Bultmann appears to have repeated a pattern in 
Pseudo-Dionysian negative theology.3 The result of this intensified realized eschatology 
2 The Kingdom of God is Within You is the title of Leo Tolstoy's manifesto on Christian anarchism and 
non-violence.
3 See de Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 83. Similarly, Kierkegaard's existentialism is a form of making 
oneself contemporaneous with Christ. But what is most important is the decision. Jacob Taubes sees 
apocalypticism manifest in both a historical tradition (Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx) and an existentialist 
tradition (Kierkegaard). 
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is the loss of the reality and efficaciousness of the historical events narrated in the 
Gospels for bringing about our salvation. 
The legacy of Joachimite future-oriented eschatologies is the same, only turned on 
its side. Joachim leaves behind salvation history via a progression through history. For 
Joachim, salvation truly takes historical form. However, this salvation is future and yet to 
come. Historical progress is itself identified with salvation, that is, realization or 
actualization of the universe. Repeating the Joachimite pattern, Hegel and Marx conflate 
salvation—though it is conceived in differing ways—with the historical process. The 
process philosophy of Whitehead also proposes a kind of self-actualization of the 
universe. In each case, the universe has an intra-worldly goal. For de Lubac, the legacy of 
Joachim was theological as well as philosophical. Some contemporary theologians, de 
Lubac wrote, were incautious in reuniting protology and eschatology, or creation and 
fulfillment. Conflating “creation” and “covenant,” they envisioned the unfolding of 
history as the goal, rather than a means to a further goal beyond history. In these cases, 
prioritizing the historical futura results in a fundamental insufficiency or incompleteness 
in the salvific events of Christ's life, death, and resurrection. Jesus is a sign and 
anticipation of the culmination of history, but no longer its focal point that takes history 
beyond itself. The concrete saving actions of Christ are, at best, ambiguous. 
In contrast to the legacy of Joachim, de Lubac insisted that history's function is to 
pass into eternity. In “La Révélation divine,” de Lubac writes,
“The history of salvation is not its own end” (L. Malvez). Its purpose is to introduce us  
to the heart of the divine life. This is what overly-invasive notions of the history of 
salvation seem to forget. God is revealed to men as their Savior by intervening into their 
193
history, he saves them through history, but that does not evidently signify that the final 
object of salvation and of revelation would be history.4 
Again, he states, “The end of the messianic mystery is the mystery of participation in the 
intimate life of God, which is not history, but eternity.”5 De Lubac explains that history 
itself is not a “mediator” of salvation. The events of secular history are not “a supplement 
somehow to supernatural revelation, they are always 'ambiguous' and 'in waiting' [en 
attente], and they must be clarified for us by the light of the Gospel.”6 
De Lubac's conception of history in Catholicism sought to hold together both 
transcendence and historical development in a unity. His later negotiation between 
Dionysius and Joachim reflected a continued attempt to negotiate a passage between the 
Scylla of modern realized eschatologies and the Charybdis of pronounced future 
eschatologies, especially in their secular forms. Both extremes, he argued, undermined 
the realism and efficaciousness of the actions of Christ in the economy of salvation.
B. The Twentieth-Century Biblical Context
De Lubac's understanding of the sacramental-historical economy of salvation 
navigates in a tension between realized and future. It is essential to provide a Lubacian 
characterization of the Christian sacramental economy, especially insofar as it attempts to 
meld together the two perspectives. The twentieth-century context is important for 
understanding what de Lubac had in mind.
Fin-de-siècle biblical studies rediscovered the eschatological aspects of the New 
4 Ibid., 85.
5 Ibid., 86.  
6 Ibid., 134. 
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Testament. Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer proposed that Jesus and the early 
church expected an imminent end of history, marked by the coming of the Lord. The 
primary context for understanding the historical Jesus was Jewish apocalypticism. The 
delay in the coming of the kingdom of God resulted in a subsequent development of the 
Gospel message that emphasized ethical action.  In response to the future eschatology of 
Weiss and Schweitzer, Rudolf Bultmann and C. H. Dodd emphasized another New 
Testament theme: “the kingdom of God is among you” (Luke 17:21 NRSV). Bultmann 
and Dodd replaced the imminent expectation of the end with the notion that the end is 
already here. Bultmann interpreted the idea of the kingdom of God as the ultimate choice 
placed before human consciousness in the concrete world. C. H. Dodd wrote that the 
eschatological fulfillment was realized within the ministry of Christ himself.7
C. The Temporal Interim and Sacramental Economy
Generally, de Lubac agreed with Cullmann's characterization of the fulfillment of 
history. The Christ-event constitutes a new situation in which Jesus “inaugurates the 
eschatological era.”8 Jesus claims to fulfill all previous prophesies and bring an end to the 
7 Today, many scholars recognize that the truth lies somewhere between future eschatology and realized 
eschatology. Oscar Cullmann's eschatology offered a mediating position between exclusively future and 
exclusively realized eschatology. His Christ and Time (first published as Christus und die Zeit: Die 
urchristliche Zeit- und Geschichtsauffassung in 1948) argued that the eschatological tension in early 
Christian writings is between present and future rather than between the immanent and transcendent, 
“time and eternity, or this world and the Beyond.” Philipp W. Rosemann, Understanding Scholastic 
Thought with Foucault, The New Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 129. In 
Cullmann's understanding, the New Testament expects a fulfillment of the present time at the end of 
time, a fulfillment of history in history. Christ is at the center of history because he initiates its ultimate 
fulfillment. Cullmann also argued for the now-classic distinction between a Greek circular idea of time 
and a Jewish-Christian linear conception of time. His description of these differences bears a 
resemblance to de Lubac's own assessment of the difference between Greek and Christian thought in 
Catholicisme and The Drama of Atheist Humanism.
8 “Christ has inaugurated the eschatological era. His work fructifies, but not by appeal to another. The 
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era of waiting for the Messiah. In the context of Jewish prophesy, the coming of the 
Messiah marked the coming of the end. The coming of the Messiah was to bring the 
prophetic age to a close [OT → CHRIST-ESCHATON ]. In a Christian context, Messianic time 
means living now in the last days in expectation of the imminent end and Christ's return. 
However, the drawing out of the eschaton changed things. The end of history was not 
imminent. Soon, Christians no longer awaited an imminent end, but rather an immanence 
of God in the present. The coming of the Messiah opened a temporal hiatus between the 
fulfillment of the Old Testament and its ultimate fulfillment [OT → CHRIST-----ESCHATON]. 
Christian life exists in a hiatus or interim between the two comings, where God prepares 
us for the ultimate consummation of God's plan.
According to de Lubac, both perspectives are conjoined in a Christian 
understanding of time. The time narrated in the New Testament is both the end time and a 
preparatory time. In Christ, the kingdom is already inaugurated and present; however, we 
remain in a period of preparation that is still symbolic and anticipatory of the final 
reality.9 The New Testament exists as present fulfillment and as a sign of what is to come. 
De Lubac calls this Christic time or evangelical time the “Interim.”10 On the one hand, the 
'last times' have arrived; salvation is accomplished in Him, and for each generation 'the Church makes 
the end of history already present to time.'” De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 93, quoting Jean 
Moroux. 
9 “Insofar as the great 'Passage' is not crossed, history and allegory are not yet absorbed into each other. 
They are not yet fully unified in the 'Mystery.'” Ibid., 120. He adds, “The same ambiguity of evangelical 
time or the mystery of salvation is envisaged 'where it is lived by the Christ-Chief in the plane of our 
historical experience. There is a fragment of human time too difficult to characterize exactly: does it 
appear as a preparatory time or the “end time”?' On the one hand, it is anterior to the 'consummation of 
time' that constitutes the event of the Cross-Resurrection-Ascension (Heb. 9:11-12). But on the other 
hand, in the incarnate Word, heaven and eternity are already made present on earth and in time; the 
Kingdom is innauguated in the person of Jesus (autobasileia, following the formula of Origen...).” Ibid, 
note 5.
10 Henri de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. E. M. Macierowski, vol. 2 
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eschaton is made present through Jesus. On the other, Jesus begins a temporal process of 
transcending time, a journey opening up for the church.11 Even if Christ has already come 
and already brought fulfillment in himself, this fulfillment awaits an ecclesiological 
completion of which present realities constitute the sacraments.12 
The time of the Interim, characterized by a tension between realized and future, 
already and not yet, end and preparation, marks out the terrain of the sacraments, which is 
also the terrain of mystery. This “terrain” makes sacramentality possible. In this vein, de 
Lubac writes that sacramental reality “is essentially related to our present condition, 
which is not one embodied in the epoch of figures pure and simple [that is the Old 
Testament], nor yet one which includes the full possession of the 'truth.'”13 
II. The Structure of Sacramentality in de Lubac
For de Lubac, the Interim—the time between the time of figures and that of 
complete truth—forms the terrain of sacramentality.14 The sacrament is a figure of the 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 183. Originally published as Exégèse médiévale, 2: 
Les quatre sense de l'Écriture (Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1959).
11 “We are henceforth, until the end of time, within Christic time (which is the time of the end). The 
Incarnation of the Word of God 'is a unique fact, not only in this banal sense, common to all facts, to all 
events, that it occurs only at one point in time; but it is still so in this completely unique, completely 
singular way.  This Fact, alone among all, after having been prepared and prefigured by the long series 
of facts of the Old Covenant, does not cease since its first instant and will not cease to fructify within 
itself,' with nothing that transcends it. It remains always current [actuel], always encompassing all of 
which he is the source: 'semper novum, quod semper innovat mentes, nec unquam vetus, quod in 
perpetuum non marcescit.'”  De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 131.
12 A significant convergence of themes occurs in the work of Jacob Taubes and Giorgio Agamben, who 
have indicated the impact of Paul on the western understanding of history. For Taubes, the Christian 
understanding of time opens doors to destructive and constructive forms of apocalypticism.
13 Henri de Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, trans. Michael Mason (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1986), 204. Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Méditation sur l’Église, Foi vivante 60 (Paris: 
Aubier Montaigne, 1953).
14 While de Lubac did not generally use the adjective “sacramental” or noun “sacramentality,” he spoke 
generally of the attributes of sacraments. He does not explicitly examine sacramentality apart from 
particular sacramental loci, that is Christ, the church, and the seven sacraments. To speak of a 
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truth to come, making it temporal and teleological. In the language of symbol, the truth 
signified is the purpose or end of the sacramental sign. It is its future state. The sign's 
inner “intention”—its finality—overflows its bare materiality, making it participate in the 
reality signified while, at the same time, not yet bringing the reality signified to complete 
presence. The signified exercises a hidden power over the sign that makes the sign what it 
is. In what follows, I examine the key terms of de Lubac's sacramental lexicon, showing 
how they are embedded in the tension between realized and future eschatology, between 
making present and anticipating the future.
A. Mysterium and Sacramentum 
Two of the most elusive and dynamic terms in de Lubac's theological lexicon—
sacrament and mystery—are terms he employs frequently and are the most elemental to 
his theological vision. While these terms possess multivalent meanings, these meanings 
should nonetheless be understood as pointing to something common. De Lubac's 
terminology should be read synoptically. One of the complications, is that, as de Lubac 
notes, “sacrament” and “mystery” were used synonymously in the early church.15 The 
word “sacrament” is not found in the New Testament. Sacramentum became a Latin 
translation for the Greek μυστήριον (mysterion), which is prominent in the New 
sacramental structure in de Lubac's work is, therefore, an abstraction from particular cases. 
“Sacramental” or “sacramentality” can describe the underlying intelligibility of the seven sacraments. 
Paul McPartlan explains that in the early twentieth-century, Catholic treatment of sacraments followed, 
more or less, a polemical anti-Protestant defense of the seven sacraments. The apologetic of the number 
seven was deficient in showing the underlying intelligibility of the sacraments, or getting “behind the 
number seven.” The theology of de Lubac and Karl Rahner, among others, influenced a shift in Catholic 
perspective towards grounding the intelligibility of the sacraments in Christ and in the church. Paul 
McPartlan, “Catholic Perspectives on Sacramentality,” Studia Liturgica 38, no. 2 (January 2008): 219.  
15 As noted above (Chapter 2).
198
Testament, especially in Paul's letters.16 The Greek mysterion received a Latin form, 
mysterium. In the early Christian tradition, de Lubac states, “sacrament” and “mystery” 
are often synonymous and refer to something sacred.
These synonyms began to be distinguished, at least in part. With Augustine, 
sacrament in particular began to possess the meaning of a “sign.”17 The sacrament is the 
visible sign of the mysterious secret. “The sacramentum would therefore play the role of 
container, or envelope, with regard to the mysterium hidden within it.”18 The two are 
opposed while united. De Lubac concedes that in the patristic tradition, the meanings of 
both sacramentum and mysterium floated between the two poles of “sign” and “secret,” 
depending on the author. The Augustinian understanding of “sacrament” and “mystery” 
as referring to the sacred is more or less retained until the twelfth century.19
In de Lubac's exposition, mysterium (mystery) floats between two poles. Apart 
from a substantive, inert meaning as a “secret,” it possesses a relational and active 
meaning. In this active meaning, mystery indicates not one or the other pole, but the 
16 See McPartlan, “Catholic Perspectives on Sacramentality,” 223. For example, Paul's Epistle to the 
Colossians refers to the Word of God as the “mystery (mysterion) that has been hidden throughout the 
ages and generations but has now been revealed to his saints”  (Col. 1:26 NRSV). Similarly, Paul writes 
“with all wisdom and insight he has made known to us the mystery (mysterion) of his will, according to 
his good pleasure that he set forth in Christ, as a plan for the fullness of time, to gather up all things in 
him, things in heaven and things on earth” (Eph. 1:9-10 NSRV). 
17  “They always appear—beyond the permanent allusion to something sacred ('divine and mystical', 
'sacred and mystical') and all the resonances which such an allusion comprises—with the two 
fundamental senses, united in variable proportions, of sign and secret—'arcanum'—which are still the 
two senses attached respectively to our two words sacrament and mystery.” Henri de Lubac, Corpus 
Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, trans. Gemma Simmonds, C.J., Faith in 
Reason (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 47. Originally published as Henri de 
Lubac, Corpus mysticum: l’eucharistie et l’Église au Moyen âge. Étude historique, Théologie 3 (Paris: 
Aubier, 1944).
18 De Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 47.
19 Ibid., 45.
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relationship between them: between tupos (figure, type) and aletheia (truth).20 Mystery 
indicates the passage from figure to truth. In this sense, “mystery of salvation” or 
“sacrament of salvation” conveys a movement from figure to truth and their unity at the 
same time. “Mystery” is not only the “secret thing” revealed, but an action joining the 
sign and secret signified, the type and truth.21 In Corpus Mysticum, he explains that the 
mystery is “the secret power by which the thing operates across the sign and through 
which the sign participates, here again in widely differing ways, in the higher efficacy of 
the thing.”22 We can speak of mystery as the active power drawing the visible sacrament 
into a participation with what it signifies. From another perspective, the mystery is the 
secret signified by the sacrament. 
According to this Augustinian distinction-in-relation of mystery and sacrament, 
the sacramental reality is requisite for discovering the mystery. It is through the power of 
the mystery operating “across” the sacrament that the sacrament possesses its 
characteristic as a sign. The mystery is present in its visible aspect, the sacrament.
The relationship between sacrament and mystery helps to illumine de Lubac's 
characterization of sacramental reality in Splendor of the Church. Sacramental realities 
possess a twofold characteristic: first, a sacrament is a sign that must be passed through 
entirely to reach the mystery; second, the sacrament cannot be discarded at will.23 The 
20 Ibid., 53.
21 Ibid., 51–2. De Lubac invokes the “communication of idioms” or exchange of attributes to describe the 
mutual participation of sign and signified. The “communication of idioms” is especially pertinent when 
speaking of the humanity of Christ and the divinity, where it literally applies. He notes that depending 
upon the kind of sacrament about which we are speaking, this communicatio idiomatum will be 
different. 
22 Ibid., 52.
23 "That which is sacramental—'the sensible bond between two worlds'—has a twofold characteristic. 
200
sign, the outward visible reality, is not the truth of the sacrament itself. Thus, to stop at 
the sign is to be arrested by an idol. At the same time, the sacrament is indispensable and 
necessary to reach the reality of which the sacrament is a sign. De Lubac cryptically 
explained, “We never come to the end of passing through this translucent medium, which 
we must, nevertheless, always pass through and that completely. It is always through it 
that we reach what it signifies; it can never be superseded, and its bounds cannot be 
broken.”24 The sacrament is the singular way to approach the mystery and its necessity is 
never compromised. Yet we must envision the sacrament as a passage rather than the end, 
or rather as an unending passage. 
B.  Sacrament : Mystery ::  History : Eschatology
For de Lubac, the unity and duality of sacramentum and mysterium is structurally 
the same as the unity and duality of history and eschatology. It is unsurprising to find the 
same structure involving this second pair because sacraments are always visible and 
historical events, realities, and rituals that signify a mysterious eschatological reality. The 
important point is that, for de Lubac, the sacrament is the visible reality that makes the 
mystery proleptically present and that mediates the eschatological consummation. 
As mentioned above, the term mysterium “floats” between sign and secret. It 
likewise “floats” between historical reality and the eschatological consummation. This 
Since, on the one hand, it is the sign of something else, it must be passed through, and this not in part 
but wholly. It is not something intermediate, but something mediatory; it does not isolate, one from 
another, the two terms which it is meant to link. It does not put a distance between them. It is essentially 
related to our present condition, which is not one embodied in the epoch of figures pure and simple, nor 
yet one which includes the full possession of the 'truth.'" De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 203–4.
24 Ibid., 204.
201
last point requires explanation. According to de Lubac, “mystery” suggests God's plan for 
salvation or God's intention: “the mystery is somehow linked to God's design for man, 
whether as marking the limit of or the means of realizing this destiny.”25 In other words, it 
globally refers to the whole plan of salvation, but its meaning can be focused on the 
means by which this design is accomplished or the final reality accomplished. 
The mystery always transcends human understanding. If restricted to the means, 
the mystery refers to its visible, historical, and tangible form. The mystery, de Lubac 
states, “concerns us, touches us, acts in us, reveals us to ourselves. To this end, it must 
have a tangible aspect, the incarnated Word of God, expression of the Inexpressible, the 
efficacious sign to realize the plan of salvation.”26 “Mystery” can encompass the “end” or 
intended reality intended by God, but also the “means” of salvation by emphasizing the  
inner meaning or reality of that means. Sign or sacrament suggest the “means”—
emphasizing its visible aspect—but always in union with the “end.”  
For de Lubac, the eschatological is not merely the future, but the depth dimension 
of the present. “Mystery” is not an inert intention of God, but an active power of eternity 
reaching into history to bring it into eternity at the end. The mystery is the reality that 
actively draws the signum to be a participation in itself. More precisely, the mystery, as 
the final reality intended by God, makes its own visible aspect, the sacrament, a means to 
25 Henri de Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, trans. James R. Dunne (Staten Island, NY: Alba 
House, 1969), 13. Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Paradoxe et mystère de l’Église (Paris: 
Aubier Montaigne, 1967).
26 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 14.
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the final consummation, imbuing the sacrament with mystery.27 In The Splendor of the 
Church, de Lubac draws the precise parallel between “mystery” and eschatology:
Like the whole of the Christian reality, of which she is the summing-up, the  Ecclesia  
Sanctorum was in  their  eyes,  when taken  in  the full  sense  of  the  words,  something  
essentially  eschatological.  They  were,  of  course,  very  far  from  regarding  her  as 
something which was merely “to come.” After all, the eschatological is not something 
simply  absent  from  the  present,  any  more  than  what  is  transcendent  is  exterior  to 
everyday reality; on the contrary, it is the foundation of the present and the term of its  
movement—it is the marrow of the present, as it were, and exercises over it a hidden  
power.28
De Lubac employs the same language of “exercising a hidden power” here to describe 
how the eschatological enters into the present as he does to describe the mystery's 
entering into the sacrament in Corpus Mysticum.29
If we can summarize the perspective which illumines de Lubac's understanding of 
sacramentality, it would be in a twofold eschatological perspective. 
1. From visible sign to signified: The inner “intention” of the sign overflows its bare 
materiality, allowing it to participate in the higher order of the signified. The 
visible and historical sacrament has a finality that makes it tend toward what it 
anticipates and signifies.
27 It is in this sense that de Lubac describes the Sacramentum Molitio from Augustine. Augustine 
interprets everything in light of a great idea “'of which each is a particular expression.' The remark can 
be understood for the ensemble of ancient commentators, to refer to the whole of Scripture. The Model 
to come disposes and orders among them all its past imitations. These are organized in a homogeneous 
series, which develop throughout history. It is the elaboration of a single great 'sacrament'—'sacramenti 
molitio'—and by it we have understood at the same time the thing signified and its sign. It is 'the order 
of prefiguration, begun with Adam.' It is a 'universal prophecy' coextensive with duration until Christ. 
Prophecy in act, a vast and unique word.” Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sens de 
l’écriture, vol. 4, Théologie 59 (Aubier: Éditions Montaigne, 1964), 81.
28 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 117.
29 Elsewhere, de Lubac emphasizes that the eschatological ensures the meaningfulness of history: 
“'History only acquires a sense and meaning by a last judgment, which is precisely the end of history. 
The end of messianic mystery is the mystery of the participation in the intimate life of God himself, 
which is not history, but eternity.'” De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 86.
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2. From the signified to the visible sign: The signified exercises a hidden power over 
the sign, making it what it is. The eschatological signified “operates across the 
sign,” making the sign efficacious as a sign. The sacrament possesses the quality 
of signifying and bringing about because the eschatological enters into it, 
exercising a power over it. 
Although this account of “sacramentality” abstracts from the particular cases—revelation, 
Christ, the church, the eucharist—it is useful to see a general structure of sacramentality. 
The next two sections treat the particular cases Christ and church, which are grounded by 
de Lubac's understanding of sacrament. 
III.  Incarnate Word as Sacrament of Salvation 
Catholicism, de Lubac's earliest book, vibrantly portrays the sacramental  
dimensions of temporality in a Christian perspective:
Of necessity we must establish a foothold in time if we are to rise to eternity; we must  
use time. The Word of God submitted himself to this essential law: he came to deliver us  
from time, but by means of time—propter te factus est temporalis, ut tu fias aeternus [he 
was made subject to time on account of you, in order that you might be made eternal]. 
That is the law of the incarnation, and it must undergo no docetist mitigation.30
De Lubac's characteristically unsystematic style raises questions. He appears to endorse 
the sacrality of time as a general principle, an “essential law,” which describes the 
functioning of the Word's incarnation.31 However, for de Lubac, Christ is the unique 
30 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1988), 144. Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogma, Unam 
Sanctam 3 (Paris: Cerf, 1938).
31 Does the incarnation, though unique, exemplify a general principle common to all of history? Or does 
history contain sacral and sacramental dimensions because of the incarnation, because Christ is the 
leaven for all of history? To put it differently, is the potential of the created order to signify the divine, 
its sacramentality, a potential inherent in the created order itself? Or does the particular event of Christ 
open the created order to that potential? The question is rather abstract. Yet it has implications for the 
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revelation of God to humanity. His historical actions become sacraments of salvation. If 
we can speak of a general “law of the incarnation,” it is a law derived from and 
dependent upon the particular case of Christ. This perspective is made clearer in de 
Lubac's Christocentric theology of revelation. The general sacramental structure 
previously elaborated is the outcome of the historical revelation of the Word. Yet, the 
relationship between revelation in Christ and “cosmic” revelation remains ambiguous 
within de Lubac's writings.
I first examine de Lubac's interpretation of the structure of revelation and 
salvation in Vatican II's Dei Verbum. Second, I argue that, for de Lubac, Christ is the 
personal unity of salvation and revelation. Revelation and salvation are concentrated in 
the person of Christ. Third, I explain that salvation occurs not only through the mediation 
of the Father to humanity, but also through the mediation of humanity to the Father. 
Christ is the sacrament of this salvation, which occurs through his historical and visible 
presence.
A. The Sacramental Structure of Revelation and Salvation in Dei Verbum
Dei Verbum, Vatican II's Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, prioritized 
the historicity of revelation and Christ as the center of revelation. The document testified 
to a radical shift of perspective within Catholic thinking about revelation. De Lubac 
significance of Christ, the church, and the particular sacraments. If the incarnation of the word is merely 
the particular instantiation of a general sacramental principle, the necessity of Christ, the church, and 
the reception of the sacraments are mitigated. The created order as such would seem to be an 
appropriate vehicle for mediating God's revelation or grace. If the Incarnation of the Word is the 
absolutely unique sacrament in which the temporal and eternal are united, the world might appear to be 
one in which God cannot be found in a sacramental or even analogous manner. De Lubac never 
attempts to resolve this tension directly. 
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played a role in the formation of the document. However, he did not reveal the precise 
nature of his role in the formation of the document in his autobiographical account of his 
writings.32 The final document, ratified in 1965, emphasizes the historical nature of 
revelation and its Christocentricity. 
De Lubac's 1968 commentary on Dei Verbum is not only a commentary from a 
participant at Vatican II; it is also an attempt at influencing the reception of the document 
in the church. His commentary produces a radically historical understanding of 
revelation, one that envisions revelation to always occur sensibly or visibly. Revelation is 
the visible sacrament through which salvation occurs. According to de Lubac, salvation is 
already taking place through the revelation of the Incarnate Word, but it is nonetheless 
only complete in a future consummation. 
32 In At the Service of the Church, he mentions that in 1960, he happened to read in a periodical that he 
had been appointed, along with the Dominican Yves Congar, as a theological consultor to the 
Preparatory Theological Commission for the Second Vatican Council. Henri de Lubac, At the Service of  
the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned His Writings (San 
Francisco: Communio Books, 1993), 116. Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Mémoire sur 
l’occasion de mes écrits, Chrétiens aujourd’hui 1 (Namur: Culture et vérité, 1989). While on the 
Commission as a theological expert, he relates, he “in particular gave the impression of being a hostage, 
sometimes even of being a defendant.” At the Service of the Church, 117. De Lubac's participation as a 
consultant to the Preparatory Commission lead to his appointment as a peritus (expert theological 
adviser) to the Council itself, which allowed him to attend meetings of the Theological Commission. 
A sub-commission of the Preparatory Theological Commission, called “De fontibus 
Revelationis”, had produced a preparatory schema entitled De fontibus Revelationis (On the Sources of 
Revelation). The working schema reflected classical positions taken as a development of the council of 
Trent and in the anti-protestant literature. While for Trent the “source” of revelation is the Gospel, in De 
fontibus Scripture and Tradition are thought to be the “sources.” Giuseppe Ruggieri, “The First 
Doctrinal Clash,” in History of Vatican II: The Formation of the Council’s Identity: First Period and 
Intersession, October 1962 – September 1963, ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, vol. 2 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), 135. It sought to “resolve” open debates over the Catholic 
understanding of revelation, scripture, and tradition in favor of a neo-Scholastic and anti-Modernist 
school. Evidently, de Lubac had very little sway as a theological expert on the Preparatory Commission.
During debate over De Fontibus Schillebeeckx and Rahner provided widely-distributed and 
influential criticisms of the schema. De fontibus Revelationis became so controversial that it took an act 
of John XXIII to push the discussion over the document to the side. It is unclear what role de Lubac 
himself played in resisting the draft schema or in composing the new one, called the 1964 schema.
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1. “Dando revelat, et revelando dat” (“In giving God reveals, and in 
revealing God gives)
De Lubac explained that the Council's intent is not to explicate the “doctrine on 
revelation,” but rather the “proclamation of salvation itself,” that is “revelation itself that 
is transmitted to us.”33 The intimate union between the proclamation, that is revelation, 
and the salvation that it proclaims is made particularly clear in the Prologue, which 
quotes 1 John 1:2-3: “We proclaim to you the eternal life which was with the Father and 
was made manifest to us—that which we have seen and heard we proclaim also to you, 
so that you may have fellowship with us; and our fellowship is with the Father and with 
his Son Jesus Christ.” In 1 John, the proclamation is of the “eternal” life who was with 
the Father and made manifest. The proclamation effects ecclesial fellowship and the 
fellowship with the Father and the Son, which constitute “eternal life.” 
Following John, the entire first chapter of Dei Verbum attests to the “indissoluble 
union of revelation and salvation.”34 De Lubac speaks of this union between revelation 
and salvation in two ways: first, revelation “contains” salvation; second, salvation is the 
object or end of revelation. First, revelation communicates the very reality of salvation:
The announcement of salvation contains the salvation announced. The object revealed 
does not consist in notions, by themselves without vital efficacy, which would just barely 
have as their goal to make explicit a Christianity existing already in an 'implicit' state, or 
to name finally a reality until then 'anonymous.'35
33 De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 58.
34 Ibid., 59.
35 Ibid. De Lubac's mention of an “anonymous salvation” sounds like a criticism of Rahner. It is possible 
that he had Rahner in mind, since Rahner had promulgated his thesis on “anonymous Christianity” prior 
to de Lubac's “La Révélation divine.” However, de Lubac did not read German. 
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De Lubac is criticizing an “intellectualist” notion of revelation as the communication of a 
series of abstract truths. “Intellectualist” theories of revelation tended to oppose 
“supernatural revelation” to “natural knowledge,” as that set of truths that the human 
mind could not attain by its own power. As a matter of course, they de-emphasized the 
historical nature of revelation because history could not easily be categorized into 
“natural” or “supernatural.” If revelation consists primarily of “concepts,” those concepts 
have no power to save. As a result, salvation would have to occur by other means. In 
contrast, de Lubac's theology of revelation is radically historical. Revelation consists in 
events that can be seen, heard, and touched. These events, and particularly the Christ 
event, “contain” the salvation that they announce.
Second, de Lubac speaks of salvation as an end or object of revelation. Again 
referring to St. John, de Lubac states that the object of divine revelation is “eternal Life,” 
that is salvation. The “life” of which the scripture speaks is identified with God. “The 
object of divine revelation, which we call 'Dei Verbum' or 'Vita aeterna,' is then God 
himself.”36 This eternal life, the last end of revelation (la finalité dernière), is the 
communion with the Father and the Son.37 For de Lubac, the gift of communion is 
brought about by the revelatory actions of God in history: 
Dando revelat,  et  revelando dat.  It  is  impossible  to  dissociate,  even in  thought…the 
manifestation that God makes of himself and the gift that he makes of himself; in other 
words, revelation and its end: this is what the whole first chapter of the Constitution Dei  
Verbum repeats. The one and the other are expressed by the same word: 'eternal Life.'38 
36 Ibid., 51.
37 Since God calls a whole people, “communion with God and communion among the faithful are then the 
two aspects of the same reality: the participation in eternal life.” Ibid., 56.
38 Ibid., 57.
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The revelatory manifestation and the salvific gift are united, yet the two are distinguished 
as means and end. 
In de Lubac's understanding of revelation, revelation is always visible or sensible 
and historical. Salvation is thought of as the object or end or revelation, which de Lubac 
expresses as the “ultimate finality” (la finalite derniere). The relationship between 
revelation and salvation, united as means to end, can also be expressed in sacramental 
language, which I will explore in the next section.
2. “Gesta Dei et consilium Dei” [“The Deeds of God and the Plan of 
God”]
The second paragraph of Dei Verbum reads:
It pleased God, in his goodness and wisdom, to reveal himself and to make known the  
mystery of his will [Seipsum revelare et notum facere sacramentum voluntatis suae] (cf. 
Eph. 1:9). His will was that men should have access to the Father, through Christ, the 
Word made flesh, in the Holy Spirit, and thus become sharers in the divine nature (cf.  
Eph. 2:18; 2 Pet. 1:4). By this revelation, then, the invisible God (cf. Col. 1:15; 1 Tim. 
1:17),  from the fullness of his love, addresses men as his friends (cf. Ex.  33:11; Jn.  
15:14-15), and moves among them (cf. Bar 3:38), in order to invite and receive them into 
his own company. This economy of Revelation is realized by deeds and words [gestis  
verbisque],  which are  intrinsically bound up with each other.  As a  result,  the works  
performed by God in the history of salvation, show forth and bear out the doctrine and 
realities [doctrinam et res] signified by the words; the words, for their part, proclaim the 
works, and bring to light the mystery they contain. The most intimate truth which this 
revelation gives us about God and the salvation of man shines forth in Christ, who is  
himself both the mediator and the sum total of Revelation.39
Instead of speaking of scripture and tradition as “two sources” of revelation, Dei Verbum 
speaks of the “economy” of revelation manifested through the words and actions of God. 
Moreover, this manifestation is centered in Christ.
39 “Dei Verbum,” in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents, vol. 1, rev. ed. 
(Northport, NY: Costello Publishing Company, 1996), 750. 
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De Lubac's commentary on Dei Verbum examines the “sacramental” relationship 
between the external actions and words within the historical economy and the salvation 
that they bring about. According to de Lubac, Dei Verbum overtly employs the language 
of the sacraments to confirm the efficacious character of God's interventions in history. 
Dei Verbum first states that revelation is communicated in gestis verbisque (deeds and 
words). But it elucidates and modifies this couplet with another phrase, doctrinam et res 
(teaching and things the words signify). 
According to de Lubac, res was intended to evoke the res sacramenti, that which 
the sacrament signifies and brings about.40 The res is not the external action or utterance 
but the profound reality united to the external action or utterance. 
The “res” of which it [Dei Verbum] speaks overflows the “opera” or “gesta” taken in 
their sole visibility…because the “res verbis significatae” that it mentions designates a 
reality more complex and more profound than the “gesta”: they [things that the words 
signify] comprehend at the same time the “consilium Dei” and, in their interior efficacity, 
the  “facta  salutaria.”  One  will  notice  that  the  subject  of  the  phrase  is  not  simply 
“revelatio” but “haec revelationis economia”; the formula has been chosen to show that 
is  a  matter  of  revelation accomplished in  time in the course of  history,  and  not the 
announcement of it that is repeated incessantly since.41 
According to de Lubac, the “res verbis significatae” of Dei Verbum comprehend both the 
salvific deeds (facta salutaria) and the plan or purpose of God (consilium Dei). The 
exterior “visibility” of the facta salutaria are interiorly connected to consilium Dei 
brought about through the facta. According to de Lubac, Dei Verbum makes explicit that 
the events of salvation are no mere exterior or phenomenal gesture but are sacramentally 
united to their salvific purpose and goal. 
40 De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 70 note 5.
41 Ibid., 70–71.
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Just as de Lubac explicated the relationship between revelation and salvation in 
terms of sacrament, he uses the same structure in relation to the saving deeds (facta 
salutaria) and the plan of God (consilium Dei) 
Sacramentum Res Tantum
Deeds (facta salutaria) Plan of God (consilium Dei)
Revelation (God's self-manifestation) Salvation (God's self-gift)
In the language of the sacraments, by the visible sacramental sign (sacramentum), God 
effects the reality signified by the sign (res tantum). In de Lubac's commentary, the 
exterior or visible events of salvation (gesta) are efficacious in bringing about the salvific 
plan of God (res). This structure is at the heart of a Christian sacramentalism: external 
rites and realities are both signs of and mediations of a reality that surpasses them. 
B. Christ, the Personal Unity of Revelation and Salvation
De Lubac's commentary on Dei Verbum speaks of the historical economy of 
salvation as a sacrament. In addition, it places the incarnation at the center of this 
sacramental economy. Because of the unity of humanity and divinity in Christ, his human 
actions both manifest the fullness of revelation and bring about the fullness of salvation.  
Dei Verbum, he argues, expresses the “concrete unity... of revelation and salvation, and, at 
the same time, the personal unity of the twofold object of revelation: the end to which it 
tends and the means willed to realize this end.”42 Christ himself constitutes the personal 
unity of revelation and salvation. 
42 Ibid., 63.
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 The incarnate Word is the “absolute Presence of God among us.”43 It is through 
him that God is revealed. Revelation is, therefore, identical to the “God-man” himself.44 
But the presence of God in Jesus is not divorced from his humanity:
The presence of Jesus Christ, illuminating and salvific at the same time, is the presence 
of the eternal Logos (Word), the only Word of God, the only Son of the Father. But it is  
at the same time a human presence, of a true man, a “man sent to men” in order to say  
from a human mouth “the words of God”: et habitu inventus ut homo.45
In the mystery of the incarnation, God speaks to human beings and is present to them 
through a human presence. Thus, for de Lubac, the visible humanity of Jesus does not 
merely extrinsically signal the divine presence but mediates it: “The one who sees Jesus 
sees the Father—but one sees him through the humanity of Jesus.”46 De Lubac refuses a 
monophysite theology of revelation that minimizes the humanity of the Son as precisely 
the site of the revelatory and salvific action of God.47 The humanity of Jesus functions 
both as a sign of his divinity and a means of bringing about the divine presence. 
How must we understand de Lubac's insistence that revelation and salvation are 
united in Christ?  In “La révélation Divine,” de Lubac stated that the divine presence is 
totally human. But he immediately shifts to the theme of kenosis: 
Already the divine Kenosis was announced in the Word of the ancient Law. In Jesus 
Christ, the temporality of the human experience and the eternal truth are joined together” 
43 Ibid., 116, quoting Rahner.
44 “God speaks...to reveal himself and make us know the mystery of his will, 'hidden since the 
beginning,'” and who is “Christ among us, hope of the glory.” Ibid., 61, quoting from Eph. 1:9 and Col. 
1:26. 
45 Ibid., 115, quoting Phil 2:7.
46 Ibid., 116.
47  For de Lubac, however, it is not just the “hypostatic union” as a kind of ontological reality that 
mediates the Father, but Christ's concrete actions as both human and divine. “Any representation of the 
Incarnation that sees in the humanity of Jesus only the vestment that God uses in order to signal his 
speaking presence, is a heresy. And it is properly this heresy, rejected by the Church in its fight against 
Docetism, Apollinarianism, Monophysitism and Monothelitism, that is today considered as mythic, and 
refused as mythology, but not the authentic orthodox Christology.” Ibid.
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[quoting Balthasar]. It is in ''emptying himself” and in taking “the form of a slave” (Phil.  
2:7) that he is made present to us in history to reveal to us “what the eye has not seen, 
nor the ear heard, what is come to the heart of man, all that God has prepared for those  
who love him.”48
The quotation from Balthasar supports de Lubac's previous explication of the incarnation: 
in sum, the divine revelation radiates through Jesus because in him human experience and 
eternal truth are united together. 
Next, de Lubac appeals to the Philippians Christ Hymn to describe Christ's act of 
revealing. In Philippians, the kenosis of the Son is his being humble by taking on human 
form. In many accounts of salvation, the self-emptying of the Son is associated primarily 
with the passion and death and not with the incarnation. De Lubac interprets the kenotic 
act of the Son as the act by which the Son becomes historically and visibly present.  De 
Lubac associates the self-emptying of the Son with his entire historical activity. It is 
through an act of self-emptying that God is able to speak to us, that the Word is 
articulated in history. As a result, de Lubac implies that revelation as such is kenotic, an 
act of self-emptying. The Word must empty himself in order to speak to us (revelation), 
not just to save us (salvation). 
C. Christ as Sacrament of Salvation
Christ makes God present to us by emptying himself. While the kenosis-revelation 
connection is profound, it remains an underdeveloped theme in de Lubac's work. How 
does this kenosis pertain to the unity of revelation and salvation in Christ? Explaining this 
connection, I am going beyond de Lubac's text in what I think is a faithful articulation of 
48 Ibid., 117.
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its implications. Christ's kenotic self-revelation is indeed the same kenosis that 
constitutes the divine life. The Triune God is the kenotic perichoresis, the eternal and 
infinite exchange. De Lubac describes salvation as an entrance into the divine “eternal 
life,” that is, the communion between the Father and Son. The self-emptying of the 
Incarnate Word is the site where the divine and eternal kenosis (divinity) takes human and 
historical form (revelation). The historical appearance of the Son is “pro nobis” in the 
most intimite sense. The self-emptying of Christ in his humanity becomes both the 
temporal site of revelation and the efficacious sacrament of salvation that brings us into a 
share of the divine kenosis. 
Christ is the personal unity of revelation and salvation. De Lubac more commonly 
referred to Christ as the “sacrament of salvation” or the “sacrament of God.”49 In The 
Splendor of the Church, de Lubac wrote, “The Church is a mystery; that is to say that she 
is also a sacrament. She is 'the total locus of the Christian sacraments,” and she is herself 
the great sacrament which contains and vitalizes all the others. In this world she is the 
sacrament of Christ, as Christ Himself, in His humanity, is for us the sacrament of 
God.”50 In “La Révélation divine,” he applies the phrase “universal sacrament” to 
Christ.51 In a similar way, in The Church: Paradox and Mystery, he describes Christ as 
the Mystery.52 
For de Lubac, Christ is a sacrament of God because he is both a sign and a means:
“The mystery of Christ…in the unity of his person, is for us the 'sacrament' of God.” He 
49 De Lubac, Catholicism, 76.
50 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 203.
51 De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 125.
52 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 14.
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notes that “sacramentum = at the same time sign and means.”53 Calling Christ the 
sacrament suggests two interrelated characteristics. First, Christ mediates God's presence 
to us through his humanity, through the sign of his humanity. This is the symbolic or 
revelatory function of the sacrament. Second, as means, Christ is the way to salvation 
who draws us to the Father. This is the salvific function of the sacrament. The sacrament 
is not merely a window onto a transcendent reality, but it is the means by which we 
ascend to that reality.
In this perspective, Christ is the sacrament of God because his saving action is 
figurative in its function. He is the universal sacrament because he signifies or prefigures 
a future salvation of humanity. This salvation is envisaged as the totus Christus, the 
whole Christ, that is, Christ the head and members united to the head, who is united to 
God the Father. If, as mentioned before, salvation is both communion between the Father 
and the Son, and communion among the entire church, then salvation must be embodied 
socially. The saving actions of Christ, according to de Lubac, are what bring about this 
social salvation of humanity united in and through Christ. The same action by which he 
reveals God to us is the action by which he constitutes the church as the social locus of 
salvation. The church hopes for its future completion as the totus Christus at the end of 
time. 
D. Excursus on Sacrament and Spiritual Exegesis
De Lubac's description of Christ as the universal sacrament could conceivably 
53 De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 63.
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raise some objections. He describes sacraments as means to a future end, something that 
we pass through to reach that end. Yet the Gospel precludes the notion that Christ is a 
means to something else, something to leave behind once we reach the end of the 
journey. The often-employed binary language of de Lubac—type and antitype, figure and 
truth, sign and signified—used to describe the sacramental mediation from visible symbol 
to thing signified could lead to misinterpretation. Speaking of Christ as a sign or 
sacrament could wrongly suggest that he falls on the side of figure or sign but not on the 
side of the truth signified. 
The counterbalance to such an interpretation is de Lubac's affirmation of the 
continuity of the “mystery of Christ,” from his earthly life to the eschatological 
consummation. While the historical actions of Christ signify a future, eschatological 
fulfillment, that fulfillment is essentially in Christ: “Everything is being produced right 
now, everything is living on and buckled up inside one and the same mystery: Christ is 
substantially always the same; Christ signifies himself.”54 The careful balance between 
affirming the completeness of the work of Christ and an eschatological reserve is 
preserved in de Lubac's account of the spiritual interpretation of the New Testament. 
The New Testament is the allegorization of the Old Testament letter; it is its 
spiritual meaning. The New Testament cannot, de Lubac, claims be allegorized in turn. 
He explains in Exégèse médiévale:
If it [the New Testament] is the spirit of the Old Testament, which is its letter, it is clear 
that we couldn't possibly treat it newly as a letter from which we could then extract the 
spirit.  From here, we would be launched into a  processus in indefinitum,  a fruit of a 
wanton imagination, destructive of the Christian reality. To admit an explication of the  
54 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:202.
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New Testament analogous to this explication of the Old Testament that itself constitutes, 
would be to remove all the specific content from the word “spirit.” It would be to admit  
that the New Testament is susceptible, as the Old was, of an ulterior transformation or 
suprassing. It would be to make its very substance a call to something beyond itself. This  
would be to make the faith in Christ a relative and provisional faith, to see in Christ and 
in his Gospel the figures of another Savior to come, which would have in its turn the  
power to transform and surpass its figures “in spiritualem intellectum”—without doubt 
until that third Savior, who would no longer be the supreme and true savior.
To believe that the New Testament in its plain and complete meaning no longer contains 
an allegorical or spiritual meaning is simply to believe in Jesus Christ,  of which his  
testament is “novissimum”—that is to say last, definitive, eternal, new—in an absolute 
sense. That is to believe that “with Jesus, eschatology has entered into history.” After  
Jesus Christ,  we no longer have anything to  understand or  to receive.  Outside Jesus 
Christ, we no longer have anything to hope for.55
To say that there can be no allegorization of the New Testament indicates that Christ 
definitively transforms the world and that we await no other savior. It claims that Christ is 
definitive and last. It claims that any future world transformation, including that at the 
end of history, is a working out of the one already realized in his person.
The definitive nature of the Christ event is why, as de Lubac claims, tropology 
and anagogy follow allegory and are developed within it. Christ, who constitutes the 
spiritual meaning of the Old Testament, does signify additional meanings. Christ is a 
figure for the church and for the heavenly Jerusalem. Yet, de Lubac explains, there is a 
priority of the “sign” over the “signified.” The Old Testament was a figure of the New 
Testament, where the New Testament was the greater reality that fulfilled the Old. 
However, when we speak of the allegory as a figure of tropology and anagogy, the figure 
is the dominant reality.56 The figure of Christ assimilates to himself (concorporatio) what 
he signifies.57 Tropology and anagogy develop “within” allegory as the further 




explication and deepening of the meaning of Christ in the life of the church.58 The 
movement of spiritual meaning is, in fact, incomplete without tropology and anagogy. 
The New Testament allegory must engender further meanings:
It is really a sign, an efficacious sign. It is not any longer only mystery; it is the whole 
mystery in its principle. Tropology will describe only the fruit, anagogy will evoke only  
the consummation. It would not be grasped in its profoundness, it would even be truly 
mutilated if it were not contemplated in this double prolongation. But this word itself of 
prologation is  inadequate,  because  in  reality the investigation of  the two last  senses  
contributes nothing to the Mystery of Christ; it does not carry us outside of or beyond it;  
it only manifests its fecundity.59
In this sense, there can never be a meaning that outstrips and supplants Christ. The New 
Testament can never be a letter for a new spiritual meaning.
However, de Lubac mentions that, in practice, the New Testament was interpreted 
as a “letter.” The Christ event is a sign pointing to the future salvation of the church, a 
salvation embodied in the tropological and anagogical meanings of Scripture. Although 
the Christ event was definitive, tropology and anagogy were something truly “to come.” 
In this way, without moving beyond Christ, the tropological and anagogical meanings are 
something more than allegory. De Lubac addresses this issue in Exégèse médiévale, 
where he asks whether the literal or spiritual sense is more important. If one is thinking of 
the Old Testament, he says, then clearly the New Testament, its spiritual sense, is more 
important: “the Mystery of Christ is superior to all its prefigurations.” However,
if one considers the New Testament, the response appears less simple. Here the literal 
58 “At the same time it is the allegory of the Old Testament, its 'truth', its 'mystery', this great Fact 
constitutes up to a certain point the equivalent of what was, in the Old Testament, the historia. For it is 
really a real fact, happened in a certain place, in a certain time; it has then completely an exterior face, 
and, as the historia , it is  really the foundation of all that there remains to inventory within the New 
Testament, that is to say, inside itself, by tropologia and anagogē. It is truly really the sign, or the figure 
of all that the establishment of the two last senses must expose.” Ibid., 4:111. 
59 Ibid.
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sense is itself spiritual, as the Mystery of Christ, even under its first aspect of historical 
fact, is the “truth,” that is to say, “the spirit” of the Old Testament. On the other hand, as 
this Mystery contains in itself, in the manner just explained, the two last senses which 
arise from its “letter,” this letter itself must be called the most dignified. The assimilating 
figure prevails clearly over the assimilated reality. The personal Act of Christ dominates 
the  constitution  of  his  “mystical  body,”  the  Head  is  superior  to  the  members. 
Nevertheless, this Act has for its end only the consitution of this “body.” The Head is  
desired for the members,  the Word of God is incarnate only “propter nos et propter  
nostram salutem,” and the Church is the “pleroma” or the plenitude of Christ. More than 
the letter of the Old Testament, the intention of the Spirit is only that one remains at the  
letter of the New, and since the spirit of this letter, that is to say tropology and anagogy 
of which it is the sign and the foundation, does not surpass it really but finds in it all its 
substance, it is here not improper to say that it is the Mystery taken in its totality, the 
final reality wished by God, that constitutes the sense otherwise the most “dignified,” at 
least the most complete and, in the end, the most important.60
God's ultimate intention, the mystery of Christ taken in its final state, takes priority. The 
actions of Christ recounted in the New Testament are truly anticipatory, prefiguring the 
eschatological consummation. When de Lubac speaks of Christ as the sacrament of 
salvation or the sacrament of God, he means that the historical actions of Christ are truly 
efficacious in bringing about a new situation between God and humanity. Furthermore, 
this salvation remains yet to come. The incarnation and his historical action remain the 
foundation and the sign of the accomplishment of salvation, which, though accomplished 
in his humanity, still awaits its full extension to the rest of humanity at the end of the 
world.
IV. Eschatology as Ecclesiology
Henri de Lubac's ecclesiology organically unfolds from Christology, just as, in 
spiritual exegesis, the allegory gives rise to tropology or anagogy. One of his 
predominant ecclesiological metaphors is the church as sacrament, which extends, so to 
60 Ibid., 4:113–14.
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speak, from Christ as sacrament. The sacramental metaphor relates the church in time to 
the church of eternity. Henri de Lubac's eschatology takes the form of an ecclesiology 
because the church at the end of time, the “whole Christ,” is the goal of all of God's 
salvific action. While a definitive account of de Lubac's sacramental ecclesiology is 
impossible here, I intend merely to relate the central ecclesiological theme, the church as 
sacrament, to his eschatology. I first briefly examine the treatment of his sacramental 
ecclesiology in recent literature, indicating the increasing prominence given to de Lubac's 
eschatology. Second, I examine the paradoxical nature of the church in terms of her being 
a “sacrament” of salvation. Third, I show that the structure of the church as sacrament is 
that she is the means to and signification of a future and heavenly communion. 
A. De Lubac's Sacramental Ecclesiology in Recent Literature
De Lubac's treatment of the church and the sacraments, especially the Eucharist, 
has received significant attention on several fronts in recent literature. De Lubac's 
writings have sustained interest for his communion ecclesiology and also for his 
understanding for the relationship between church and sacrament.61 The 2008 English 
61 Hans Boersma, “The Eucharist Makes the Church,” Crux 44, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 2–11; Francesca 
Murphy, “De Lubac, Ratzinger and Von Balthasar: A Communal Adventure in Ecclesiology,” in 
Ecumenism Today: The Universal Church in the 21st Century (Aldershot, England / Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 45–81; Lisa Wang, “Sacramentum unitatis ecclesiasticae: The Eucharistic 
Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac,” Anglican Theological Review 85, no. 1 (December 1, 2003): 143–58; 
Robert Franklin Gotcher, “Henri de Lubac and Communio: The Significance of His Theology of the 
Supernatural for an Interpretation of Gaudium et Spes” (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 2002); 
Dennis M. Doyle, Communion Ecclesiology: Vision and Versions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2000), 
chap. 4; Susan K. Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in the Theology of Henri de Lubac (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998); David L. Schindler, Heart of the World, Center of the 
Church: Communio Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1996); Paul McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church: Henri de Lubac and John 
Zizioulas in Dialogue (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993); Elie Koma, “Le mystère de l’Eucharistie et ses 
dimensions ecclesiales dans l’oeuvre d’Henri de Lubac” (Th.D., Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 
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translation of his 1939 book Corpus Mysticum, which made this difficult text more 
accessible to English-speaking audiences, has spurred further debate over de Lubac's 
understanding of the social dimensions of ecclesial existence. 
De Lubac's Corpus Mysticum argues that the term corpus mysticum (mystical 
body) applied within the late medieval and modern era to the church. At the time, 
“mystical body” was in the process of being opposed increasingly to the “real body.” The 
“real body” was that of Christ as really present in the Eucharist. De Lubac showed that 
these uses of the terms “mystical body” and “real body” came about through an inversion 
of meanings that took place primarily during the twelfth century. De Lubac revisited an 
earlier theology that envisioned the Eucharist as the “mystical body” and the church as 
the reality of which the Eucharist was the sign and sacramental means.
 A dominant reading of Corpus Mysticum, from Michel de Certeau and Radical 
Orthodoxy, interprets de Lubac's recovery of the eucharistic meaning of corpus mysticum 
as a response to the individualistic spirituality that arose in modernity. The overemphasis 
on the Eucharist as the “real presence” of Christ (what Lawrence Paul Hemming calls the 
“fetishization” of the Eucharist), was a result of a spirituality that increasingly neglected 
the social dimension of salvation. By recovering the idea of the Eucharist as the “mystical 
body,” de Lubac shifted our attention to the assembled body of believers and their 
ecclesial practices as the object signified by the Eucharist.62 
1990); Marc Pelchat, L’Église mystère de communion: l’ecclésiologie dans l’œuvre d’Henri de Lubac, 
Collection Brèches théologiques 2 (Montréal: Éditions Paulines, 1988); Hubert Schnackers, Kirche als 
Sakrament und Mutter: Zur Ekklesiologie von Henri de Lubac, vol. 22, Regensburger Studien zur 
Theologie (Frankfort am Main: Peter Lang, 1979). 
62 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1998), 158–166; John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture 
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As Lawrence Paul Hemming indicates, Catherine Pickstock and John Milbank 
interpret de Lubac to have spoken of the liturgical and social action of the visible church 
as the “site” of God's salvation. Not only is the work of Christ made present through the 
church, but the visible, assembled community is the site of the saving action of God: 
“What is being read back into de Lubac is precisely the visibility of the assembled 
community, the ecclesia, whilst at the same time an enforcement of the visibility of the 
work done as mystical.”63 In other words, the visible ecclesial community is the “real 
body” of Christ that gathers to constitute the “mystical body,” the Eucharist, a sign and 
performative manifestation of the “real body.” Pickstock and Milbank, following de 
Certeau, collapse the saving action of God into the liturgical and social activity of the 
church.
This collapse of God's saving activity into the liturgical action of the church is 
consonant with John Milbank's interpretation of de Lubac's theology. First, Milbank 
advanced an interpretation in which de Lubac's understanding of the supernatural grounds 
all other aspects of his theology. De Lubac consistently rejected the Scholastic theory of 
pure nature, which proposes a hypothetical state in which humanity is not called to the 
beatific vision. As a correlate to the theory of pure nature, there developed a notion that 
human beings possessed a dual finality, a natural finality in virtue of possessing a human 
nature, and a supernatural finality “superadded” in virtue of the reception of grace. 
Instead, de Lubac proposed that humanity possesses a single, supernatural finality.64 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997).  
63 Laurence Paul Hemming, “Henri de Lubac: Reading Corpus Mysticum,” New Blackfriars 90, no. 1029 
(September 2009): 526.
64 See Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Études historiques (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991). Originally 
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According to Milbank, de Lubac's opposition to “pure nature” and its consequences 
implied that he collapsed the distinction between “nature” and the “supernatural” and 
between the immanent and the transcendent.65
Second, as a consequence, de Lubac also removes any distinction between social 
practice and grace, that is between ecclesial performance and supernatural life, or praxis 
and theoria. Milbank's ecclesiology reflects his understanding of the supernatural. Thus, 
Milbank's Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture lacks any partition between 
Christology and ecclesiology, because, as John Webster puts it, Christ and the church are
“co-constitutive.”66 To be fair, Milbank does not demonstrate absolute consistency in his 
published in 1944. See also Henri de Lubac, Le mystère du surnaturel, Théologie (Paris: Aubier, 1965); 
Henri de Lubac, Petite catéchèse sur nature et grâce, Communio (Paris: Fayard, 1980).
65 For the pivotal texts on Milbank's interpretation of de Lubac, see John Milbank, The Suspended Middle:  
Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2005); John Milbank, “Henri de Lubac,” ed. David F. Ford, The Modern Theologians: An 
Introduction to Modern Theology since 1918 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005); John Milbank, Theology 
and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 220–
225; John Milbank, “The Programme of Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy?: A Catholic 
Enquiry (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2000), 33–45; John Milbank, “An Essay Against Secular Order,” 
Journal of Religious Ethics 15, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 199–224.  
66 John Webster is critical of Catholic communion ecclesiologies for their lack of partitioning between the 
agency of the visible church and God's agency. According to Webster, communion ecclesiologies share 
the characteristic of viewing salvation as something embodied within a particular ecclesial communion, 
as “essentially visible as a form of common life and part of the world's historical and material 
economy.” John Webster, Confessing God: Essays in Christian Dogmatics II (London / New York: T&T 
Clark International, 2005), 161. While Webster recognizes the need to overcome an overly 
individualistic notion of salvation by re-integrating theology and church practice, he believes that most 
communion ecclesiologies fail to safeguard the “unparticipable perfection of God's triune life.” Ibid., 
163. They fail to recognize God's “utter difference” in relation to creatures and, as a result, risk 
minimizing God's freedom and grace with regard to the church: “The very density of the resultant 
ecclesiology can sometimes become problematic. Ecclesiology can so fill the horizon that it obscures 
the miracle of grace which is fundamental to the church's life and activity.” Ibid., 155.While Webster 
takes particular exception to Milbank's theology, he believes that Milbank, Jenson, and de Lubac fall 
within a spectrum of the same teaching. De Lubac's ecclesiology, which he says depends upon a 
“metaphysical substructure” found within Surnaturel, is a principal example of a confusion of the divine 
and human within communion ecclesiologies, 
Webster critiques a range of communion ecclesiology rather than offering a definitive 
interpretation of de Lubac. However, his understanding of communion ecclesiology in its Lubacian 
form is influenced by John Milbank's unfortunate interpretation of de Lubac's ontology. As a result, 
Webster understands a theology of communion to be a systematic consequence of the confusion 
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own theological program.67 
It remains, however, that the Radical Orthodox interpretation tends to distort de 
Lubac's ecclesiological vision by delimiting the scope of the “real body” to the present, 
visible communion. As Hemming states, 
The result—caricature indeed—has been the fetishisation, not of the sacred species, the 
eucharistic  host,  but  of  the  community  itself,  the  one  that  has  assembled  for  the 
Eucharist, and so the Anwendung of the interpretation has been a turning-in on ourselves, 
to  intensify the  objectification  of  the  subjects  for  whom the  host  has  become mere 
object.68 
The interpretation advanced by Milbank and others results in a misunderstanding of both 
de Lubac's ecclesiology and his understanding of sacraments.
I contend that de Lubac's sacramental ecclesiology corrects what Hemming calls 
the “fetishization of the assembly” and what Webster claims is a confusion of human and 
divine action within the church. However, de Lubac's ecclesiology must be read in an 
eschatological key. Hemming himself indicated the importance of eschatology for 
understanding de Lubac's theology of the church: 
Only at the end of time is the Church in its entirety to be understood as fully present, and 
so only then is the identity of the Church with the Body of Christ visible and complete.  
between creator and creature. First, Webster's view depends upon a misinterpretation of de Lubac's 
understanding of nature and grace. Second, Webster falsely believes that communion ecclesiology 
depends upon this confusion between God and creature. Instead, de Lubac vigorously defends the 
absolute transcendence of grace that makes communion possible.
67 In Theology and Social Theory, he writes, “In the Incarnation, God as God was perfectly able to fulfil 
the worship of God which is nevertheless, as worship, only possible for the creature. This descent is 
repeated and perpetuated in the Eucharist which gives rise to the ecclesia, that always 'other-governed' 
rather than autonomous human community, which is yet the beginning of universal community as such, 
since it is nothing other than the lived project of universal reconciliation. Not reducible to its 
institutional failures and yet not to be seen as a utopia either, since the reality of the reconciliation, of 
restored unity-in-diversity, must presuppose itself if it is to be realizable (always in some very small  
degree) in time and so must be always already begun.” Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, xxxi. 
Rather than failing to distinguish between the ecclesia and Christ, or between the visible community 
and grace, here Milbank describes the church as the already-begun “universal reconciliation.” 
68 “Henri de Lubac,” 528.
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At this point, sacraments, and above all the sacrament of the altar, cease to be, no longer 
needed as the mediation of the incompleteness of the Corpus mysticum (the end of time 
and the glorification of Christ’s mystical Body, and the point at which the Body ceases to 
be mysterious, or a matter of significations, and is completed). Von Balthasar himself 
emphasises the importance of this eschatological aspect in de Lubac’s work, and notes: 
“the Origenistic thought, which finds so strong an echo through history... that Christ and 
the  blessed  attain  their  ultimate  beatitude  only  if  the  whole  'Body  of  Christ,'  the 
redeemed creation, is gathered together in the transfiguration, is honoured in its lasting 
spiritual meaning.” This occurs, von Balthasar tells us, only in “the heavenly Jerusalem.” 
There is a hermeneutical key proposed in the text that most commentators have, as far as  
I can see, overlooked.69   
While Hemming is correct to locate the hermeneutical key in de Lubac's eschatology, he 
overlooks Susan Wood's Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in which she correlates de 
Lubac's understanding of Scripture, the church, and the sacraments. She notes that de 
Lubac did not explicitly capitalize on the eschatological orientation of spiritual exegesis 
in his work on the sacramentality of the church.70 In other words, the correlation between 
scriptural anagogy, the eschatological church as totus Christus, and the res sacramenti, 
that signified by the sacramental signs, remains underdeveloped. In what follows, I draw 
from Wood's analysis of the church as sacrament to explicate this eschatological key to de 
Lubac's understanding of sacrament.
B. Paradox and Mystery: The Church as Sacrament
At the outset, we should note that de Lubac's ecclesiology weaves together the 
central biblical and patristic metaphors for the church: body of Christ, spouse, mother, 
mystery. Each metaphor is incomplete in itself and must be supplemented by the others. 
As Susan Wood notes, the church-as-sacrament supplements the “body of Christ” 
69 Ibid., 530.
70 Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 127.
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metaphor.71 The church as the “body of Christ” could suggest that the incarnation of the 
Word in Jesus extends through the church in an “ongoing incarnation,” which de Lubac 
himself employed to describe the church. The metaphor of sacrament, she writes, 
functions to moderate the body of Christ metaphor.
The sacramental metaphor for the church functions to bring together two sides of 
the church's paradoxical nature. In his post-Vatican II work, The Church: Paradox and 
Mystery, de Lubac examines the church in terms of paradox, opposing truths that must be 
somehow reconciled or joined together. To neglect either pole of the paradox would be to 
deform its reality. Paradox is characteristic of our present state, where we lack the 
intellectual perspicacity to rationally resolve both poles. The paradox is “resolved” only 
by recognizing the mystery, in which the parallel lines meet only at the horizon, the limit 
of history. “The mystery always transcends our definitions.”72 Referring to the church, de 
Lubac describes three paradoxical pairs: the church is of God and of humanity; the 
church is visible and invisible; the church is of time and of eternity. 
First, de Lubac states the “Church is of God (de Trinitate) and she is of men (ex 
hominibus).”73 De Lubac describes the church with the highest ecclesiological 
descriptors: she is “a mysterious extension in time of the Trinity,” “the incarnation 
continued,” the “presence of Christ on earth,” “the spouse of Christ and his body.”74 He 
warns that these descriptions are inadequate because the church is also very human and 
sinful. We should avoid “ecclesiological 'monophysitism'” as well as Christological 
71 Ibid.




monophysitism. She is faulty and sinful. “The Church disguises her borrowed splendour 
in a shabby garment: the contradiction is, therefore, part and parcel of her nature and only 
the penetrating regard will know to discover the beauty of her face.”75 
De Lubac's high ecclesiology should make someone from the Reformed tradition, 
like Webster, uncomfortable. The first side of the paradox may not always match one's 
experience of the church. But, in what way does the church extend the Trinity in time? In 
what way is it the presence of Christ? De Lubac's intention is not to literally apply the 
incarnation of the Word to the ecclesial body. The church has a “borrowed splendor,” just 
as the moon borrows its light from the sun.76 Nevertheless, this borrowed splendor can 
only be seen by penetrating her shabby humanity. The idea of “sacrament” remains in the 
background of this exposition, which will be filled out by two additional paradoxes.
Second, de Lubac describes the church as visible and invisible at the same time. 
Here the sacramental nature of the church becomes clearer: “The mystery, the efficacious 
sign, is not separated from that which it signifies and, on the other hand, what is signified 
can only be grasped through the mediation of the sign.”77 De Lubac insists on the 
necessity of the visible, hierarchical, ministerial, and historical reality of the church as a 
sign pointing to its invisible reality. In the church, a “reciprocal interiority” pertains 
between the visible and the transcendent.
We must keep in mind that the relation between visible and invisible is, for de 
75 Ibid., 25. 
76 On the lunar symbolism for the church, see ibid., 16.
77 Ibid., 26. 
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Lubac, the relation between the “visible ecclesial communion” and the “invisible 
communion with the Trinity”: 
Communion is the objective—an objective which, from the first instant, does not cease 
to be realized in the invisible; the institution is the means for it—a means which even 
now does not cease to ensure a visible communion. But their reciprocal interiority could  
not be understood…if we did not believe that the Christian life is received from above, a 
life to which we are begotten and in which we are nourished by a ministry coming from 
Jesus himself and which realizes historically a communion victorious over all history.78 
Here the church generates a visible ecclesial communion while at the same time acting as 
a means to the invisible. It is a means, but the invisible is already present, already acting 
within the visible communion. What is critical is that the visible communion is an 
historical “means” to an invisible, eternal “end.” 
This leads us to the third paradoxical pair: the church is of time and of eternity. It 
is historical and eschatological. In Motherhood of the Church, de Lubac describes the 
church as the “eschatological anticipation, within the temporal order itself, of that 
Kingdom of God proclaimed by the Gospel.”79 In The Church: Paradox and Mystery, he 
states:
The reign of God is yet to come: but “without waiting for history to run its course, it has 
already,  in  a  mysterious  anticipation,  made  its  appearance  in  the  inner  marrow  of 
history.” After the coming of Christ and his resurrection, “'time-after' is already present  
in the interior of time.”80 
The church is a visible and historical communion that anticipates the eschatological 
communion and is the site for the eschatological acting within the temporal. There 
78 Henri de Lubac, The Motherhood of the Church Followed by Particular Churches in the Universal 
Church and an Interview Conducted by Gwendoline Jarczyk (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 35. 
Originally published as Henri de Lubac, Les églises particulières dans l’Église universelle; suivi de La 
maternité de l’église, et d’une interview recueillie , par G. Jarczyk, Intelligence de la foi (Paris: Aubier 
Montaigne, 1971).
79 The Motherhood of the Church, 126. 
80 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 52.
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remains an identity between the present and eschatological church, as well as a 
distinction between them.  
De Lubac's criticism of the Vatican II constitution on the church, Lumen Gentium, 
is helpful for understanding this identity with distinction. De Lubac approved of Lumen 
Gentium's recovery of a virtually lost theological theme, the “people of God journeying 
towards a common destiny.”81 This theme recovered the historical dimensions of ecclesial 
existence as a communal pilgrimage on the way to a goal that transcends history. 
However, de Lubac criticized the document for reintroducing a modern dualism between 
the “pilgrim church” and the “heavenly church.” Commenting on the seventh chapter of 
Lumen Gentium, de Lubac explains that the eschatological perspective of the church 
arising in the last centuries and articulated in Lumen Gentium is “novel in the light of the 
classic teaching (though not always of the theological reflections).”82 This dualism—
which originated from a focus on individual eschatology against corporate eschatology—
sees the two churches as vertically juxtaposed. While Lumen Gentium melds together 
corporate and individual eschatologies, he says, the juxtaposition of the earthly and 
heavenly tends to occlude the notion that the terrestrial is already making the heavenly 
present. As a result, Lumen Gentium represents a “narrowing of the patristic horizons.”83  
For the Fathers, the church is both terrestrial and heavenly, existing as a terrestrial 
anticipation of the eschatological kingdom constituted by the whole Christ.84 






balance the image of development through time with proleptic anticipation. The church 
exists in a paradoxical “not-yet” and “already-present;” it is the “church on pilgrimage” 
and the “church as already filled with Christ and the Spirit.”85 
C. Communion Ecclesiology in an Eschatological Perspective
The church-as-sacrament is situated in the tension between these two 
perspectives. Between the visible church and the heavenly church, there is both an 
identity and a gulf. The church militant is not other than the heavenly church: in de 
Lubac's perspective, they are different states of the same reality. Yet there is clearly a gulf 
between the now and the eschaton. De Lubac's understanding of the church as a 
sacrament helps to harmonize the two affirmations.
There are two temporal trajectories to any ecclesial sacrament: the sacrament is 
first a making-present of a past reality; secondly, it makes present and anticipates a future 
reality.  De Lubac writes, 
The Church which gave them life in the waters of baptism, this Church--visible and 
terrestrial herself—was therefore for them at the same time “the heavenly Church,” “the 
heavenly  Jerusalem,  our  mother”.…  In  this  all-embracing  view  of  the  mystery  the 
Church is identified with Christ, her spouse, who is himself the kingdom: “autobasileia,” 
as Origen admirably puts it. Now this view corresponds to the deepest logic of Christian 
eschatology and to depart from it could lead to many abuses of both thought and action. 
The reign of God is yet to come; but “without waiting for history to run its course, it has 
already,  in  a  mysterious  anticipation,  made  its  appearance  in  the  inner  marrow  of 
history.” Since the fact of Christ and his resurrection, '”time-after” is already present in 
the interior of time.”86  
To speak of the church as a sacrament means first of all that the church makes Christ 
present. But this making-present is equally a making the end of time present to us since 
85 Ibid.
86 De Lubac, Catholicism, 76; See also, de Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 147.
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Christ has entered into that fullness in his own person. The eschatological church, the 
whole Christ, is what the sacrament makes present. He states: “Christ has inaugurated the 
eschatological era. His work fructifies, but not by appeal to another. The 'last times' have 
arrived; salvation is accomplished in Him, and for each generation 'the Church makes 
already present to time the end of history.'”87 This end of history is constituted by the 
unity of all humanity through Christ. 
The historical church is a means to its own eschatological realization and a 
proleptic anticipation of that realization: “The Church is the ark that saves us from death. 
But we are not mere passengers on this ark: we are the ark, we are the Church.”88 The 
church is the sacramental means and the eschatological end. As means, she is a present, 
visible, organic, and incomplete unity which is the sacrament of her eschatological 
culmination, the “whole Christ,” the heavenly unity of all humanity.89 To put it 
differently, the visible communion exists in anticipation of a more perfect communion. 
The eschatological élan of de Lubac's communion ecclesiology moderates a 
triumphalistic fusion of church and kingdom that would presume an identity between the  
Roman Catholic Church with the kingdom. It moderates the “already-present” with a 
“not-yet.”90
87 De Lubac, “La Révélation divine,” 93, quoting Jean Mouroux.
88 De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 21.
89 As Susan Wood explains, the notion of the church as sacrament supplements the notion of the church as 
body of Christ by limiting the identification of church with Christ: “The Church as a sacrament of 
Christ is Christ, yet it is different, and the difference can, at least in part, be expressed as the difference 
between sacramental mediation of that which is complete eschatologically and its full eschatological 
manifestation.” Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 127.
90 Similarly, in his “Le Fondement théologique des missions,” de Lubac describes the catholicity of the 
church as what the church is called to be. Catholicity is not a description of the geographical extent of 
the Roman Catholic Church. Rather, it is an essential aspect: “It is an idea and a force. It is an ambition 
and exigence. Its catholicity is its vocation, which is melded with its being.” Henri de Lubac, “Le 
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In summary, the church is the present union of humanity awaiting its 
eschatological completion; but it is also the concrete anticipation of and means to that 
completion. For de Lubac, the locus for salvation is concrete and visible. This exposition 
of de Lubac's eschatological understanding of the church may not satisfy some 
objections. Webster might interpret a sacramental ecclesiology as endangering divine 
freedom or agency. For de Lubac, it indicates concrete and historical nature of our 
participation in salvation without thereby reducing salvation to an historical process.
D. Temporal Progress and the Kingdom
At this point it is pertinent to raise the question of the relationship between 
temporal progress and the kingdom of God. If the Christian church is a visible unity that 
anticipates and mediates the Kingdom, and if that unity is social, concrete, and historical, 
it would follow that the actions of the temporal church anticipate and mediate the 
kingdom. The tradition of Catholic social teaching assumes that the church has a positive 
role to play in the human social and political arena. If salvation is indeed social, the social 
doctrine of the church cannot be divorced from other theological doctrines. In sum, the 
practical action of the church in the social sphere is unified with its liturgical action and 
its function as a sacrament of salvation. If salvation is being realized in the concrete, then 
it must take up social and political dimensions, embody particular relationships, and 
social structures.91
Fondement théologique des missions,” in Résistance chrétienne au nazisme, vol. 34, Œuvres complètes 
(Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2006), 47. This essential mark of the church is its calling. 
91 Such a perspective is implied in a range of recent studies. Susan K. Wood's book, Spiritual Exegesis 
and the Church, is based on her dissertation entitled “The Church as the Social Embodiment of Grace in 
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De Lubac's position remains somewhat ambiguous. Schindler argues that for the 
liberal tradition of political thought, there is a sharp dualism between citizen and believer, 
between the political and the supernatural, between ultimate and penultimate ends. For de 
Lubac, he states, sanctity comprehends citizenship and the eternal comprehends temporal 
ends. In other words, our ultimate destiny is already being worked out within the 
particular and historical, and is embodied in political and social forms.
However, in his A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, de Lubac insisted on the 
non-identity of temporal progress and the kingdom of God.92 He argued human liberation 
is fundamentally ambiguous in its relationship to salvation:
“Liberation  of  man,”  understood  as  a  social  emancipation,  is  a  human  undertaking 
which, even when inspired by faith, brings about...by human means certain changes in 
the organization of temporal society, and which becomes part of human history, with all  
the hazards...of  going from bad to worse,  which will  always remain possible  in  this 
the Ecclesiology of Henri De Lubac.” While Wood extensively analyzes de Lubac's communion 
ecclesiology, she does not address the question of social and political progress. David L. Schindler, 
employing a communion ecclesiology from de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and John Paul II, argues 
that social and political practices (processes and procedures) are not ideologically neutral. There is a 
religious form embodied within social and political practice, which either bear a structurally 
resemblance to the Christian mystery, or which take on another form. John Milbank and Catherine 
Pickstock take the perspective that socio-political practices can either embrace nihilism or embody 
salvation, the latter constituting the social-liturgical practice of the Christian church. In a similar 
perspective, Hans Boersma has indicated that de Lubac's sacramental ecclesiology suggests a pathway 
between two extremes: an exaggerated anti-Constantinianism which would restrict the action of the 
church to the “spiritual,” leaving the state in its own realm; and the “perfect society” ecclesiology that 
imagines the church as a national or political community.  Susan K. Wood, “The Church as the Social 
Embodiment of Grace in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac” (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 
1986); Schindler, Heart of the World, Center of the Church; Milbank, The Word Made Strange; 
Milbank, “Henri de Lubac”; Pickstock, After Writing; Hans Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature 
and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac,” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1015 (2007): 
242–273; Jean-Yves Calvez, Chrétiens, penseurs du social, Histoire de la morale (Paris: Éditions du 
Cerf, 2008).
92 The context of ABrief Catechesis on Nature and Grace can help explain its tone. It was written during 
the Cold War and at a time when Marxist thought was influencing Christian theological reflection on the 
coming of God's kingdom and the role of temporal progress and development. It was also written a year 
after de Lubac's La Posterité spirituelle, which traced Hegelian, Marxist, and other future-oriented 
philosophical eschatologies back to Joachim. When he writes about human progress, he is thinking of 
Joachim, Hegel, and Marx. See Henri de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 162.
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groping and sinful world. “Salvation in Jesus Christ,” on the contrary, is essentially a 
divine undertaking which comes about in the depths of hearts and is inscribed in eternity.  
This makes clear the proper role of the Church; she is the messenger and bearer of this 
salvation and hence she cannot be assimilated, either in her structure or in her aims, to 
any of our human societies.93
De Lubac maintains the absolute transcendence of the grace of salvation with respect to 
the structures of political society. He distinguishes between liberation as a social program 
and liberation as the freedom from sin. The first is fundamentally ambiguous in 
relationship to the latter. Yet one might wonder, given his language, whether human 
liberation is ambivalent with regard to salvation.
Writing about the relationship between the “world process” and salvation, he uses 
stronger language: 
since the world as a whole is going to its death, “it cannot be considered an immanent 
reflection or an anticipation of the Kingdom of God.” Hence it cannot be, as such, the  
goal of our hopes. We must, then, take care not to confuse the “progress of this world” 
(itself a very ambivalent term) with the “new creation.” We must avoid slipping from 
conversion of  heart,  by which the “new man” is  born in  Christ,  to  the unfolding of 
history (dialectic or not) that bears “as in its womb” the societies of the future.94
Neither human progress nor world history should be considered an anticipation of the 
promised kingdom: 
In its social meaning liberation of every kind belongs to time; salvation is for eternity, 
and for that reason anticipates time. We should not even say, strictly speaking, that the 
more or less perfect accomplishment (it always remains imperfect) of the first of these  
two goals is at least the indispensable preparation for the second; for this would amount  
to  saying  that  the  Christian  hope  is  necessarily  situated  in  the  prolongation  of  the  
objective results obtained by human efforts.95 
Human liberation cannot be confused with the spiritual renewal that occurs in the human 
heart and which transcends history and progress.
93 Ibid., 159–60.
94 Ibid., 101.
95 Ibid., 107. 
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De Lubac's response to Edward Schillebeeckx's considerations on the relationship 
between salvation and human progress illumines his position. As Wood has argued, de 
Lubac reacted to Schillebeeckx's characterization of the church as the sacramentum 
mundi, the “sacrament of the world.” The question is posed about what the ultimate 
reference of the church-as-sacrament is: is the church the sacrament of the world or of 
Christ?96 For Schillebeeckx, the church is the visible sacrament of the growth of the 
historical process toward salvation. God's universal will to save humanity is manifested 
in the struggle for a better world, even though this manifestation is not explicit or 
thematic. The salvation of the world through God's grace, coinciding with the unity of 
humanity, is made explicit within the church.97 
De Lubac criticized Schillebeeckx on two fronts. First, Schillebeeckx's description 
of the church as sacramentum mundi presented the church as the expression of a salvation 
already available in the secular world. It ultimately confuses the supernatural and nature 
and itcollapses “creation and divinization.”98 As a result, the  church explicitly thematizes 
a salvation implicit within socio-political projects. Second, Schillebeeckx fails to 
articulate the fact that salvation transcends all the features of our historical world. 
Concerning Schillebeeckx's position, he asks, “Does the 'eschatological kingdom' not 
appear, in all this, as the culmination of our 'earthly expectations,' as their supreme 
fulfillment and consummation?… So, in practice, human history and salvation history 
96 See Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 109–17.
97 See Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 260.
98 De Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, 226. 
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would be one and the same.”99 The problem, as de Lubac saw it, was that the 
eschatological kingdom for Schillebeeckx is merely the endpoint of secular progress and 
not the transfiguration of the world that takes the world beyond itself.
In general, de Lubac's eschatology attempted to avoid two pitfalls. On the one 
hand, he wished to avoid the identification of temporal and secular progress with a 
coming eschatological kingdom (reflecting his engagement with Joachim and Joachim's 
posterity). The infinite difference between creation and salvation is preserved in the 
difference of orders between human progress and the kingdom. It is clear that he wished 
to avoid collapsing salvation into an immanent world process to which political progress 
would contribute. On the other hand, de Lubac attempted to avoid severing all  
relationship between the visible, temporal order and grace, the supernatural, or the 
kingdom (reflecting his engagement with early modern theories of pure nature). In 
different contexts, he places a greater emphasis on avoiding one or the other extreme. In 
Brief Catechesis, he was primarily attempting to avoid the former. His manner of 
speaking of temporal progress and human liberation is telling, for he defined “human 
liberation” as the restructuring of temporal society by human means. Human liberation is 
the rearrangement of the deck chairs on the sinking ship of history. It is a social or 
political rearrangement considered independently from the revolution of God's grace, the 
conversion of heart. 
In the context of my wider discussion, does de Lubac's insistence that grace is of 
an entirely different order than temporal progress conflict with his understanding of 
99 Ibid., 225.
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sacramentality, especially of the church's visible and historical presence? Is de Lubac's 
sacramental ontology, in which we proleptically encounter salvation in concrete, social, 
and historical forms, at odds with his claim that temporal progress cannot be the 
preparation or anticipation of salvation? De Lubac did not directly address this apparent 
conflict within his writings. 
For de Lubac, the church itself is the temporal reality—a visible communion and 
sacramental anticipation—that makes the kingdom present. The church is the sacrament 
of the eschaton. As in all sacramental reality, the visible sacrament cannot be an end in 
itself. It achieves its identity as sacrament when it is a means to the final end, a means 
that we must pass through, and which we never completely pass through. The church 
embodies a certain way of life that takes on social, liturgical, and political dimensions, 
which constitute her visibility. Salvation proleptically enters into these dimensions. 
Yet this social and political space is always an anticipation and, as such, is incomplete. 
In de Lubac's view, it would be false to absolutize a certain set of practices as 
definitively embodying salvation. His communion ecclesiology cautions against it. We 
enter into communion with God through the ecclesial communion. It would be a mistake, 
however, to confuse the exterior dimensions of the ecclesial communion, conceived of as 
exterior practices and structures, with communion with God. The rearrangement of 
institutions, structures, and practices is no guarantee of salvation; and salvation is not 
reducible to these institutions, structures, or practices. That is why the exterior of the 
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sacrament, however we conceive it, cannot be an idol pursued for its own sake. Rather, it 
must be an icon transparent to the eternal.
Unfortunately, de Lubac did not apply the notion of sacramentality to human 
liberation or the growth of charity as an ecclesial practice that embodies salvation, at least 
partially. Unlike Johann Baptist Metz or Gustavo Gutiérrez, de Lubac did not show how 
social and political practices, the struggle for justice, or the social aspects of ecclesial 
communion could be anticipatory of the consummation of God's plan. Conceived as only 
a human effort to reorganize the bureaucracy of social existence, social justice appears 
enclosed within its own order. Conceivably, de Lubac's understanding of the church as 
sacrament—of God and of humanity, bearing both the invisible and visible, uniting the 
eschaton with history—could be reclaimed for interpreting the church's socio-political 
dimensions. Keeping in mind that these dimensions are always ambiguous—as is 
temporal progress—they might appear as icons of the divine or as sacraments of the 
eschaton. In this sense, practices of communion could be considered within the 
sacramental economy of salvation as anticipatory of the eschatological kingdom. 
V.  Mysticism as Anagogy
After outlining the eschatological features of de Lubac's Christology and 
ecclesiology, the transition to mysticism may appear abrupt. I concede that it is. Yet, de 
Lubac's eschatological themes are extended in his writings on mysticism and this 
mysticism suffuses his writings.100 Like his eschatology in general, his reflections on 
100 As Rudolf Voderholzer states, his interpretation of Christianity is mystical and the mystical appears as 
a leitmotif throughout his works. Rudolf Voderholzer, Meet Henri De Lubac, trans. Michael J. Miller 
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mysticism are fragmentary and incomplete. De Lubac claimed that his unwritten book on 
mysticism inspired much of his thinking. In 1956, he wrote:
I truly believe that for a rather long time the idea for my book on Mysticism has been my 
inspiration in everything; I form my judgments on the basis of it, it provides me with the 
means to classify my ideas in proportion to it. But I will not write this book. It is in all 
ways beyond my physical, intellectual, spiritual strength. I have a clear vision of how it  
is linked together, I can distinguish and more or less situate the problems that should be 
treated in it, in their nature and in their order, I see the precise direction in which the 
solution  of  each of  them should  be  sought—but  I  am incapable  of  formulating  that 
solution. This all is enough to allow me to rule out one by one the views that are not  
conformed to it, in the works I read or the theories I hear expressed, but all this does not 
take its final form, the only one that would allow it to exist. The center always eludes  
me. What I achieve on paper is only preliminary, banalities, peripheral discussions or  
scholarly details.101
Beyond his powers to begin, this book is at the center of his theology. While de Lubac 
failed to articulate the systematic core of his thinking, his failure is congruent with his 
mysticism itself, in which the very ideas and concepts that we vitally need to reach God, 
in the end, must be transcended.
De Lubac gave significant attention to mysticism in four sets of writings. Because 
de Lubac lacked a systematic approach to the diverse arenas in which he spoke of 
mysticism, most commentators fail to correlate them. First, de Lubac's ecclesiological 
writings treat the “mystical body,” which we have already touched upon. Second, his 
writings treating non-Christian religions have “mysticism” as a prominent theme.102 His 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 211.
101 De Lubac, At the Service of the Church, 113; Voderholzer suggests that de Lubac’s unstarted book on 
Christ and never-begun book on mysticism were one and the same. Voderholzer, Meet Henri De Lubac, 
159; The book on Christ is mentioned in de Lubac, At the Service of the Church, 147–8.
102 Henri de Lubac, “Mysticism and Mystery,” in Theological Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1989), 35–69; Henri de Lubac, Aspects du Bouddhisme (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1951); Henri de 
Lubac, La rencontre du Bouddhisme et de l’occident, Œuvres complètes 22 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 
2000); Paul Magnin, Jean-Noël Audras, and Association internationale Cardinal Henri de Lubac, 
L’intelligence de la rencontre du Bouddhisme: Actes du colloque du 11 octobre 2000 à la Fondation 
Singer-Polignac, “La rencontre du bouddhisme et de l’Occident depuis Henri de Lubac,” Études 
lubaciennes 2 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2001); David Grumett, “De Lubac, Dry Land Buddhism, and 
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article “Mysticism and Mystery,” which relates non-Christian mysticisms with the 
Christian mystery, is sometimes referred to as an outline of his mystical theology. Third, 
de Lubac's writings on the history of biblical interpretation speak of “tropology,” the third 
sense of scripture, as the “interiorization” of the mystery. These writings describe the 
unity of biblical interpretation, mysticism, and doctrine in pre-Modern times.103 Lastly, 
his Discovery of God presents a fragmentary religious epistemology and apologetic. It 
presents our experience of the finite world as a pathway to God. Interpretation of this 
work is made difficult by the fact it reads more like Pascal's Pensees than a treatise on 
religious knowledge: it gathers together fragmentary thoughts, quotations, and prayers of 
praise under a single title. Instead of presenting a demonstration for theistic belief, it 
leads the reader to move beyond the constructions of our limited intellects and recognize 
in those constructions the traces of God. Discovery of God is certainly mystical, though 
its themes are not easily harmonized with his other writings. 
I will not attempt a systematic correlation among his various writings on 
mysticism. My intention is more limited. In what follows, I merely sketch how de 
Lubac's mysticism is situated in his eschatology.  First, I interpret de Lubac's The 
Discovery of God in terms of its tension between possession of God in the present and 
anticipation of God. Anticipating his recovery of anagogia in the Fathers, de Lubac 
describes mysticism as the discovery of the sacramental traces of God in the world. At the 
same time, these traces of God forever propel the mystic beyond them. Second, de Lubac 
Roman Catholicism,” The Journal of Religion 92, no. 1 (2012): 58–83.
103 See Voderholzer, Meet Henri De Lubac; William Murphy, “Henri de Lubac’s Mystical Tropology,” 
Communio 27, no. 1 (2000): 171–201; Marcellino G. D’Ambrosio, “Henri de Lubac and the Recovery 
of the Traditional Hermeneutic” (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1991).
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interpreted natural or non-Christian mysticisms as anticipations of the mystery to be 
consummated only at the end of time. His understanding of mysticism assumes the 
pattern of his Christology and ecclesiology, in which the eschatological enters into the 
present and the present is a proleptic anticipation of the mystery to come. 
A. Religious Epistemology
The question of religious epistemology is integral to de Lubac's understanding of 
mysticism. However, de Lubac's reflection on religious epistemology treats a distinct set 
of themes from a different viewpoint. Whereas his writings on mysticism addressed the 
relationship between the human image and divine likeness, his writings on religious 
epistemology account for how knowledge of a transcendent God is possible via a 
knowledge of creation. The latter question was one of the obligatory questions of natural 
theology in nineteenth- to twentieth-century Catholic theology, which de Lubac took up 
in The Discovery of God.104 In a sense, mysticism and religious epistemology converge, 
according to de Lubac's thought, on a single point. 
In what follows, I will first contextualize de Lubac's The Discovery of God in the 
debates over natural theology early in the twentieth century. Second, I examine de 
Lubac's treatment of the “dialectic of affirmation” for its eschatological themes. Third, I 
argue that sacramentality and kenosis are two themes that emerge from de Lubac's 
religious epistemology, albeit in an underdeveloped way.
104 The Discovery of God is the English language translation of de Lubac's Sur les chemins de Dieu (On 
the Roads toward God) (1956), an updated edition of his De la connaissance de Dieu (On the 
Knowledge of God) (1948). While the two versions were substantially the same, the updated title 
perhaps reflects a shift in metaphor, from scientific knowledge to mystical journey. 
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1. Transcendental Thomism and the Recovery of Intuition
De Lubac sought to remedy a tendency within modern Catholic natural theology. 
Often following Thomistic principles, natural theologies attempted to demonstrate God's 
existence, rising from the knowledge of being of creatures to a knowledge of God's 
being. Neo-Scholastic natural theologians of the early twentieth century operated under 
the problematic derived from the Thomistic revival in the nineteenth century. They saw 
their primary task as establishing a pathway between rationalism and fideism by 
demonstrating that, on the one hand, reason could prove the existence of God 
independently of faith and, on the other hand, the act of faith was reasonable.105 
For the neo-Thomist school, the knowledge of the first principles of metaphysics 
is garnered from sense experience rather than immediate intuition. The “intelligibility 
grasped in the universal is the intelligibility of the sensible singular.”106 This position 
characterizes the Thomism of Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange. For this school, the concept is acquired through abstraction from singulars. The 
105 The neo-Scholastics reacted to the nineteenth-century Catholic theology influenced by continental 
idealism, that is “traditionalism” and “ontologism.” They opposed Catholic traditionalism, which 
grounded knowledge of God exclusively in revelation. As Gerald McCool explains, “The traditionalism 
of Lamennais, Bautain and the Catholic Tübingen School, which made man's knowledge of the first 
principles of metaphysics and ethics dependent upon a primitive act of divine revelation communicated 
to Adam's descendants by tradition, deprived human reason of its legitimate autonomy and, by doing so, 
undermined the reasonableness of the act of faith.” Gerald McCool, Nineteenth Century Scholasticism: 
The Search for a Unitary Method, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), 7. The neo-
Scholastics likewise opposed “ontologism,” which grounded human knowledge of concrete particulars 
in the “intuition” of Infinite Being. The mind's direct intuition of the divine being would undermine the 
need for historical revelation, fail to respect the relative autonomy of reason, and fail to respect the 
gratuity of faith. The Holy Office's condemnation of Antonio Rosmini's ontologism in 1887 cast a 
shadow over the Augustinian tradition of religious epistemology as a whole and became a point of 
contention between different theological schools.
106 Ibid., 11.
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object “Being” is grasped immediately in the concept. Through the process of abstraction, 
the mind moves from concrete singulars to a concept of Being. Through the concept of 
Being, one obtains an analogical knowledge of God through creatures.
The transcendental Thomists recognized a deficiency in the neo-Thomist account. 
It is impossible to move from a concept of creaturely perfection to a concept of divine 
perfection that adequately represents the transcendent. The process of abstraction, which 
removes all finitude from our concept of Being, remains suspended in a negative phase. 
Abstracting the finite elements from our concept of the being of creatures leaves the 
knower no closer to representing the infinite and transcendent. 
The problem, for Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944), was how analogical knowledge 
of God was possible. The neo-Scholastic epistemological tradition had placed all of the 
work of religious epistemology, so to say, in objective conceptual knowledge. “Must this 
objective concept necessarily be the proper, direct, 'quidditive' concept of God?”107 If so, 
Maréchal stated, we are forced to accept either ontologism, a direct knowledge of God’s 
essence, or a univocal concept of being that applies the same way to God and to 
creatures, a denial of God’s transcendence.
In contrast to the neo-Thomists, Maréchal's religious epistemology moved from 
creatures to God through the finality of the human mind rather than the concept. For 
Maréchal, the “object of sense experience…would, as soon as it enters our consciousness, 
contain a meta-empirical element, which is intimately associated with a strictly empirical 
107 Joseph Maréchal, A Maréchal Reader, ed. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 144.
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element.”108 This meta-empirical element derives, not from the concepts themselves, but 
from the natural finality of the human intelligence toward its infinite end. Gerald McCool 
explains, “It is the dynamism of the mind into which man’s concepts have been inserted 
rather than the representative content of the concepts themselves which grounds them in 
reality.”109 In other words, concepts are entirely constructed through the experience of 
sensible realities, but the dynamism of the human mind towards the infinite draws the 
knower to seek a “beyond” of that experience:
Thus we are induced to postulate in our objective knowledge…a movement of thought which 
would bring us constantly 'beyond' that which may still be represented by concepts, some 
kind  of  metaempirical  anticipation  which  should  show us  the  objective  capacity  of  our 
intellect expanding infinitely until it exceeds any limitation of being.110 
 For Maréchal, without concepts derived from the sensible world, the intellect could 
never know the world as contingent, that is, to make the judgment, “This is not God.” 
The dynamic finality of the mind for the infinite allows the mind to recognize the world 
as contingent, pushing beyond toward the transcendent source of being. 
The dynamism of the intellect serves to ground an analogical knowledge of God's 
being. Instead of requiring an adequate “univocal” concept of being applied in the same 
way to God and creatures, Maréchal argues that the concept of being derived from our 
sense experience signifies more than it contains. That is because the “internal dynamic 
finality” of the mind causes us always to seek beyond. For Joseph Maréchal, as for Karl 
Rahner, this “internal dynamic finality” of the mind grounds the ability to recognize the 
world as contingent and it constitutes a “pre-thematized” intuition of the divine. 
108 Ibid., 236.
109 McCool, Nineteenth Century Scholasticism, 88.
110 Ibid., 145.
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2. The Dialectic of Affirmation: Affirmatio, Negatio, Eminentia
De Lubac, borrowing liberally from Maréchal, sought to restore the pre-
conceptual intuition of the divine that undergirds the movement from creation to God. 
His Sur les chemins followed Maréchal in defending a pre-conceptual, “intuitive” 
knowledge of God, which he believed was suppressed in modern Catholicism. De Lubac 
sought to recover intuition in the resources of a broad Christian spiritual tradition that at 
once preserved God's transcendence and, in the face of negative theology, affirmed our 
ability to know God through creation. 
In fact, de Lubac's stated intention was to support a religious epistemology 
expressed in transcendental Thomism, though employing the resources of a more ancient  
notion of anagogy:
It [Sur les chemins] sought...to remedy what seemed to me to be a deficiency of classical 
Thomism: for the latter, the necessary movement of negative theology creates a danger 
of  agnosticism…; so  I  wanted  to  base  this  same movement  on  a  more  fundamental 
exigency, there at the beginning and constantly recurring, by which I sought to define the 
human  spirit  in  its  relation  to  God.  This  intuitive,  or  more  precisely  proleptic  and 
dynamic (not thematized, as one would say today), element, well founded in tradition, 
was  diametrically  opposed  to  the  extrinsic  and  restrictive  rationalism  of  one  whole 
modern Thomistic school; it seems more important to me today than ever to stress this,  
at a time when an undue inflation of “negative theology” risks opening the way not only 
to  agnosticism  but  to  atheism.  On  the  other  hand,  still  dependent  upon  awkward 
reflections dating from my beginnings as an apprentice philosopher, I was also moving 
in an atmosphere of “natural theology,” outside of which, even today, I cannot breathe 
completely  at  ease—which  does  not  mean  that  I  admit  a  natural  theology correctly 
constituted outside revelation, which would in that case come simply to be added onto 
it.111
Like Maréchal, de Lubac's religious epistemology grounds the movement of the mind 
beyond sense experience in the “dynamic finality of the intelligence.” Furthermore, this 
111 De Lubac, At the Service of the Church, 80–1.
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“dynamic finality” must be understood as a proleptic anticipation and an anagogical 
drive.
De Lubac distinguishes between objective, conceptual knowledge and 
transcendental, pre-conceptual intuition. On the one hand, we possess an objective, 
conceptual knowledge deriving from the world of experience and from which we 
compose our ideas concerning God. This constructive, conceptual knowledge is entirely 
derived from the human experience of the world. As a result, any concept concerning 
God must be purified by negating everything in it belonging to the finite world.
Yet, prior to the construction of concepts there exists a primordial “affirmation” of 
God, which de Lubac sometimes calls “transcendental.” “Every human act,” he writes, 
“whether it is an act of knowledge or an act of the will, rests secretly upon God, by 
attributing meaning and solidity to the real upon which it is exercised.”112 It is a “'basic 
experience'—the presence of nonconceptual being to consciousness which is common to 
the philosopher and to all men.”113 De Lubac appeals to the Thomistic maxim that “all 
knowers know God implicitly in all they know.” Before any conscious and conceptual 
affirmation, there is an “affirmation which is still implicit, implied in each of our 
judgments on existence or judgments of value, and in consequence co-extensive with our 
whole spiritual activity, an affirmation congenital to the mind.”114 Conceptual processes 
of discursive reason that prove God's existence by moving from creatures to God are not 





worthless. However, according to de Lubac, the success of these processes depends upon 
a “transcendental” affirmation deeper than the “conceptual” or “objective” affirmation.
The transcendental affirmation is what de Lubac calls “the idea of God.” “The 
idea of God is not a conceptual construction; it is antecedent to conscious or volitional 
acts: In its primary and permanent state the idea of God is not, then, a product of the 
intelligence. It is not a concept. It is a reality: the very soul of the soul; a spiritual image 
of the Divinity, an 'eikon.'”115 It is significant that de Lubac speaks of the affirmation in 
terms of an “image” or “eikon” of God. The notion of “image” and “likeness,” so 
prominent within his eschatology, suggests that the affirmation is an ontological effect of 
being created as an “image” with a finality toward “likeness.”
De Lubac affirms the historical and cultural constructedness of our concepts about 
God yet affirms that those concepts can truly signify God: 
In reality the authentic  affirmation of God—which is something much more than an 
affirmation—belongs in the first instance to the deepest operation of thought, which is  
not itself either “mythical” or “logical,” although it is obliged to borrow the procedures 
of logic in order to express itself, and makes use of imagination to give itself body, in 
such  a  way  that  its  spontaneous  constructions  reveal  a  structure  analogous  to  the  
structures of myths. Perhaps, if we are to take all these elements into account, we should 
do better to describe it with a word of which modern abuse ought not to be allowed to  
deprive us,  namely a  “symbolic” affirmation or  even,  to  use another and older term 
beloved of the Fathers, “anagogical.”116 
The mention of “anagogy” is not incidental. The “affirmation” of God is implicit within 
each objective judgment because the affirmation is co-extensive with the spirit or mind 
itself. The mind is drawn towards its final end in a movement described as “anagogical.” 
While de Lubac does not explicitly link the two, the anagogia explicated in 
115 Ibid., 40. De Lubac's notion of the “transcendental affirmation” is similar to Karl Rahner's Vorgriff auf 
esse (pre-apprehension of being) that underlies all objective, conceptual judgments.
116 Ibid., 19.
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History and Spirit and Exégèse médiévale is essentially the anagogy in The Discovery of 
God. In Exégèse médiévale de Lubac described two senses of anagogy. On the one hand, 
it is the fulfillment of the “doctrinal formulation,” the fourfold sense of Scripture. This 
anagogy is objective: it denotes a “higher meaning,” an eschatology in a speculative 
sense; it is the fulfillment of the person or the cosmos. On the other hand, it is also the 
fulfillment of the “spiritual formulation,” the threefold sense of scripture. It is subjective 
in nature: it indicates the manner of apprehending those higher things; it is a higher 
contemplation, or theoria.117 Anagogy in The Discovery of God is oriented toward what 
Exégèse médiévale calls “subjective anagogy.” In The Discovery of God, anagogy 
designates the objective “end” insofar as it engenders an ascent through our present 
reality. The mystical impulse to know God in essence is an “anagogical dialectic” and an 
“ascending dialectic.”118
De Lubac's “affirmation of God” is a supplement or corrective to an account of 
theological language. Drawing from Thomas Aquinas's formulation of the dialectic of the 
affirmation of God, de Lubac reinterprets the way of affirmation, the way of negation, 
and the way of eminence.119 At the beginning of the dialectic is the affirmation (via 
affirmationis) that some attribute belongs to God (being, goodness, truth). As I have 
noted, the concept is formulated through knowledge of sensible realities, through 
processes of abstraction and unification within the mind. The concept used of God here 
never can be applied univocally to particular objects of our experience and to God, who is 
117 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:183.
118 De Lubac, The Discovery of God, 150–1; de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:184. 
119 See D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans, 2009), 152–155.
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already known through the fundamental experience of the human mind. Applying such a 
concept to God is a construction ultimately inadequate to its object.120 Through the 
concept the 
absolute, upon which our knowledge rests, now enters into the system of our knowledge. 
It therefore appears to be caught up in the universal network of relationships. And the 
Transcendent,  which  by  definition  “goes  beyond”  the  notions  elaborated  by  our 
intelligence, seems to allow itself to be imprisoned within them.
As soon as we formulate a concept of God, a concept that is necessary for knowledge of 
God, it becomes inadequate. To rest at a conceptual formulation of God would be to form 
an idol.
The way of negation (via negationis) is the second stage of the dialectic. The 
negation is a purification of the concept: “As the idea of God is particularized and 
becomes objective, it is submitted to a negative dialectic, which is turned against all the 
gross elements from which it seems to take its substance.”121 At the negative stage, the 
concept does not become vacuous, as if the affirmative stage were simply denied. Instead, 
the negative phase denies that we affirm God in the manner that we affirm the beings in 
the world. The way of negation makes room for the final stage of the dialectic, the way of 
eminence (via eminentiae). The final stage predicates something of God, but recognizing 
God's transcendence, it affirms that the predicate absolutely transcends what we can 
affirm of the world.
The traditional manner of viewing the dialectic of affirmation raises an objection. 
120 De Lubac, The Discovery of God, 106.
121 Ibid., 106. The radical difference between God and creation is enshrined in the Fourth Lateran 
Council's statement “Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest similitudo notari, quin inter eos major sit 
dissimilitudo notanda” [Between creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without implying 
an even greater dissimilitude].
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If all concepts are formed by abstraction from the material world, and if, in the negation, 
we deny those elements in the concept that are formed through experience of the sensible 
world, are we not left with nothing? If the negative stage denies everything “which, 
starting from the creature, we have first affirmed of God,” we will end in atheism or 
agnosticism.122 
De Lubac responded that there is “more in the concept than the concept itself.” 
Besides the concept, there is the transcendental affirmation that underlies it. This 
primordial affirmation—co-extensive with the human spirit—is drawn toward the 
transcendent:
In the dialectic of the three ways, which gives us access to a human knowledge of God 
(affirmatio, seu positio; negatio, seu remotio; eminentia, seu transcendentia),  the  via 
eminentiae  does  not,  in  the  last  analysis,  follow on  the  via  negationis;  it  demands, 
inspires, and guides it. Although it comes last, the  via eminentiae is covertly the first, 
superior and anterior to the via affirmationis itself. Although it never assumes a definite 
form in the eyes of the intelligence, it is always the light and the norm…a hidden power 
which excites us to pursue objective knowledge and compels us to rectify it. That is why 
we  can  enter  the  via  negationis and  remain  in  it  without  fear,  once  the  necessary 
preliminary  affirmations  have  been  left  behind.  Understood  in  this  way,  the  via 
negationis is only negative in appearance or negative of appearances.  In other words – 
and more exactly perhaps—although it is negative and remains negative, it is the very 
opposite of negation.123
The via eminentiae is at the beginning of the dialectic insofar as it is presupposed by the 
via affirmationis and the via negationis as the end of the journey and the source of its 
inspiration. In de Lubac's resolution, the likeness exercises a “hidden power” over the 
historical image, and the via eminentiae exercises a “hidden power” over the via 
affirmationis. 




negating only the concept that the mind constructs, a concept that the created intellect 
must transcend even if remains necessary for knowledge. The conceptual affirmation and 
negation remain in tension: the idea of God rises spontaneously and is objectified by the 
mind. The need to check the objective affirmation continues in the negative phase. 
Always recurring, the objective affirmation rises again, only to be censured by negative 
theology. “It may seem, perhaps, as though man were destined to oscillate forever 
between those two poles without ever finding a haven in which to rest.”124 The 
affirmative and negative phase remain together an unbreakable paradox, each correcting 
the other, neither permanently gaining the upper hand. 
In the present state, our knowledge of God exists only in constructed 
representations. Because of God's transcendence, these representations always exist in 
tension with negative theology. The mystic must use concepts, affirmations, images 
derived from the created world, but must be willing to brush them aside forever. One 
must enter the light through the darkness, abandoning all representations, even if those 
representations are carrying us, just as the swimmer stays afloat only by pushing the 
water aside.
In the Lubacian vision, the tension between affirmation and negation is creative 
insofar as it causes the human being always to push beyond his or her own constructions. 
Although de Lubac's religious epistemology is neither well-developed philosophically 
nor systematically connected to his eschatology, there are obvious parallels with his 
understanding of the sacraments and ecclesiology. Just as the way of eminence is covertly 
124 Ibid., 108.
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the inspiration for the way of affirmation, the eschaton enters into the present. In a text 
quoted above de Lubac explains:
After all, the eschatological is not something simply absent from the present, any more than 
what is transcendent is exterior to everyday reality; on the contrary, it is the foundation of the 
present  and  the  term of  its  movement—it  is  the  marrow of  the  present,  as  it  were,  and 
exercises over it a hidden power.125
De Lubac's understanding of eschatology expressed here applies as readily to his 
understanding of the church's temporal movement toward the kingdom as it does to the 
movement of the mind through creation to God.
3. Emerging Themes: Sacrament and Kenosis
Two complementary themes emerge in de Lubac's account of religious 
knowledge, themes which reflect his understanding of sacramentality and eschatology but 
are not overtly developed. First, created realities can truly signify the divine, and are the 
requisite medium of our minds to reach God. Second, the dialectic of religious 
knowledge reflects a Christic pattern of life, death, and resurrection, in which 
transcendence requires a death to self. 
The first theme reflects a positive outlook on the ability of created realities to 
possess a transcendent referent. Hans Boersma, reflecting on nature and grace in the 
nouvelle théologie, states that “de Lubac and [Henri] Bouillard thus left a lasting legacy 
by rediscovering that the contingencies of human existence were sacramental mysteries 
meant to draw the created order into deifying union with their origin and end, the triune 
God.”126 
125 De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 117.
126  Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, 115.
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In de Lubac's religious epistemology, our conceptual formulations can signify 
God, but only in the acknowledgment of their contingency and insufficiency. He submits 
that “our concepts really have the power to signify God—and yet, strictly speaking, we 
cannot grasp God in any one of them; or rather, it is in that very way that they really do 
signify Him.”127 From de Lubac's perspective, if mysticism is seeing through signs, it is a 
seeing of their radical contingency in reference to and in anticipation of the fullness to 
come: “Every creature reveals him [God] by virtue of the being it borrows from him, 
crying out that it is not he. Such is the mystery which, in spite of its obscurity, is always a 
light; the emptiness which it demands of us is the form of his Fullness.”128 The human 
knower, recognizing the insufficiency of the sign, moves beyond it in an “anagogical” 
anticipation. The movement of our mind through created signs to God, however, follows 
upon the movement of God toward us. The signified acts within the sign, acts through the 
sign. If de Lubac affirms that human concepts and worldly realities authentically signify 
God, it is because of God's descent through the world to my mind, in a form of cosmic 
revelation.129
Second, in de Lubac's religious epistemology, negation is presented as kenosis. 
127  De Lubac, The Discovery of God, 130.
128  Ibid., 92.
129 “'O Thou who appearest through every form and structure without adhering to them or being 
confounded with them!' From this it follows, in the first place, that the knowledge of God which comes 
through the external world is itself, in a sense, a revelation: The greatness of God and the beauty of 
creatures make us, by analogy, contemplate their Author (Wis. 13:5). It is an objective revelation just as 
natural reason is in itself, as we have seen, a subjective revelation. There is a double and unique natural 
revelation, a gift of the sign and of the capacity to interpret it, a gift of the book and the capacity to read 
it. For it is not my mind which first rises from the world to God: it is God who first descends, in some 
sort, through the world to my mind. The proof [of God] is my construction, but the sign which precedes 
it and already contains it, which allows it, provokes it, sets it in motion, and always overflows it, is 
given me by another. In all truth, God makes me a sign.” Ibid., 89–90.
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Characteristic of de Lubac's work is the lack of partitioning between theological topics, as 
well as a lack of partitioning between topics often treated only under the discipline of 
“theology” and those only treated by “philosophy.” Within de Lubac's religious 
epistemology—which until recently would be characterized as philosophy—mystical and 
Christological themes emerge.
As noted above, de Lubac speaks of construction and negation as a “double 
dialectic” in the ascent of the mind to God. Two kinds of mysticisms or spiritualities 
correspond to the dialectic: “The way of signs and the way without signs. Like the two 
dialectics, these two spiritual ways are, moreover, less separate than united; but is is 
sometimes one and sometimes the other which dominates.”130 The objective affirmation 
of God, the ascent to God through created signs, requires its own purification in the 
negative phase. The negative phase does not merely negate the affirmation: it functions as 
a spiritual way to God, a form of spiritual detachment.
Because man cannot receive anything into his mind without collaborating with his own 
thought: even the object of revelation must, after all, be conceived. In the same way the 
mystic  needs  the  intellectual  because  detachment  from  defined  forms—videntur  ut  
paleae—presupposes the work which constructs those forms, and the judgment which 
acknowledges their value. So the conflict cannot end in the victory of either side. It must 
be transformed into harmony. It  must become a rhythm—and mirror the rhythm first 
sounded by the incarnation, death and resurrection of the Savior.131 
Religious knowledge emerges in The Discovery of God as a mirror of the revelation of 
Christ's kenotic incarnation, death, and resurrection. 
In de Lubac's account of mysticism, the willingness to cede before the mystery 
characterizes the authentic form that non-Christian mysticisms take. Authentic non-
130 Ibid., 156 note 29.
131 Ibid., 98.
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Christian mysticisms are characterized by their willingness to cede before the mystery of 
Christ. Christian mysticism, already in “possession” of the mystery through baptism and 
the Spirit, is characterized by an attitude of hope for the second coming. On the other 
hand, an inauthentic expression of mysticism either devolves into myth by worshiping its 
own constructions (a corruption of the via affirmationis) or by refusing any object by 
making oneself the object (a corruption of the via negationis). 
For de Lubac, the willingness to cede before the mystery constitutes an essential 
aspect of religious knowledge and mysticism. In concert with the theme of kenosis, 
negative theology is characterized by letting go of the very constructions which allow one 
to raise one's mind to God. By giving oneself up to the mystery, we enter the light 
through the darkness.
A telling account of de Lubac's own experience was preserved in his personal 
notes, copied by Edouard Duperray, and included in the appendix of Michel Sales, L'Etre  
humain et la conaissance naturelle qu'il a de Dieu:
Then the only thing that remains is a great emptiness. A single word names it, mystery.  
But in this gulf an invincible strength, a strange austere softness pushes me. And the 
deeper it gets, quenching all clarity, in a leap of faith I throw myself into the Mystery, 
guessing its true name, Love. Mystery! Mystery!…Everything is darkness. But I believe 
in Love. Outside of this, which is not knowledge [science], I know nothing.
Thirst to escape these stifling vanities, of these vanities that  are believed so serious.  
Thirst  to  break  this  system  of  representations;  these  learned  formulas;  and  these 
complicated doctrinal scaffoldings, a thirst for fresh air.
In a gesture of refusal, I reject all these concepts—not that I don't know in time, their  
role and their value—because they constantly abuse, they clutter the mind, they arrogate 
to themselves the whole place, they mask the Being to whom they should initiate me. 
One must from time to time empty out one's house.
However, when all the ideas are placed outside, there still remains in the centre of my 
255
spirit as of my heart, a great living image. There is no risk of it disappearing because the 
hollow that I make in myself opens up a place for it. In it, in the death of everything that 
appears to be wisdom or knowledge, I have all knowledge and wisdom. I embrace it in  
my anguish, and the night makes it more luminous. This great living image is the Cross 
of Jesus.132
In these personal notes, the author dramatically expresses the negation of all human 
representation in the attempt to transcend them. This movement requires a leap into the 
darkness of unknowing. At the point of darkness and the abandonment of security, there 
remains the belief in love and the “great living image,” the “Cross of Jesus.” Through this 
death, he has “all knowledge and wisdom.”133
The recovery of anagogy is omnipresent in de Lubac's account of religious 
knowledge and mysticism. However, it never receives a systematic presentation. The 
affirmation of God that is pre-conceptual and ontological is the anagogical drive of the 
human spirit, which moves us to transcend the signs in search of their ultimate meaning. 
This same drive requires the mystic to move beyond those constructions while 
simultaneously moving through them. For de Lubac, negative theology is not a mere 
intellectual negation, but a spiritual disposition of emptying oneself to await God's 
advent. The search for God itself enables a foretaste of what is to come: “To await God is 
to possess him.”134
132 “Une note personelle” in Michel Sales, L’Être humain et la connaissance naturelle qu’il a de Dieu: 
Essai sur la structure anthropo-théologique fondamentale de la Révélation chrétienne dans la pensée 
du P. Henri de Lubac (Paris: Parole et silence, 2003), 132–3; I employ the translation of “Une note 
personelle” in Noel O’Sullivan, Christ and Creation: Christology as the Key to Interpreting the 
Theology of Creation in the Works of Henri de Lubac, Religions and Discourse 40 (Oxford / New York: 
Peter Lang, 2009).
133 The note echoes de Lubac's religious epistemology: “Beyond all conventions—in the rejection of all 
untruth—at the cost of security—behind all negations—when everything fails—in the abandonment of 
everything: The discovery of God.” De Lubac, The Discovery of God, 169.
134 Ibid., 172.
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B. A Mysticism of Likeness: Conformity to the Figure of Christ
Among many Catholic authors in the twentieth century, de Lubac attempted to 
reconcile an appreciation for the diversity of religions with the exclusive claims of 
Christian doctrine. He distinguished a “natural mysticism,” a natural openness of 
humanity to God, from “Christian mysticism,” that is, conformity to the mystery of 
Christ. De Lubac's account of mysticism is eschatological in the sense that he envisions 
mysticism as a proleptic anticipation of the mystery to come or, alternatively, it results 
from the eschatological “mystery” entering into the present. 
1. La mystique et le mystère
Two related essays—“Mystique naturelle et mystique chrétienne” and “Mysticism 
and Mystery”—contain de Lubac's reflection on the relationship between natural or non-
Christian mysticism and Christianity. De Lubac rejected two opposing accounts of 
mysticism, the first of which posits mysticism as the one truth of all religious systems and 
the second which rejects mysticism as idolatry.135 
The “Catholic position,” as he presents it, maintains that mysticism is a universal 
135 The first, he calls “universalist”: “there is a universal mysticism, which is the same depth, the same 
truth, the one truth of all spiritual systems, religious or non religious, which can be found in humanity.” 
Henri de Lubac, “Mystique naturelle et mystique chrétienne,” Bulletin du Cercle saint Jean-Baptiste 32 
(1964): 10. The second, finding an expression in the Protestant reformers, regards mysticism as a 
human product opposed to the true revelation of God and idolatry: “All mysticism leads to pantheism; it 
is a naturalism. Faith is received from above, and in order to be preserved as pure, it must reject 
mystical infiltrations as the supreme evil.” Ibid., 11. De Lubac rejects this extreme claim, yet affirms an 
element of truth in it: outside of Christianity, mysticism tends towards the identification of the mystic 
with God.
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impulse for humanity, while preserving the Christian claim of the centrality of Jesus 
Christ:
One can say, in sum, that everything is explained by the relationship that the Christian makes 
between  two  ideas,  the  two  words:  mysticism  [la  mystique] and  mystery  [le  mystère]. 
Everywhere human nature is the same in its very depths inasmuch as it comes from the same 
creator God. We have a precise biblical expression of this truth: man created in the image of 
God. The idea is often expressed in the Christian tradition, since the patristic era, in this  
manner: God has created man in his image in view of likeness. The image is…the very depth  
of the being; the divine likeness is to realize, under the action of the redeeming incarnation,  
by union with Christ, where one finds divine union. Mysticism is inherent to human nature,  
since man is made for this union. There is a yearning. In other words, within human nature  
there  is  a  certain  power  of  intussusception  of  the  mystery  given  and  revealed  in  Jesus  
Christ.136
In de Lubac's account, mysticism (la mystique) describes the same capacity for God 
common to all human beings that is the result of God's universal calling of humanity. 
Mysticism is the “inherent” capacity for grace. The correlate to “mysticism” is “the 
mystery” (le mystère), Jesus Christ, who completes and elevates it.
De Lubac furthermore distinguishes between “natural mysticism” (mystique 
naturelle) and “Christian mysticism” (mystique chrétienne), both modalities of la 
mystique. Both mysticisms designate the passive capacity to receive the mystery, a 
capacity that is “empty and powerless.” De Lubac recognizes a common, “natural” root 
to Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and even atheistic forms of mysticism 
(Nietzsche). 
Mystique naturelle—this inherent capacity for God—can blossom in different 
directions. This inherent capacity, which de Lubac calls the “image of God,” “is that by 
which the Christian reality is assimilated, as well as that by which divine revelation 
becomes fecund; but alone, it is sterile. And if it wishes to hide its proper object by being 
136 De Lubac, “Mystique naturelle et mystique chrétienne,” 13.
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realized by itself alone, it will become pernicious.”137 In “naturalistic” forms, this 
capacity for God can fold in upon itself: “In its final stage of realization, natural 
mysticism, having become naturalistic, would be a 'pure mysticism.' No longer 
recognizing any object, it would almost be the mystical intuition hypostatized in a way; 
and that, it seems, would be the most profound kind of atheism.”138 The innate capacity of 
human beings for God can turn upon itself as its own object, thereby refusing its true 
object. “Christian mysticism” is the process of recognizing and “interiorizing” the 
transcendent object, the “Mystery.” 
A couple of clarifications concerning de Lubac's lexicon are essential to 
understanding his account of mysticism. First, the two poles of the Lubacian exposition—
mysticism (la mystique) and mystery (mystère)—are interpreted in terms of the biblical 
expression “the image and likeness of God.” The image, for de Lubac, is the ontological 
openness to God that all people have because God creates them and destines them for 
himself. “Likeness” is, fundamentally, the destiny or goal of the image. In de Lubac's 
account of mysticism, “likeness” describes the conformity of the mystic (le mystique) to 
the mystery. As a result, natural mysticism is incomplete unless it attains to the likeness 
of God, which is the penetration into the divine Mystery. The image is created only to be 
137 Ibid., 13–14.
138 De Lubac, “Mysticism and Mystery,” 53. De Lubac's assessment of atheistic humanism focused on its 
religious and mystical elements, particularly its refusal to recognize transcendence in the name of 
immanence (or God in the name of humanity). See Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995); Grumett, “De Lubac, Dry Land Buddhism, and Roman 
Catholicism”; William L. Brownsberger, “The Confrontations with Modern, Western Atheism of Henri 
de Lubac, S.J., Martin Buber, and Wolfhart Pannenberg” (S.T.D. diss., Pontificia Universitas 
Gregoriana, 2001).
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united to God in likeness by taking the mystery into itself in a process of “interiorization” 
or deepening. 
Second, while de Lubac contrasts “natural” mysticism with “Christian” 
mysticism, he is not contrasting natural with supernatural. In this case, “natural” 
designates the capacity we have for God because we are created in God's image. It does 
not thereby indicate that “natural mysticism” embodied in different religions is somehow 
“un-graced.” 
Third, le mystère is concrete. All mysticism is oriented toward fulfillment in a 
transcendent goal specified by divine revelation. Drawing from St. Paul, de Lubac takes 
le mystère to be “the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure that he set forth 
in Christ, as a plan for the fullness of time, to gather up all things in him, things in heaven 
and things on earth” (Eph. 1:9-10 NRSV). The mystery is the plan of God that is revealed 
in Christ and to find its fulfillment at the “fullness of time.”139
2. Mysticism as an Expression of “Supernatural Finality”
In his writings on the supernatural, nature, and grace, de Lubac recovered the 
traditional teaching of a single, supernatural finality of human beings and the “natural 
desire for the supernatural.” In his writings on mysticism, “natural mysticism” is an 
expression of the “supernatural finality” of humanity. In other words, the innate mystical 
impulse of human beings is an epiphenomenon of their intrinsic orientation to their 
eschatological destiny.140 
139 See above, chapter 4, II, A and B.
140 These themes are treated in detail in Éric de Moulins-Beaufort, Anthropologie et mystique selon Henri 
260
First, de Lubac's characterization of la mystique approximates his characterization 
of “natural desire for the supernatural.” In “Mysticism and Mystery,” de Lubac claims 
that la mystique “is a capacity [for God] that is naturally accompanied by desire, a desire 
that must be described as ontological.”141 By “ontological” he means that desire for the 
supernatural belongs essentially to the constitution of humanity. Although la mystique is 
powerless in itself, it is truly a yearning for le mystère. As I have mentioned above, just as 
the “image” is oriented to its “likeness,”  la mystique is oriented to le mystère. His earliest 
publication, “Apologetics and Theology,” expressed this idea by affirming that the image 
of God imprinted on all human beings testifies naturally to God's presence and spurs the 
human being to discover the likeness that can complete it.142
In a parallel manner, de Lubac's writings on the supernatural claim that “the 
natural desire for the supernatural,” though powerless, is an expression of the inner 
orientation of the human being toward God. De Lubac expressly rejected the neo-
Scholastic interpretation of Cajetan's axiom “Natural desire does not exceed the power of 
nature” (naturale desiderium non excedit vim naturae). Exploiting a controversial axiom 
of Thomas Aquinas—“Every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance” 
de Lubac: « L’esprit de l’homme » ou la présence de Dieu en l’homme, Études lubaciennes 3 (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 2003); Jean-Pierre Wagner, La théologie fondamentale selon Henri de Lubac (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 1997).
141 De Lubac, “Mysticism and Mystery,” 52. 
142 “What is more legitimate than basing understanding on the divine image that every man has within him 
and that gropingly searches for the only religion capable of uniting it with its model?  Do we not have 
the right to trust in this 'testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae' [the witness of the naturally 
Christian soul] that far from testifying in favor of some sort of 'natural religion' where the soul can find 
its rest, instead stimulates it in its quest until it finds the unique way to salvation?” Henri de Lubac, 
“Apologetics and Theology,” in Theological Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 100. 
Originally published as Henri de Lubac, “Apologétique et théologie,” Nouvelle Revue théologique 57 
(1930): 361–378.
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(Summa Contra Gentiles 3.57.4)—de Lubac argued that human beings, powerless to 
attain supernatural life, nonetheless desire the supernatural as their only end. The 
knowledge given to us through revelation that we are called to a supernatural end (the 
beatific vision) enables us to “recognize within ourselves the existence and nature of that 
desire (for that supernatural end).”143 The scriptural knowledge of the supernatural 
destiny of human beings is evidence of the “natural desire for the supernatural.” 
Second, de Lubac makes a much stronger claim: the desire for the supernatural is 
constituted by God's calling or our supernatural finality. This desire for the beatific vision 
is the ontological consequence of God's intention for humanity:
For  this  desire  is  not  some “accident”  in  me.  It  does  not  result  from some peculiarity,  
possibly alterable, of my individual being, or from some historical contingency whose effects 
are more or less transitory. A fortiori it does not in any sense depend upon my deliberate will. 
It is in me as a result of my belonging to humanity as it is, that humanity which is, as we say,  
“called.” For God's call  is  constitutive.  My finality,  which is expressed by this desire,  is 
inscribed upon my very being as it has been put into this universe by God. And, by God's 
will, I now have no other genuine end, no end really assigned to my nature or presented for  
my free acceptance under any guise, except that of “seeing God.”144
The “desire for the supernatural” is a consequence of the inner orientation of humanity as 
a whole by God to supernatural life. God's call, that is God's ultimate intention, 
“constitutes” the finality of humanity. In this light, the mystical impulse should be 
similarly understood as a consequence of the supernatural finality of human beings. It is 
the consequence of the impact that the final eschatological reality, as the essential goal of 
our entire being, has upon our present existential condition, characterized by 
incompleteness and yearning.
143 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: The Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 1998), 209.
144 Ibid., 54–5.
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De Lubac's work is marked by a number of parallel terms: image and likeness, la 
mystique and le mystère, natural desire and supernatural, nature and grace. While they do 
not always possess a perfectly analogous meaning, these pairs are tied to de Lubac's 
eschatology. In de Lubac's imagination, the movement to the supernatural life takes place 
an historical plane, as a movement through history toward an eschatological 
consummation. The Mystery of the Supernatural states that to pass from the natural to the 
supernatural is to “pass from the 'dignity of the image' received at the 'first creation' to the 
'perfection of the likeness' which is 'reserved for the consummation of all things.'”145
3. An Origenian Tension: Mysticism as Possession and Anticipation
The mystical impulse—alternatively called the natural desire for the supernatural
— belongs to human beings by reason of their supernatural finality. Mysticism exists 
within the tension between an anticipation of the mystery as a future reality and a present 
possession by the mystery. De Lubac indicates that this tension exists for forms of non-
Christian and Christian mysticism.
Speaking of the salvation of non-Christians, de Lubac affirmed that all of 
humanity is saved only through conformity to the mystery of Christ, what he calls 
“likeness.” The desire of the “image of God” is insufficient in itself for salvation; the 
“image” must be conformed to the likeness of God. However, de Lubac recognizes that 
the search itself is already an anticipatory possession by the mystery:
The only condition  on which  his  [the  non-Christian]  salvation  is  possible  is  that  he 
should already be a Catholic as it were by anticipation, since the church is the “natural  
145 Ibid., 31.
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place” to which a soul amenable to the suggestions of grace spontaneously tends. The 
“less” is then sufficient …not in itself, of its own worth, but insofar as it aspires to the  
“more,” insofar as it  is ready to be lost in this “more” directly the exterior obstacles 
which hide the “more” from it are removed.146
De Lubac thinks of salvation as an incorporation into the body of Christ and a conformity 
to the person of Christ. For the individual, salvation comes through a recptiveness to the 
mystery revealed in Christ and completed at the end of time. The non-Christian aspiring 
to a mystery and open to this mystery has, already, an inchoate possession of the mystery.
In effect, the readiness of the “image” to be “lost in the more” is already the intimation of 
“likeness,” a conformity to the mystery. In sum, the mysticism of non-Christians is 
characterized by de Lubac as anticipating a future mystery as well as being possessed by 
the mystery in the present.
A similar tension exists in de Lubac's elaboration on Christian mysticism, for 
which his sources are the Pauline and Johannine texts. Christian mysticism is, for Paul, a 
present union of the believer with Christ, which does not have a “purely eschatological 
significance.”147 In Paul, the believer is presently united with Christ through baptism and 
in the Spirit, and this union is oriented to a future fulfillment. Paul himself, de Lubac 
claims, has been interpreted as a master of mystical understanding in two ways: 
146 De Lubac, Catholicism, 236–7.
147 De Lubac, “Mysticism and Mystery,” 50–1.
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A symbol, and a material expression as well, of this opposition [between two forms of  
Christian mysticism] can be found in the two different ways of referring to St. Paul as a  
great  master  of  understanding.  Some  people,  who  consider  the  entire  process  of 
mysticism,  say  that  St.  Paul  is  the  master  because—on  the  road  to  Damascus, 
overwhelmed  by  Christ—he  understood  completely,  in  a  sudden  illumination,  the 
meaning of the Scriptures by seeing that they led to Christ and found their fulfillment in  
him. Thus, they are the basis for everything. For others, St. Paul is the master because 
one  day  he  was  raised  up  to  the  third  heaven  and  there,  in  a  unique  intuition,  he 
contemplated  the  mystery  of  God—inexpressible,  incomprehensible—in  which 
everything is summed up and unified.
Pauline mysticism envisions the entire history of salvation as coming to fulfillment in 
Christ at the end of time and is also the present contemplation of God's impenetrable 
mystery. 
Similarly, the Johannine teaching combines present mystical union with 
eschatological hope:
According to John, the Christian has received divine life; he is reborn from water and the 
Spirit. Кαί νΰν [and now]: these two little words, it can be said, explain the complete  
doctrine of the fourth Gospel. They echo through it like a refrain, attesting that mystical 
unity  is  not  only  something  to  come  but  that  it  has  already  been  mysteriously 
consummated. The life that John announces is, of course, a gift that will be fully realized 
only on the last day.148
In both the Pauline and Johannine forms, the mystical initiation into salvation is balanced 
by an expectation of its future consummation. 
De Lubac expressly appealed to Hans Urs von Balthasar's Prayer to elaborate an 
understanding of Christian mysticism.149 According to Balthasar, Christian mysticism is 
the contemplation of the deeds accomplished by Christ in history and, as such, has a 
“backward gaze.” However, these deeds remain cloaked in mystery. Their ultimate 
unveiling to us occurs only at the parousia, the second coming.150 Balthasar warned 
148 Ibid., 50–1.
149 Ibid., 63, note 94.
150 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prayer (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 145. 
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against “subsuming the eschatological element [of Christianity] into mere mysticism.” 
This would be to “reduce what is historical in Christianity simply to the general, pre-
historical relationship of God and man, of transitory time and the hidden eternity above 
and within it.”151 Instead, Christian contemplation looks back to the events of salvation 
awaiting their ultimate apokalypsis, their unveiling of the hidden, but present mystery. 
For de Lubac as for Balthasar,  contemplation synthesizes gazing backward at the events 
of salvation and the future expectation of the ultimate unveiling of the mystery at the 
parousia, a mystery that is proleptically present to present contemplation.
 Christian mysticism, in sum, follows a pattern captured by Origen's anagogia.152 
Anagogy describes a unity of the mystical ascent to God with that which is the object of 
the ascent. According to the pattern of the fourfold sense, anagogy follows upon history, 
allegory, and tropology. In fact, as it is the perfect synthesis of the allegorical meaning 
and the tropological meaning, anagogy designates the “fusion of the mystery and the 
mystic.”153 
Anagogy is a contemplation of the heavenly realities that looks forward to a future 
consummation; it is a present union with Christ that anticipates a future fulfillment. De 
151 Ibid., 145–6. Balthasar states that for Christianity, the “backward gaze on Jesus is one with the prospect 
of his expected, future parousia in glory. The Day of the Lord which began with the arrival of the 
Messiah will come to its fulfillment. So it is only insofar as the Old and New Covenants meet in Christ, 
their center, and show their inner unity and penetration in him, that their respective eschatological 
horizons can also converge on him.” Ibid., 146–7.
152 Christian mysticism is that [mystical understanding of Scripture] pushed to its most fruitful phase by 
its four traditional dimensions—history, “allegory” or doctrine, ethics or “tropology” and anagogy—
each of which is absorbed by the following one…It is by submitting to the historical-doctrinal facts and 
assimilating them that the necessary foundation for union can be found. The anagogical sense by which 
the spirit raises itself to God in a unique intuition has the richness of the three preceding dimensions 
concentrated within itself. de Lubac, “Mysticism and Mystery,” 58.
153 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 2:184.
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Lubac explains: “By the very fact that it is a mysticism of likeness, Christian mysticism is 
directed toward a goal, toward God who calls to us and beckons us to meet him at the end 
of the road. It presupposes a process that can never be finished, and it contains an element 
of eschatological hope.”154 
VI.  Conclusion
I have argued that, for de Lubac, Christian eschatology must reintegrate the 
invisibilia with the futura, bringing together what was increasingly separated beginning 
in the twelfth century. The Dionysian and Joachimite traditions were not so much 
opposed theological traditions as mirror opposites. Both contributed to an increasing 
separation between the ascent to the transcendent and the hope for the future. De Lubac 
read this twelfth-century separation in light of what I have described as the separation of 
“realized” and “future” eschatologies in the twentieth century. The result was diminution 
of the sacramental dimensions of the historical economy of salvation, that is, the efficacy 
of historical events for salvation.
De Lubac's formulation of “sacramentality” responded to what he saw as the 
separation of the future and the transcendent. In effect, the sacramental sign is an 
anticipation of the eschaton but also a making-present of its reality. The inner “intention” 
or finality of the sign overflows its bare materiality, allowing it to participate in the higher 
order of the signified. It points forward to its eschatological end. At the same time, the 
signified exercises a hidden power over the sign. The sacrament possesses the quality of 
154 De Lubac, “Mysticism and Mystery,” 57.
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signifying and bringing about because the eschatological enters into it, exercising a 
power over it. In de Lubac's account of the particular sacraments, he emphasizes that the 
sacraments are loci of the eschatological entering into history and propelling us on to 
eternity.
De Lubac's general account of sacramentality underlies his narration of Christ as 
the sacrament of salvation and his ecclesiology. His Christology places Christ at the 
center of history, much as Oscar Cullmann did. Christ inaugurates the eschatological era 
and initiates the beginning of the end. It might be better to state that the historical actions 
of Christ are the manifestation of and means to the eschaton. The result is an account of 
revelation that weaves a passage between exaggerated realized eschatologies like that of 
Rudolf Bultmann and future eschatologies like that of Jürgen Moltmann. His account of 
Christ as sacrament of salvation attempts to retain the orientation toward the future in 
Moltmann by presenting Christ as the means to a future realization. De Lubac avoids the 
pitfalls of the Joachimite posterity by situating that future realization in Christ.
Similarly, de Lubac's ecclesiology reflects the insight, present in Catholicism, that 
Christianity unites transcendence with historical development. The church militant is the 
historical communion that anticipates the eschatological communion. Even though it is 
terrestrial and sinful, as the “sacrament of Christ,” the church makes the eschaton present 
within time. The Christian has  access to salvation now and patiently awaits its 
consummation in the totus Christus, the union of all humanity in Christ. Although he 
supported the recovery of the ecclesial image of the “people of God” in Vatican II's 
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Lumen Gentium, he felt that it inadequately expressed the unity of the terrestrial and the 
heavenly dimensions of the church. His sacramental ecclesiology allowed him to affirm 
both the terrestrial and the heavenly without thereby conflating the two. As a result, his 
ecclesiology sharply contrasts with the institutional ecclesiologies of a previous era. 
In dialogue with post-Vatican II theologies of history, de Lubac opposed what he 
believed was an identification between temporal progress and the kingdom of God. His 
opposition to Joachimite thought influenced his position in A Brief Catechesis on Nature 
and Grace that just as the natural is not a seed of the eternal, temporal progress cannot in 
any sense “anticipate” the coming kingdom. His position is consistent with his refusal to 
collaborate with political regimes or to allow theology to underwrite political ideologies. 
However, I have argued that de Lubac's position on this point is not entirely consistent 
with his understanding of the sacramentality of the temporal order, especially when we 
are speaking of ecclesial practices of charity in the world. If the temporal ecclesial 
communion is indeed an anticipation of the eschatological body of Christ, the actions of 
the church in the world might be considered in a sacramental perspective. 
De Lubac's The Discovery of God elaborates the implications of his mystical 
theology for a religious epistemology. As the image of God, the human spirit constitutes a 
primordial affirmation of God coextensive with that spirit. This affirmation is the 
substratum to all objective acts of volition and intellection. Drawing from Joseph 
Maréchal, de Lubac conceived this affirmation as a consequence of the finality of the 
intellect for an infinite object. The finality of the intellect drives its search for what will 
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fulfill it, not letting it rest until it reaches the true transcendent. De Lubac freely 
associated this natural desire for the supernatural with the anagogia of the Fathers, which 
is the unending movement through present historical signs to their transcendent 
eschatological signified. In The Discovery of God, he described anagogia as an 
“anticipatory” and “proleptic” knowledge. In effect, his religious epistemology reflects 
the notion that we are situated in the time between the first and second comings. This is 
the time of the ending, the time of waiting, the Interim. In the present state, our 
knowledge of God is obscure and attained only through signs.  
It is clear that while mysticism is an omnipresent theme in de Lubac's writings, it 
is not systematically integrated with his other theological topics. It does, however, 
consistently play on eschatological themes. Whereas his Christology and ecclesiology 
focus on the objective dimension of eschatology, his mysticism maintains a subjective 
focus, that is, on the experience of the mystic. In “Mystique naturelle et mystique 
chrétienne” and “Mysticism and Mystery,” de Lubac characterizes mysticism as the 
passive power to receive the Mystery. The relationship between the mystic and the 
Mystery is analogous to the relationship between the image and its likeness. There are 
traces of an emerging subjective eschatology insofar as he draws upon the idea of finality 
to characterize the “likeness.” Likeness to God is the eschatological term of the image. 
Thus, likeness exercises a proleptic influence upon our humanity, causing it to search for 
that which could complete it. The mystic—in reality, any human being—possesses an 
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orientation to his or her transcendent goal, which is his or her completion within the body 
of Christ, which is the Mystery.
Arguably, the pivotal but underdeveloped aspect of de Lubac's mystical theology 
is on the kenotic dimensions of the passage of the soul to God. These dimensions appear 
in his “La Révélation divine,” where he construes the historical and visible revelation of 
the Word as itself kenotic. The Word's kenotic revelation and presence in the church 
inspires the kenotic return of humanity to God. Again, in his account of mysticism, the 
attitude of openness to the mystery and of willingness to give up oneself is requisite for 
Christian and non-Christian mysticisms. Because “negative theology” is inscribed within 
kenosis, knowledge of God requires the mystical abandonment of knowledge. De Lubac 
does not expressly bring together his writings on kenosis in revelation, in mysticism, or in 
religious epistemology. Kenosis does, however, resonate with de Lubac's understanding 
of mysticism in general. The anagogical ascent of the mind to God is not merely the 
contemplation of an ahistorical transcendence, but an entrance into the mystery of 
salvation enacted in Christ. It is a personal participation in the mystery of salvation 
through the personal and ecclesial interiorization of the historical mystery, which itself is 
a kenosis unto eschatological life. This anagogical ascent is never complete. In the 
present state, our contemplative ascent remains suspended in the hope for the parousia.
271
CONCLUSION
This study has intended to elaborate the theology of history and eschatology 
underlying Henri de Lubac's contributions in a range of theological topics, including 
sacramental theology, the theology of revelation, Christology, the history of biblical 
exegesis, and mysticism. While de Lubac's work does not admit a metaphysical or 
epistemological foundation in a strict sense, there is an “organic unity” amidst the 
diversity of themes. I have argued that de Lubac's understanding of history and its end 
comprises a significant component of this unity. 
I. De Lubac's Eschatological Vision
In the first chapter, I argued that the prominence of eschatological themes within 
de Lubac's writings issued from a cultural and religious context in which the relationship 
between time and eternity was increasingly a problem. A defining characteristic of late 
nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century “Modernist” culture was the 
preoccupation with temporality and eternity. The consciousness of European moderns 
registered a rupture between the past and the future, envisioning the present as the 
beginning of the end. This rupture featured prominently in the Futurist and Decadent 
Movements around the turn of the century. 
The struggles with temporality in European modernity acutely affected Roman 
Catholicism. Many Catholics saw the problematic relationship between time and eternity 
as the consequence of the faithlessness of modern culture and life. Beginning in the 
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nineteenth century, Roman Catholic culture defined itself against a modern European 
culture, philosophy, and politics, and the Catholic Church saw itself as the bulwark 
against the loss of eternity altogether in modern life. The neo-Scholastic movement 
erupted as an intellectual response to modernity and as an attempt at recovering a 
medieval era in which faith and reason, church and state, and time and eternity were 
united. The deepest concern of the neo-Scholastics was the same as that of the cultural 
modernists: to secure the eternal in the midst of flux. The various attacks on church 
authority and property were conducive to an apocalyptic view of modernity within 
Catholicism. While apocalypticism was a prominent Catholic interpretation of the present 
day, this apocalypticism was at odds with a traditional Scholasticism. 
In the World War II-era debate over the theology of history, the understanding of 
history was subjected to theological critique. Henri-Marie Féret launched this debate by 
seeking a theological understanding of history in the Book of Revelation. He originally 
concluded that the Book of Revelation forecasts a coming era in which the structures and 
institutions of human existence conform to the Gospel. Joseph Huby and Gaston Fessard 
both saw Féret as the advocate of a new millenarianism. Féret responded, stating that 
Christians must take seriously the temporal character of biblical prophesy even if the 
precise object of prophecy is unclear. Fessard argued that biblical prophesy signifies, not 
the specific event, but a dialectic of history significant to every generation. Jean Daniélou 
turned to a developmental view of the historical actions of God in history for the source 
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of an interpretation of the historical present. I argued that de Lubac sought a synthesis for 
these divergent understandings of history within the nouvelle théologie. 
My second chapter argues that de Lubac sought his synthesis under the inspiration 
of Origen of Alexandria. While many scholars dismissed Origen as an ahistorical 
Platonist, de Lubac argued that Origen was the source for a Christian theology of history 
influential for a millennium. The spiritual sense of scripture—the supposed proof of 
Origen's Hellenism—was more indebted to the Bible than to Philo. The fourfold and 
threefold senses of scripture sought to uncover the depth-dimension of history within a 
progressive and unified history of salvation. For Origen, historical revelation symbolizes 
and prepares for that which will fulfill it. The Old Testament takes its fuller meaning from 
the New Testament; the New Testament will only be fulfilled at the eschaton.
Origen offered a critique and response to his Hellenistic milieu. In Hellenistic 
allegory, the mythic account was merely the occasion for a moral or philosophical 
meaning. In Christian allegory, an Old Testament event is interiorly related to a later 
event in history. The Old Testament event is significant in itself as God's salvific 
intervention into history. However, this intervention is related to the fulfillment of God's 
entire plan of salvation. The Old Testament prepares for and symbolizes its realization in 
Jesus Christ. 
De Lubac brings out a paradox in Origen's exegesis of the relationship between 
the Old and New Testaments, between figure and truth. On the one hand, the figures of 
the Old symbolize the truth of the New and are oriented toward their own realization in 
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the truth. On the other hand, Christ brings total “newness” and transcendence in relation 
to the Old. How is it possible that the Old Testament prefigures the New without already 
possessing the knowledge or reality of what is to come? How is the Old Testament figure 
oriented to something that utterly transcends it? De Lubac explains that Christ objectively 
reorients the prefigurations of him. His entrance into history transforms the entire 
“spiritual horizon,” so that he makes those figures signs of himself. 
De Lubac's interpretation of the relationship between the figures of the Old 
Testament and the truth of the New echoes his understanding of human finality. While not 
already in possession of supernatural life, humanity nevertheless desires it as its only end. 
This desire is possible because God's intention for humanity objectively orients human 
existence. Furthermore, the paradox of Christ and his historical prefigurations is the 
model for the relationships between sacrament and mystery, type (tupos) and truth 
(aletheia), sign and signified, and mysticism and mystery.
My third chapter treated de Lubac's recovery of Origen's anagogia. De Lubac 
clearly drew from Origen in order to offer an alternative to the eschatological legacy of 
the twelfth century, the dissociation of the futura and the invisibilia. De Lubac saw in the 
twelfth century the beginnings of the gradual dissociation of mysticism and dogmatic 
eschatology, on the one hand, and eschatology and apocalypticism on the other. The 
influence of Pseudo-Dionysius during the Middle Ages led to an understanding of 
anagogy as the individual contemplation of the invisible through the visible. For de 
Lubac, this was a stage in a separation of individual and subjective mysticism from the 
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Christian teachings about the consummation of human history. In the twelfth century, the 
radical teaching of Joachim of Fiore transformed anagogy into an apocalyptic expectation 
of a radical upheaval within history. These two traditions—the Dionysian and Joachimite
—constituted the source of two opposed eschatological trajectories in modernity.
Origen provided de Lubac with an understanding of anagogy that synthesized and 
united the Dionysian and Joachimite eschatology. First, Origen's anagogia unites 
objective and subjective elements that could be called dogmatic eschatology and 
mysticism. The object of the “spiritual understanding” is the Christian mystery. In order 
to know the Christian mystery, one must be united to it and transformed into it. The 
objective content of this mystery is the same as the subjective union with it. The 
apocatastasis is, according to de Lubac, the conversion of the whole church to Christ in 
charity, both a transformative conversion and an ecclesial-cosmic consummation. Second, 
anagogia unites the futura and the invisibilia. The Origenian tripartite division “shadow / 
image / truth” is fundamentally the same as the division “Old Testament / New Testament 
/ Eternal Gospel.” The New Testament is definitively oriented toward the “Eternal 
Gospel” as its symbolic prefiguration. It is oriented to a fulfillment that is yet to come. 
However, the Eternal Gospel shares the identity of the New Testament Gospel; it is 
simply the future state of the present Gospel. Origen retains an eschatology in which 
salvation is available in the present yet simultaneously something to be awaited. He 
retains a tension inherent in Christian thinking that we live in the “interim,” a time of 
276
signs, during which we must await the final unveiling of the truth already present to us 
through signs pointing to it as a transcendent eschatological future.
My fourth chapter provides a synthetic examination of de Lubac's eschatology in 
his understanding of sacramentality, his theology of revelation and Christology, his 
ecclesiology, and his understanding of mysticism. I have examined these diverse 
theological fields under the lens of de Lubac's reintegration of the invisibilia with the 
futura. In de Lubac's account of sacramentality, the sacramental sign points toward and 
makes present the eschaton. The inner “intention” of the sign overflows its bare 
materiality, making it point forward in anticipation of its eschatological end. The 
sacrament possesses the quality of signifying and bringing about because the 
eschatological enters into it, exercising a hidden power over it. In Corpus Mysticum, de 
Lubac recovers a Eucharistic ecclesiology in which the sacrament symbolizes and brings 
about the true Body of Christ, made complete only at the end of time. 
De Lubac's account of Christ as the sacrament of salvation represents the 
historical actions of Jesus as the manifestation of, and the means to, the eschatological 
kingdom. The kenotic actions of Christ in the incarnation and passion both make God's 
salvation visible and conduce humanity to that salvation. In a sense, the lines are blurry 
between his Christology and his ecclesiology. This is not because, as John Webster 
supposes, the lines are blurry between nature and grace. Instead, it is because the church 
is the “sacrament of Christ.” Even though the church is terrestrial and sinful, it makes the 
eschaton present in and through time, and the church points forward to its fulfillment in 
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the totus Christus. De Lubac's sacramental ecclesiology allows him to affirm that the 
church is terrestrial and heavenly without conflating the two. 
Lastly, de Lubac's theology of mysticism and his religious epistemology draw on 
eschatological themes. He associates both intellect's tendency toward the transcendent 
and the natural desire for the supernatural with the anagogia of the Fathers. While not yet 
possession, this tendency constitutes a “proleptic” knowledge of the end. Similarly, the 
relationship between mysticism—the passive power to receive the mystery—and the 
mystery parallels the relationship between between “image” and “likeness.” The likeness 
is, for de Lubac, the final goal of humanity, completion within the Body of Christ. By 
reason of being made as “image,” we have a mystical yearning that is an anticipation of 
the eschatological communion and an inchoate possession.
Although de Lubac never developed a systematic eschatology, an eschatological 
vision permeating his work is disclosed throughout his various theological interventions. 
This eschatological vision takes shape in analogous binary structures: sacrament and 
mystery, type (tupos) and truth (aletheia), sign and signified, and mysticism and mystery. 
The former is the immanent historical reality that constitutes the manifestation of, and 
means to, the latter transcendent and eschatological. The latter is the term or final goal of 
the former. The binary structures support a sacramental pattern of thinking, or, as Hans 
Boersma describes it, a “sacramental ontology.” These binaries are not univocal in de 
Lubac's writings. Instead, they find various applications in various fields of inquiry. 
As I have argued, the dual structures in de Lubac's work must be read in terms of 
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the duality between history and its eschatological fulfillment. In Catholicism, his first 
book, de Lubac was concerned to chart a path between two extremes: first, a Hellenistic 
worldview in which history was an eternally recurring nightmare from which the soul 
must escape; and, second, an historical immanentist worldview in which there is nothing 
more than history. The Christian view of the world preserved both the need for 
transcendence and the belief that events really matter. De Lubac elaborated Catholicism's 
proposal for a recovery of a patristic understanding of history in subsequent writings, 
including History and Spirit and Exégèse médiévale. The relationship between history 
and its eschatological fulfillment constitutes a significant theme in these works. 
Moreover, the relationship between history and eschatology is the framework through 
which de Lubac understands sacramentality, revelation, Christ, ecclesiology, and 
mysticism. 
II. Significance and Implications
There are several ways in which this study contributes to understanding Henri de 
Lubac's theology. First, I have shown the significance of de Lubac's reflection on history 
and eschatology for many of his significant theological writings. Although my study is far 
from exhaustive, it examines a theological theme little explored within de Lubac studies.
Second, extending the work of Susan K. Wood and Rudolf Volderholzer, I make 
the case that history and its consummation are at the center of de Lubac's theological 
vision. Particularly, by examining de Lubac's Exégèse médiévale in conjunction with 
History and Spirit and his other writings on spiritual interpretation, I was able to indicate 
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how Origen is, for de Lubac, the inspiration for his theology of history. By examining 
parts of his Posterité spirituelle, I could trace a common eschatological theme from the 
time immediately following World War II until the early 1980s. 
Third, many accounts of the nouvelle théologie focus on the commonalities 
among the thinkers generally grouped within this movement, contrasting them with the 
neo-Scholastics. On the other hand, in my account, unresolved tensions within the 
Catholic Church as a whole in the mid twentieth century took shape as a division within 
the nouvelle théologie itself concerning eschatology and the theology of history. My 
examination of the historical context of the nouvelle théologie debate suggests that a re-
imagination of the eschatological was occurring in social, literary, and cultural spheres 
long before it hit the theological journals.
III. Limitations of this Study
This study, focused on the particularities of de Lubac's theology, has several 
limitations. First, the debate over nature and grace triggered by de Lubac's Surnaturel 
concerned the meaning of human finality. Recently, de Lubac's writings on nature, grace, 
the supernatural, and human finality have been the source of significant controversy. In 
some cases, the relationship between natural and supernatural is interpreted as de Lubac's 
most foundational interest and insight. Without denying the significance of this theme in 
his work, one must simultaneously interpret de Lubac through the lens of history and 
eschatology. This study has treated de Lubac's understanding of human “finality,” which 
is an eschatological issue for de Lubac. I suggested that the binary terms “nature” and 
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“supernatural” are not strictly parallel to “history” and the “eschaton” because God's 
intervention in history makes history neither distinctly natural nor supernatural. History is 
the place of encounter of the natural with the supernatural. Similarly, the historical-
eschatological structure of de Lubac's various theological interventions cannot be easily 
reduced to the relationship between nature and the supernatural or between nature and 
grace. There is a need to respond more directly to recent challenges to de Lubac's 
understanding of nature and grace, nature and the supernatural, and human finality.
My account needs to be supplemented by a thorough exploration of the eschatological 
themes in de Lubac's Surnaturel, The Mystery of the Supernatural, Augustinianism and 
Modern Theology, and A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace. 
Second, I sought to reconstruct the pertinent historical background for de Lubac's 
theology of history. Focusing on the debate over the theology of history during the 1940s, 
I did not examine the subsequent work of the contributors to that debate. Gaston Fessard 
and Jean Daniélou produced a significant body of work pertaining to the theological 
meaning of history to which I merely alluded. A broader theological account would 
require a greater attention to Catholic eschatological contributions leading up to the 
Second World War, as well as to the various trajectories of the nouvelle théologie. 
Furthermore, the current study did not compare de Lubac's contribution to that of other 
significant contemporary theologians before or after the Second Vatican Council, such as 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Rahner, and Johann Baptist Metz. 
Third, Chapter One examined a broad eschatological revival within European 
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culture and within Catholicism in the nineteenth to twentieth century. A lacuna in its 
examination of the theology of history debate is that it focuses exclusively on texts. 
While I provided a snapshot of the situations that occasioned these texts, this study could 
benefit from an examination of the relationship of these theologies to practice. Lyon, 
Paris, and Amiens during and following the Second World War were laboratories for 
putting theologies into creative practice. L'Action catholique movements, including 
Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne (Christian Working-Class Youth) sought a new social 
Catholicism during the post-War period. Maurice Montuclard and his Jeunesse de 
l'Église movement sought a rapprochement between Christianity and communism 
following the Second World War. Les Semaines sociales de France sought to direct the 
light of faith onto the concrete social conditions of laypeople in France and around the 
world. In the post-War situation, the prêtres ouvriers sought a new form of ministry 
among the working classes in France. A more complete picture of the theology of history 
debate would examine not only the texts, but the movements, practices, and communities 
as living theories of history, society, and eschatology.
IV. Directions for Future Research
Aware of this study's limitations and its lacunae, I believe that further research 
could go in several fruitful directions. First, focused research on the “theologies of 
history” and theologies of society blossoming in the lyonnaise context during and 
following the Second World War would be a significant contribution to understanding the 
nouvelle théologie. A significant number of authors associated with the nouvelle 
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théologie or in its lineage had roots in Lyon, including de Lubac, Huby, Chaillet, Fessard, 
von Balthasar, Jean Mouroux, Henri Bourgeois, and others. The book series Théologie 
and the translation series Sources chrétiennes had their roots in Lyon. Furthermore, many 
who were in dialogue with, connected to, or who had inspired, the authors of the nouvelle  
théologie had lyonnaise connections, including Stanislaus Fumet, Pierre Frenay, 
Emmanuel Mounier, Gabriel Marcel, and Maurice Montuclard. While Lyon was not the 
whole of the nouvelle théologie, it constituted an important site of confluence of Catholic 
theologians, historians, activists, poets, and philosophers.
Second, in a related way, de Lubac and the nouvelle théologie drew from 
essayists, novelists, and poets whose work was adjunct to the theology of history debate. 
Charles Péguy, François Mauriac, Paul Claudel, Emmanuel Mounier, and Georges 
Bernanos each contributed to moving history, eschatology, and apocalypticism to the 
center of French Catholic consciousness. French Catholic literary production had a more 
immediate impact on French Catholics than did theological production. It has been said 
that the theology leading to the Second Vatican Council drew from twentieth-century 
renewals in biblical studies, liturgical studies, and patristic studies. Perhaps the Catholic 
literary scene should also have its place.1 At the very least, de Lubac's theological vision 
was inspired by the eschatological mysticism of Péguy and Claudel.
Third, Chapter Three indicated that de Lubac sought to understand the origins of 
modern eschatology. He traced a divergence between the futura and the invisibilia within 
1 Stephen Schloesser's research into French Catholicism following World War I is a significant starting 
point. See, Jazz Age Catholicism: Mystic Modernism in Postwar Paris, 1919-1933 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2005).
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anagogy to the twelfth century. His work on Joachim of Fiore was essentially an account 
of the genesis of a modern eschatological consciousness. While this work came late in his 
life, it echoed some of his early work. De Lubac was not alone in his attempt to discern 
the role of eschatology in the genesis of modernity. Hans Urs von Balthasar completed 
his dissertation, “The History of the Eschatological Problem in Modern German 
Literature” in 1928. After completing the dissertation, he joined the Jesuits, then studied 
in Lyon from 1932 to 1936. In 1937, Balthasar published Apocalypse of the German Soul, 
the book form of his dissertation. Jacob Taubes, the Jewish political philosopher, 
completed his Occidental Eschatology in 1947. Taubes is known as the opponent of Carl 
Schmitt, a Catholic jurist, political philosopher, and Nazi. Taubes was provoked into 
writing through attending the lectures of Balthasar. Occidental Eschatology was, in part, 
a Jewish response to Balthasar. The work of Balthasar, Taubes, and de Lubac reacts to the 
“messianic apocalyptic” arising during their lifetimes in the concrete form of a 
“messianic politics.” An examination of their respective genealogies of modern 
eschatology would be a significant interdisciplinary extension of this present study.
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